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Abstract 
This thesis considers the decline of idealistic ‘liberal internationalism’ within British politics 
between the Liberal election victory of 1880 and the final resignation of William Gladstone as 
Prime Minister in 1894. It argues that by this latter date British political attitudes towards 
international relations had dramatically changed. Where once policymaking was directed with 
reference to British power and the progress of peace, by the 1890s government decisions were 
driven by an assumption of British weakness and foreign strength, with sudden, unprovoked and 
unforeseen war a constant concern. In its conclusion, the thesis explains how this changed 
environment eventually forced the unrepentant optimist Gladstone out of office by his refusal to 
endorse Britain’s continuing involvement in the European arms race.   
In charting these developments the thesis identifies a trinity of themes which brought about the 
liberal internationalist collapse. These were (1) the anxieties about British vulnerability here 
termed ‘defence pessimism’; (2) the politicisation of the armed forces’ officer corps; (3) the 
manipulation of ‘public opinion’. Building on the work of military, naval, social and intellectual 
historians, the thesis deconstructs many of the foundations upon which the narrative of British 
defence and foreign policy during this period has been built. British vulnerability is shown to 
have been largely a myth, generated by ‘alarmists’ within the British armed forces themselves, 
in their quest for a larger defence budget; meanwhile assumptions about popular support for the 
‘anti-internationalist’ policy shift of the 1890s are challenged with an analysis which argues that 
public opinion was misrepresented or ignored in favour of the alarmists. Throughout, these three 
themes are contrasted with the inability of the liberal internationalists to respond to the anti-
internationalist attacks, with the conclusion that the defeat of the former ideology was reflective 
of a wider malaise within contemporary liberal thought and organisation. 
These themes are examined in detail in the two case studies which make up the bulk of the 
thesis. The first is a study of the 1882 Channel Tunnel attempt, which was cancelled after the 
War Office whipped up a media ‘scare’ over fears of French invasion. Unlike previous histories 
of the nineteenth-century Tunnel this study provides a balanced account of the pro-Tunnel case, 
framing its defeat not simply as a victory for Francophobic defence pessimism but also as a 
decisive defeat for liberal internationalism. In the first in-depth look at the state of ‘public 
opinion’, the study, challenges the established narrative of overwhelming and popular 
opposition to the Tunnel borne of British ‘insularity’, revealing substantial support especially 
among working class organisations.  
The second study looks at the genesis and passage of the 1889 Naval Defence Act, which 
formally established the Royal Navy’s ‘two-power standard’. It is commonly believed that the 
Act was the result of a popular ‘navalist’ campaign for naval increases and that it enjoyed 
widespread support both in and out of Parliament. This study completely rejects that 
assessment, and instead shows how the navalists’ success relied not on public support, but on 
pessimistic hyperbole, a misrepresentation of the strength of the Navy and a lacklustre political 
response. In a long analysis of the Bill’s parliamentary passage the thesis dramatically reverses 
our understanding of the Liberal Party’s attitude to the Act, revealing that, although 
disorganised, the Party voted repeatedly against the programme, which was framed by the 
Conservative government as an explicitly ‘anti-internationalist’ policy. This new understanding 
is then applied to Gladstone’s 1894 resignation, showing how he became a victim of the 
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Framing the Retreat of Liberal Internationalism 
 
A true Colossus, firmly poised and bold, 
The light of principles to hoist and hold 
Amidst time-serving veerings and vagaries, 
And, like the Sun-God of the Rhodian Chares, 
While a world’s wonder to the common view, 
A useful beacon too. 
 
‘The Colossus of Words’, Punch, 13 Dec. 1879, p. 270.1 
 
 
                                                          




Figure 1: ‘The Colossus of Words’. 
An image from Gladstone’s Midlothian campaign.  He holds the beacons of ‘Finance’ and ‘Foreign 
Policy’, his feet resting firmly on the safe harbour of ‘Peace’ and ‘Retrenchment’. Few images 
better conveyed the awe Gladstone inspired in his supporters and the high regard in which his 
liberal internationalism was held. Punch, 13 Dec. 1879, p. 271. 
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In the 1880 British General Election, following six years of increasingly ‘imperialist’ and 
‘jingo’ government under Benjamin Disraeli’s Conservative Party, the Liberals led by William 
Ewart Gladstone swept to power on a platform of ‘peace, retrenchment and reform’ [Figure 1]. 
In a series of speeches during his campaign to win the seat of Midlothian, Gladstone had vividly 
characterised the differences between the two parties as a struggle between good and evil.2 In 
the Conservatives he saw the savage, almost bestial side of humanity, whose foreign policy was 
driven by the ‘baleful spirit of domination’. Against this he positioned the Liberal spirit of 
cosmopolitanism, with its belief in international cooperation built on a foundation of law and 
justice. Safely removed from the tensions of the European mainland, protected by the Channel 
and its powerful navy, he argued that the United Kingdom was in a position to promote 
liberalism across the Continent. Under a Liberal government, the country would be destined for 
‘the noblest part that any nation was called upon to play…a part blessed in its origin, worthy of 
our Christianity…the work of peace and the work of goodwill among men.’3  
Fourteen years later, an eighty-four year old Gladstone found himself dejectedly contemplating 
his final resignation as Prime Minister. His government of 1880, founded on so much hope, had 
collapsed in 1886 when the Liberals were split in two over Home Rule for Ireland. The 
subsequent Conservative administration under Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, third Marquess of 
Salisbury, oversaw increased tensions with European neighbours and a large-scale increase in 
defence spending, to Gladstone’s growing dismay. Although the Liberals returned to power 
following a lacklustre victory in the 1892 General Election, Gladstone faced a fundamentally 
hostile political environment. The proud, confident nation to which he had appealed in 1880 had 
seemingly disappeared. Barely eighteen months into his fourth premiership he was presented 
with demands for an enormous increase in naval spending by the First Lord of the Admiralty. 
The increases, claimed the professional naval chiefs, were necessary to keep pace with the flee s
of France and Russia, from whom Britain was vulnerable to sudden attack. The Conservative 
                                                          
2 Robert Kelly, ‘Midlothian: A Study in Politics and Ideas’, Victorian Studies, 4 (1960), pp. 119-140. 
3 William Ewart Gladstone, 22 March 1880 in Political Speeches in Scotland March and April 1880 
(Edinburgh: Andrew Elliot, 1880), p. 222. 
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Party was keenly pressing for a new naval programme in the Commons, while outside 
parliament ‘public opinion’ also appeared to be clamouring for such a policy. In January 1894, 
Gladstone summarised his objections in ‘a memorandum remarkable in the annals of British 
radical writing’.4 He condemned the proposed plan as in excess of public expectation and 
political precedent; a threat to ‘sound finance’; and a sop to the ‘aggression’ of Britain’s armed 
forces and the ‘weakness of alarmism’. In language recalling his Midlothian speeches, he 
refused to ‘dress Liberalism in Tory clothes’: 
I shall not break to pieces the continuous action of my political life, nor trample on the 
tradition received from every colleague who has ever been my teacher[.] 
Above all I cannot & will not add to the perils and coming calamities of Europe by an 
act of militarism which will be found to involve a policy, and which excuses thus the 
militarism of Germany, France or Russia. England’s providential part is to help peace, 
and liberty of which peace is the nurse; this policy is the foe of both.5  
However remarkable, the protest fell on deaf ears. Finding himself in a minority of two in his 
Cabinet, Gladstone resigned in March 1894. ‘Militarism’, it seemed, had triumphed over peace; 
the ‘alarmism’ of the armed forces and ‘public opinion’ proved more than a match for the man 
who had practically defined British budgetary policy since the 1860s. As Admiral John Fisher, 
then the Third Naval Lord, cheerfully recalled: ‘We got the ships and Mr. Gladstone went.’6 
* 
This thesis analyses the transformation in attitudes towards foreign affairs and national defe ce 
that occurred in Britain between 1880 and 1894. Its central argument is that this period was 
characterised by the retreat of ‘liberal internationalism’, which was pushed from the public and 
political spheres by a vigorous ‘anti-internationalist’ attack. The primary drivers of this change 
were the officer corps of the British armed forces, who, as avowed enemies of civilian control 
over defence policy, used political pressure and sophisticated media manipulation to influence 
                                                          
4 H.C.G. Matthew, Gladstone: 1875-1898 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 351.  
5 Gladstone, ‘The Plan’, 20 Jan. 1894 in H.C.G Matthew (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries, vol. XIII (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 364. 
6 Lord Fisher, Records (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), p. 53. 
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government policymaking towards their own extreme and illiberal interpretation of Britain’s 
geopolitical position. National defence, they argued, was too serious a subject to be left to the 
‘amateur’ politicians. Instead, they embraced the language of ‘scientific expertise’, which was 
growing in popularity during the 1880s, to portray themselves as disinterested patriots fighting
to save the nation from the ‘fanatical economists’ who wanted to cut defence spending, most of 
whom were to be found in the Liberal party. Allying with sympathetic individuals within the 
Conservative party and the press, these men succeeded in reframing British defence policy, 
enormously expanding the influence of the professionals at the War Office and Admiralty. By 
the 1890s, British defence policy was devised not to fit the ideological or economic doctrines of 
the politicians, but primarily to meet the strategic demands – not to say prejudices and paranoia 
– of the services. Crucially, the thesis maintains that the anxieties about British naval and 
military vulnerability which acted as a catalyst for these developments were largely baseless, 
and that Gladstone was driven out of office in 1894 by a ‘myth’ of British weakness.  
Within this wider narrative, the thesis considers the ways in which the Liberal and Conservative 
parties responded to these developments. Distracted, divided and lacking coherent leadership, 
the Liberals made little serious attempt to defend the policies on which they had fought the 1880 
election. Opposition to the ‘vested interests’ of the Army and Navy formed a core plank of 
Liberal ideology. Nevertheless, during the 1880s the party, with little more than a whimper in 
objection, witnessed professional soldiers and sailors pick apart the principle of civilian ontrol, 
reverse government policy and push the defence budget ever higher. Meanwhile the 
Conservatives, already closely connected to the armed forces through personal networks and 
political sympathies, were soon won over to the policy aims of the military lobbyists. During the 
1880s, Tory MPs and Peers happily pushed for a diminution of the role of parliament in foreign 
and defence policy, and eagerly embraced the cynical ‘realist’ view of international relations in 
order to justify their views. The thesis is especially critical of the attitudes and actions of 
Gladstone and Salisbury. Both men, in government and opposition, were offered a number of 
opportunities to slow or reverse the collapse of civilian authority. Yet neither man did: while 
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Gladstone, distracted by the Irish issue, largely ignored the threat until it was too late, Salisbury 
took the opportunity to place himself at the head of the ‘anti-internationalist’ policy shift, 
sacrificing his commitment to a measured defence policy in the process.  
To illustrate these developments the thesis is built around two revisionist case studies of major 
though understudied events. The first examines Sir Edward Watkin’s attempt to dig a Channel 
Tunnel between Dover and Calais in the early 1880s, which was prevented following an 
invasion scare whipped up by the War Office. Arguing that the project’s defeat should be 
regarded as a major setback for liberal internationalism, the study shows how the often ignored 
Tunnel controversy reveals an enormous amount about Britons’ attitudes to war and 
international affairs. The second case study reconsiders the genesis and parliamentary passage 
of the Naval Defence Act, Lord Salisbury’s enormous programme of naval expansion which 
formerly introduced the ‘two power standard’ of strength for the Royal Navy. In the first 
detailed political study of the Act, it is argued that this was not a popular piece of well-balanced 
Conservative legislation, but rather a triumph for the anti-internationalist worldview of 
Admiralty lobbyists, built on a misrepresentation of the true needs of the Royal Navy; the 
narrative is continued in chapter ten to show how Liberal failure to formerly oppose the Act led 
directly to Gladstone’s 1894 resignation. Through these studies the thesis demostrates how by 
the 1890s policymakers were operating under substantially changed and largely mistaken 
assumptions about Britain’s defence needs, capabilities and vulnerabilities. Where once British 
power and European quiescence were taken for granted, the political elites were now largely 
convinced of the Empire’s susceptibility to immediate and unprovoked attack. Internationalist 
Liberals and Radicals had failed to effectively defend their own ideals and outlook against this 






The ‘Transformation’ of Politics in the 1880s 
Historians have long considered the 1880s to be a period of political ‘transformation’, not only 
in Britain but across Europe.7 Although its previously dominant position had been severely 
shaken by the ‘great depression’ of the 1870s, by 1880 liberalism was in power across the 
Continent’s more advanced economies. At the end of the decade, however, the political right 
had triumphantly returned, buttressed by the adoption of a new harder language of jingoism and 
imperialism calculated to appeal to the expanded electorates of this ‘age of the masses’.8 
Although the reasons for liberalism’s decline continue to encourage vigorous debate, it is clear 
that the ideology struggled to keep pace with both its conservative and socialist rivals in this 
more democratic environment, especially after 1885.9 In vivid contrast to the internationalist 
hopes of the early 1880s, the European 1890s were marked by a rapidly spreading arms race, 
economic protectionism and, in their latter years, a political language which was increasingly 
dominated by ideas of competition, rivalry and struggle.10 The two decades prior to the 
declaration of war in 1914 are frequently regarded as a time of cultural and racial anxiety about 
national decline and a renewed interest in, even enthusiasm for, armed conflict, reinforcing an 
increasing loss of optimism in the future of European progress.11 A  such, the 1880s have been 
characterised by some historians as the decade which laid the foundations for the turmoil and 
warfare of the twentieth century.12 
Central to these political changes were developments in the rhetoric of national defence. War 
had become ‘democratic’: already by 1880 most European nations had or were in the process of 
                                                          
7 Norman Stone, Europe Transformed: 1878-1919 (London: Fontana, 1983), pp. 42-73. 
8 Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 44-45; Michael D. Biddiss, The Age of the Masses (Harmonsworth, 
Middlesex: Penguin, 1977); E.J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 2nd edn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), ch. 4. 
9 For an overview see Alan S. Kahan, Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe: The Political Culture of 
Limited Suffrage (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), ch. 5. 
10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 196; Stone, Europe Transformed, pp. 96-106. 
11 Arno Mayer provides a particularly evocative discussion of this outlook in, The Persistence of the Old 
Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York: Pantheon, 1981), ch. 5. See also H.W. Koch, ‘Social 
Darwinism as a factor in the ‘New Imperialism’’ in H.W. Koch (ed.), The Origins of the First World War, 
2nd edn (London: Macmillian, 1984), pp. 319-342. 
12 Pertinent examples include Brian Bond, War and Society in Europe 1870-1970 (London: Fontana, 
1984), chs. 3-4; C.J. Bartlett, The Global Conflict 1880-1970: The International Rivalry of the Great 
Powers (London: Longman, 1984). 
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adopting more inclusive conscription laws, the most prominent symptom of a growing 
obsession with comparative military strength.13 The same approach also began to pervade 
thinking about navies, leading to a renewed burst of navalist ‘theatre’, propaganda and 
shipbuilding which laid the groundwork for the naval arms races of the following two decades.14 
From the mid-1880s onwards, Europeans became re-acquainted with arms races and war scares 
between the great powers, a phenomenon which had been largely absent during the previous 
fifteen years.15 Rapid technological developments added further vigour to this military 
competition, while also revolutionising the way in which generals and admirals thought about 
warfare. As the German military successes in 1866 and 1871 illustrated, European conflict had 
been rendered more deadly by the introduction of breech-loading rifles and machine guns, and 
more rapid through the adoption of the steamship, railway and telegraph.16 Encouraged by these 
developments military theory became increasingly obsessed with the idea that future European 
conflict would be characterised by swift ‘wars of annihilation’ deciding the fate of nations in 
mere weeks.17 Culturally this was reflected in a growing popular preoccupation with ‘the next 
great war’, an intellectual process termed the ‘rationalisation of slaughter’ by one historian.18  
In many respects British politics followed this wider trend. British patriotism, argues Hugh 
Cunningham, came increasingly to be identified with ‘Conservativism, militarism, royalism and 
racialism’ during this period.19 By the late 1890s the country’s political landscape contained an 
array of radical right and ‘militarist’ individuals and organisations advocating causes such as 
                                                          
13 Ute Frevert, ‘War’ in Stefan Berger (ed.), A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe 1789-1914 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), pp. 417-431 (pp. 421-426); John Gooch, Armies in Europe 
(London: Routledge, 1980), ch. 5. 
14 Arthur Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (London: Frank Cass, 1964), ch. 2; William McNeill, The Pursuit of 
Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), ch. 8; Jan 
Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Agof Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
15 David Stevenson, ‘Land Armaments in Europe, 1866-1914’ in Thomas Mahnken, Joseph Maiolo and 
David Stevenson (eds) Arms Races and International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
pp. 41-60 (pp. 52-57).  
16 Frevert, ‘War’, p. 428. 
17 Geoffrey Wawro, Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 124. 
18 Daniel Pick, War Machine: The Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1993). See also I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War: Future Wars, 1763-3749, 2nd edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 4.  
19 Hugh Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914’, History Workshop Journal, 12 (1981), 
pp. 8-33 (p. 24). 
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naval expansion, conscription and economic protectionism to an extent which would have 
seemed inconceivable twenty years previously.20 In a society which had long prided itself on its 
small state and voluntary organisations, ‘national efficiency’ emerged as the political catchcry 
of the early twentieth century, marking a distinct break with the language of orthodox 
Gladstonianism.21 The principle driver of this change was the feeling, widespread especially in 
Conservative circles, that Britain was a nation under military, economic and diplomatic 
challenge.22 Within this context Gladstone’s 1894 resignation – and his replacement by the 
‘liberal imperialist’ Archibald Primrose, fifth Earl of Rosebery – is easily explained as a 
symbolic passing of the old untenable Liberal consensus that had governed British politics since 
the mid-1860s.23 In the age of high imperialism, Gladstonianism was simply ‘irrelevant’.24   
However, this interpretation suggests as many questions as answers. As Jonathan Parry 
observes, ‘though he [Gladstone] complained that the naval increases of 1894 surrendered to 
militarist sentiment, Britain was hardly a militarist society.’25 Far from struggling in the 
enlarged post-1885 electorate, Gladstone had proven himself ‘able to square the circle of 
making classical liberalism viable in a mass democracy’.26 The Liberal Party, and Gladstone 
himself, remained remarkably popular among the working classes, who continued to endorse its 
ideology of a small state, low-taxation and limited defence spending.27 I  its refusal to 
                                                          
20 Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in 
Edwardian England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Anne Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain 
before the Great War’, History Workshop Journal, 2 (1976), pp. 104-123; Anne Summers, ‘The Character 
of Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular Leagues’ in Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (ed.), 
Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and Germany Before 1914 (London: Macmillan, 1981), 
pp. 68-87; A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914 
(London: Routledge, 1984); R.J.Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great 
Britain, 1900-18 (London: Macmillan, 1987). 
21 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency (London: Ashfield, 1990). 
22 G.R. Searle, A New England? Peace and War 1886-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), ch. 
8; E.H.H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideology of the British 
Conservative Party, 1880-1914 (London: Routledge, 1995). 
23 Anthony Howe, ‘Gladstone and Cobden’ in David Bebbington and Roger Swift (eds), Gladstone 
Centenary Essays (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), pp. 113-32 (pp.125-126). 
24 Leo McKinstry, Rosebery: Statesman in Turmoil (London: John Murray, 2005), p. 213. 
25 Jonathan Parry, ‘Crawling towards God’, London Review of Books (Nov. 1994), pp. 34-35 (p. 35). 
26 Eugenio F. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform: Popular Liberalism n the Age of Gladstone, 
1860-1880 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 4. 
27 Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform, pp. 416-425; Simon Peaple and John Vincent, ‘Gladstone 




countenance mass conscription the United Kingdom had established itself as ‘the most liberal 
country in Europe’ in terms of personal freedoms, while pacific cosmopolitanism increased in 
popularity during the 1900s.28 The Liberal Cabinet of 1892 was itself largely ‘internationalist’ in 
outlook, most of its members ideologically adverse to large-scale defence spending. From this 
perspective, the near-unanimity of the Cabinet behind the Admiralty’s 1894 demands appears 
curious, to say the least. 
This is not to suggest that the ‘transformation’ in attitudes to defence did not occur in Britain. 
However, the historiography of nineteenth century British politics is remarkably lacking in 
long-term perspectives on the resignation crisis; historians have neglected to reflect on how, 
considering the ideological confidence of 1880, Gladstone and his Cabinet found themselves in 
the situation they did in March 1894. There has, for example, been no real attempt to explain in 
concrete terms how the abstract concept of a more ‘militarist’ society actually led to Gladstone’s 
resignation. This is indicative of the fact that defence policy during the decade is largely
neglected within the political historiography. The wider political discourse of defence during 
this time has not been closely probed; the role of the armed forces themselves remains murky; 
and the state of ‘public opinion’, despite historians’heavy reliance on the term, remains limited 
to discussions of organisations like the Navy League or individual newspapers. Although work 
by military and naval historians has rewritten much of our understanding of Britain’s defence 
establishment and geopolitical position during this period, this new work has not filtered 
through into the political narrative. In seeking to address this historiographical gap, this thesis 
offers a fresh perspective on the origins and nature of the changes which, over the period 1880-
1894, rendered high politics – if not popular politics – an environment hostile to the ideals of 
the Midlothian campaign.  
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International Relations in Late-Nineteenth Century Britain 
It is necessary at this point to detail the nature of the clash in attitudes with which this thesis is 
concerned. Broadly speaking, contemporaries considered foreign policy in a strictly binary and 
oppositional context. These two competing approaches have been given many different names: 
‘idealism’ versus ‘realism’; ‘internationalism’ versus ‘imperialism’; a ‘cosmopolitan’ policy 
versus a ‘national’ one.29 In party political terms, by the last decades of the century these two 
approaches had become vital components of the ideology and self-perception of, respectively, 
the Liberal and Conservative parties. 
All British Liberals were, in the broadest sense of the term, internationalists.30 Nineteenth 
century internationalism was not, as it subsequently became, the antithesis of nationalism; nor, 
indeed, was it exclusively employed by any particular party, ideology or social group.31 British 
‘liberal internationalism’ was thus only one of many interpretations of the creed, although it was 
by far the most dominant internationalism within the United Kingdom during the 1880s. Nor 
was it necessarily ‘liberal’ in the sense of being purely the preserve of the Liberal party.32 
During the first half of the century, when Gladstone himself was a member, the Tory party 
maintained its own form of ‘restrained internationalism’ under Robert Peel.33 By the 1880s, 
however, there were few genuine internationalists left in the Conservative Party. Instead, driven 
to a great extent by Gladstone’s leadership, the internationalist outlook had become an 
important unifying force within the Liberal coalition.  
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As delineated in the work of Casper Sylvest, British liberal internationalism was a broad
interpretive framework built on the three principles of progress, order and justice.34 
Fundamentally idealist and optimist in outlook, it stressed the importance of international law, 
co-operation and arbitration over the use of violence and force in settling conflict.35 It was 
staunchly humanitarian, drawing inspiration from the powerful ‘conscience’ of Christian 
nonconformity which formed a vital pillar of the Liberal coalition.36 It looked to the future with 
hope, believing that the historical trend was towards the unification of humanity, socially, 
politically and technologically. In practical terms it attacked the control of foreign affairs by 
‘vested interests’, be they aristocratic, economic or ideological, preferring instead a more open 
approach which often – though not always – stressed the common-sense wisdom of ‘the 
people’.37 It was, to be clear, much more of a ‘political vocabulary’ than a cohesive ideology, 
and as such it accrued a range of interpretations within the Liberal coalition.38 It was often split, 
for example, between those who believed that Britain should hold aloof from the rest of the 
world – an attitude that could be indistinguishable from anti-imperialism – and those like 
Gladstone who were more willing to advocate a ‘moral’ foreign policy, including military 
intervention in support of national self-determination if necessary.39 There is also truth in the 
view that liberal internationalism was as much a creation of its enemies as its supporters, a 
strawman stereotype at which to launch revisionist attacks on the direction of British foreign 
and defence policy. As such it is important to understand that this thesis does not regard liberal 
internationalism as a hard, coherent and consistent ideology. Yet, on balance, it is clear that its 
fierce crusading rhetoric unified Liberals more than it divided them, offering a ‘useful beacon’ 
by which individuals were able to navigate their own course. Indeed, paradoxically, its 
opponents’ strawman attacks often helped to harden and clarify many of internationalism’s 
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positions, as Liberals stepped up to defend ideas which they had previously held to only in 
theory. 
One figure who loomed especially large in the liberalism of the 1880s was Richard Cobden. 
Although he had died in 1865, one of the contentions of this thesis is that the words, deeds and 
ideas of Cobden formed a central point of ideological reference within the politics of national 
defence throughout the 1880s and beyond, in much the same way that Marxism acted during the 
twentieth century. A Manchester calico printer who came to prominence during the 1830s and 
1840s as the leader of the Anti-Corn Law League, Cobden became the  defining figure in what 
was known – more to its enemies than supporters – as the ‘Manchester School’ of economics.40 
At the heart of his philosophy was a profound faith in the positive power of unrestrained free 
trade, which he believed would eventually bring the nations together in the spirit of friendly 
commerce. A firm believer in the principle of non-intervention, it is said that Cobden’s 
favourite toast was ‘no foreign politics’.41 Indeed, with its ability to bypass governments and 
scheming diplomats to forge direct and mutually beneficial relationships between peoples, 
Cobden regarded free trade as a natural, even divi e law. ‘Free Trade is God’s diplomacy,’ he 
once wrote, ‘and there is no other certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace.’42  
During his later life Cobden regularly found himself in a minority on matters of foreign affairs, 
and in high politics the ‘Cobdenite’ outlook was often regarded as the ‘excitation of the few’, 
too radical for many mainstream Liberals.43 After his death, however, Cobdenism became a 
distinctive and crucial facet of British liberalism and especially popular Radicalism.44 As 
Anthony Howe has demonstrated, by the 1880s the ‘church’ or ‘cult’ of Cobden had recast him 
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as a popular hero, ‘the successor of Cromwell, Wilberforce, and Cobbett’, while the Cobden 
Club – motto: ‘Free Trade, Peace, Goodwill Among Nations’ – worked to ensure that his ideas 
retained the strength and relevance to successfully resist protectionism prior to 1914.45 The 
more utopian views of the Manchester School were never fully accepted by a majority of 
Liberals, and Gladstone’s own internationalism always remained distinct from Cobden’s.46 
Gladstone distanced himself from the Manchester school during the Midlothian campaign, and 
was more comfortable with the idea of Europe as a ‘family’ or ‘concert’ of nations, rather than a 
fully integrated continental cosmopolis.47 Nevertheless the two men had grown close between 
1860 and 1865, a process which, ideologically, continued beyond C bden’s death.48 In his own 
words, by the 1890s Gladstone had become ‘fundamentally a Peel-Cobden Man’.49 A core 
argument of this thesis is that the ‘renaissance’ enjoyed by liberal internationalism during the 
1880s owed much to the surge of interest which Cobden enjoyed during this decade, from both 
his supporters and detractors.50 Whether or not they signed up to all of his views, Liberals found 
Cobden, much like liberal internationalism itself, an important reference point by which they 
could set their own views. 
Arrayed against this liberal coalition during the 1880s were the ‘anti-internationalists’, 
represented principally by the Conservative party under its leader, Lord Salisbury.51 As Sylvest 
observes, the ideology of anti-internationalism is difficult to characterise, in part because it did 
not rely on a canon of works and thinkers in the same way as did internationalism itself.52 Th re 
was no Richard Cobden of realpolitik, although Bismarck and Palmerston were sometimes 
referred to as such. Nor did Disraeli easily fit the role. Although ‘Beaconsfieldism’ provided an 
excellent strawman for Gladstone in 1880, Disraeli’s ‘forward’ imperial policy was too overtly 
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aggressive for most Britons to comfortably endorse, while his opposition to high military 
spending sat uneasily with many in his own Party.53 Opposition to liberal internationalism 
therefore differed markedly between individuals. Some were merely pessimistic regarding the 
future of Europe, while others ascribed to a fully-f edged ‘new imperialist’ and social-Darwinist 
view of the universe; most were isolationists to some extent, although a minority advocated 
aggressive imperial expansion.54 Nevertheless, there are a number of distinct elements which 
defined the ‘realist’ outlook.  
In the first place, they were united in regarding Cobdenite liberal internationalism as naïve a d 
dangerous. Their world was one of struggle and mutual suspicion: nations, many argued, were 
‘natural enemies’ and should be prepared and willing to exploit any weakness in their 
neighbours.55 Lord Salisbury, for example, argued that a willingness to engage in warfare was 
‘the point d’appui [fulcrum] of diplomacy’.56 As such, powerful armed forces were vital both as 
a diplomatic tool and as a reflection of national prestige. Put crudely, the world the realists 
inhabited ran on social Darwinian, not Cobdenite principles.57 This did not mean that they were 
necessarily opposed to free trade or international cooperation, although protectionist feelig was 
steadily growing in the Tory party throughout this period.58 They did, however, maintain a 
profound lack of trust in international law and arbitration. International relations were for them 
a matter of interests, not ethics.59 Indeed, they tended to doubt or even reject the notion of 
straightforward human progress, arguing that humanity’s jealous, self-interested and violent 
tendencies would not disappear and could not be controlled other than by force.60 While they 
were rarely openly aggressive, they argued, as we shall see, that warfare – often unprovoked –
was a fact of international life. Many believed that a great war was on its way; all believed that 
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the British Empire should ‘play safe, prepare for the worst, and secure by force what in former 
times she had preferred to secure more subtly.’61  
Neither of these perspectives necessarily matched the reality of nineteenth century Europe. 
Liberal internationalism was and is easily accused of complacent utopianism and an uncritical 
belief in the coming millennium.62 There was much truth in the anti-internationalist riposte that 
warfare was unlikely to be abolished simply because nations were more easily able to talk and 
trade with one-another. On the other hand, the ‘realist’ dystopian vision of the eternal struggle 
for survival, in which apparently friendly nations might launch a sudden invasion of a neighbour 
without warning, also carried with it an air of unreality. There was, in 1880, no obvious reason 
why Britain should be plunged into a war of national survival. Yet the anti-internationalists had 
the benefits of novelty and intellectual dynamism on their side. With international amity looking 
increasingly dated as war scares and arms races returned to Europe, this new, harder and more 
pessimistic outlook was well positioned to challenge liberal internationalism and become the 
dominant ‘spirit of the age’. 
The Channel Tunnel, the Naval Defence Act and National Defence 
Using the binary opposition between liberal internationalism and anti-internationalism as ts 
intellectual framework, this thesis provides a new perspective on the ‘transformation’ of British 
defence policy, 1880-1894. In order to trace this ideological struggle for the direction of 
Britain’s defence policy, the thesis uses two detailed case studies which have hitherto received 
only marginal attention from political historians. The first is the rejection of a proposal to dig a 
Channel Tunnel between England and France during the early 1880s, the result of an apparently 
widespread fear that it might be used by France to invade. The second is the 1889 Naval 
Defence Act, the culmination of at least four years of navalist campaigning which enshrined the 
principle that the Royal Navy must be equal to the next two strongest fleets. The only other 
historian to place these events into the same narrative is Parry, in a brief discussion towards the 
conclusion of his book The Politics of Patriotism (2006). For Parry, the Channel Tunnel’s 
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demise reflected the defeat of ‘Cobdenite optimism’ while the Naval Defence Act showed the 
strength of ‘Admiralty lobbyists and imperial enthusiasts’.63 Both, he argues, demonstrated the 
extent to which anxieties about the national defences and fear of sudden French aggression 
governed British foreign policy during this period. Importantly, both events also had important 
implications for Gladstone’s Midlothian vision: while the Tunnel controversy showed the limits 
of what internationalism was now able to achieve, the Naval Defence Act was a serious blow 
against the Gladstonian enthusiasm for low state spending.  
Examination of these two events therefore allows us to appreciate how the transformation of 
defence policy played out in practical terms within British politics. Such a study also brings to 
light a trinity of interlinked themes which this thesis argues were crucial to the wider political 
shift. The first and most important of these was ‘defence pessimism’: the pervasive belief in the 
vulnerability of the British Isles to direct attack or invasion. Although without credible 
foundation, this anxiety, which was reliant on the anti-internationalist rejection of ‘civilised’ 
warfare, spread throughout the political elite during the 1880s and offered the ultimate reasons 
for the rejection of the Tunnel or the passage of the Naval Defence Act. The second theme was 
the pivotal role of the armed forces in driving this anti-internationalist policy shift.In both the 
Channel Tunnel and Naval Defence Act, Army or Navy officers were directly involved in 
lobbying the government to change tack, going well beyond their roles as simple advisors to 
their civilian ministers. As such, this thesis has much to say about the nature of civil-military 
relations during this period, arguing that the 1880s saw a transformation in the power and 
influence of the service ‘professionals’ within the halls of government. Thirdly, as both changes 
in policy were presaged by public agitations, the Tunnel and the Defence Act also offer an 
important insight into how nineteenth century public opinion affected government decision 
making in defence and beyond. Ultimately, the thesis argues that the Channel Tunnel and the 
Naval Defence Act, often sidelined within the historiography, deserve to be regarded as 
important elements of the political narrative of the 1880s.  
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Furthermore, both case studies offer the historian a window into the outlook of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties, showing how the former struggled to arrest the internationalist retreat and 
the latter openly embraced it. This thesis is particularly critical of Gladstone’s role, especially 
during the parliamentary passage of the Naval Defence Act, arguing that the Liberal leader’s 
lack of interest in defence and obsession with the Irish issue left his Party directionless and 
unable to counter the anti-internationalist attacks. The obvious popular support for a liberal 
internationalist foreign and defence policy highlighted at the opening of this introduction was 
squandered, with the result that the illiberal ‘defence pessimists’ dominated the British public 
sphere with a strength entirely out of proportion to their numbers. Although an enthusiastic 
‘pro-Tunneller’ and opponent of naval armaments, Gladstone was forced to watch as the ideals 
which he held so dear were driven back as a consequence of his own failure to defend them 
effectively.  
Methodology and Sources 
Traditionally, historians of the British armed forces and British politics during this period have 
not made great use of one-another’s work. Military and naval historians tend to concern 
themselves only with those politicians who were directly involved in policymaking, neglecting 
the wider party-political and ideological contexts. Meanwhile the bibliographies of political 
historians often reveal a profound ignorance of an entire generations’ worth of work on British 
national defence policy, especially on the Royal Navy. As Chapter One explains, historians 
continue to rely on Arthur Marder’s 1940 study The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 1880-1905, 
despite the fact that many of its foundations have been comprehensively discredited by 
subsequent research, some of which is now itself over twenty years old. Where Marder assumed 
British weakness, historians now know the opposite to have been true; this fact has profound 
implications for our understanding of the political decisions taken during this period. One of the 
principal tasks of this thesis, therefore, has been to combine the political and military/nav l 
historiography into a coherent whole and to consider the new perspective which emerges. The 
results of this process are then themselves viewed through the prism of the internationalist/anti-
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internationalist binary to produce some useful and revealing generalisations about the period as 
a whole. 
In support of this approach the thesis also contains a large quantity of new research in the form 
of the Channel Tunnel and Naval Defence Act case studies. In both of these the focus has been 
to create a narrative of the respective events which combines the official, parliamentary and 
public spheres into a single narrative, demonstrating how these three areas influenced and 
interacted with one-another. Decisions made around the Cabinet table are considered with an 
eye to subsequent parliamentary tactics and press reaction; similarly, movements of ‘public 
opinion’ are evaluated with their effect on ministers always in view. Consequently this thesis 
draws from a very wide range of sources. Traditional archival and personal sources such as the 
Gladstone diaries are only one part of a project which also incorporates close readings of 
parliamentary debates and extensive use of newspaper and other published sources. In the case 
of parliament, not only have the debates themselves been analysed but the relevant Commons 
divisions, a source so rarely utilised by historians, have been reconstructed from the divisions 
lists held at the Institute for Historical Research in London. Through this process the thesis is 
able to show not simply how popular an issue was within the Commons as a whole, but also 
how the separate parties divided on the subject, rewriting, especially in the case of the Naval 
Defence Act, much of the accepted narrative. 
One of the most distinguishing features of the present work is its use of digitised newspapers 
and journals, principally The British Newspaper Archive, an archive which has continued to 
expand at an exponential rate over the four years in which research was conducted. No limit has 
been placed on the type of papers used, from London staples such as The Times to regional 
weeklies like the Whitstable Times and Herne Bay Herald. The benefits of using the latter not 
only include a greater understanding of local opinion– including more unconventional research, 
such as the survey of local debating societies made in Chapter Five – but through their 
substantial coverage of London news these papers also offer a perspective and detail on 
metropolitan events which the London press sometimes lacked. More generally, the digitisation 
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of newspapers allows the historian to escape the reliance on contemporary politicians’ private 
papers for summaries of press opinion, a freedom which, in both case studies, has shown much 
of what previous historians assumed about ‘public opinion’ to have been flawed.  These 
archives have also allowed this thesis to include a wide range of political cartoons from the 
satirical journals. The topical doggerel which heads each chapter is largely from the same 
source: for these the author offers no apology, merely the assurance that he has tried to avoid the 
inclusion of the very worst examples he discovered.  
Thesis Structure  
The thesis consists of three parts, one thematic and two case studies. Due to the wide range of 
historiographical areas engaged with, Chapters 1-3 and parts II-III each contain separate 
discussions of the relevant academic literature. Part I consists of three Chapters, one on each of 
the three themes identified above. The first theme, examined in Chapter 1, is the triumph of the 
‘pessimistic’ interpretation of Britain’s defence establishment over the ‘optimistic’. Building in 
particular on work by naval historians, the chapter argues that the assumption of British 
weakness during this period was largely an illusion and that no contemporary European state 
posed a serious threat to the British Empire. The Royal Navy remained the strongest fleet on the 
planet and faced little danger even from foreign combinations; consequently, the fears and 
anxieties which predominated by the 1890s were internally generated and sustained, in part, by 
the failure of the ‘optimists’ to effectively dispute them. Once the ‘myth’ of British weakness 
had become firmly entrenched in political culture, liberal internationalist interpretations of 
international affairs rapidly became seriously destabilised.  
Chapter 2 examines the self-image and political world view of the British officer corps and their 
supporters. The armed forces were crucial to the shift in attitudes to defence policy, providing 
the intellectual framework for the ‘pessimist’ case and pushing it in the official and public 
spheres. Drawing from academic literature on professionalism and expertise, the Chapter 
explains how, by exploiting their positions as ‘patriotic’ experts, these men attacked the 
authority of civilian politicians and succeeded in imposing their agenda in areas of 
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policymaking from which the ‘professionals’ had hitherto been excluded. By 1890, they had 
converted the Conservative Party wholesale to their opinions while also throwing Liberal 
defence policy into confusion.  
Chapter 3 considers the nature of ‘public opinion’ and its importance to the defence debate. This 
period is often cited as the first in which the British people took a serious interest in the state of
the national defences, and appeals to ‘public opinion’ formed a vital plank of the defence 
pessimists’ claims to legitimacy. This chapter deconstructs this narrative of public enthusiasm 
and argues that apparent public support was reliant on the limited and exclusionary 
contemporary understanding of ‘public opinion’ itself. By exploiting this understanding, 
alarmists succeeded in convincing the government – and many subsequent historians – that their 
cause was representative and popular and that the fear of a sudden foreign attack was therefore 
‘national’ in scope. Crucial to this was the idea that the public was an unpredictable and 
irrational creature, prone to dangerous ‘panics’ against which the nation must protect itself just 
as carefully as against the French Navy.  
These themes and arguments are illustrated in two large case studies, which make up the bulk of 
the thesis. The first, Part II, is a study of the 1882 Channel Tunnel attempt, which was cancelled 
after Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley successfully whipped up a media ‘scare’ over 
fears of French invasion. Unlike previous histories this study gives equal attention to the pro-
Tunnel case, demonstrating that it was rooted in the internationalist philosophy of the mid-
century politician Richard Cobden. In this context the defeat of the Tunnel is seen not simply as 
a victory for British insularity and defence pessimism but also as a decisive rejection of liberal 
internationalism. In the first in-depth look at the state of ‘public opinion’, the study reveals that 
the nation was far from unanimously opposed to the Tunnel as historians have assumed. It also 
pays close attention to the decision-making process of Gladstone’s government, which, in a 
move indicative of the wider malaise afflicting ‘Cobdenism’ during this time, made little serious 
attempt to defend a project suffused with the spirit of 1880.  
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Part III looks at the genesis and passage of the 1889 Naval Defence Act, which formally 
established the Royal Navy’s ‘two-power standard’. It is commonly believed that the Act was 
the result of a popular ‘navalist’ campaign for naval increases, led by Captain Lord Charles 
Beresford, and that it enjoyed widespread support both in and out of Parliament. This study 
completely rejects that assessment, and instead shows how Beresford’s success relied not on 
public support, but on pessimistic hyperbole, a misrepresentation of the strength of the Navy 
and a lacklustre response from politicians, especially on the Radical wing of the Liberal Party. 
In a long analysis of the Bill’s parliamentary passage, the thesis dramatically reverses our 
understanding of the Liberal Party’s attitude to the Act, revealing that, although disorganised, 
the Party voted repeatedly against the programme. In its conclusion, the thesis follows this 














Defence Pessimism and the Myth of British Vulnerability 
 
I don’t want to fight, 
But by Jingo if I do; 
I am in a woful plight, 
If what I read is true: 
And I cannot understand, 
When I see the money go, 
How my dear native land, 
Is not safe from a foe. 
I was proud to see my sons 
Going forth as volunteers; 
Of my big breech-loading guns, 
Frowning grandly in their tiers; 
My Iron-clads I thought, 
At a pinch, would ever be 
A match for navies brought 
From every other sea. 
And now I’m coolly told, 
If an invader came, 
That England could not hold 
Her own. It is a shame! 
But you can’t believe one half 
Of what the papers say. 
It is bluster, bounce, and chaff, 
That makes the dailies pay. 
 





Historians of the European Great Powers during the last two decades of the nineteenth century 
have commonly characterised the British experience as one of relative decline.1 Economically, 
industrially and demographically, other European nations were coming to equal or outstrip the 
United Kingdom.2 Crucially, or so the narrative inspired in particular by Arthur Marder’s 
enormously influential Anatomy of British Sea Power maintains, the Empire was under 
substantial military and naval pressure from the early 1880s onwards.3 Thi  chronology is well 
rehearsed.4 Already outnumbered by every other comparable European force and overstretched 
by its colonial commitments, investigations during the 1880s revealed the British Army to be 
suffering from shortcomings in organisation and efficiency; the Channel Tunnel scare of 1882, 
the invasion scare of 1888 and long-running concerns about the defence of India were all 
symptoms of this feeling.5 This problem was made acute, or so it is argued, by the ‘well-
justified alarm at the relative impotence of the Royal Navy’.6 In 1884, W.T. Stead’s Pall Mall 
Gazette exposed the ‘Truth about the Navy’: British ships were in poor condition, badly armed 
and armoured and the fleet as a whole had almost sunk to a level of equality with its French 
rival.7 Relative decline of British naval power continued for the rest of the century, in spite of 
attempts, such as the 1889 Naval Defence Act and the 1895 Spencer Programme, to reverse the 
trend.8 The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 multiplied the Navy’s responsibilities in the 
Mediterranean, while a large and growing trade deficit in foodstuffs caused further anxiety 
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within the Admiralty.9 Finally, this position is contrasted with the more vigorous policies of 
Britain’s imperial rivals, principally France and Russia, who together appeared to possess the 
power to overthrow the Pax Britannica.10 The result was that by 1890 Britain was a nation 
‘under siege’, firmly on the defensive in a world of hostile and predatory opponents.11 
It is important to understand that this narrative of British decline is drawn from a close reading 
of a wide range of primary sources – mainly from the public sphere – that emphasised British 
military and naval vulnerability. When Joseph Chamberlain, for example, famously 
characterised the Empire as a ‘weary titan’ struggling under ‘the too vast orb of its fate’ in 1902, 
he was reflecting a deep well of contemporary opinion.12 I  the language of international 
relations theory, many Britons during this time were labouring under a particularly bleak 
‘geopolitical vision’, which this thesis terms ‘defence pessimism’.13 Convinced of Britain’s 
relative weakness – not to say defencelessness – in the new world created by steamship, railway 
and telegraph, pessimists were increasingly anxious that the country’s great wealth was a 
tempting target for an unscrupulous and opportunist foreign state. This perspective implied an 
inevitable rejection of an internationalist foreign policy, for, as G.R. Searle observes, the 
‘Gladstonian creed’ relied heavily on the assumption of British pre-eminence.14 In place of the 
relaxed internationalist outlook, the pessimists argued that Britain must be prepared for a ‘bolt 
from the blue’, a surprise invasion or naval strike launched, most likely, by France. This thesis 
argues that defence pessimism came to dominate the discourse surrounding national defence in 
Britain during the 1880s, pushing aside the liberal internationalist consensus and sealing the fate 
of the Channel Tunnel in 1883 and the Naval Defence Bill in 1889. However, the thesis 
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approaches this narrative from a position which rejects the idea that Britain was faced with a 
genuine threat during this period. A defining feature of defence pessimism was that it bore lit le 
relation to reality.  
Historians of British decline have often added the caveat that contemporaries exaggerated the 
Franco-Russian threat.15 But it is only since the 1990s that the reality of the balance of power 
during the period 1880-1914 has been subjected to serious scrutiny. Keith Neilson and John 
Hobson have both demonstrated that the British Empire was hardly struggling during this 
period, economically or militarily, emphasising how its financial strength allowed it to maintain 
its pre-eminent position relatively cheaply.16 Compared to its principal rivals, Hobson argues, 
Britain suffered ‘fiscal-military understretch’: it was political reluctance, rather than financial 
pressure, which prevented the country maintaining, for example, an army of comparable size to 
its neighbours.17 At the same time, revisionist studies of Britain’s naval strength by John Beeler, 
Roger Parkinson and Robert Mullins have comprehensively rejected the idea of British naval 
weakness during this period.18 Not only have these scholars demonstrated that Britain easily 
outstripped its rivals in terms of both naval strength and spending, but they have also laid stress 
on the comparative weakness of those rival fleets.19 Using tools of quantitative analysis and 
qualitative evaluation, these historians have convincingly revised our view of Britain’s 
geopolitical position. What is more, they have concluded that, within the Admiralty at least, 
British naval supremacy was generally accepted and understood as fact.20 Their conclusions are 
stark and uncompromising: British vulnerability was a ‘myth’, a ‘gigantic deception’ 
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perpetrated by interested parties in the armed forces, press and parliament.21 This is a theme 
which runs like a red line throughout this thesis.  
The implications that this new perspective has for our understanding of British history are far-
reaching. If, in reality, the Pax Britannica remained intact during this period, then defence 
pessimism and the fears, anxieties and scares it inspired including the defeat of the Channel 
Tunnel and the passing of the Naval Defence Act, can all be shown to have been unnecessary, 
‘internally generated and based on illusions that could have been refuted at the time’, to quote 
Beeler.22 The triumph of anti-internationalism during the 1880s thus changes from a settled 
inevitability to a serious historical problem lacking a clear explanation. Unfortunately, most 
historians have not yet come to incorporate the ‘revisionist’ perspective in their work. There has 
been no detailed attempt to explain the factors which allowed the pessimist attitude to flourish 
during the 1880s; nor has there been any serious attempt to delineate and deconstruct the 
pessimist outlook and deceptions. 
Building on this revisionist work, this chapter summarises and analyses the nature and 
development of British defence pessimism during the 1880s. It argues that much of its success 
can be attributed to the influence of the invasion scares which wracked the country during the 
mid-century, a formative period for the politicians of 1880-1900. In a short narrative of these 
events, it shows how they determined the outlook and tactics of the pessimists themselves and 
those of their ‘optimist’ opponents. As the main inspiration for this latter group, Richard 
Cobden’s writings on the subject produced during the 1850s and 1860s are examined at some 
length. Not only was Cobden enormously influential in creating the ideological environment of 
the 1870s and 1880s, but his analysis, despite its flaws, provides a powerful interpretative 
framework for the historian. Cobden’s optimistic belief in British security and ‘international 
morality’ thrived during the 1870s, embodied in part by the Gladstone government of 1868-
1874. After establishing this context, the chapter then examines how pessimist denunciations of 
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the state of the nation became more overtly ideological during the 1880s, aimed at destroying 
the liberal internationalism which occupied a strong position in British thinking about 
international affairs. Attention is drawn to J.F. Maurice’s 1883 book Hostilities without 
Declaration of War, which, it is argued, embodied and defined this new turn. Maurice’s 
deconstruction of ‘civilised’ warfare and emphasis on the danger of a sudden and unprovoked 
invasion provided the intellectual tools with which defence pessimists were able to misrepresent 
the reality of the French threat as it existed at the time, a reality which historian  f British 
defence policy have rarely acknowledged. Therefore, in its final section, the chapter describes in 
detail the weakened position of France during the 1880s, demonstrating just how illusionary 
were British fears of attack from this quarter. Overall, it is shown how the pessimist case, built 
on memory, rhetoric, ideology and history, comprehensively obscured and distorted the military 
and naval state of the nation and that of its most likely ‘foe’.  
The Mid-Century Foundations of Defence Pessimism 
Although perhaps a statement of the obvious, it is important to note that present-day geopolitics 
can only be interpreted through the lens of past experience.23 This was especially true for British 
attitudes to national defence during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Britons of the 
1880s were all too aware that their arguments and anxieties were echoes of a recent, traumatic 
past.24 In early June 1888, at the height of that year’s ‘scare’, the Radical MP Jacob Bright gave 
exasperated and sarcastic voice to this feeling:  
The country was told that there was danger of invasion, and the country which was to 
invade us was France. It was always France. He could never recollect the time when we 
were not in danger from an invasion by France. He did not understand why this should 
be so, because France was not a country composed of men who were absolutely without 
sense.25 
Most obviously, Bright may have been referring to the experience of two decades of war with 
France between 1792 and 1815. This conflict, however, lay beyond the lived memory of even 
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the aged Member for South-West Manchester. Rather, he was reminding his audience of what 
Richard Cobden had named the ‘three panics’ – three substantial invasion scares and 
accompanying Anglo-French antagonism which occurred between 1840 and the early 1860s. 
Understanding these ‘panics’ is crucial for appreciating later developments, as they provided a 
foundational framework within which the events of the 1880s developed and were interpreted 
by contemporaries. This is rarely stressed by historians, however, who tend to depict the last 
decades of the century as an entirely new ‘era’. This section thus aims to re-establish this 
continuity. 
Although the immediate aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars had seen the United States and 
Russia as the next likely threat to the British Empire, as the steam age dawned it quickly 
became apparent that only France had the industrial capacity to compete with British naval 
power.26 Steam appeared to have transformed the British strategic position. No longer, it 
seemed, would an enemy fleet be at the mercy of the fierce Channel weather. In theory, an army 
embarked at a Continental port could be steamed across the sea in a matter of hours, while 
cruisers might attack the coastline with impunity. ‘Naval war’, observed The Times in 1844, ‘is 
now a new game.’27 When, therefore, tensions between Britain and France rose over Egypt in 
1840, it was hardly surprising that the old British bugbear of the previous war soon rose its 
head: invasion.28 In 1845 Viscount Palmerston, then in Opposition, memorably caught the mood 
when he declared that ‘the Channel is no longer a barrier. Steam navigation has rendered that 
which was before impassable by a military force nothing more than a river passable by a steam 
bridge.’29 Added to concerns of French offensive power were anxieties, publicly articulated by 
senior Army officers, about the strength of Britain’s land defences. In 1846 the Inspector-
General of Fortifications Major-General Sir John Burgoyne produced a memorandum ‘on the 
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possible results of a war with France’.30 Burgoyne questioned the ability of the Royal Navy to 
prevent a hostile landing, seriously criticised the organisation and efficiency of the Army, and 
laid stress on the nation’s ‘absolute’ lack of fortresses. The result was an authoritative and 
profoundly pessimistic document, which, by exaggerating British weaknesses and French 
strengths, set the tone for all subsequent alarmists. Burgoyne was supported in a private letter 
from the septuagenarian Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Wellington, published in January 
1848, which maintained that the French could land 40,000 troops ‘at any time of tide, with any 
wind, and in any weather’ and seize London.31 The motivations ascribed to the French were 
brutally simple, almost one-dimensional: expansionist greed, jealousy of British power and 
determination to avenge the defeat of 1815.32 
This ‘first’ invasion panic lasted only a few short months, but its conclusion did not end the 
ongoing Anglo-French antagonism.  Despite the grand talk of universal peace generated by the 
Great Exhibition, 1851 saw a reinvigoration of Francophobia in Britain as the Anglo-French 
naval arms race reached a new peak.33 In December Louis Napoleon staged a coup which placed 
the name most associated in the British mind with invasion at the head of a modern steam 
navy.34 With France in a state of some instability, one emerging fear was that Napoleon might 
attack Britain in an attempt to unify his own country, an anxiety which long outlived his ill-
fated reign.35 The ‘second’ panic slowly died away during early 1853, finally dissipating in 
1854 after France and Britain found themselves allied during the Crimean War. Indeed, the 
conclusion of the war appeared to herald a new dawn for international law and co-operation, 
when in 1856 the Treaty of Paris outlawed privateering and recognised the rights of neutral 
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shipping. Passionately supported by Liberal opinion in Britain, this declaration gave 
encouragement to Cobden’s view that free trade would eventually abolish warfare altogether.36  
The events of 1858-1860 were to strike a severe blow at this new confidence, however. In 
January 1858, Italian nationalists attempted to assassinate Napoleon using a bomb made in 
Birmingham. Coinciding with friction over Italian unification and recent French naval increases 
– including the launch of the world’s first seagoing ironclad Gloire – it was hardly surprising 
that these years saw the most severe peacetime invasion scare in modern British history.37 More 
than any other war scare the panic of 1859 was a watershed moment, leaving its imprint on both 
the British people and their landscape.38 It inspired the Rifle Volunteer movement, an attempt to 
turn middle England into ‘efficient exemplars of Guerrilla warriors’ which was taken up across 
the nation.39 It also moved Prime Minister Palmerston to fund a multi-million pound 
fortification programme, unmatched in the history of the British Isles, ringing Portsmouth and 
Plymouth with guns.40 Subsequently known as ‘Palmerston’s follies’, these forts became 
regarded as an example of the enormous financial and military damage which an invasion 
‘panic’ could wreak: defence spending rose by almost a third between 1859 and 1861.41 
Nevertheless by 1860, with the exception of Cobden and his small group of followers, the 
outlook of the defence pessimists had become accepted across the British political spectrum.42 
Indeed, even Cobden was forced to give a sop to this feeling, assuring the Commons in 1862 
that, if the Navy was shown to be insufficient, ‘I would willingly vote £100,000,000 of money 
to protect our country against attack’, a statement that his followers would later come to regret.43 
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While the intellectual continuity between 1859 and later events is obvious, historians have not 
tended to emphasise the personal nature of this link. This is an important omission, because a 
perusal of the biographies of many prominent politicians of the 1880s reveals the ‘third’ panic 
to have been a formative moment for many of them. Lord Salisbury, at this time a journalist, 
was deeply impressed by the danger posed by French desire for ‘military glory’.44 The future 
Liberal Cabinet members Joseph Chamberlain and Charles Dilke enthusiastically joined the 
Rifle Volunteers alongside many other serving and future politicians, both MPs and Lords.45 On 
the other hand, as Palmerston’s Chancellor, Gladstone was forever haunted by his inability to 
prevent the fortification programme.46 In this respect it also had an important effect on Liberal 
Radicalism. For example Sir Wilfrid Lawson, an ‘advanced Radical’ prominent in the peace 
movement during the 1880s, was first elected to the Commons in 1859 and never forgot either 
the cost or the popularity of Palmerston’s fortification programme against which he protested 
alongside Cobden.47 These experiences left a profound impression on an entire generation. 
While politicians may have remembered the cost and ‘panic’, for alarmists the period provided 
an important cautionary tale of what could occur if the defences were allowed to slip. This latter 
impression was given credibility by the fact that, during the 1850s, the French fleet posed a 
genuine, if exaggerated, technological and numerical challenge to the Royal Navy.48 Within 
naval circles this time was remembered as an ‘era of fortification’ when the Navy was neglected 
and the importance of sea power forgotten.49 It is no coincidence that the second half of the 
1860s saw the foundations laid for what would become the ‘blue water’ school of naval theory, 
which laid emphasis on the Navy as the first and only line of defence against invasion.50 
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Equally important was the literary tradition left by the panics. By 1860, the vulnerability of 
Britain had become a profitable industry, and writing treatises on the subject a common pastime 
for retired or half-pay armed forces officers. Michael Partridge has identified well over a 
hundred such works published between 1845 and 1870, from sober theoretical texts on 
fortification to the hyperbolic Defenceless State of Great Britain (1850).51 In the aftermath of 
the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 this phenomenon was given a new impetus when Colonel 
George Chesney published his short story, The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer, 
spawning a popular genre of ‘invasion literature’ that only lost its appeal after 1914.52 In a vivid 
account of the invasion and subjugation of Britain by Germany, the Royal Navy is destroyed 
and the British Army and Volunteers are routed by the efficient Prussian military. In the 
Carthaginian peace that follows, Britain’s trade and industrial power is usurped by the victor 
and the Empire is carved up by opportunistic imperial rivals. ‘Truly’, reflects the narrator, ‘the 
nation was ripe for a fall; but when I reflect how a little firmness and self-denial, or political 
courage and foresight, might have averted the disaster, I feel that the judgement must have 
really been deserved.’53 An explicit critique of the dangerously contented ‘commercialism’ that 
Chesney regarded as a hallmark of the liberal outlook, the story added not only novelty, but also 
signalled an ideological turn in the arguments of the defence pessimists. From the 1870s 
onwards, they increasingly strove to attack not simply the ‘defenceless state of England’, but the 
liberal world-view itself.  
The Cobdenite Critique 
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If the war scares of the 1840s and 1850s provided the foundations of the later defence 
pessimism, the parallel career and publications of Richard Cobden served as a model for the 
Radicals and peace campaigners of the 1880s. After the repeal of the Corn Laws, Cobden, along 
with his close friend and ally John Bright, became closely involved with the British peace 
movement.54 He was an important supporter of the 1851 Great Exhibition, protested 
Palmerston’s foreign and defence policies by refusing a Cabinet position in 1859 and with 
Gladstone’s support attempted to combat the war scare by negotiating a free trade treaty with 
Napoleon in 1860.55 The arguments against the invasion scares he constructed during these 
years came subsequently to pervade British intellectual and popular thought on warfare, 
something to which the lack of a proper academic study has blinded us.56 When Chesney came 
to pen The Battle of Dorking in 1871, for example, it was Cobden’s outlook which he had in his 
sights. It is necessary, therefore, to summarise Cobden’s principle critiques of the mid-century 
invasion scares in order to understand the ideological context in which the defence debates of 
the 1880s took place. 
For Cobden, war represented a fundamental collapse of human rationality.57 As far as he was 
concerned, the interests of both individuals and the state were directly linked to the peaceful 
maintenance of industrialism and free trade: war, by disrupting these ‘natural’ processes, 
damaged the entire community.58 Armed forces, argued Cobden, should be maintained only for 
defensive needs. Any money spent on warlike preparations represented a waste of state 
resources and an unnecessary, even tyrannical, burden on the taxpayer.59 Interweaving his 
criticisms with an older anti-aristocratic Radical tradition, he maintained that wars were ‘got up’ 
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at the whim of diplomats and generals who had either an ideological interest in maintaining the 
European balance of power, or a personal interest in securing more funding for the military. 
Convinced that the interconnected world of the nineteenth century had rendered war and 
imperial expansion obsolete, Cobden argued for an essentially isolationist foreign policy, with 
Britain acting only to use its ‘moral’ influence to secure the expansion of liberty and 
commerce.60  
As part of his opposition to the invasion scares, Cobden produced two substantive works 
analysing and refuting the claims of the defence pessimists, 1793 and 1853, in Three Letters 
(1853) and The Three Panics (1862), the latter perhaps his most famous literary production.61 
Quick to analyse the ‘shoal of publications’ that resulted from the scare of 1853, Cobden boiled 
down the pessimistic geopolitical vision to two essential ingredients:  
First, that we have made no provision for our defence, and, therefore, offer a tempting 
prey to an invader; and, next, that the French are a mere band of pirates, bound by no 
ties of civilization, and ready to pounce upon any point of our coast which is left 
unprotected.62 
Cobden did much to combat these assumptions. In the first instance, he meticulously compared 
French military and naval strength with the British, arguing that the British navy had long been 
maintained at a ratio of three-to two over its French counterpart. 63 France, he suggested, had 
neither the financial, material nor industrial resources to pose a serious challenge. From the 
British ignorance of these facts he drew an important lesson about the psychological nature of 
the defence ‘panic’. ‘It seems to be the peculiar characteristic of these panics,’ he reflected, ‘that 
they who fall under their nfluence are deprived of all remembrance of what has been already 
done for their security.’64 
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In answer to the idea that the French would act as ‘pirates’, Cobden argued that such fears were 
entirely at odds with the past and present conduct of that nation. Indeed, whereas alarmists 
insisted that history showed France to be constantly plotting against its neighbour, in Cobden’s 
view it was the United Kingdom that had repeatedly ravaged French coasts, landed armies on 
the Continent and was now constructing an enormous navy despite the lack of any obvious 
threat.65 France, he insisted, was one of the most cultured, commercial and intelligent nations on 
earth. ‘There is no instance recorded in history’, he continued, ‘of such a country suddenly 
casting itself down to the level with Malays and New Zealanders by committing an unprovoked 
act of piracy upon a neighbouring nation.’ 66 Crucially, Cobden stressed the necessity of 
appreciating the situation from the French perspective, a point which hitherto had been 
conspicuously absent from the British defence debates. Relentlessly emphasising commercial 
factors and the interconnectedness of trade, he completely rejected the idea that France could 
make any profit out of an opportunist war. Not only would its own economy suffer, but Cobden 
believed it would face the combined wrath of European civilisation: 
Intelligent men in that country cannot believe that we think them capable of such folly, 
nay madness, as to rush headlong, without provocation, and without notice, into a war 
with the most powerful nation in the world, before whose very ports the raw materials 
of their manufactures pass, the supply of which, and the consequent employment and 
subsistence of millions of their population, would be immediately cut off, to say nothing 
of the terrible retribution which would be visited upon their shores, whilst all the world 
would be calling for the extermination of a community which had abdicated its civilised 
rank, and become a mere band of lawless buccaneers.67  
These appeals to civilisation pointed to a fundamental difference in attitude between the 
pessimists and the liberal internationalists. For the latter, struggles between states were 
conceived of almost as a ‘duel between honourable gentlemen’, with all the assumptions about 
legal processes the metaphor implied.68 War, it was argued, was limited by a range of 
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international laws and precedents, including the necessity to issue a formal declaration, respect 
for the rights of neutral powers and the condemnation of underhand tactics such as spying.69 In 
this ‘civilised’ vision of war the ‘bolt from the blue’ was impossible. For Cobden, this was an 
important flaw in the pessimist case: 
…this hypothesis of sudden invasion is absolutely indispensable for affording the 
alarmists any standing ground whatever. Take away the liability to surprise, by 
admitting the necessity of a previous ground of quarrel, and the delays of a diplomatic 
correspondence, and you have time to collect your fleet, and drill an army.70 
Cobden’s arguments provided an incisive and rational deconstruction of the invasion fear. He 
distinguished himself among contemporary commentators not only by his confident declarations 
of British strength, but also by his close attention to the French perspective. Appealing to 
perceived economic and diplomatic realities, he undercut many of the alarmists’ most ingrained 
assumptions. On the other hand, many of Cobden’s criticisms are open to the charges of naivety 
and insularity. Cobdenite ‘little Englanders’ were and are easily accused of existing in a bubble 
of total security created by the Channel and the Royal Navy, reasoning away all British 
weaknesses and foreign threats.71 Importantly, Cobden and his followers repeatedly 
demonstrated an inability to understand why capitalists might support belligerent policies for 
their own personal gain.72 Although he anticipated, in an important way, the more hard-headed 
economic arguments of Norman Angell half a century later, he still relied heavily on arguments 
from human morality which, if not in themselves weak, were like a red rag to the defence 
alarmists.73 Fundamentally, he failed to appreciate that technology, trade and communication 
were not always on the side of the peacemakers. Alongside the many strengths of Cobden’s 
arguments, the idealists of the 1880s also inherited these weaknesses. 
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The ‘Silver Streak’ 
From the nadir of 1859, Anglo-French relations slowly improved during the 1860s. Internal 
politics, the creation of a multipolar European order following the rise of Prussia and Italy, and 
the increasingly obvious superiority of the Royal Navy all contributed to a period of relative 
cross-Channel diplomatic calm, something cemented by Prussia’s defeat of France’s in 1871.74 
Encouraged in part by this, the 1870s were a decade of relative optimism for Britain’s Liberals. 
‘Gladstone-Cobdenism’ had triumphed in the 1868 General Election, ushering in a new era of 
hope for internationalists.75 This mood was caught by the Prime Minister himself in a famous 
essay of 1870, in which he exhibited his belief in Britain’s providential role as a nation which 
understood, more than any other, ‘duty, responsibility and conscience’.76 Often missed by 
historians is the article’s profound optimism, prominent especially in its conclusion, where 
Gladstone argued that a new moral force, more powerful than electricity or steam, was coming 
to characterise the spirit of the age:77 
Certain is it that a new law of nations is gradually taking hold of the mind, and coming 
to sway the practice, of the world; a law which recognises independence, which frowns 
upon aggression, which favours the pacific, not the bloody settlement of disputes, which 
aims at permanent and not temporary adjustments; above all, which recognises as a 
tribunal of paramount authority, the general judgement of civilised mankind.78 
This was, on the other hand, also a period of increased insularity. Because of its geography, 
Britain was able to maintain a small volunteer army, in stark comparison with the mass 
conscription that came to characterise Continental forces post-1870. While the British may have 
regarded Europe as a bastion of world civilisation, they were also quick to condemn its military 
‘despotism’, characterising France and Germany as little more than ‘armed camps’, straining 
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under the massive cost of ‘bloated armaments’.79 ‘Happy England!’ wrote Gladstone in the 
same article: 
…happy, with a special reference to the present subject, in this, that the wise 
dispensation of Providence has cut her off, by that streak of silver sea, which passengers 
so often and justly execrate, though in no way from the duties and the honours, yet 
partly from the dangers, absolutely from the temptations, which attend upon the local 
neighbourhood of the Continental nations.80 
Though he may have been mocked for the complacency of this essay, the phrase ‘silver streak’ 
immediately entered the lexicon not only as an alternative name for the Channel, but also as a 
signifier of British exceptionalism and security.81 It reflected, too, a newfound confidence in the 
Royal Navy. As Gladstone pointed out, the United Kingdom possessed the finest ironworks and 
shipbuilders in the world and was entirely self-sufficient in coal.82 Over the following years, 
until Stead’s campaign of 1884, this confidence only grew. Even in the gloomiest of scenarios 
there was no navy or conceivable combination of navies which might have challenged British 
sea power during the 1870s, while the capacity and resources of British shipbuilders meant that 
any attempt to engage the country in a naval arms race would have been ‘futile to the point of 
foolishness’.83 
Gladstone, of course, could never completely live up to the hopes of his 1868 victory. Despite 
his best efforts spending on the Army slightly increased, while Britain’s foreign policy was 
accused of drift and impotence.84 Disraeli’s victory of 1874 and the rise of European 
protectionism following the economic depression of the late 1870s offered much over which 
Liberals might despair.85 Yet Liberal confidence in Britain’s present and future remained 
buoyant, a feeling which Gladstone was able to exploit in his Midlothian campaign at the end of 
                                                          
79 Jörn Leonhard, ‘Nations in Arms and Imperial Defence – Continental Models, the British Empire and 
its Military before 1914’, Journal of Modern European History, 5, (2007), pp. 287-308 (pp. 288-291). 
80 Gladstone, ‘Germany, France, and England’, p. 588. 
81 Parry, Politics of Patriotism, pp. 285-286; Cynthia Fansler Behrman, Victorian Myths of the Sea 
(Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977), pp. 45-46. 
82 Gladstone, ‘Germany, France, and England’, pp. 389-390. 
83 Beeler, British Naval Policy, pp. 208-209, 253. 
84 Jonathan Parry, ‘Gladstone, Liberalism and the Government of 1868-1874’ in David Bebbington and 
Roger Swift (eds), Gladstone Centenary Essays (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), pp. 94-112.  
85 Howe, Free Trade, pp. 169-170. 
44 
 
the decade. The victory of 1880, although significant in terms of seats, was won on a small 
enough margin of votes that to ascribe it to any specific policy is difficult.86 Nevertheless the 
peace movement, which had expanded the number of its own advocates in parliament, was 
convinced that the event marked a victory for peace and internationalism.87 In the immediate 
aftermath of the victory, ‘Gladstonianism’ was used as an antonym for jingoism.88 At that year’s 
jubilant meeting of the Cobden Club – of which twelve of the fourteen new Cabinet ministers 
were members – the Liberal success was celebrated as a victory for the ideals of its hero: ‘the 
political nightmare was over’.89  
Hostilities without Declaration of War 
As a Prime Minister with an established record of opposition to armament spending, it was 
hardly surprising that Gladstone’s election heralded the return of defence pessimism. Inspired 
by the increasing ‘militarism’ which was now appearing in mainland Europe, military and naval 
writers were quick to dust off the fears of Wellington and Burgoyne and present them to a 
generation more aware of the advance of technology than any before. No pessimist diatribe was 
complete without an introduction dwelling on the growth of international tension. England on 
the Defensive (1881), for example, one of the earliest of the new wave of publications, 
introduced its subject with a discourse on the power of science, the fragility of peace, ‘the 
increasing perfection of continental organization and equipment, and the direful celerity of 
modern war.’90 Three years later Colonel Sir Charles Nugent, an inveterate critic of the state of 
the nation, began a lecture on the same note: 
Look where we will throughout Europe, there is cause for grave anxiety;– a vague 
feeling of uneasiness and mistrust prevails everywhere. Nation watching nation, all 
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stand armed to the teeth in painful expectancy…On every side the elements of strife 
abound.91 
Most famously, in 1887, Sir Charles Dilke published ‘a tract for the times’ in the form of The 
Present Position of European Politics.92 ‘The present position of the European world’, he 
began, ‘is one in which sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modern times since 
the fall of Napoleon.’ The 1880s, he reflected, had become ‘a period of despair to the disciples 
of Richard Cobden.’93 
Once again, steam was pointed to as negating British insular protection. In a direct attack on the 
legacy of Gladstone’s 1870 essay, retired naval officer Edward Plunkett, 16th Baron Dunsany, 
dismissed the silver streak as nothing more than a ‘delusion as dangerous as any which has 
deceived a nation.’94 ‘No naval officer’, he declared, ‘would contend that in a war with France 
alone, our present ironclad navy could protect our colonies, our commerce, and our 
communications with India, and likewise provide a superior force to defend our shores.’95 By 
1888 there had developed a vocal movement, led by the respected Lieutenant-General Sir 
Edward Hamley, relentlessly arguing that the next great war ‘will, in all probability, be fought 
out on English soil’.96 The ‘invasion scare’ of that year marked the opening of a public and 
official debate on invasion defence that did not subside until the end of 1914 [Figure 2].97  
These new concerns were not completely removed from the international situation. By 1880 
France had rebuilt its armed forces, and was obviously imbued with a new sense of 
confidence.98 In 1881, French forces swiftly and easily annexed Tunis, foreshadowing the 
Anglo-French break over Egypt the following year [Figures 3; 4]. Colonial tensions steadily 
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increased during the rest of the nineteenth century, peaking in 1898 when the two nations came 
close to war.99 Complimenting this newfound imperial energy was a vociferous public debate 
about the future of the French navy. Most prominent was the name of Admiral Hyacinthe Aube, 
who was Minister of Marine in 1886 and 1887. Aube advocated for an aggressive strategy of 
commerce warfare and the mass deployment of torpedo boats, a strategy subsequently known as 
the Jeune École.100 Although in retrospect an admission that France could never hope to equal 
the Royal Navy’s battleship strength, Aube’s ideas garnered great attention in Britain, where he 
was often used by alarmists to illustrate France’s hostile intentions towards the Empire.101  
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Figure 2: ‘The Unprotected Female!’ 
An image from the 1888 scare. Britannia, surrounded by smashed arms and ‘broken 






Figure 3: ‘Vive la Gloire!’ 
France re-accustoms herself to military glory, exchanging her Phrygian ‘liberty’ cap for a suit 




Figure 4:‘They manage these things better in France’. 
 A British soldier, who has lost an arm in Zululand and a leg in the Transvaal, indicates the ease 
with which the French occupied Tunis to a mounted Duke of Cambridge, the Commander in 
Chief of the British Army. Moonshine, 28 May 1881, pp. 257-258. 
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Although these anxieties owed much to the scares of the mid-century, there was an ideological 
undercurrent common to the works of the 1880s which the pessimism of previous decades had 
rarely featured. As we have seen, Gladstonian Liberalism was more than simply parsimonious. 
Its world-view, reflected in the slogan ‘peace, retrenchment and reform’, stood fundamentally at 
odds with that held by the defence pessimists. The Gladstonian political consensus which 
combined low-spending commercialism and liberal internationalism was regarded by them as 
dangerous utopianism, placing the United Kingdom in a profoundly vulnerable position:  
Well worth plundering, rich and vulnerable; exciting the envy of her neighbours; 
unreliable as an ally; unwilling to march a soldier or move a ship, save in defence of her 
own selfish interests; loudly proclaiming her selfishness to the world; trusting to her 
own inoffensiveness and meekness under insult to save her from attack – she offers a 
tempting prize to her poorer and possibly less scrupulous neighbours, who still seem to 
retain more faith in big battalions than in the doctrines of the international arbitration 
society.102 
Above everything else, this perspective was defined by an absolute disavowal of the idea of 
‘civilised’ warfare. In the period since Cobden had written The Three Panics international law 
had grown in confidence and popularity, and during the 1870s there emerged in Europe a 
genuine feeling that war could be ‘humanised’ through legal restrictions.103 One important effect 
of this development was the belief that conflict between states could not occur without a formal 
declaration of war being issued.104  Surprise attack, it was argued, was now practically 
impossible, prevented by diplomatic conventions, intelligence gathering, technological 
developments and ‘international morality’. This view was summed up by the Liberal 
Manchester Guardian i  1882, in an echo of Cobden’s observations two decades earlier: 
Nations as a rule do not go to war without some preliminary diplomatic skirmishing, 
and even the great military Powers would find it difficult, if not absolutely impossible, 
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to organise a powerful expedition with a secrecy which would elude all observation. 
This being so, there would be ample time to prepare for an enemy.105 
This, of course, did not sit well with the pessimist outlook. As Cobden perceived in 1862, the 
‘hypothesis of sudden invasion’ was utterly crucial to the cries of ‘England in Danger’. In the 
face of legal, political and cultural confidence in the declaration of war and the impossibility of 
surprise attack, pessimists needed more than mere rhetoric to give their arguments intellectual 
weight. This they acquired in 1883 through the work of Colonel J.F. Maurice. 
In January 1882, during Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley’s interview before the Board 
of Trade Committee on the Channel Tunnel, the committee’s Chairman and determined 
Cobdenite Thomas Farrer treated with scepticism the likelihood that the country could be 
attacked ‘out of a clear sky without any previous strain or notice that a quarrel was impending’. 
‘Has that’, he wanted to know, ‘happened on any single occasion within the last 50 or 100 
years?’106 Struck by this question and his own difficulty in answering it, Wolseley 
commissioned Colonel John Frederick Maurice of the War Office Intelligence Branch to 
conduct research into the matter. The result was Hostilities without Declaration of War: an 
Historical Abstract of the Cases in which Hostilities have occurred between Civilized Powers 
prior to Declaration or Warning from 1700 to 1870, provided as evidence to the 1883 
Parliamentary Joint Select Committee on the Tunnel. At the end of 1883 it was published by 
order of the Secretary of State for War, ‘accessible to the public at a low price’ of two 
shillings.107 
According to Maurice’s introduction, the findings of Hostilities surprised even the author 
himself. Far from a few isolated cases, Maurice identified 107 examples between 1700 and 
1870 where European war had occurred without a formal declaration, and fewer than ten cases 
where the opposite was true; as far as he was concerned, the practice of declaring war prior to 
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aggressive action had very little precedent in history at all.108 Insofar as official declarations 
served any purpose, Maurice argued they had traditionally been used by the government of the 
aggressor nation to inform its own people, rather than to notify the country that had been 
attacked. Far from the progress of science reducing bellicosity, he argued that his findings 
showed how new technologies tempted, encouraged and rewarded pre-emptive strikes.109 He 
was, he wrote, aware that his book ‘almost assumes the form of an attack upon the national 
morality of the modern world’.110 Yet he was keen to stress how, at the time they occurred, 
these apparent breaches of international law went uncondemned by the international 
community, contradicting Cobden’s assumptions that such ‘piracy’ would be swiftly punished 
by the community of nations.111 For him, the modern feeling against surprise attacks was drawn, 
not from a reading of history, but from the plays of Shakespeare or wars of classical antiquity.112 
‘Sympathies’, Maurice concluded, ‘do not alter facts’. 
Although his preface insisted that the book contained no moral, Maurice was obviously 
concerned with drawing lessons from the past which might be applicable to the present British 
situation. For example, in discussing those cases where surprise had been achieved, Maurice 
assured his readers that ‘the surprise, which overtook the assailed country, was as complete as 
would be the effect if to-day, or at any time during this last year and a half, a foreign army had 
landed on the shores of England.’113 To reinforce this point, much of the book’s introduction 
was dedicated to a comparative discussion of ‘peace’ as experienced in Britain and on the 
European mainland. As far as Maurice was concerned, only in England and the United States 
could peace be said to ‘reign’. ‘The profoundest peace in which the Continent ever lives’, he 
argued, ‘does not present the equivalent of English placid security.’ To support this assertion he 
gave a practical example from everyday life: while Continental fortress guards went on duty 
with loaded rifles and orders to shoot trespassers, their British equivalents were not even issued 
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ammunition and were reliant on the local police to deal with civilian intruders.114 To those who 
believed that Britain would never be attacked during a period of ‘profound peace’, Maurice 
retorted that such an argument ignored this important difference in meaning which the phrase 
held either side of the Channel. Rarely had Britain’s insular exceptionality – both its benefits 
and drawbacks – been articulated with such lucidity. 
Although recognised as providing ‘quasi-official backing’ to the idea of surprise attack or 
invasion, Maurice’s work has generally been neglected by historians.115 This is surprising, not 
least because its importance was readily recognised upon publication. The Conservative 
Morning Post was effusive in its praise, declaring that ‘the patriotic opponents of the scheme for 
“invasion made easy” will do well to peruse and digest “Hostilities without Declaration of 
War.”’116 The St. James’ Gazette considered it a fatal blow to the complacent assumption that 
wars rarely began without a formal declaration.117 In a significant retreat from its former 
position, the Manchester Guardian recommended the ‘remarkable and spirited’ book, observing 
how it proved neither public nor international opinion were to be depended upon as a ‘safeguard 
against the recurrence of high-handed proceedings in times of national excitement.’118 The book 
continued to influence military thought into the twentieth century. In 1905, the Secretary of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence complained that high-ranking Army officers were continually 
citing it in support of a larger Army for defence against sudden invasion.119 It was one of two 
works cited by the Royal United Services Institution when it awarded Maurice the prestigious 
Chesney Gold Medal in 1907 and in his obituary in 1912 The Times referred to Hostilities as a 
‘classic’ worthy of the attention of contemporary military opinion.120  
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On closer analysis, however, Maurice’s work contained a number of problems. In particular, he 
had failed to differentiate between attacks that had occurred with total surprise, and the grea  
majority which, while not preceded by any formal warning, had nevertheless taken place during 
a period of strained relations, when the defenders were not taken unawares.121 Thi  was the line 
taken by the London Standard in 1883, which expressed surprise that the Intelligence 
Department appeared willing to spend so much of its time ‘forging such terrific thunderbolts 
against the peace and comfort of human society.’122 So many of Maurice’s examples, argued the 
paper, occurred during periods of general European warfare or tension; more importantly, recent 
European conflicts such as those of 1859, 1866, or 1871 could hardly be said to have fallen out 
of a clear sky. ‘It seems somewhat absurd’, it continued, ‘to go back a century and a half, when 
international morality was almost unknown, and was habitually ignored; but the writer in the 
Intelligence Department sets such store by the action of Frederick the Great in entering Silesia 
without a declaration of war, that one might think it happened yesterday.’ Hostilities without 
Declaration of War, it concluded, was ‘difficult to treat seriously as an official document’.  
It is hard to deny that Maurice’s version of history had not been carefully edited and presented 
to support his views about present-day ‘international morality’. But this should not distract from 
the fact that he had introduced a level of academic rigour which had hitherto been lacking from 
the arguments of the defence pessimists.123 Over the following years, soldiers and sailors 
increasingly turned to the events of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to inform and 
support their own theories of how wars should be fought and the state should be defended, a 
genre which saw it’s most famous output in 1890 with the American A.T. Mahan’s Influence of 
Sea Power Upon History.124 A good example of this trend was C.B. Norman’s 1887 book, The 
Corsairs of France. Although the bulk of the text provided a history of French privateering, its 
express aim was to illustrate how vulnerable Britain would be in a future commerce war with 
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France. Tellingly, the only map attached to the book depicted Anglo-French naval bases in 
1887. For Norman, there was no question that wars of the present would follow the lines of 
those of the past. Dismissing the 1856 Treaty of Paris, he presented a vision of ‘uncivilised’ 
warfare which owed much to Maurice’s example: 
Treaties are still made to be broken, and I presume no sane man in the United Kingdom 
harbours the most distant hope that Privateering will not be vigorously resumed in the 
next great war in which England is engaged. These pages show how we suffered at 
hands of our hereditary foes in earlier days; the map which heads the volume shows 
how easy it would be for France to inflict a like damage in future years. Her naval 
stations dominate every commercial route we possess, and yet our coaling stations are 
unfortified and our swift cruisers unbuilt.125 
Certainly, Britain was slightly deficient in fast cruisers in 1887, but, as discussed in Part III, the 
nation was hardly as defenceless as Norman maintained.126 If it demonstrated anything, 
Norman’s map showed the weakness of the French, not the British position: with so many of its 
naval bases stationed close to major British colonies, it appeared unlikely that they would 
remain in French hands for long following the outbreak of an Anglo-French naval war. By 
emphasising France’s historical tradition of commerce raiding, Norman thereby concealed the 
contemporary weaknesses of the country. This, besides a lack of faith in the home defences, was 
a defining feature of the British pessimistic outlook: a total failure to rationally appreciate the 
real position of France. Considering the importance that the myth of French strength played in 
the political developments of the 1880s, it is worth taking some time to examine how the 
geopolitical situation looked from the other side of the Channel.  
The French Threat: Reality and Perception  
The driving fear behind the British invasion and naval scares of the 1880s was that the country 
would find itself in a position of military and naval weakness from which it would be 
impossible to recover during wartime. For contemporary France, this situation was, in many 
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respects, a reality.127 On the high seas the French Navy was in a position of permanent 
inferiority to its British rival.128 If the British Admiralty struggled with the balance of forces in 
the English Channel and Mediterranean, the French position was even more acute, forced to 
spread its smaller number of ships to defend not only both shores of France but also North 
Africa against the nightmare combination of Britain and the rising naval power of Italy.129 On 
land the situation was little better. Although its army enormously outnumbered the British, 
relative to the other Great Powers France’s population declined during the nineteenth century, 
leaving it trailing Germany in terms of military manpower, while the more numerous German 
reservists were generally better trained, organised and supported than their French 
counterparts.130 Unsurprisingly the French economy, which in almost all measures was eclipsed 
by Germany during the 1880s and 1890s, struggled to maintain armed forces which could 
defend the country from three potential rivals.131 These serious geopolitical, demographic and 
economic problems were compounded by political instability. France had no fewer than ten 
separate Ministers of Marine during the 1880s, and by the 1890s the regular policy changes had 
left its fleet ‘the least homogenous in the world’.132 Meanwhile the Army suffered ‘a succession 
of incompetent War Ministers’ and growing political disunity, which culminated in the ‘Dreyfus 
Affair’ of the 1890s.133 This is not to say France lacked strengths, not least a strong 
psychological belief in its own fighting ability which lead to increasingly confident and 
aggressive war planning across the period.134 Nevertheless, the challenges it faced were in most 
respects far greater and more complex than Britain’s. Most revealingly in the context of British 
defence fears, despite occasional belligerent outbursts from individual officers it was not until 
1897 that the French army put any serious thought into planning an attack on the United 
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Kingdom, and even this proposal for a small expeditionary force was roundly rejected by a 
French navy convinced of its own inferiority in the face of the British.135 
If France alone struggled to offer a concrete threat, the other great British bugbear of th period, 
a Franco-Russian combination, also collapses under scrutiny. Certainly, the Russian threat to 
India caused serious consternation in both London and Delhi, and the issue brought the two 
nations close to conflict in 1885.136 Concern about the Russian navy was also substantial, not 
least because a lack of intelligence served to conceal its true potential from the British.137 The 
danger to the British Isles itself from such a combination was easily exaggerated, however. The 
Russian Navy was seriously compromised from the top down, suffering problems of 
organisation, technology and personnel.138 Indeed, suggestions that the French and Russian 
Fleets might work together to destroy the British in the Mediterranean were dismissed by the 
French, who found nothing to praise in the Russian fleet and baulked at the distances involved 
in any cooperation.139 The fact was that a Franco-Russian alliance was never likely during the 
1880s, and was only signed in 1894.140 More generally, it was obvious to any competent 
observer that Germany remained the overwhelming focus of both the French and Russian armed 
forces throughout the later nineteenth century; a war with the British would leave either country 
exposed to attack from this quarter.141  
The French therefore had much to be concerned about during this period, and as in Britain, this 
occasionally manifested itself in defence scares. In January 1894, for example, at the same 
moment that British pessimists were putting pressure on Gladstone’s government over the 
future of the Royal Navy, a series of ‘revelations’ about the state of the French Navy were 
published in the Paris press condemning the ‘present deplorable state of things’ which prevailed 
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in the fleet.142 Punch took the opportunity to poke fun at a situation in which admirals on both 
sides of the Channel were doing their utmost to condemn their own navies, producing a cartoon 
showing British and French sailors glumly ‘comparing scares’ [Figure 5].  
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Figure 5: ‘Confidences’. 
John Bull and Jean Crapaud lament the strength of their respective navies.  
Punch, 10 Feb. 1894, p. 67. 
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This example from Punch brings us to an important question: to what extent were the British 
conscious of the French position? As has been noted in the introduction to this chapter, many 
within the Admiralty did appreciate the comparable inferiority of the French fleet, and on 
occasion these truths found their way into the public sphere, not least through returns submitted 
to parliament by the Sea Lords.143 For example, in an 1885 article following the ‘Truth about the 
Navy’ scare, the naval historian John Knox Laughton demonstrated how alarmists had 
manipulated these figures to conceal the fact that ‘our navy has never, in time of peace, been 
relatively stronger than it is at the present day’.144 Seven years later the Liberal MP and former 
Cabinet member George John Shaw Lefevre followed the example of Cobden by producing a 
perceptive and prescient analysis of the current French geopolitical situation.145 Arguing that 
‘we must look at the position from the point of view of France’, he pointed out that with 
Germany the focus of its attention, its colonies and trade greatly expanded and its navy 
effectively cut in two by Gibraltar, France had little to gain from a Franco-British confli t:  
She has great interests beyond her shores as well as we have; she has foes on her flank 
far more threatening and dangerous than any that we have. She has nothing to hope 
from war with us in the shape of gain; she has very much to lose.146 
Indeed, when events forced the British to seriously examine their relationship with their cross-
Channel neighbour, it quickly became apparent that an Anglo-French war was, by any 
estimation, very unlikely. The best example of this reality was the British reaction to the 
‘Boulanger affair’ of the late 1880s, which is sometimes cited by historians as a driver of the 
1888 invasion ‘scare’ and 1889 Naval Defence Act.147 Rising to prominence as French Minister 
for War during the Franco-German war scare of 1886, General Georges Boulanger captured the 
attention of Europe as Le Général Revanche, committed to rebuilding French military 
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strength.148 During 1888 he returned as a populist politician, impressively winning a series of 
by-elections and for a while appeared to be destined for the Élysée Palace in the general election 
of 1889, although in the event he was forced out of the country by the government, and killed 
himself in 1891. Nevertheless, in 1888 and 1889 there was some alarm within the Foreign and 
War Offices that Boulanger might, in an attempt to unify France, launch an attack on Britain.149 
Commentary on this theme appeared in the press and literary magazines, suggesting, for 
example, that the General might pursue a Franco-Russian war against Britain in order to avoid a 
clash with Germany.150 However, while these views were certainly prominent they were also 
rare. Virtually no major newspaper suggested that Boulanger would press for an attack on 
Britain. As A.J.P. Taylor observes, ‘Boulangism made France unfit to be anybody’s ally’.151 
Indeed, what Boulanger served to emphasise was not France’s muscle but its disunity and 
fragility. The influential Conservative Manchester Courier, for example, considered an Anglo-
French war as ‘the most unpopular policy which a French ruler could commit himself to’.152 ‘If 
General Boulanger should threaten England with French fleets and armies,’ asserted the Tory 
Daily Telegraph, ‘millions of Frenchmen would protest that he was paid by Bismarck to waste 
on an island the exertions that should have been reserved for the Rhine.’153 ‘Boulanger is 
infinitely small’, concluded another paper, ‘he only has any strength because France is so utterly 
weak.’154   
It is at this point important to stress what so many historians have described as the ‘ambiguous’, 
nature of Anglo-French relations during this period.155 Certainly there was much mutual 
                                                          
148 Boulanger’s political rise and fall is chronicled in Frederic H. Seager, The Boulanger Affair: Political 
Crossroads of France, 1886-1889 (New York: Cornell University Press, 1969).  
149 Roberts, Salisbury, pp. 480, 487; Halik Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero, (London: 
Hambledon Press, 1999), p. 180. 
150 Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke, ‘The State of Europe and the Position of England’, Universal Review 
(May 1888), pp. 5-26 (p. 18). See also M rning Post, 14 Feb. 1889, p. 4; Pall Mall Gazette, 17 Apr. 
1888, p. 1. 
151 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, p. 323. See also Mullins, Transformation, pp. 46-51. For contemporary 
examples of this perspective see Pall Mall Gazette, 12 Mar. 1889, p. 1; The Observer, 16 Jun. 1889, p. 4. 
152 Manchester Courier, 22 Apr. 1889, p. 5. 
153 Daily Telegraph, 19 Feb. 1889, p. 4. 
154 Western Morning News, 28 Jan. 1889, p. 4.  
155 P.M.H. Bell, France and Britain, 1900-1940: Entente and Estrangement (London: Longmans, 1996), 
pp. 1-3; R. Gibson, Best of Enemies Anglo-French Relations since the Norman Conquest (London: 
62 
 
antipathy, primarily over Egypt, and the ‘anti-English’ party remained a powerful force in 
French politics during the period.156 Theodore Zeldin is not entirely mistaken when he observes 
that ‘the odd thing about the relations of France and England in this period is that at no stage 
was there a war between them.’157 Yet, as Parry argues, while France and Russia certainly 
constituted the greatest threats to Britain, neither was considered ‘the enemy’.158 Among British 
Liberals especially, there was a strong belief in an Anglo-French tente of shared ideals, 
including civilisation and the rule of law, and on most subjects the French were considered as 
sensible and enlightened as the British themselves. Even Lord Salisbury, for all his concerns 
about the French danger, was a firm Francophile, keeping a house in the country.159 ‘The Anglo-
French disputes,’ writes Taylor, ‘though fierce, were family quarrels between two nations with a 
common civilization and a common liberalism; they were conducted with all the bitterness, but 
also within the limits, of a parliamentary debate.’160   
It is in this context that we should draw our conclusions about the British pessimist use of the 
French threat. Geographically, economically and militarily France was obviously the nation 
from which Britain had the most to fear and with which it had the most to quarrel. Yet its 
obvious weaknesses and preoccupations, not least with Germany, meant that directly accusing 
France of plotting to imminently invade the United Kingdom was more likely to attract ridicule 
than agreement. Instead, alarmists treated France as an ever-present yet entirely abstract danger. 
Building heavily on the theme of French political instability, they posited future, not present 
war, for which they believed the nation should prepare.161 As the inveterate pessimists at The 
Times observed, in the first editorial to raise security doubts about the Channel Tunnel: 
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No doubt such a war is about the most unlikely thing that could be imagined…But 
France may change, and so may we. One century cannot answer for anothe ….we may 
one day be divided, as we have been before. France, too, may be ambitious, as she has 
been before.162 
If the nature of French military capacity was discussed, pessimists relied on vague, broad 
statements which, as we have seen, reduced the issue to matters of French advantages and 
British weaknesses. Compare, for example, Shaw Lefevre’s careful analysis of the French 
geopolitical position quoted above with Lieutenant-General Hamley’s characterisation, from an 
address delivered to the London Chamber of Commerce in 1887:   
…in first-class ironclads, which would decide a general engagement, France is much on 
an equality with us; and having no interests abroad so vital as ours, she could always, 
for a great object, assemble in her home ports a force equal to our Channel and 
Mediterranean squadrons combined.163 
Considering that between them, Germany and Italy possessed more first-class ironclads than did 
France in 1887, the rashness of such a strategy becomes immediately apparent.164 Hamley was 
similarly cavalier about the ‘great object’ for which France would risk such a venture, which he 
predicted would occur at some unspecified point in the future, perhaps when Boulanger had 
seized control.165 In place of a legitimate case for war he instead suggested ‘that the wealth and 
prosperity of the City [of London] are what invite attack’, a declaration worthy of Cobden’s 
accusation that alarmists reduced the French to ‘a mere band of pirates’.166 Yet Hamley dwelt 
only briefly on the nature and motivations of France. Generally speaking his articles and 
speeches dealt exclusively with the present flaws in the British national defences without 
detailed reference to the threats they were to protect from. It is for this reason that the fe r of 
surprise attack, the ‘bolt from the blue’, was so important. Only by suddenly throwing all of its 
military and naval strength against Britain, in a manner described by Hamley, might France gain 
any sort of advantage against the Royal Navy. It was therefore on this simple theme that the 
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pessimists focused all of their energies. Guided by the example of the past, exploiting the 
ideological trends of the present, they appealed to the uncertainty of the future, and demanded 
that Britain prepare for war. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the myth of British vulnerability was constructed during the 
nineteenth century. Although dormant for some years, by the early 1880s it had been revived by 
a new generation of alarmists, driven by an ideological hatred of ‘naïve’ cosmopolitanism, itself 
largely a strawman stereotype. It was a myth, as Beeler concludes, of ‘gigantic’ proportions, 
without obvious foundation or justification, maintained by the methodical misrepresentation of 
British strength. To reinforce this shaky positon, the pessimists constructed an intellectual 
framework which replaced the established ‘civilised’ view of warfare with a more brutal 
interpretation to suit their arguments. In parallel with these developments, they worked to 
obscure the real position of France, sowing doubt as to its intentions and military capabilities. 
The result was the creation of a powerful geopolitical vision, completely at odds with the 
Cobden-Gladstonian understanding of international relations, a rival ‘spirit of the age’ that 
would come to pervade British politics during the decade. It was a vision which would throw 
Liberalism into disarray, bringing about in the process the halting of the Channel Tunnel and the 
passage of the unnecessary Naval Defence Act. Despite possessing the knowledge and ability to 
counter it, Liberals entered the 1890s bound by these assumptions and unable to escape them. 






Politicians, Professionals and Policy 
 
Always the same? Shade of sleek Samuel, yes,1
With Pepys or Brassey as Chief Secretary,2 
Naval affairs seem always in a mess; 
At least the critics’ stories never vary, 
In this brave bellicose much blundering land, which  
Muddles on still as in the days of Sandwich.3 
Your memoirs on the Navy, honest ghost, 
By Reed and Robinson might well be edited.4 
Still croakers croak, official optimists boast, 
the cry of “Wolf!” oft heard but half credited. 
The one thing not in doubt, a fact that’s funny, 
Is that our Navy – costs a lot of money. 
’Twas just the same in your time? Very like! 
There’s little comfort, though, in that reflection. 
I want to know that I can safely strike, 
And that the “silver streak” lacks not protection; 
And – Northbrook sniffs with mild superiority,5 
And “sets authority against authority”! 
 
‘The Same Old Game’, Punch, 21 March 1885, p. 134. 
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Although forced out of office in 1894 as a consequence of the myth of British vulnerability, 
Gladstone did not limit himself to simply attacking ‘militarism’ and ‘alarmism’. Rather, he 
specifically identified the professional sailors at the Admiralty as the architects of his fall. These 
men, he believed, had exceeded their traditional positions as advisors to the Cabinet by 
proactively imposing their pessimistic view of the national defences upon their civilian masters, 
defeating Gladstone’s attempt to uphold finance and liberal internationalism in the process. In 
1895 his attitude towards the ‘experts’ was recorded by his friend, Lord Rendel: 
Mr. G. never touches these questions from the military or expert side. He says often of 
himself, “No man can know less of military questions than I do.” He takes up a position 
outside these questions. We ought to have our own standard and conscience in these 
matters. There is no finality in a mere race with other Powers. To leave the decision to 
Admirals and experts is both cowardice and surrender. They will never be satisfied.6 
This deep suspicion of military and naval ‘experts’ is regarded as a defining feature of 
politicians’ approach to the national defences in Britain during the 1860s and 1870s.7 This was a 
culture that prioritised ‘parsimonious prudence’ and ‘short-termism’ over ‘necessity’ – in other 
words, the amount of money to be spent on defence was decided annually by ministers who, 
unless alarmed by a ‘scare’, generally adopted a relaxed attitude to Britain’s geopolitical 
situation.8 Specialist involvement beyond the level of advisors was distrusted and discouraged. 
By virtue of their wide experience and responsibilities, Cabinet ministers were regarded as 
better able to evaluate the bigger picture than ‘monomaniacal’ generals and admirals.9 As 
should be clear from Gladstone’s 1895 reflections, however, by the 1890s this situation had 
shifted dramatically. Naval historians now agree that during this period the ‘professional 
authorities’ at the Admiralty seized the reins of British naval policy, ‘recasting’ it to reflect their 
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own pessimistic and anti-internationalist outlook.10 Although much less successful in obtaining 
public funds than their naval colleagues, Army officers had nevertheless also succeeded in 
setting the political agenda within their own sphere, convincing many in government that a 
sudden foreign invasion was a realistic possibility which must be guarded against.11 Not only 
did they use these arguments to see off the Channel Tunnel, but by 1888 they had convinced 
Salisbury’s government o set aside funds for a small number of ‘London Defence Positions’, 
built during the 1890s and like Palmerston’s follies before them, rapidly declared obsolete.12 In 
both the Admiralty and War Office civilians had lost considerable authority, while professional  
were now directly involved in policymaking in a way they had not been previously.  For Paul 
Smith:  
The eighties and the nineties were a watershed, when relations between government and 
the Services were being recast as civilian and economical control of the Armed Forces 
was challenged by the emergence of defence policy driven by external threats, 
technological imperatives, service demands and public alarms which no minister could 
easily resist.13  
It is clear that these developments can be directly linked to a newfound sense of self-assurance 
within the ranks of the British officer corps and their supporters. Compare, for example, the 
Duke of Wellington and Lieutenant-General Hamley. Hamley’s warnings about the dangers of 
invasion in 1888 were, in style and substance, little different from Wellington’s forty years 
previously. Crucially, however, Wellington’s letter of 1848 had been a private epistle, never 
intended to be published, and he was angry when it subsequently appeared in the Morning
Chronicle.14 Hamley on the other hand did everything in his power to disseminate his views. 
Not only did he publish articles and speak to organisations such as the London Chamber of 
Commerce, but he also sat as Conservative MP for Birkenhead between 1885 and 1892, a 
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position he readily used as a soapbox for his campaign to fortify London.15 Hamley was 
confident in facing the glare of publicity and aware of the importance of courting and 
manipulating the public; he felt more comfortable speaking openly as a ‘professional authority’ 
than had the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in 1848. Equally as importantly, he was 
more explicitly politicised in his status as an expert than the alarmists of the previous generation 
had been. Not only was he openly aligned with a political party, but his speeches are peppered 
with attacks on civil servants and politicians of both parties to an extent which was absent from 
the pessimism that had flourished under the Palmerstonian consensus of the 1850s. 
Historians have long recognised the period after 1870 as one of increased public and political 
activity within the upper echelons of the Army and Navy’s officer corps.16 Armed forces 
officers were among the most prolific authors of ‘invasion scare’ fiction, for example, and their 
work regularly contained overt attacks on the defence policies of the civilian-led government.17 
There has, however, been little attempt to provide a satisfactory reason for these developments. 
The exception is C.I. Hamilton’s Making of the Modern Admiralty (2011), which suggests that 
these developments were linked to wider changes within British society. During the 1880s, he 
observes, British political language became more ‘nervous’ and obsessed with applying 
‘regularity and purpose’ to governmental organisation, in a way that quickly developed into a 
challenge to the existing civilian hegemony over defence.18 Casting the historiographical net 
wider, there is an obvious link between these reflections and the ‘cult of the expert’ and 
obsession with ‘scientific government’ identified by G.R. Searle in his study of the early 
twentieth century ‘national efficiency’ movement.19 Efficiency campaigners attacked ‘amateur’ 
party politicians and lionised ‘generals, admirals, administrators, Imperial proconsuls, men who 
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had proved their title to be considered real rulers and governors of men.’20 By portraying 
themselves as above and beyond the party-political struggle, these individuals were able to 
forge a special position for themselves as disinterested, selfless and patriotic critcs of 
government policy. For the present study, the only limitation of Searle’s work is its focus on the 
twentieth century. Drawing on his analysis, this chapter argues that defence pessimists had 
adopted the techniques and language of national efficiency by the 1880s, a development which 
provided them with both the confidence and rhetorical tools to face the ‘optimistic’ political 
establishment head-on.  
This chapter shows how the spread of defence pessimism was directly linked to broader 
structural changes within the contemporary political and public sphere of late-nineteenth 
century Britain. In its first section, it describes how politicians’ obsession with finance and  their 
apathetic attitude towards the details of defence policy created a culture of ‘short-termism’ 
within the War Office and Admiralty, a situation which drove deep discontent within the ranks 
of the professional soldiers and sailors who came to regard their services as dangerously 
disorganised and underfunded. Drawing on literature on the rise of ‘professionalism’, the 
second section argues that these officers took their resentment into the public sphere by 
exploiting a contemporaneous trend towards ‘scientific’ government, using their professional 
authority as ‘experts’ to attack civilian politicians and give their defence pessimism greater 
legitimacy. In this respect the chapter offers a new perspective on the increase in political
activity within the British officer corps during this period. The discussion then turns its attention 
to the attacks launched by these officers on party politics, examining in particular the public 
statements of Garnet Wolseley and Charles Beresford in 1888. The national defences were in a 
bad state, they argued, because the ‘political system of government had utterly failed in 
connexion with this subject.’21 By branding party politics the ‘curse of modern England’, these 
men sought to portray themselves as ‘non-political’ patriots who alone could rectify the 
weaknesses of the country. Finally, the chapter considers the position of the Conservative and 
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Liberal parties in relation to the pessimistic experts. The Tory party is shown to have been 
extremely vulnerable to the pessimistic onslaught due to its close links with the armed forces. 
Meanwhile the Liberals were ill-equipped to face the newfound professional confidence, armed 
with out of date arguments and a ready willingness on the part of many in its ranks to believe 
the alarmist claims of the ‘expert authorities’.   
The Context of Civilian-Led Defence Policy  
By the mid-nineteenth century, ‘good government’ had become associated in Britain with the 
ideals of justice and the common good, most crucially in the area of taxation.22 G vernment 
‘profligacy’ was unpopular with the electorate, especially in working class and trade union 
movements.23 Defence spending was a central feature of this discourse for the simple reason that 
it constituted more than a third of all government expenditure, overtaking debt repayments to 
become the largest single outgoing by the middle of the 1880s.24 According to W.S. Hamer, the 
unwillingness of the British public to pay for an expanded army ‘runs like a red line’ through 
this period.25 ‘Retrenchment’ in this area had long been a core ingredient of plebeian 
Radicalism, inspired by Richard Cobden’s ‘national budget’ which aspired to halve the defence 
estimates.26 During the 1850s and early 1860s however, Lords Derby and Palmerston had 
reacted to the invasion scares by making defence policy a high-profile priority of their 
governments, and, although they may have been criticised for their focus on fortifications, they 
nevertheless did their utmost to ensure that the armed forces received a generous financial 
settlement.27 The ascension of Gladstone to the Liberal leadership substantially changed this 
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political situation, moving the centre of gravity towards Cobden’s old position.28 A staunch 
proponent of retrenchment, Gladstone exploited the Anglo-French thaw of the 1860s to 
establish ‘fiscal prudence’ as the keystone of his political programme.29 Although the 
Conservatives liked to strike a more conciliatory tone towards the services they too were swept 
along in the Gladstonian enthusiasm for parsimonious government. Indeed, Disraeli himself was 
a lifelong opponent of high defence spending, even if his government record and ‘imperial’ 
language often failed to bear this out.30 The evocative phrase ‘bloated armaments’, so beloved 
of Radical anti-militarists, had actually been coined by Disraeli as early as 1862.31 While he was 
never as enthusiastic on the subject as his Tory predecessor, Salisbury nevertheless emulated 
much of this language.32  
Certainly, feeling against high spending should not be overemphasised. Radical attempts to 
reduce the estimates by amendment in parliament were always doomed to failure, and neither 
House ever refused military spending demanded of it by the government. On the other hand, by 
the 1870s it had become obvious to soldiers and sailors that their services were funded only 
begrudgingly, and that successive governments had worked hard to minimise the amount they 
had to ask parliament for in the first place.33 Hamley himself gave voice to this discontent when 
he complained that politicians, working on the ‘happy conclusion that nobody desires…to 
interrupt the peace of the world’, were always ready to convince the public that ‘it is a heinous 
offence to give money for armaments or defences’.34 As the previous chapter has explained, 
however, this accusation was at best an enormous exaggeration of the truth. Even under 
Gladstonian parsimony, the armed forces cannot be said to have been severely underfunded; the 
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idea that they were was simply part and parcel of the myth of British weakness.35 It i  hardly 
surprising, therefore, that civilians were quick to question whether the armed forces were really 
as cost-effective as they could be.36 ‘Departmental extravagance’ was a favourite stock-in-trade 
of Liberal rhetoricians and the principle excuse for Lord Randolph Churchill’s resignation from 
Salisbury’s Cabinet in 1886.37 ‘We have plenty of authorities assuring us that the French Navy 
is stronger than ours’, reflected one Radical paper in 1884, ‘but we have none to explain how 
our inferior fleet happens to cost half as much again as that which we are dolefully assured 
could blow it out of the water.’38 
This determination for economy and cost-effectiveness was matched in most politicians by an 
obvious lack of interest in the technical details of defence policy. Liberals in particular are 
characterised as ‘profoundly uninterested in the details of military and naval policy’, details 
which the leadership were also encouraged to avoid due to its divisive potential.39 Even the so-
called ‘Liberal Imperialists’ showed little interest in defence until after the 199-1901 South 
African War.40 Gladstone’s obsession with ‘conscience’ often obscured his actual opinions, a 
policy gap rarely filled by his frontbench colleagues. Liberal MPs were, of course, hardly 
unique in showing little interest in the technical details of national defence during the ninetee th 
century.41Although Conservatives were much more comfortable with the subject, Salisbury 
himself was ‘fundamentally uninterested in military matters’, only raising them publicly when 
there was an obvious political benefit in doing so.42 In this he was probably in line with the 
majority of his party: the difference, as we shall see, was the Tories were more comfortable 
deferring to military and naval professionals than were Liberals. By remaining aloof on 
everything other than finance, mainstream politics could thus easily find itself intellectually ill 
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equipped when defence did demand its attention. Another significant outcome of this wider 
indifference was that discussion became dominated and defined by the political fringes. ‘The 
customary desultory discussion’ on the annual Army and Navy estimates, for example, was 
mainly attended by Conservative ‘service’ members and members of the Radical ‘peace party’ 
group, who quibbled over figures and threw accusations of lack of patriotism or denunciations 
of ‘bloated armaments’ across the floor at one-another.43  
The War Office and Admiralty naturally chafed under this political regime. With each 
department’s annual funding voted separately by parliament, the sister services were placed in 
direct competition for resources, famously leaving them on ‘little better than speaking terms’.44 
The result, as Howard Moon has exhaustively demonstrated, was a running debate between 
Army and Navy officers as to the best methods of defending the country, a debate that often 
spilled out into the public sphere.45 This narrative of opposition, however, has tended to under-
emphasise similarities between the two departments, especially the problems both experienced 
in the areas of organisation and civilian financial control.46 Matters were especially tense within 
the War Office, the more costly and least efficient of the two departments, where Liberal 
reforms of the 1870s inspired a ‘mounting chorus of criticism against civilian domination’.47 By 
officially subordinating the Commander-in Chief – a position held throughout this period by the 
Queen’s Cousin the Duke of Cambridge – to the Minister for War, the reforms had created a 
situation where the professional soldiers were responsible for maintaining Army efficiency, but 
had little say in the amount of resources they received.48 Inspired by the defence pessimism that 
pervaded his department, Cambridge habitually refused to accept responsibility for a service he 
considered to be inadequately funded.49 This tension was exacerbated by a reformist group 
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within Horse Guards who wished to curtail the powers of the conservative Duke and introduce a 
more organised regime, clustered around Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, 
appointed Quartermaster General in 1880 and Adjutant General in 1882.50 Compared to the War 
Office, the Admiralty was a relatively well-organised and structured department, which 
contained, in the form of the Admiralty Board, a group of four naval officers with an official 
position as advisors to their Secretary of State.51 The level of specialism needed to understand 
the complexities of a steam navy created less tension in an environment where decisions were 
necessarily collective, while the fact that a new Board was appointed by every incoming 
administration meant that there was less chance of a single individual dominating the service as 
Cambridge did in the Army.52 As in the War Office, however, finance proved the sticking point, 
with the First Lord holding the unenviable task of mediating between the demands of his 
advisors and the limitations set by the Exchequer.53 The vast task of administration completely 
dominated Admiralty time, meaning that long-term strategic questions were regularly ignored.54 
It was enough to encourage a reformist movement to match that in the Army, with Captain Lord 
Charles William de la Poer Beresford, the bullish hero of the 1882 bombardment of Alexandria 
and Junior Naval Lord from 1885, as its rising star.55  
One particularly important consequence of this environment was a sustained and pervasive lack 
of war planning in either department. It was only in 1888 that the Army was provided with a 
basic statement of its purpose, and it was not until after the embarrassment of the South African 
War that either service began to look seriously at developing a proper planning system.56 Fro  
the point of view of many politicians the lack of decision-making power wielded by the 
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servicemen was a blessing. As W.S. Hamer and G.R. Searle argue, the anti-militarism of 
Britain’s liberal state meant that governments were reluctant to allow the services to plan for a 
war for fear that this might in turn precipitate one.57 In the eyes of the armed forces officers 
themselves this served only to reinforce the impression that defence policy was dangerously 
disorganised and amateur in nature, suffering from what Wolseley later termed ‘our habitual 
unpreparedness for war’, something he and his colleagues suggested was a uniquely British 
affliction.58 
By the early 1880s, therefore, Britain had developed an ethos within defence policymaking that 
subordinated professional opinion to political responsibility, and was naturally inclined to 
distrust the former. This culture found its strongest advocates in Gladstone and Salisbury, the 
latter of whom was famously suspicious of experts.59 ‘If you believe the doctors,’ he once 
wrote, ‘nothing is wholesome: if you believe the theologians, noting is innocent: if you believe 
the soldiers, nothing is safe. They all require to have their strong wine diluted by a very large 
admixture of insipid common sense.’60 A fundamental part of this ‘liberal’ settlement was a 
‘time-honoured constitutional rule’ that forbade servicemen from protesting in public about 
official government policy.61 Although not embodied in legislation, this tradition was 
particularly valued by Liberals and Radicals, who instinctively distrusted the political soldier.62 
‘I would advise you never to take the opinion of high military authorities’, John Bright told a 
Birmingham audience in 1883, ‘except on a question of what should be done when you are 
actually at war.’63 In order to correct the perceived deficiencies in British defence preparedness, 
therefore, the armed forces and their supporters required a rhetorical platform that would allow 
them to denounce the existing system while also protecting them from these liberal prejudices 
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and accusations of unconstitutional behaviour. This they found in the language of 
professionalism.   
‘Professional Authorities’ 
As indicated in this chapter’s introduction, from the late 1870s onwards the armed forces and 
their supporters became more outspokenly political. A number of reasons have been provided to 
account for this: a reaction against the ‘parsimonious’ political culture; disgruntlement in the 
Army caused by reforms of the 1870s; opposition to the later expansion of the franchise; and, 
most commonly, the more general renewal of international tension.64 The Liberal adoption of 
Home Rule in 1886 – regarded as an ‘anti-imperial’ policy in an era when the services were 
more closely associated with Empire than ever before – also had a galvanising effect.65 Yet, 
even when taken together, these reasons are not entirely satisfactory.66 Friction between 
servicemen and politicians over official policy was hardly new to this period, while the invasion 
scares of the 1850s had seen no comparable anger against the British political system.67 The 
problem with these proffered explanations is that they fail to appreciate how broader structural 
changes within British society affected the status and position of armed forces officers and other 
defence ‘experts’, giving them the confidence to speak their minds and the platforms from 
which to do so. 
The key to these developments was what Harold Perkin has described as the ‘rise of 
professional society’.68 From the 1880s onwards, those in the ‘professions’ – law, science, 
medicine, etc – came to regard themselves, and were regarded by others, as possessing a special 
right to speak with authority on subjects related to their own discipline. As Daniel Duman 
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argues, an important part of this trend was the development of a professional ‘ideology’ that 
stressed service as a ‘moral imperative’.69 By following the path of duty rather than profit, 
placing themselves and their skills at the service of the ‘public’, professionals gained respect 
and status within wider society.70 Importantly, they also gained political independence and a 
sense of superiority over ‘party politicians’. Although politicians were also theoretically 
dedicated to public service, they were often regarded by professionals as driven by partisan 
concerns rather than the national interest, operating in a system ill-suited to the needs of th 
modern state. Frank Turner, for example, has demonstrated how, from the late 1870s onwards, a 
number of scientific writers began to attack the political system for its perceived inability to 
address the national problems of the day because it lacked the procedures and expertise that 
only scientists could provide.71 He continues: 
In turn, they [the scientists] pictured science itself as not only the victim of pluralistic, 
partisan, democratic politics, but also as the potential instrument for salvaging the 
beleaguered national interest from the dangers posed by partisan politics. Scientists 
came to define good government, sound politics, and true patriotism as efficient 
administration based on the principles of science and carried out by persons with 
scientific education.72 
This description can be applied word-for-word to Britain’s professional armed forces officers. 
That an increased sense of professionalism encourages politicisation is not a novel idea within 
the history of British civil-military relations.73 That this accounts for the increased politicisation 
of the officer corps post-1870 has not been seriously considered, however.74 This is despite the 
fact that an awareness of themselves as professional experts is detectible in the language of 
defence pessimists from the early 1880s onwards, in parallel with its development within the 
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scientific community.75 For example, after denigrating the state of the naval defences in his 
1881 ‘Silver Streak’ essay, Lord Dunsany launched into a vehement and bitter attack on British 
politicians ‘from both parties alike’. Clearly inspired by the new political turn in scientific 
writing, and incensed by the political enthusiasm for financial prudence, he castigated MPs for 
their ‘stupendous and alarming’ ignorance of the ‘science of war’: 
For it is our statesmen, not, as some people think, the professional members of the 
Admiralty, that really decide upon the force and form of our Navy, and this accounts for 
its manifest insufficiency to meet emergencies. We heard much lately about ‘scientific 
frontiers,’ i.e. frontiers devised by experts to meet the requirements of science, but we 
certainly have not at present a ‘scientific navy’ to answer such a definition, nor have we 
had one for many long years. The truth is, our navy is a ‘House of Commons navy,’ 
devised to suit financial, or, as the French would say, ‘Budgetary’ considerations, and to 
meet the criticisms of a body profoundly ignorant of all military and technical 
principles.76 
This binary clash between, scientific ‘high authorities’ and ignorant ‘high officials’ quickly 
became a staple of pessimistic rhetoric.77 ‘The serious matter in our case is that the optimists 
represent the opinion of those who know nothing, absolutely nothing whatever, on the subject’, 
declared one letter to the Morning Post, ‘whilst the pessimists represent all the scientific and 
professional experience of the country.’78 This ‘scientific’ approach relied heavily on the idea, 
common in the later ‘national efficiency’ movement, that public administration was reducible to 
apolitical facts and could be treated as an ‘exact science’.79 This was reflected in the more 
serious attitude officers took towards strategic theory – the creation of the Naval Intelligence 
Department in 1882 or even the publication of H stilities without Declaration of War.80 In 
1883, the Morning Post made the telling observation that by virtue of his position as an officer 
in the War Office Intelligence Branch, the author of H stilities without Declaration of War ‘can 
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indulge in no political bias, and is scrupulously careful to deal with facts only’.81 The zeal for 
‘facts’ was further encouraged by the large increase in the number of official commissions, 
committees and inquiries into the armed forces and defence policy during the 1870s and 1880s, 
of which the famous 1888 Hartington Commission into ‘the civil and professional 
administration of the naval and military departments’ was merely a culmination.82 These offered 
a protected, non-political platform for officers while also adding legitimacy and authority to 
their criticisms, which were relayed to the public in a commanding manner through the 
publication of the proceedings in parliamentary ‘blue books’.83 This ‘official’ platform was used 
to powerful effect by canny officers with an eye to influencing official policy, most notably 
Wolseley in the case of the Channel Tunnel.  
Perhaps the most significant result of this trend towards ‘scientific principles’ was the special 
effort made by defence pessimists to exploit the nineteenth century enthusiasm for statistical 
analysis, which had by the latter half of the century encouraged ‘a critical culture of 
governmental distrust and accountability’.84 The classic example of the pessimistic adoption of 
statistical authority was the ‘Truth about the Navy’ article, published over six pages in the Pall 
Mall Gazette of 18 September 1884.85 Compiled by ‘One who Knows the Facts’, the piece 
contained twenty-four tables and an enormous quantity of minute analysis of ship numbers, 
armour thickness and gun calibres, together with a liberal helping of alarmist rhetoric about 
French imperial ambitions and naval increases. The numbers, the accompanying editorial 
assured its readers, had been carefully checked and found to match ‘the figures of those who are 
generally denounced as official optimists’.86 ‘Unless the facts and figures which we print today 
can be authoritatively demolished, the case for such a vote [to increase the Navy] is irresistible’, 
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concluded the paper.87 The campaign as it developed over the following weeks was itself a case 
study in the application of ‘professional’ authority, as the Gazette proceeded to print 
voluminous correspondence from retired and serving naval officers and administrators with a 
heavy emphasis on their expertise and lack of political partisanship.88 Despite this, the real 
‘Truth about the Navy’ was much less clear. As Beeler has demonstrated, the Pall Mall 
Gazette’s campaign was ‘not based on substantive evidence, but on scandal-mongering 
alarmism’.89 Not only did ‘One who Knows the Facts’ rely on improbable scenarios of 
European combinations against the Royal Navy, but they completely glossed over the fact that 
their own figures listed a number of French ironclads as modern and ‘first class’, when in fact 
they were of an obviously inferior quality to their British equivalents, older, lighter in 
displacement and predominantly made of wood.90 The language of professional authority 
therefore served as an important smokescreen, lending credence and legitimacy to what were 
otherwise spurious allegations of British military and naval weakness; without this 
smokescreen, it is difficult to see how the ‘Truth about the Navy’ and other pessimistic 
deceptions would have succeeded in achieving such widespread acceptance.   
‘The Curse of Modern England’ 
The ultimate goal of the ideology of professionalism was not simply to combat the ‘official 
optimists’, but to effect a revolution in civil-military relations, removing defence policy from 
the hands of civilians and placing it into those of the ‘experts’ themselves.91 This was driven by 
the idea that politicians were too ignorant of defence and ideologically obsessed with ‘popular 
budgets’ – as the economical impulse became known – to properly attend to strategic needs.92 
Politcans, wrote one anonymous pessimist in 1889, pursued the ‘short-sighted craze for 
economy, – both Conservatives and Liberals bidding for popular favour by promises of reduced 
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taxation, a popular budget being of more importance in their eyes than the safety of this 
magnificent empire.’93 Although advocacy of ‘patriotic’ interests over narrow party policy was 
nothing new in Britain, there was nevertheless a certain vehemence in the language of defence 
pessimists which made their attacks particularly passionate.94 For the ‘Cromwellian’ Wolseley, 
hatred of the political classes was the defining theme of many of his public statements during 
the later 1880s, as he became increasingly frustrated with the Conservative Minister for War, 
Edward Stanhope.95 At the Royal United Services Institution in 1887, for example, he attacked 
the Secretary of State for War and his ‘financial friends’ for too often refusing money for 
equipment. As a consequence, he concluded, ‘we shall soon have an Army absolutely unsuited 
and unfitted for the work we have to do.’96 Yet this language was tame in comparison with his 
infamous speech of 23 April 1888 made at an influentially attended dinner in honour of the 
telegraph entrepreneur and Liberal Unionist politician Sir John Pender.97 The target of his ire on 
this occasion was a political system which demanded public silence on the part of its serving 
military and naval officers, while encouraging, as he saw it, ministers to conceal their own 
views in favour of ‘party exigencies’: 
…the answer to the question, why the army and the navy is not as strong as it ought to 
be, is to be found in the system of Government by party – that curse of modern 
England, which is sapping and undermining the foundations of our country, which is 
depriving our statesmen of the manly honesty which was once their characteristic.98 
Politicians, he argued, were more interested in building a ‘clap-trap reputation’ for themselves 
by cutting defence expenditure than in listening to and acting on the advice of military and naval 
officers. This, he said, was a ‘crime against the country’, the result ‘of a low and vicious 
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standard of morality which is now uppermost in men’s minds’. Significantly, there can be little 
doubt that this speech was made in support of Beresford’s public campaign to introduce a more 
‘businesslike’ defence policy and expand the Navy, launched in January 1888 and examined in 
Part III, of this thesis [Figure 6].99 A friend of Beresford’s from when the latter had served under 
him in Egypt and the Sudan, Wolseley wrote on 23 January, wishing him success and 
expressing the hope that ‘it may end in forcing governments to listen to the naval and military 
experts.’100 Denouncing the board of the Admiralty as a ‘fiction’, Beresford himself publicly 
accused both Liberals and Conservatives of being ‘delinquents alike’ in allowing finance to 
overrule strategy.101 The aim of this language was to detach defence policy from the prevailing 
ideas of parsimonious good government, and instead approach it, in the words of the retired 
naval Captain C.C. Fitzgerald, ‘on its true methods, regardless of party interests’.102 The only 
truly patriotic course, it was argued, was to defer entirely to the experts. As the Cobdenite 
journalist Francis Lawley complained in the context of the Channel Tunnel scare in 1883, this 
rhetoric allowed the professionals to paint any attempt by civilians to contest their claims as 
unpatriotic, ‘an insult to our gallant defenders by land and sea’.103 Beresford, for example, 
affixed to his attacks on the political classes the observation that it was the sailors, not the 
politicians, ‘who would have to do the work and take command of the British fleets’ in wartime, 
with the insinuation that to question the professional’s opinions was tantamount to playing 
politics with other men’s lives.104 Even this language was relatively mild by some standards; in 
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an 1884 article, Dunsany suggested that by advocating popular budgets against the advice of 
their professional advisors politicians were close to committing ‘high treason’.105 
It is important to understand, however, that while the status of professionals may have risen 
during this period, this did not mean that trust in ‘generalist’, ‘gentlemanly’ politicians 
necessarily fell.106 By the 1880s, sceptics could point to a long list of mistakes made by 
professional experts, who were constantly arguing and disagreeing among themselves.107 
Distrust and public arguments between the services became so common during the later 1880s 
that one prominent naval theorist even suggested that a public meeting of experts should be 
called to vote on the best method of defending the state, ‘because the country will only give a 
certain amount of money for defence … and the greater excuse it has for being parsimonious 
will be this, that the experts cannot agree on the most simple and common sense main issue.’108 
More prosaically, it was obvious that, like any other leading professionals, high-ranking armed 
forces officers had much to gain personally from the government adopting their ideas, and were 
therefore hardly as disinterested as they claimed.109 The national defence debates of the 1880s 
were therefore not simply a clash between pessimists and optimists, but were also marked by a 
struggle for authority between, broadly speaking, ‘professionals’ and ‘politicians’.    
A case in point was the diverse public reaction to Wolseley’s speech in the House of Lords on 
14 May 1888, a set-piece example of serious pessimism couched in the language of professional 
expertise.110 After roundly condemning the national defences and arguing that a sudden French 
invasion was eminently possible, Wolseley concluded by declaring that ‘the views I have 
expressed this evening, and upon many previous occasions, are those entertained by nine out of 
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every ten soldiers and sailors whose opinions are worth having’.111 The Conservative press was 
split between the likes of the Spectator, which called for him to be made ‘Minister for War, 
Commander-in-Chief, and Director-General of Ordnance’, and supporters of the government 
such as the Manchester Courier, which unflatteringly compared the Adjutant-General to 
General Boulanger. Considering that he was a ‘servant of the British public’, the Courier found 
it incomprehensible that Wolseley continued to draw pay after roundly condemning the system 
he was employed under.112 Meanwhile the Liberal press was determined on resignations, 
although without a consensus as to who should go. While the Manchester Guardian was quick 
to suggest ‘sacrificing one or two Secretaries of State’ if they had really been acting against the 
advice of the armed forces, the Daily News conversely declared that ‘officers must back their 
opinions with resignations’.113 Although the language of expertise can hardly be said to have 
been a resounding success in light of these responses, what they demonstrate is that the edifice 
of civilian pre-eminence was weakening, the language of professional expertise had genuine 
cross-party appeal and the experts were no longer as tightly bound by the ‘time-honoured 
constitutional rule’ of silence as they had once been. 
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The Parties and the Professionals 
There is, however, an important caveat to add to the professional-politician binary, that is the 
vast majority of pessimistic ‘experts’ were themselves anti-Gladstonian and staunch supporters 
of the Conservative Party, usually to be found o  the ‘radical right’ of the Party.114 This fact has 
long been recognised by scholars of the literary genre of invasion fiction.115 From the Battle of 
Dorking onwards, argues Harry Wood, tales of imaginary invasion cast the Liberals as 
contemptible, irresponsible and unpatriotic, with Gladstone becoming for a time ‘the genre’s 
personification of invasion scepticism.’116 This reflected a state of affairs that pessimists often 
acknowledged cheerfully. Some, like Fitzgerald, did so in in order to emphasise how serious 
they were in making defence a ‘non-political’ issue.117 Hamley, on the other hand, positively 
revelled in using his seat in Parliament to attack ‘hon. Gentlemen opposite’ – that is, the Liberal 
Party – ‘who professed to regard invasion as a bugbear, and were ready to vote away Army, 
fortifications, and defences of all kinds in their ardent desire to conciliate the taxpayer’.118 Many 
other figures key to the events of this thesis were similarly politically inclined. The Duke of 
Cambridge sat in the Lords throughout his career, making a political name for himself as the 
‘embodiment of reaction’, while Wolseley believed that Salisbury’s retention of office was 
‘essential to the preservation of the Empire’, a reflection of his deep antipathy to Irish Home 
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Figure 6 (previous page): ‘War-Dance of the Jingo Minstrels”; Chuck us yer Coppers, 
Gents!”’. 
‘Our Only Sailor’ (Beresford, far right), ‘Our Only General’ (Wolseley, second from right) 
and ‘Our Patent Commander-in Chief’ (Cambridge, centre, strumming a ‘War Barometer’) 
play for race-goers as the Chancellor, George Goschen (third from left), collects money. Lord 
Salisbury (fourth from left) sleeps while Randolph Churchill (far left) looks down his nose at 
the ‘minstrels’. Fun, 30 May 1888, p. 233. 
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Rule.119 Lord Dunsany also sat for the Conservatives, singling out Gladstone and Sir William 
Harcourt for special censure in his ‘Silver Streak’ essay, while the most respected sailor of the 
period, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, regarded Gladstonian Liberals as little more than 
‘enemies of the state’.120 Few could match the political involvement of the populist Tory 
Democrat Beresford, however, who was the only naval officer of his generation to be elected to 
Parliament while also on the active list, sitting for five separate constituencies – w th substantial 
gaps for sea service – between 1874 and 1910.121 Although he lost his seat in 1880, he was 
elected Conservative MP for East Marylebone as the self-declared ‘member for the Navy’ in 
1885.122 When retired and volunteer officers are included, ‘service members’ constituted one of 
the largest occupational groups in Westminster and were overwhelmingly Conservative in 
allegiance, especially after 1886.123 Indeed, following the 1886 election, the Liberal and Radical 
complained that the number of service members had created a House of Commons ‘dominated 
by militarism’.124 The view from Horse Guards and the view from the Conservative 
backbenches was therefore a remarkably similar one. 
Although it can hardly be regarded as an organised group, the significance of this parliamentary 
influence should not be underestimated. Considering that over half of Conservative MPs had 
personal connections with the armed forces, it was hardly surprising that the centre of gravity 
within the Party moved towards the pessimistic world-view.125 The invigorating ideology of 
expertise not only gave these men more confidence to speaking out, even against their own 
Party, but it also meant that they could be assured of a supportive echo chamber both within and 
beyond the House of Commons. The increasing Tory concern with national defence and 
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imperial polices during this period can thus be seen in part as a response to the more assertive 
attitudes of these professional ‘experts’.126 Significantly, with the passing of Disraeli, the party 
had lost a strong restraining influence against war scares and Francophobia.127 His replacement, 
Lord Salisbury, was too canny a politician to allow his distrust of experts to outweigh the 
concerns of his backbenchers, and was more willing to bow to ‘public opinion’ in such matters, 
as we shall see.128 By the 1890s the Party had developed great confidence in its ‘ownership’ of 
defence, especially when combined with the anti-Home Rule crusade.129 Consequently the 
deepest ire of the allegedly ‘non-political’ pessimists was increasingly turned against 
Gladstonian Liberals and that favourite bugbear of the Conservative imagination, the ‘fanatical 
economists’ and ‘peacemongers’ on the Radical benches [Figure 7].130 For his part, Gladstone 
was acutely aware of how the ‘powerful professional classes’ within the Army both supported 
and influenced the Conservative party; ‘the Colonels in the House of Commons’, he 
complained, ‘are always on the wrong side.’131 As this thesis’ case studies demonstrate, by the 
end of the period the Tory party had become the principal vehicle for the dissemination of anti-
internationalist defence pessimism.  
In theory the Liberal Party of the 1880s was in a much stronger position to resist the 
professional onslaught. The number of ‘service members’ in its parliamentary ranks, little 
enough before 1886, was reduced to a negligible quantity after the exodus of the aristocratic 
Whigs over Home Rule.132 At the same time the large and growing proportion of the 
parliamentary party elected as Radicals attested to the fact that it continued to uphold sceptical 
and anti-militarist traditions, both in the Commons and on the campaign trail.133 The memory of 
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Cobden also offered the party a tradition of civilian criticism as an alternative to professional 
expertise. This tradition, however, was suffering by the end of the 1870s, stymied by a lack of 
leadership. Obsessed with the Irish issue, the Liberal party failed to ‘play a more active role in 
advancing the sort of institutional development of internationalism implicit in Gladstone’s 
campaigns … [of] the 1870s.’134 The Party leadership was often unable to operate on subjects 
outside of Gladstone’s own obsessions with ‘finance, religion, and the immorality of coercive or 
careless government’, reflected in the fact that his government which took power in 1880 did 
not enter office with an agreed programme.135 Conservative confidence in defence policy drew 
much oxygen from these failings of its opposition. 
Although Liberal ideology could still exhibit considerable dynamism during this period, many 
within the Party reacted to the lack of leadership by becoming obsessed to a dangerous extent 
with maintaining mid-century ideological ‘relics’, and this was no-where more common than in 
defence policy.136 Under pressure from reinvigorated militarist and imperialist sentiments, many 
Liberals simply adopted a ‘fiercer insistence on core elements and the truthfulness of 
internationalism’.137 Reflecting on this in 1934, H.G. Wells, himself a self-declared optimistic 
utopian, argued that the lack of critical attention paid towards warfare was ‘the most 
conspicuous blind patch in the English liberal outlook at the close of the nineteenth century’ and 
his view has generally been endorsed by subsequent historiography.138 Matthew Johnson, for 
example, has recently argued that one reason the Great War was so destructive to the Liberal 
Party was because prior to 1914 so few within it had seriously attempted to confront the 
problems thrown up by militarism.139 By struggling to exploit the new language and mood of 
nationalism, argues Parry, the Liberals allowed the Conservatives to paint them as unpatriotic, 
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naïve and ‘penny-pinching’ cosmopolitans.140 Meanwhile the British peace movement was in 
the intellectual, organisational and financial ‘doldrums’ during the 1880s.141 Instead, for 
example, of answering the 1884 scare with a fresh debunking of the pessimistic exaggerations, 
the Cobden Club simply reissued The Three Panics.142 Well might Gladstone have lamented 
that the commercial classes had failed to produce another Cobden.143 Instead the Radical press 
generally limited itself to vehement though dated denunciations of the ‘parasitical’ armed 
forces, whose rulers, ‘atrabilious Admirals and Tory Lordlings’, it accused of growing fat on 
military and naval increases.144 The fact that the ‘Truth about the Navy’ scare was sparked by a 
Liberal paper edited by W.T. Stead, a prominent anti-war crusader, pointed to another problem 
that both the party and the peace movement never managed to solve, namely the ‘widespread 
assumption in Britain of the peaceful nature and ‘disinterestedness’ of the country’s maritime 
strength’.145 While a great many Liberals and Radicals were always prepared to attack naval 
spending, most retained a belief in the navy as the customary defender of ‘English freedom’ and 
this often compromised the party’s attempts to present a unified front against the demands of the 
Admiralty.146 As we shall see in both the Channel Tunnel and the Naval Defence Act, the 
Liberals found themselves struggling to square ‘little England’ navalism with internationalism 
or parsimonious critique. More dangerous even than this was the tendency of centrist Liberals, 
who wished to limit the electoral damage of their party’s reputation for parsimony, to accept 
uncritically the assertions and demands of the defence pessimists. In December 1884 Lord 
Kimberly – that representative figure of the ‘quiet mass’ of ‘moderate’ Liberal opinion – 
lamented ‘how very reluctant Gladstone is to increase expenses even for the most urgent wants 
of the army or navy’, a reluctance Kimberly believed was ‘mischievous to the public 
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interests.’147 Considering that the weaknesses of Stead’s campaign were by this time well 
understood by Kimberly’s political colleagues within the Admiralty, his attitude was 
symptomatic of his statesman’s inability to understand complex defence issues, his inclination 
to trust the ‘expertise’ of public alarmists and crucially, his determination to meet the demands 
of an agitated ‘public opinion’, the subject of the following chapter.148  
Conclusion 
In a society increasingly respectful of specialist expertise, professionalism became central to the 
armed forces officers’ claim to public attention. Disgruntled with the way in which civilian 
politicians ran Britain’s defence policy, pessimistic professionals set about attacking the party 
system and its idol of ‘retrenchment’. In demanding that policy be developed on ‘scientific’ 
principles, they aimed to recast the debate within a frame of reference defined by themselves, 
thereby excluding the older tradition of ‘amateur’ ministerial policymaking. With most 
politicians largely uninterested in the complex details of national defence, this strategy was, as 
we shall see, surprisingly effective. They found a particularly receptive audience in the 
Conservatives, exploiting the party’s existing prejudices to push their own vision of patriotic 
‘good government’ onto a reluctant Lord Salisbury. At the same time, they were able to take 
advantage of weaknesses within the Liberal anti-armament tradition, which found itself 
distracted and lacking the intellectual weight to seriously counter the newly invigorated and 
confident ‘professional authorities’. This produced a state of affairs which ultimately proved 
fatal to the future of liberal internationalism in British politics.  
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Figure 7: ‘Days with Celebrities: The Peace Party’. 
The Conservative Journal Moonshine voices the revulsion Tories felt at the anti-imperialist and 
pacifist attitudes of many on the Radical wing of the Liberal Party.  





Public Opinion, the Press and Panic 
 
Our Only General went one day, 
Determined for to say his say, 
And he told John Bull such a norrible tale, 
That it made his rosy face turn pale. 
It was all about our great countree 
and its terrible in-se-cur-i-tee, 
Enough to make every boy and gal 
Grow lamentablee hy-ster-i-cal. 
The Army was fine, of course, but then 
It couldn’t well fight unless it had men; 
and no se-cre-ta-ree of State 
Would provide for men in his estimate. 
The Navy was that in which we trust, 
But its ships were few, and its guns would bust; 
And ships and guns were what no First Lord 
Appar-i-ent-lee could afford. 
If an enemy chose to cross the seas, 
He could capture us all with perfect ease; 
And when in London he’d made his breaches, 
Farewell to after-dinner speeches! 
This norrible tale caused quite a scare, 
As the Telegraph trumpet blared its blare; 
And everybody seemed overcome, 
Tweedle, twiddle, twaddle, twoddle, twum. 
 
‘The “England in Danger” Scare’, Fun, 23 May 1888, p. 222.1 
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The importance of public opinion to the transformation of British national defence during the 
late nineteenth century has long been recognised. For Marder, the 1880s saw the creation of a 
widespread ‘intelligent interest’ in naval matters, sparked by the ‘Truth about the Navy’ 
campaign.2 Although he strikes a cautious note as to its impact on official policy, Marder 
nevertheless argues that the public became a ‘useful ally to the Admiralty, enabling it to squeeze 
more out of the treasury than would have otherwise been possible.’3 Much subsequent naval 
historiography – including that which has exposed the ‘myth’ of naval weakness – has endorsed 
this conclusion, stressing the apparent ease with which alarmists were able to harness and direct 
public feeling, especially through their connections with the press.4 By the 1890s, argues G.R. 
Searle, the Admiralty and the pessimistic world-view it represented had ‘captured the popular 
imagination’, thereby forcing the hands of policymakers.5 On the other hand, military and 
cultural historians who focus on the fear of invasion after 1870 characterise British society not 
as intelligent but irrational. According to these academics, fear of naval defeat or mili ary 
invasion became a ‘peculiar susceptibility’, a ‘chronic anxiety’, a ‘grave national psychosis’ and 
a ‘national obsession’: late nineteenth century Britain, they argue, was a society pervaded by 
panic.6 Either way, the 1880s have come to be regarded as a watershed moment for popular 
attitudes towards national defence. After decades of apathy, the public is considered to have 
‘woken up’ and become an active force on the side of the pessimists. 
On closer inspection, however, this perspective contains a number of problems. In the first place 
there are some basic chronological issues. Most statements about the ‘spirit’ of the period 1880-
1894 are overwhelmingly reliant on sources from the late 1890s, when navalist or ‘invasionist’ 
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language was far more common.7 This in turn is indicative of the lack of detailed research on 
public opinion during the 1880s. Historians tend to rely on invasion fiction, London ‘clubland’ 
papers, private or official documents and claims of public support made by obviously interested 
contemporaries such as Beresford or Hamley, and have not expanded their scope to include 
provincial or working class newspapers, for example. As we shall see, these problems bedevil 
work on both the Channel Tunnel and Naval Defence Act. Finally, as touched upon in the 
preceding chapter, the narrative of popular support for naval expansion or popular fear of 
invasion has done little to engage with the claims of historians who argue that the British people 
were economically minded and largely apathetic towards the details of national defence.8 In 
particular, Jan Rüger’s seminal study of ‘popular navalism’ in Britain and Germany during the 
two decades before 1914 suggests that, while government ‘stage-managers’ might have been 
enthusiastically interested in the state of the navy, there is little hard evidence that these feelings 
pervaded the mass of the populace.9 In the context of the empire, Bernard Porter has argued that 
the novelty of ‘new imperialism’ from the 1880s onwards encouraged both its supporters and 
detractors to overemphasise its popularity, and he draws attention to much evidence which 
points the other way.10 Indeed, the obvious continuing popularity of Gladstonian Liberalism in 
the 1890s presents a serious problem for the assumption of popular enthusiasm for the anti-
internationalist pessimist cause. It is telling, for example, that the first sentenc  of Gladstone’s 
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memorandum of opposition to the naval increases of 1894 read: ‘I deem it to be in excess of 
public expectation’.11  
These problems are brought into sharp relief by developments in our understanding of how 
nineteenth century ‘public opinion’ was created and represented. Historians are no longer 
satisfied with assuming that the press or the platform accurately reflected the feelings of the 
entire nation.12 It is recognised, for example, that a reliance on London newspapers ‘of record’ 
such as The Times has skewed our understanding of ‘national’ opinion, something 
acknowledged by contemporaries themselves.13 As Simon Potter points out, politicians and 
journalists of this time had few qualms about ‘appropriating the voices of people they had not 
been able to consult in any meaningful way.’14 This tendency was encouraged by the expansion 
of the franchise, which turned ‘the democracy’ from an enemy of the constitutional order into a 
powerful source of authority which politicians competed strenuously to represent, in the hope 
that being seen to speak ‘for the people’ would boost their own personal legitimacy.15 This 
tactic proved especially useful for those – like the defence pessimists – who wished to attack 
‘the tyrannical grip of party’.16 However, as James Thompson has shown, the specific rhetoric 
of ‘public opinion’ could also be used to gain legitimacy by excluding certain classes or 
constituencies.17 The ‘public’ was a vague and limited concept, rarely synonymous with the 
‘people’ and regularly confined to the middle and upper classes.18 In this way politicians, 
journalists and commentators were able to co-opt or ignore whole swathes of the country as they 
saw fit, exploiting the ill-defined boundaries of the political public for their own ends. A key 
                                                          
11 Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, vol. XIII, p. 364. 
12 Compare, for example, Marder, Anatomy, pp. 11-12 with Rüger, Great Naval Game, pp. 124-125. 
13 Aled Jones, Powers of the Press: Newspapers, Power and the Public in Nineteenth-Century England 
(Aldershot: Scolar, 1996), pp. 92-93; Andrew Hobbs, ‘The Deleterious Dominance of The Times in 
Nineteenth-Century Scholarship’, Journal of Victorian Culture, 18 (2013), pp. 472-497. 
14 Simon J. Potter, ‘Jingoism, Public Opinion, and the New Imperialism’, Media History, 20 (2014), pp. 
34-50 (p. 40).  
15 Robert Saunders, ‘Democracy’ in David Craig and James Thompson (eds), Languages of Politics in 
Nineteenth-Century Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), pp. 142-167 (pp. 156-159). See 
also Jon Lawrence, Speaking for the People: Party, Language and Popular Politics in England, 1867-
1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
16 James Thompson, British Political Culture and the Idea of ‘Public Opinion’, 1867-1914 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 5.  
17 Thompson, British Political Culture. 
18 Thompson, British Political Culture, ch. 1. 
97 
 
part of the methodology used in this thesis, therefore, involves careful analysis of the reality 
behind the rhetoric of public support used by both internationalists and anti-internationalists.  
This chapter considers the importance of the ‘public’ as a factor in the discourse of national 
defence. By the 1880s, public opinion had emerged as both ‘an essential element of the political 
system and an expression of social forces’, with politicians and political campaigners 
increasingly focussing their energies on cultivating and directing it.19 As the first section of this 
chapter shows, national defence was no exception from this trend. Both optimists and pessimists 
believed that if they succeeded in convincing the people the government would quickly swing 
behind their own policies. Section two puts these aims into the context of recent scholarship 
which has shown contemporary public opinion to have been an exclusionary construct that gave 
greater weight to high ‘society’ and often ignored lower and non-metropolitan classes. By 
paying special attention to the structure of the nineteenth century press, this section argues th t 
defence pessimists exploited their close links with London newspapers to appropriate the voice 
of the ‘nation’, sidelining the much largeer constituency in the ‘provincial’ and Radical 
working-class press that was often hostile to the myth of British vulnerability.  Finally, the 
chapter turns its attention to the fear of the irrational public, an idea much used yet rarely 
analysed by historians. Though regularly hailing common sense as a national characteristic, 
journalists and politicians alike were deeply concerned that the British people too easily slipped 
into a state of panic when the issue of military or naval weakness was raised. Drawing on the 
experience of the mid-century invasion scares and the more general nineteenth century fear of 
the ‘panic terror’, contemporary commentators came to regard ‘newspaper panics’ as reflecting 
a fatal flaw within the national psyche. Overall, the chapter provides a much-needed account of 
the relationship between public opinion and defence policy in late nineteenth century Britain, 
which both contextualises the thesis’ later case studies and goes some way to explaining why 
historians continue to assume that ‘the people’ were firmly supportive of the pessimistic cause. 
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Speaking to the People  
The first half of the nineteenth century saw ‘the public’ installed as a powerful, sometimes 
omnipotent force in the minds of Britain’s politicians.20 The reform agitation of 1832, the Anti-
Corn Law League of the 1840s and the contemporary Chartist campaigns left a deep impression 
in the minds of all who witnessed them, demonstrating how vulnerable governments now were 
to external pressure organised on a large-scale.21 As the subsequent invasion scares 
demonstrated, foreign policy and defence was by no means excluded from this influence. 
Drawing on his experiences in the Anti-Corn Law League, Richard Cobden always maintained 
that arms spending and belligerence could only be reduced by educating the nation and bringing 
‘the conscience of the people’ to bear upon governments; free trade and liberal democracy 
would, if properly directed, work hand-in hand to achieve international peace.22 The Peace 
Society of the 1880s similarly believed that statesmen would only abandon their warlike 
policies ‘by the force of public opinion declaring against the perpetuation of the war system, 
and demanding the institution of rational methods for settling disputed points’.23 Likewise, 
defence pessimists were convinced that public opinion was the vehicle by which their views 
could become adopted as government policy. ‘The only method of obtaining reform in any 
direction is so to persuade the public of its necessity, that the party in power will perceive that t 
is more to their own profit to grant than to withhold it’, wrote Charles Beresford in his 
Memoirs.24 A populist Tory Democrat – Lord Salisbury regarded him as ‘too greedy of public 
applause to get on in a public department’ – Beresford’s language was suffused with appeals to 
‘the people’.25 Although the autocratic Garnet Wolseley was far removed from this point of 
view, he was nevertheless a canny media manipulator deeply aware of the importance of 
courting public opinion.26 ‘We all profess anxiety for a better state of things,’ he wrote to the 
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Minister for War in 1887, ‘but until the public is taken into confidence our complaints against 
the present system will have no practical result’.27 ‘It must ever be remembered that politicians 
are merely the weather-cocks of public feeling’ reflected one Admiralty critic in 1888.28 
These attitudes were predicated on a common perception, which had developed early in the 
century, of public opinion as an intelligent and patriotic force, capable of responding in a 
coherent and dynamic way to national issues.29 Inspired by an idealised liberal vision of the 
sturdy and independent-minded middle classes, this narrative pointed to events such as the 
repeal of the Corn Laws – a ‘triumph of reason’ – as evidence that the British public were 
fundamentally rational.30 Public debate therefore valued the declaration of serious, reasoned and 
earnest beliefs that treated the nation as capable of evaluating the evidence and coming to its 
own conclusions.31 ‘I have great faith in great multitudes when appealed to perseveringly and 
honestly’, wrote Cobden in 1857.32  
Emboldened by their status as professional experts, confident in ‘the soundness of our 
reasoning’, defence pessimists found themselves naturally at home in this environment.33 All 
they wished to do, they said, was take the country ‘into their confidence’. Once the facts of 
Britain’s weakness were clearly articulated, the patriotic public would not fail to ‘do their duty’ 
and force the government to bow to the pessimist demands.34 ‘We believe this system would not 
be allowed to go on for a single year,’ wrote one navalist, ‘if the public were once thoroughly 
enlightened as to the consequences which must inevitably ensue if we found ourselves at war 
with a maritime Power.’35 This rhetoric complemented criticisms of the political elite, who, it 
was often suggested, were actively concealing the facts from the public for political gain. ‘The 
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country wants to have the truth, which no Government has he honesty to tell’, argued Wolseley 
in 1888.36 In this way pessimists were able to reinforce their image as honest and ‘non-political’ 
purveyors of facts rather than mere political lobbyists. In his 1882 condemnation of the Navy, 
Forewarned, Forearmed, the perennial alarmist Lord Henry Lennox concluded:  
The numbers of our ships and guns compared with those of France is now before the 
People of this Country, and it is for them to decide whether England is any longer to 
hold the doubtful position which she now occupies among the maritime powers of the 
world!37  
In appealing to the rational public, pessimists were challenging liberals on their home ground. 
An optimistic belief in human intelligence was critical for a world-view that held global unity to 
be an achievable aim.38 Cobden’s Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860 was an example of 
an attempt to put this theory into practise by allowing the ‘natural forces’ of trade and public 
opinion to pressure governments into adopting less belligerent foreign policies.39 By the 1870s, 
‘trust in the people’ had become a central animating force of Gladstonian Liberalism, which 
interpreted contemporary politics as a conflict between the ‘people’ and ‘privilege’ – with the 
armed forces situated firmly in the latter camp.40 Far from enthusiastic supporters of greater 
arms spending, peace campaigners believed that ‘the vast masses of the people were growing 
tired of the old game – tired of sacrificing their children and the wealth they produced’ to feed 
Britain’s war industries.41 Gladstone’s Midlothian speeches, for example, appealed to the 
cosmopolitanism of an electorate which he assumed was naturally inclined to support free trade, 
retrenchment and moral government, and would never waiver in its patriotic ‘duty’ towards 
peace, justice and liberty.42 The bullish anti-militarism of the British was a staple of Radical 
literature and was rooted in the conviction that the ‘masses’ were morally superior to the 
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‘classes’ [Figure 8].43 Looking forward from 1882 to the enfranchisement of large swathes of 
the working classes, the Liberal-Labour MP Thomas Burt assured his readers that the new 
electorate would bring with it a perspective ‘uncorrupted by interests, unwarped by prejudice’, 
demanding greater accountability on the part of its government and always opposing the 
‘military spirit’ and ‘secret diplomacy’. ‘The forces and tendencies that make for peace and 
justice are constantly increasing,’ he declared, ‘and with these forces and tendencies the 
Democracy – which is indeed itself probably the very fount and source of the new spirit – will 
certainly sympathize and co-operate.’44 
The fight between internationalists and pessimists for the support of the people was thus a test 
of the nature of British patriotism demanding the nation choose between cosmopolitan or 
national principles.45 In placing their faith in, and appealing to, the influence and power of the 
people, both sides were hoping to encourage a ‘bottom up’, popular movement for informed, 
rational and patriotic change, which would outflank unpatriotic politicians or scheming generals 
respectively. To this end, it is important to understand that national defence was rarely the 
subject of mutual dialogue or exchange of ideas. Pessimists and optimists were not speaking to 
one-another: instead, they sought to produce weighty and convincing monologues for the wider 
audience in the country. In most cases, their aim was not to deconstruct or rebut the arguments 
of their opponents but to create an alternative narrative, often using the same data, for the 
consumption of public opinion. They provided the facts, and the people would do the rest. ‘Our 
business must be with the masses’, concluded Cobden in 1853. ‘Keep them right, and we can’t 
go wrong.’46 
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Figure 8: ‘The Painter and His Portrait’. 
John Bull expresses the moral revulsion towards Wolseley’s militarist and conscriptionist 
sentiments that Radicals ascribed to the British public. Liberal and Radical, 2 Feb. 1889, p. 73. 
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It is important, however, to recognise that though the people’s power and rationality was widely 
credited, the determination to speak to and educate the public was rooted in the concern that the 
populace was essentially apathetic towards national issues, including defence. Despite the 
academic interest in the concept of public opinion in the nineteenth century, the idea of th  
apathetic public has received little attention.47 This is curious, not least because disengagement 
was a matter of foremost concern to contemporaries. Reflecting on the state of the nation in 
1882 Gladstone wrote in private of ‘the impossibility of keeping the public in mind always 
lively and intent upon great national interests’.48 If Liberals largely kept these concerns to 
themselves, anxiety that the nation was living in a dangerous state of indifference was a vital 
ingredient of the pessimistic platform.49 ‘National complacency’ was a central theme of the 
invasion scare literary genre and regularly served as the self-justification for ther forms of 
‘alarmism’.50 In 1884 Colonel Sir Charles Nugent opened a lecture on ‘Home Defences’ at the 
Royal United Services Institution by expressing his amazement at the ‘apathy and indifference’ 
of the public on the subject. ‘Is it’, he asked, ‘that we are so wrapped up in our individual 
concerns that we…are content to live in a fool’s paradise, from which we may any day be 
rudely awakened?’51 Four years later, although admitting that ‘there is a growing feeling in the 
country which may be turned to good account’, Nugent again repeated the charge.52 In the 
discussion that followed both occasions his audience largely agreed, stressing education as the 
only practical remedy.53 ‘The public mind is in a fog’, observed Captain John Colomb MP in 
1888, ‘…it seems to me that somehow this nation has lost the power of grasping great and wide 
national principles of defence’. Only by uniting together as experts behind a prominent 
manifesto, he argued, could a ‘healthy’ and ‘intelligent’ public opinion be brought to bear on the 
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issue.54 In this context the effect of the 1884 Representation of the People Act was a matter of 
great interest to officers, who were keenly aware of the extent to which the defence estimates 
now rested in the hands of the working classes. Some, such as Sir Edward Hamley, hoped that 
this new constituency could be converted to an ‘enlightened influence’ and a source of strength 
for military reformers and administrators.55 Unsurprisingly, Wolseley inclined to the opposite 
view. In September 1888 he published an article which eulogised the ‘great man’, declaring that 
‘the torrent of anarchical democracy lately let loose upon England is undermining, and must 
eventually destroy, that fabric of military and naval strength upon which our stability as a nation 
rests.’56 
These concerns were so prominent because both sides feared that the other was best placed to 
exploit the apathetic public. As we have seen, Cobden had encouraged the idea that warlike 
activities were driven primarily by the upper classes, who exploited the ignorance, gullibility 
and apathy of the public to line their own pockets.57 In this spirit, Gladstone complained that, 
while the people were lethargic, ‘the opposite sentiment of class never slumbers.’58 Defence 
pessimists meanwhile never failed to stress the strong influence that ‘ conomists and 
peacemongers’ held over official policy.59 For both sides, the alternative to an awake, informed 
and active public was a national policy ruled by their ideological opponents – or, as we shall 
see, one defined by the anarchic influence of panic. 
Listening to the Press 
Grandiose claims about the power and influence of public opinion were commonplace during 
the 1880s.60 This attitude persisted despite the fact that the British electoral system was one of 
the least inclusive in Europe, with only sixty percent of adult males holding the vote and no 
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form of direct or proportional representation.61 Indeed, argues Thompson, despite the 
democratic veneer, ‘public opinion’ actually had little to do with true democratic representation, 
tending instead to serve as a euphemism for upper and middle class opinion.62 All were not 
equal in a political culture that ‘weighed rather than counted’ opinions, valuing reason, 
rationality and status above sheer numbers; the voice of a prominent member of the elite was 
able to outweigh, for example, multiple trade unionists, especially if the latter were expressing 
an unfashionable view.63 Faced with a country that appeared, in the main, ambivalent or 
apathetic towards national defence and potentially hostile to increased military spending, this 
limited and exclusionary interpretation of ‘the public’ became crucial to defence pessimists’ 
narrative of reasoned public support for their cause. As Parts II and III illustrate, the defence 
revolution of the 1880s was rooted more in the skilful manipulation of ‘respectable’ London 
opinion than it was in any kind of groundswell of popular enthusiasm. 
 By the late nineteenth century there had developed three principal methods of measuring public 
opinion, the petition, the platform and the press.64 Of these the petition was the least used, with 
formal petitions to Parliament largely limited to issues such as church rates or temperance, 
although, as we shall see, the format was used during the Channel Tunnel scare, when class 
prejudice was exploited to present a group of signatories from the metropolitan elite as 
representative of ‘national’ opinion.65 On the other hand, platform speaking and public meetings 
were a crucial element of all political discourse at this time, and national defence was no 
exception. Navalist campaigners made extremely effective use of meetings from 1884 onwards, 
projecting an idealised impression of their movement as an engaged and representative fusion of 
genuine public opinion and professional expertise.66 However, although both the Channel 
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Tunnel petition and the navalist meetings were central set-pieces of their respective campaigns, 
they would have been little more than voices in the wilderness were it not for the accompanying 
support of the press.  
Reflecting back, defence campaigners were never in any doubt that it was the newspaper press 
that had provided them with the crucial advantage needed to push their polices onto the British 
government. Writing in 1897, Admiral Philip Colomb provided a narrative of the 1880s which 
stressed the centrality of newspapers as a tool for the transformation of public opinion, and 
thereby defence policy:    
Independent and patriotic editors, with their hands free, and yet stimulated by business 
instincts, undertook the task which was impossible to statesmen and officials either in 
or out of office. They set the anonymous pens of the best-informed and keenest men in 
the country to work; they opened their columns to the free-lances of the navy, and in the 
earlier eighties initiated and stimulated a tremendous change in the public opinion of the 
country, reinforcing it in the later eighties, so that it has never ceased to run in the 
direction then marked out for it.67 
Colomb was certainly correct that he and his colleagues had made excellent use of the press 
during this decade. Driven by a self-imposed responsibility to ‘enlighten’ and educate, and 
designed to appeal to a readership assumed to possess ‘a serious concern for the affairs of a 
world power’, many newspapers provided a congenial environment for expert defence 
pessimists.68 Yet the limited approach to the press often adopted by historians ignores the fact 
that it was predominantly the London papers that defence pessimists exploited. Like its 
readership, the London middle and upper-class press was overwhelmingly Conservative during 
this period, while the commercial, industrial and shipping interests of the City were 
disproportionately interested in defence matters as compared with the rest of the population.69 
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Indeed, the fact that the armed forces were themselves an integral part of London high society 
meant that the City was liable to swallow pessimistic exaggerations wholesale. Consequently, 
London papers were eager to print such exaggerations: as the editor of Murray’s Magazine 
wrote to Beresford in 1888, an article or series of articles on the national defences by their 
foremost critic would prove ‘extremely valuable to the magazine’.70 
It is therefore hardly surprising that Army and Navy officers maintained close links with 
sympathetic journalists in the capitol and they regularly provided information or wrote pieces 
themselves.71 Consequently, these metropolitan papers were easily swung behind the narrative 
of British weakness. The Times had been known as ‘the alarmists’ chief spokesman’ since the 
1840s and the Morning Post, which was widely read by Tory party members, also became an 
eager producer of pessimistic rhetoric.72 The Daily Telegraph was especially important, printing 
articles from Wolseley on the danger of invasion which precipitated the ‘scare’ of 1888.73 
Equally as important was the pessimistic domination of the influential London ‘clubland’ 
papers, particularly the Pall Mall Gazette, the St. James’ Gazette and the Spectator, which 
specialised in producing analysis and discussion from a consciously ‘imperial’ perspective for 
their small but elite readerships.74 ‘The Truth about the Navy’ campaign itself illustrated the 
power that these papers, working in combination with armed forces ‘experts’, could wield.75 
Lastly, it is also important to stress the defence agitators’ mastery of that most quintessentially 
nineteenth-century and middle-class literary phenomenon, the essay.76  After 1880, and 
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especially during bumper years such as 1882 or 1888, rarely a month went by without one of the 
literary journals carrying an article by a concerned pessimist. Self-consciously imbued with 
intellectual prestige, these journals proved the perfect forum for the discussion of weighty 
matters of national security, allowing the ‘true’ weakened state of the national defences to be 
elaborated in full. Foremost among them was the Nineteenth Century, edited by the architect 
and socialite James Knowles, who was determined to run the magazine on ‘utterly impartial’ 
lines.77 By the 1890s the journal had become the first port of call for alarmist articles, with both 
Wolseley and Beresford publishing their respective manifestoes against the Channel Tunnel and 
in favour of naval increases in its pages.  
This is not to say, however, that the London press’ support for the pessimistic narrative was 
inevitable. As Part II illustrates, at the opening of the 1880s metropolitan newspapers were 
enthusiastically supportive of Cobdenite attempts to encourage European peace by a Channel 
Tunnel, and inclined to be sceptical of alarmist stories about military and naval weakness.78 I  
this context the pessimistic conquest of the Nineteenth Century was a damning indication of the 
wider liberal internationalist malaise. In contrast to the prodigious output of retired Generals 
and Admirals, few defence optimists put pen to paper in a determined attempt to defend their 
ideals and rebut the myth of British weakness. Anti-militarist ideologues like Sir Wilfrid 
Lawson, enthusiasts of retrenchment such as Sir William Harcourt or optimistic Army officers 
like Sir Andrew Clarke were notably absent from the pages of the literary journals; the essays of 
John Knox Laughton and George Shaw Lefevre referred to in Chapter One were unique in this 
respect. The result of this failure was stark. Of the papers most widely read by the London 
‘elite’ only a small Liberal minority – the Daily News or Henry Labouchere’s gossip magazine 
Truth – consistently attempted to strike an ‘optimistic’ and critical line during times of 
heightened concern.  
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Two areas where optimists and internationalists were likely to gain a more sympathetic hearing 
were the ‘provincial’ and working class press. The four decades before 1914 were a ‘golden 
age’ for non-London newspapers, many of which maintained circulations far in excess of The
Times.79 Holding great influence within their local areas they were predominantly Liberal in 
outlook and thus more sympathetic towards the internationalists.80 The Liberalism of Cobden 
and Bright had been forged not in London but in Manchester and it was to the provinces that 
Liberals continued to look for support against the pessimists and alarmists in the London press. 
‘London never was England’, reflected Thomas Burt in his 1882 discussion of the working 
classes and British foreign and defence policy. ‘It has been repeatedly pointed out how little the 
ablest London journalists know of the feelings and thoughts which stir the hearts of the masses 
of their countrymen.’81 Considering the country as a whole in December 1884, the Radical 
Northern Echo – which happened to be W.T. Stead’s old paper – asserted: 
The present ministry is essentially a peace ministry. But there is a danger of their 
looking not so much to the facts of the case as to a so-called demand from the country. 
There is no such demand. There is not even a semblance of it. If the country really 
wants more means of slaying its neighbours it is surprisingly silent on the subject. The 
masses of the people have not condescended to discuss the matter, and the ravings of 
alarmists are to them as meaningless as the crackling of thorns under a pot.82 
Although the Liberal split of 1886 pushed many regional papers towards the Unionists, they 
continued to maintain a sceptical attitude towards the anxieties of the capital. For example The 
Scotsman, which left the Gladstonian fold following the Home Rule crisis, continued to 
maintain a derisive attitude towards the ‘manifest folly’ of Wolseley and Beresford in 1888.83 
Of course, the independence and optimism of the extra-London press should not be exaggerated. 
As Part II shows, most provincial papers turned against the Channel Tunnel in imitation of their 
metropolitan counterparts. Nevertheless, they were a realm into which the pessimists rarely 
directly ventured and where the myth of British weakness often struggled to establish itself. 
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If the provinces were difficult territory, the working class newspapers proved the alarmists’ 
most persistent and principled opponents. Foremost among these were Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper and Reynolds’s Newspaper, both published on a Sunday and possessing 
comparatively enormous readerships: Lloyd’s had a circulation of well over 600,000 by 1879 
and Reynolds’s 350,000 by the middle of the 1880s.84 The political positions of these papers 
have often received little attention from historians of the press.85 Yet this is to ignore, as Alan 
Lee and Eugenio Biagini point out, the strident Radicalism of both.86 In terms of national 
defence Lloyd’s  and Reynolds’s tended to take a calmer view of things than The Times or Pall 
Mall Gazette, displaying a balanced and competent handling of things like naval policy absent 
from their metropolitan ‘betters’. In September 1884, for example, both Lloyd’s and Reynolds’s 
quickly struck back at the alarmism of the Pall Mall Gazette, accusing naval officers of acting 
out of self-interest and the Conservative opposition of stoking the scare to further its own 
ends.87 Lloyd’s immediate reaction was to provide its readers with a comparative table showing 
the superiority of the British Navy over the French, while the more Radical Reynolds’s 
combined this with an anti-aristocratic, almost revolutionary tone. Consider, for example, the 
following extract, taken from the paper’s leading column on the front page of the 12 May 1889 
issue, reflecting on the passage of the Naval Defence Act and entitled ‘The Naval Defences 
Fraud’: 
Is there any reason to believe that the disinherited “masses” would be worse under a 
foreign conqueror than under the existing re ime? ... Why should men who are ground 
to the dust by an industrial system which leaves them no escape from practical slavery 
plus uncertainty of employment trouble themselves about the naval defence of the 
country or any other kind of defence? As the old Roman proverb has it, “Vacuus viator 
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cantabit coram latrine” (“The penniless traveller will laugh in presence of the robber.”) 
… Let them defend it who have a stake in it.88 
Two weeks later, under the title ‘Humbugging the Working Man’, the paper accused politicians 
of ‘carefully avoid[ing] all direct contact’ with the working classes, thereby remaining ignorant 
of the fact that the majority opposed the proposed naval programme.89 Of course, it would be 
easy, as Stephen Koss does in his monumental study of the British ‘political press’, to dismiss 
the idea that these papers reflected their reader’s political opinions.90 This, however, is to ignore 
much contemporary evidence to the contrary.91 As Biagaini argues merely buying a copy of 
Reynolds’s was a political act, and he gives much evidence to suggest that the p per’s leader 
columns were widely read.92 This is not to say that the British working classes were 
unanimously Radical, but it serves to emphasise the little evidence there is pointing the other 
way, in support of anti-internationalist claims of support. The almost total lack of any mass-
circulation Tory Sunday paper during this decade is extremely telling, for example.93 
The evidence from the newspaper press, therefore, goes some way to questioning the idea that 
the British people bought overwhelmingly into the pessimist narrative.  As we shall see, Radical 
MPs repeatedly pointed to provincial and working class opinion as evidence that defence 
anxiety was not a nation-wide concern. However, as discussed, nineteenth century public 
opinion was not measured by quantity. Although they may have had a readership in the 
millions, provincial papers and Radical weeklies were not often read at Westminster, while 
journals with tiny circulations such as the Pall Mall Gazette would have reached every Member 
of Parliament.94 For Conservatives especially, ‘public opinion’ consisted of the ‘clubland’ 
papers, The Times and the literary journals, which together were regarded as speaking for the 
nation.95 As inhabitants of the metropolitan social scene, London journalists were themselves 
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susceptible to this top-down, limited and exclusionary view.96 Reviewing the aftermath of the 
‘Truth about the Navy’ scare in 1886, the editor of the Fortnightly Review Thomas Escott 
declared:  
Not from the Government, but from the people, speaking through the press, have come 
the demands for a strengthened navy and fortification of coaling stations. It will be wise 
to anticipate the next outcry, and provide the elements of a national army resting on the 
goodwill of the people.97 
Escott’s conclusion was only plausible if one concentrates exclusively on London papers. Yet it 
is this perspective which has been largely adopted by historians.98 By heavily influencing the 
London press, and then claiming that self-same press as the voice of the nation, pessimists 
largely bypassed the problem of public support. Taken singularly, an article condemning the 
state of the Army by a retired general was an example of expert authority from above; a number 
of such articles taken together became ‘public opinion’. This was precisely the method against 
which Sir Wilfrid Lawson raised a lone voice in the debates on the supplementary estimates 
following the ‘Truth about the Navy’ scare in December 1884: 
It was a misfortune to the country that the Government should be so strongly influenced 
as it was by the Press and the platform. The fact was that no Government was able to 
stand against the public opinion of the country. He regretted that they were not able to 
stand against the force of public opinion when public opinion was false, and he only 
regretted that that false public opinion did exist. What interest had the people in keeping 
up these enormous armaments? Their interest was all the other way, and the whole of 
this panic had been got up by the writers in the Press, anonymous people whom nobody 
knew.99 
Lawson’s characterisation of ‘public opinion’ as little more than an anonymous pressure group 
masquerading as the voice of the nation was one with which many Liberals, including 
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Gladstone himself, agreed.100 The Party was not, however, united on this score. In a long and 
rambling pessimistic speech during the 1884 debate, for example, the Liberal shipping magnate 
Sir Donald Currie produced ‘a letter addressed to me from a working man’, which claimed that 
‘the Democracy’ was awakening to the need for increased naval spending.101 These Liberal 
disagreements about the true state of popular feeling on national defence pointed to a fracture 
that had existed within the party since its mid-century creation, between those who took their 
inspiration from Lord Palmerston and those who followed the tradition laid down by Richard 
Cobden. The former were more comfortable dealing with the populist ‘imperial’ themes of the 
1880s and did not regard agitation for greater military or naval spending, or popular support for 
imperial wars, as an implicit threat to Liberal ideals; many, including Sir Donald Currie, left the 
party in 1886 over Irish Home Rule. Meanwhile the Cobdenites, as we have seen, desperately 
hoped that the reason and morality of the people would cause them to reject the allure of 
jingoism. As the decade progressed however Cobdenites proved far less confident than their 
imperialist colleagues. By the 1890s, many, including Sir Wilfrid Lawson, had arrived in 
despair at the conclusion that the alarmist newspaper press did indeed represent the British 
people. ‘It may be laid down as a rule’, Lawson reflected bitterly in his memoirs, ‘that all wars 
are popular in England’.102 
Liberal fear of the irrationality of the people was not new to this period. Despite his hopeful 
optimism in the future of humanity, Cobden regularly expressed disillusion with the British 
‘war spirit’, which, during the Crimean War, he regarded as an all-pervasive ‘moral 
epidemic’.103 ‘I get discouraged as to the effect of reason and argument and facts in deciding the 
policy of the country’, he wrote in the aftermath of the 1859 war scare. ‘We are a very illogical 
people, with brute combativeness which is always ready for a quarrel and which can be excited 
at the will of a governing class that has subsisted for centuries upon this failing in John Bull’s 
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character.’104 Although his Three Panics was an appeal to reason, it dealt with, and was 
intended to prevent, periods of unreasonable ‘passion’.105 In selecting the word ‘panic’ for his 
title Cobden was using a word already familiar to his audience, especially in the context of 
financial collapse and geopolitics. By the 1880s the term and the vision of the nation it 
represented had become central to the lexicon of national defence in Britain. 
Fearing the Irrational  
Speaking to a Manchester audience in January 1894, the Tory frontbencher and future Prime 
Minister Arthur Balfour summed up the British attitude to national defence as alternating 
‘between intervals of apathy and panic’: 
…we let the whole question slide out of our minds for a long interval. We then awake 
and find that we are in a position of inferiority as regards these armaments, compared 
with the national obligations we may be called upon to fulfil; we awake with a start, and 
suddenly begin to make frantic preparations, which would have been wholly 
unnecessary if we had kept the even tenor of our own way, carefully from year to year 
considering the necessities of our position, and carefully from year to year seeing that 
those necessities were fulfilled.106 
By the 1890s, the idea that Britain was uniquely susceptible to defence panics as a consequence 
of its indifference had become something of a truism. ‘Unfortunately discussions on naval or 
military inefficiency either leave the public cold or plunge them into panic’, wrote the Liberal 
politician Reginald Brett, who had worked closely with Stead on the ‘Truth about the Navy’ 
articles.107 ‘It seems impossible to generate healthy and sustained public interest in these 
matters’.108 Indeed, the trope of the sleeping public suddenly awakened by realisation of its 
defenceless was as old as the post-Napoleonic defence anxiety itself.109 By the 1880s Britons 
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had come to regard invasion and naval panics as a regular and virtually unpreventable 
peculiarity of national life.110 ‘Panics, like the poor, are “always with us”’ sighed the Leeds 
Times in 1889.111 A year earlier Jacob Bright lamented that defence panics occurred ‘almost 
with the regularity of the seasons’.112 
For Liberals and Conservatives, optimists and pessimists, defence panics represented the 
antithesis of the rational public. So widespread was the conviction that the British people were 
the ‘scariest’ in Europe that, as the historiography quoted in the opening paragraph of this 
chapter indicates, the language of scare and panic remains a crucial prism through which 
national defence in Britain between 1870 and 1914 is understood by academics.113 In their 
analyses these historians have moved a surprisingly small distance from early twentieth century 
Liberal writers such as J.A. Hobson or Caroline Playne, who, seeking to explain the apparent 
‘madness’ of the South African and Great Wars respectively, drew on the then emerging field of 
psychology to describe a ‘psycho-neurotic’ mentality of militarism and paranoia which swept 
over the collective mind of the nation from the 1880s onwards.114 For both of these writers 
public opinion was excitable, unreasoning and even insane, peculiarly susceptible to alarmist 
warnings and jingoistic appeals and liable to be driven into a panic that politicians, in their
‘moral impotency’, found irresistible.115  
It is, firstly, worth considering the significance the word ‘panic’ held for nineteenth century 
Britons.  As Thomas Lansdall-Welfare and others have recently demonstrated via content-
analysis of digitised newspapers, panic was a quintessentially nineteenth century word.116 First 
emerging into popular use in connection with the 1826 financial collapse, by the depression 
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years of the 1870s it had become a commonplace synonym for economic loss and disaster on a 
personal, national and international scale.117 It was in this context that the word also received an 
important link with conflict, as ‘wars, rumours of wars, and revolutions’ were the most common 
cause of major fluctuations on the London stock exchange.118 It was in the nineteenth century 
that the term ‘panic-monger’ was coined, quickly becoming a charge that public figures would 
go to great lengths to avoid.119 When, for example, in 1889 it was suggested to Lord Salisbury 
that a member of the government should speak at a meeting in favour of increased defence 
spending, he dismissed the idea on the grounds that any accusation of stirring up panic would 
negate any good which the meeting itself might do the cause.120 While the pages of Hansard 
rarely contain direct accusations of panic, they are filled with denials from members afraid that 
their words, actions or policies might be seen in such a light. By the end of the century panic 
had become one of the great bugbears of the age, an ineradicable reminder in this ‘Era of 
Crowds’ of humankind’s evolutionary origins and the ease with which illogical ‘nature’ might 
gain the upper hand over rational ‘science’.121 Culturally, it is no coincidence that the later 
nineteenth century saw a revival of interest in the Greek god Pan, the god of the wild whose 
pipes were said to have struck all who heard them with fear and from whose name the word 
derives.122 ‘Pan is not dead’ became a favoured refrain of commentators wishing to emphasise 
the unbroken link between contemporary panics and the fears of the ancients; ‘panic terrors’ 
sent modern armies fleeing in fear just as they did the Hoplites.123 
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Central to the late nineteenth century experience of panic was the news media. The basic idea of 
a media panic is well understood. In a highly organised and interdependent democracy, social, 
moral or political panics are possible only through the mass communication of risk. They are 
therefore both the creation of and entirely dependent on the media, whose dominant interest is 
profit.124 As such, a press panic is defined by numbers; if a newspaper’s coverage of an event 
boosts circulation, then it automatically has an interest in maintaining and expanding its 
hysterical language. Although the idea of spreading fear and alarm through newsprint was by no 
means new to the late nineteenth century, the sheer number of papers available during this 
period constituted a sort of crowd in their own right, magnifying and sensationalising once 
limited or niche hysterias into national or international events.125 In 1882 Punch produced a 
satirical ‘Panic-Monger’s Guide’ in response to a recent collapse on the Paris stock exchange, 
which neatly illustrated the idea that a newspaper panic could be quantified in terms of leader 
columns: 
Two “Questions” in the House of Commons make twenty-four Leaders. Twenty-four 
Leaders make one Alarm. Four Alarms make two Panics. Two Panics make one 
Catastrophe. One Catastrophe makes two hundred Leaders. &c., &c.126 
Significantly, in a culture which regularly treated the voice of the press as the voice of the 
people, newspaper panics could easily become regarded as more general phenomena, giving the 
impression that the entire country was in a state of anxiety.127 This was the case with the 
traditional narrative of the defence panic. As indicated in Balfour’s summary, a defence panic 
was a short period of high-profile media interest and anxiety in the state of the national 
defences, usually sparked by a particularly influential article or speech condemning some 
deficiency, real or perceived, in the Army or Navy [Figure 9]. During such events, the usually 
apathetic public would ‘wake up’ to its defenceless condition, demand, with ill-thought out 
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haste, the laying down of some new ironclads or the erection of fortifications, and, after a few 
weeks, retire back into its indifferent state, having added only inefficiencies to the defences and 
fresh burdens on the exchequer [Figure 10]. As such, like financial panics defence panics were 
regarded by all sides as dangerously costly, both in terms of cash and in weakening the defence 
infrastructure, as the post-1859 ‘Palmerston’s follies’ demonstrated.128 ‘Panics’, asserted the 
Tory arch-pessimist Lord Carnarvon, ‘produce bad work and expensive work.’129 Somewhat 
dubiously, Lord Henry Lennox argued that the Royal Navy was in such a weak positon because 
whereas the French had a ‘settled’ shipbuilding programme its British counterpart was a product 
of panic.130 Sensitive to accusations of panic-mongering, Armed forces professionals and their 
supporters were always careful to frame their criticisms as motivated by a wish to promote 
‘such a state of preparedness that the nation may be raised, above the unworthy region of panic, 
into a higher and serener atmosphere’.131 Charles Beresford, for example, insisted that he 
attacked, ‘the fatal, rotten, misleading system’ of civilian government because it had plunged 
the country into a ‘chronic panic’ from the 1880s onwards.132 Speaking to a consultative 
committee in 1887, Sir Andrew Clarke, former Inspector-General of Fortifications, suggested 
that ‘actual war itself, when we are plunged into it, will really do less injury to the country than 
these recurring panics from the supposed defenceless condition of our great centres of 
commerce and our great lines of communication’.133 In this Clarke was articulating a concern 
shared by both his fellow officers and his fellow Liberals, for there were no greater critics of 
‘government by panic’ than Liberals and Radicals.134 Traditionally, the Liberal party had taken a 
longer-term view of military and especially naval policy than its Conservative counterpart, 
preferring to build slowly and steadily in anticipation of future crises where the Tori s aimed at 
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a more ‘forward’ imperial policy.135 As a consequence Liberals tended to regard panics as more 
of a threat to their own policies as did the Conservatives.136 In language which Beresford would 
have whole-heartedly endorsed, the Daily News condemned the ‘vicious system of progress by 
panic, which has really been the cause of all our shortcomings.’137 As dangerous as panic 
measures might prove, however, other commentators believed that the real peril lay in the 
reversion to apathy and ‘placid security’, as J.F. Maurice termed it, which followed such events. 
‘The inevitable result of any irrational panic is the return, when the scare has passed away, of a 
feeling of equally irrational security’, warned The Observer.138 Alarmist ‘gabble’, reflected the 
Saturday Review, ‘is soon found out, and then the whole thing is dropped in disgust, the good 
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Figure 9: ‘The “England in Danger” Scare’. 
General Wolseley gives John Bull a fright via the Daily Telegraph.  









Figure 10: ‘The City Arms! ... Continental Papers Please Copy’. 
Funny Folks satirises the tendency of invasion panics to result in extravagantly expensive and 
unnecessary fortification schemes. Funny Folks, 26 May 1888, p. 166.  
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For some critics, panics were little more than metropolitan affairs created by and for the 
enjoyment of ‘society’, though costing the country millions.140 The satirical journal Funny 
Folks, which was aimed, significantly, at a lower-middle and working class audience, captured 
this in an 1888 cartoon depicting a very middle-class looking London as the target of the 
invasion scare of that year [Figure 11].141 For many others, however, the British press’ 
susceptibility to panic was seen as reflective of an irrational streak within the national psyche, a 
weak point in the otherwise logical ‘national character’ identified in the first section of this 
chapter. ‘I think we are in other matters eminently a business-like people, eminently a practical 
people, eminently a people not given to panic’, opined Balfour. Only in matters of defence, he 
argued, were the British people susceptible to fright.142 Writing a decade earlier, the Liberal 
journalist Francis Lawley echoed Cobden when he declared: 
We are so fond of believing that some other nation is preparing to invade us—that gun 
for gun we are no match at sea for France—that something has happened, or is about to 
happen, which fundamentally alters our position, and leaves us comparatively at the 
mercy of some hypothetical foe, that panic-mongers have always had, and always will 
have, a glorious time of it in our midst.143 
For his part, Lawley believed that this attitude had perverted British perceptions of what a good 
citizen should be: ‘panic,’ he asserted, ‘and a ready credulity and alacrity in accepting and 
entertaining it, are always regarded in this country as evidences of patriotism.’144  
The fear of panic was magnified in the minds of contemporaries by their concerns as to what 
such a scare might do to the country when it was actually embroiled in a European war. Lord 
Salisbury himself foresaw a nation ‘incapacitated by panic’ in the event of a wartime invasion 
rumour, a vision he supplemented with prophesies of riots, looting and mutiny.145 These views 
were brought to public attention in the immediate aftermath of the invasion scare of 1888, when 
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as part of a reorganisation of Rifle Volunteer battalions, Salisbury’s government issued a letter 
to commanders of newly created Volunteer Brigades, emphasising the ‘grave evils which would 
result from a panic of an invasion’. ‘Timely’ and ‘judicious’ preparations, declared the letter, 
would be the surest means of instilling in the public ‘such a confidence in our powers of 
defence, that the disorder consequent on a sudden apprehension of invasion may be 
prevented’.146 Such concerns combined an acute awareness of the apathy of the public, the 
volatility of the press and the political significance of ‘public opinion’, with the collective 
memory of decades of panics over finance and defence. Britain’s unique susceptibility to panic, 
it was feared, might ultimately prove its undoing. In 1891, Reginald Brett drew upon this 
experience of past scares to describe the possible effect a press panic might have in wrecking 
government strategy: 
The timid citizens of London and Liverpool and Glasgow, believing the battleships to 
be their first and last line of defence, frightened by newspaper rumours, would clamour 
for the presence of the naval forces in British seas, in close proximity to the great 
exposed centres of commerce; and a Government trembling for its reputation and its 
Parliamentary majority would doubtless yield to the “force of public opinion.”147 
As the studies in Parts II and III of this thesis demonstrate, the fear of panic had a measurabl 
influence on policymaking, ultimately in favour of the defence pessimists. Indeed, for critics of 
the national defences, the fact that panics were so easily raised only served to prove the ‘truth’ 
of their concerns. As such, panic provides an excellent example of the power which the press 
held over the mind of government. By repeatedly invoking the term, British politicians and 
journalists built the power and irrationality of public opinion up to enormous proportions, 
convincing themselves that the nation was suffering from a nervous disposition that might 
become fatal if the national defences were seen to be neglected. As we shall see in the case of 
the Channel Tunnel scare, contemporaries feared not only the extravagant expense which 
resulted from ‘government by panic’, but that panic might, if allowed to run unchecked, destroy 
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Britain’s liberal institutions. So prevalent were these attitudes that they have become picked up 











Figure 11: ‘The Scare of Unprotected London’. 
The head on top of the pole is probably that of Edward Levy-Lawson, the Daily Telegraph’s 




It is no exaggeration to say that the subject of national defence in late nineteenth century Britain 
revolved around the cultivation, control and containment of ‘public opinion’. Inspired by the 
ideal of the rational public, defence pessimists and liberal internationalists alike believed that, if 
they were able to bring ‘the people’ on side, their vision for Britain’s defence establishment 
would eventually triumph. In spite of this attitude, however, public opinion was in fact an 
extremely problematic term, used as much to exclude and appropriate as to include and consult. 
Indeed, the idea that the people were largely apathetic loomed large over the debate, 
exacerbated by the lack of channels through which they might make themselves heard. The 
result was that attention in Whitehall focused overwhelmingly on the elite metropolitan press, 
which the pessimists, who dominated it, represented as the true voice of the nation. The 
alarmists also inspired and drew strength from the widespread fear of panic, which lurked 
wherever the idea of future warfare was discussed. Far from a rational and patriotic guide for 
policymakers, many politicians, especially in Salisbury’s post-1886 government, came to see 
the people as a dangerous and unpredictable force that required a strong defence policy to keep 
in check. The overall result of this elite attitude towards public opinion favoured the methods 
and propaganda of the defence pessimists, pushing the weighty voices of the London-based 
armed forces professionals to prominence at the expense of more sceptical voices. In assuming 
that the ‘public opinion’ of the London newspaper press represented the great mass of the 
nation, they made the mistake, as the Cobdenite F.W. Hirst, later complained, of confusing ‘the 
minds and opinions of our people with the nonsense they have to read.’148 As is illustrated in the 
remainder of this thesis, this confusion had a decisive effect, helping to define both 
contemporary policymaking and the historical memory of the 1880s. 
 
  
                                                          
























On 20 January 1882 the ‘Second Railway King’, Sir Edward William Watkin MP, chaired the 
first meeting of his newly founded Submarine Continental Railway Company (SCRC). Already 
the Chairman of three other railway companies and the recent recipient of a Baronetcy, Watkin 
undoubtedly regarded this moment as the opening of his business career’s finest chapter: the 
construction of a railway tunnel underneath the English Channel. It is impossible to miss the 
confidence, not to say triumphalism, of his inaugural address to the assembled members: 
I think you will agree with me, gentlemen, that to connect the Continent with England is 
a work without an equal among all the labours until now accomplished by the hand of 
man. I cannot myself realise, either a better, or a greater, work, and it seems to me that 
the only question left with regard to it is – its practicability.1 
Even on this score, Watkin displayed few doubts. Underneath the Channel, he told his audience, 
was a layer of grey chalk, impervious to water. All they had to do was ‘follow the chalk’. The 
South Eastern Railway Company (SER), of which he was also Chairman, had acquired a patch 
of land on the foreshore between Dover and Folkestone, at the closest point in the UK to France. 
The Company had already begun trial diggings using a pneumatic boring machine partly 
designed by Royal Engineer officer Colonel Frederick Beaumont, with the aim of meeting mid-
Channel a tunnel begun by a French company at Sangatte, near Calais. The SCRC had been 
formed to oversee this work. Colonel Beaumont himself, for whom his role in the SCRC was 
‘one of the proudest moments of my life’, told the meeting that once boring was fully under way 
his machine could tunnel a yard an hour.2 
Among the men who addressed the meeting after Watkin, there was a feeling that they were 
assembled at the dawn of a new, more prosperous and peaceful age. Lord Edward Brabourne, 
Deputy Chairman of the SER and a director of the SCRC, declared that all associated with the 
Tunnel would soon have made their names ‘something in history’. Another speaker, Lord 
Alfred Churchill, was sure that by promoting trade and communication between peoples the 
Tunnel would ‘do more than anything else to maintain the peace of the world’. It was admitted, 
                                                          
1 Report of a Meeting of the Members of the Submarine Continental Railway Company…on Friday the 
20th January, 1882 (London: C.F. Roworth, 1882), p. 3. 
2 Meeting of the SCRC…20th January, 1882, pp. 32-33. 
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and a number of speakers alluded to this, that there were a few objections to the project on 
military grounds. Lord Brabourne dismissed such fears as belonging to the previous century. 
Watkin himself was untroubled; those present were men of science and business, imbued with 
‘intellect and patriotism’. The moment they combined behind the scheme, ‘no military 
objections will be allowed to stand in the way.’3   
Unfortunately for Watkin, the practicability of the project was rapidly to become the least of hi  
worries. The previous year, following concerns expressed in The Times about the Tunnel’s 
defensibility, the Board of Trade, unknown to parliament or the wider public, had set up a 
Committee to enquire into the scheme. Meeting during December 1881 and January 1882, the 
Committee interviewed a number of witnesses including Watkin and the Tunnel’s most 
prominent opponent General Sir Garnet Wolseley, quickly concluding that a more extensive 
inquiry was needed. In February 1882, Wolseley published a vehement article in The Nineteenth 
Century arguing that the naive cosmopolitanism of the Tunnel scheme represented a decisive 
threat to national security. Within a fortnight a wave of anxiety had engulfed the hitherto placid 
press, and by March ‘public opinion’ appeared to have swung decisively against the scheme. 
Alarmed by the sudden panic, the government first directed the War Office to set up a ‘Channel 
Tunnel Defence Committee’, which reported against the project in May 1882, and then 
established a Joint Select Committee under Lord Lansdowne, which met during the first half of 
1883. Although Lansdowne himself found in favour of the scheme the majority of his 
committee voted against it, a decision the government accepted on 24 July 1883, resulting in the 
withdrawal of two Bills then before the Commons. Work on the French tunnel, which had never 
lacked the full support of its government, ceased in March 1883. By this time, the British and 
French companies between them had succeeded in boring well over 3,000 yards under the 
Channel without complication, a convincing indication of the project’s feasibility. Although 
Watkin continued to campaign for the Tunnel, repeatedly introducing Bills into parliament and 
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receiving in 1888 the support of Gladstone, he retired from the Commons in 1895 having failed 
to reverse the decision of 1883. 
Historiography 
While the long history of the Channel Tunnel idea, 1802-1994, has generated a respectable 
amount of academic work, the rejection of the project during the 1880s has received only 
cursory attention.4 The Official History of Britain and the Channel Tunnel (2006) dedicates 
barely four pages to the entire decade, while Michael Bonavia’s Channel Tunnel Story (1987), 
although a useful study from the perspective of railway history, is similarly brief.5 The most 
comprehensive work on the pre-1945 Tunnel, Keith Wilson’s Channel Tunnel Visions (1994), 
treats the 1880s as a ‘prologue’ and is essentially a quotation-heavy narrative of various 
government enquiries, providing little in the way of detailed analysis.6 Probably the most 
balanced account of the 1880s attempt is Anthony Travis’ detailed 1991 article, which does 
much to place the project within its technological, ideological and political contexts, but, again, 
its length prevents all but the briefest of analysis.7 The only extended investigation into the 
Gladstone government’s rejection of the scheme is Robert Culham’s insightful 1992 Master’s 
thesis.8 Culham emphasises the reluctance of successive British governments to support the 
project from the 1870s onwards as the principal reason for its failure, branding it an example of 
‘official mismanagement’. These studies, which all take the official sphere as their focus, have 
constructed a clear chronology centred on the three enquiries of the Board of Trade (1881-
1882), the War Office (1882) and Parliament (1883), culminating in the withdrawal of the 
Channel Tunnel Bills in July 1883. They largely draw on only two sources: a parliamentary 
Blue Book, Correspondence with Reference to the Proposed Construction of a Channel Tunnel, 
                                                          
4 For general surveys of the Channel Tunnel historiography see Richard S. Grayson, ‘Britain and the 
Channel Tunnel’, Twentieth Century British History, 7 (1996), pp. 382-388; Duncan Redford, 
‘Opposition to the Channel Tunnel, 1882-1975: Identity, Island Status and Security’, History, 99 (2014), 
pp. 100-120. 
5 Terry Gourvish, The Official History of Britain and the Channel Tunnel (Abington: Routledge, 2006), 
pp. 4-7; Michael R. Bonavia, The Channel Tunnel Story (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1987). 
6 Keith Wilson, Channel Tunnel Visions, 1850-1945 (London: Hambledon, 1994), pp. 22-49. 
7 Anthony S. Travis, ‘Engineering and Politics: the Channel Tunnel in the 1880s’, Technology and 
Culture, 32 (1991), pp. 461-497. 
8 Robert Bryce Culham ‘The Channel Tunnel Project: 1871 – 1883: A Study in Public Sector 
Mismanagement’ (MA Thesis: University of Alberta, 1992). 
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which covers the period from 1870 up to its publication in August 1882; and the proceedings of 
the Select Committee, published in July 1883.9 As a result, they tend to emphasise the slow and 
staggered nature of institutional decision-making, minimising both ideological factors and the 
influence of public opinion.10 Furthermore, their narrative takes as its principle theme the fear of 
invasion expressed at length by the likes of Wolseley during the official enquiries, while 
ignoring Watkin’s pro-Tunnel arguments, which, as a public relations campaign, do not feature 
as strongly in the official material.11 Nor do they take more than a passing glance at the 
parliamentary situation, despite the fact that the Commons voted on the scheme five times 
between 1884 and 1890. These problems also bedevil the much earlier studies of Slater and 
Barnett, (1957) and Thomas Whiteside (1962), which would be of little concern were they not 
so heavily relied upon by more recent historians despite their tendency to generalise about areas 
such as public opinion without adequate research to back up their claims.12  
Alongside these studies of the official attitude to the Tunnel are a number of works by cultural 
and literary scholars examining the small quantity of pamphlet literature which the Tunnel scare 
produced. Most notably this included a number of fictional narratives of future war, such as The 
Seizure of the Channel Tunnel (1882) and How John Bull Lost London (1882), which gave the 
invasion genre a fresh lease of life after the Battle of Dorking episode. The best of these 
academic studies, I.F. Clarke’s Voices Prophesying War (1992), uses the Tunnel to provide an 
important insight into the development of nineteenth century popular literature.13 As historical 
studies, however, these works are compromised by the shared assumption that their sources are 
representative of contemporary debate and national opinion. Furthermore, little attempt is made 
to appreciate the pro-Tunnel case, which did not inspire any comparable output of ‘future 
fiction’. More broadly, they are preoccupied with reading the anti-Tunnel campaign through the 
lens of British insular national identity, which is approached as irrational, intangible and almost 
                                                          
9 Correspondence; Report from the Joint Select Committee…On the Channel Tunnel; together with the 
Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence, and Appendix (10 July 1883, HC 248). 
10 See especially Culham’s discussion of public opinion in ‘Channel Tunnel Project’, pp. 3-11. 
11 A good summary of the invasion scare is Longmate, Island Fortress, ch. 29. 
12 Humphrey Slater and Correlli Barnett, The Channel Tunnel, (London: Wingate, 1957); Thomas 
Whiteside, The Tunnel Under the Channel (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962). 
13 Clarke, Voices, pp. 95-98. 
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undefinable. Cynthia Behrman (1977) uses the affair as an example of Britain’s sentimental 
‘myth of islandhood’, characterising the debate as ‘emotional, even hysterical, rather than 
rational’, while Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan (2010) argues that the Tunnel was rejected because it 
attacked the ‘matchlessness of English native soil and diminished the unique characteristics of 
its people’.14 The most extreme interpretation of this type is forwarded by Daniel Pick (1993), 
whose argument that anti-Tunnel literature ‘alluded, more or less explicitly, to sexual risks of an 
explosive and invasive kind’, appears, to this reader at least, to be reliant more on Pick’s own 
sense of innuendo than the historical sources.15 By selectively taking words out of context – 
laying stress, for example, on Charles Bradlaugh’s entirely innocent use of the term 
‘intermingling’ in a pro-Tunnel pamphlet – and overemphasising the fear of foreign races or 
political extremists using the Tunnel to enter and ‘corrupt’ the country, Pick constructs an image 
of the anti-Tunnel campaign as resting upon a pathological fear of ‘national rape’, itself required 
‘in order to provide the foundation and the support for a viable mythology of national identity’. 
As the following chapters illustrate, a balanced reading of the source material finds this account 
to be seriously misleading. 
The assumption that the Tunnel debate revolved around a form of innate and irrational British 
insularity dominates and defines our understanding of the demise of Watkin’s scheme. Wilson, 
for example, cannot resist describing his subject as a struggle between the ‘gut and the head’.16 
This view raises one central conclusion, inquiry into which forms the basis of the present study: 
that British national identity meant that any attempt at building a fixed-link Channel crossing 
was doomed to founder on the rocks of public opinion during the 1880s. The fundamental 
problem with this assumption is that it is maintained in the absence of a thorough study of the 
public sphere, or a close reading of the pro-Tunnel case.17 More importantly, it appears to 
seriously clash with our wider understanding of the nineteenth century as a time which 
                                                          
14 Behrman, Victorian Myths of the Sea, pp. 49-53; Amelia Hadfield-Amkhan, British Foreign Policy, 
National Identity, and Neoclassical Realism (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), p. 68. 
15 Pick, War Machine, pp. 121-135. 
16 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, p. xvi. 
17 Grayson, ‘Britain and the Channel Tunnel’, pp. 385-386. 
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celebrated ‘reason, science, progress and liberalism’, regarded technological development as 
inevitable and lauded increases in speed and efficiency of intercommunication.18 In this context, 
as Rosalind Williams argues, railway tunnels ‘incarnated what the age understood as 
progress’.19 It is unsurprising, therefore, that within the history of British Liberalism the Tunnel 
has come to be recognised as a project symbolising the spirit of Cobdenite, optimistic free trade 
internationalism. Most suggestive of all is Boyd Hilton’s description of it as a crowning 
example of ‘Practical Cobdenism’, which, along with other projects such as arbitration and 
fiscal union, hoped to build a unified and free trading ‘Europe of municipalities’.20 Both 
Anthony Howe’s study of Britain and free trade (1997) and Parry’s work on Liberal foreign 
policy (2006) associate it closely with Cobden’s philosophy and supporters, and cite its defeat 
as an example of the increasing strength of ‘militarist fears of invasion and patriotic glory in 
isolation’ during this period.21 For H.C.G. Matthew (1995), who ascribes its defeat to a 
combination of ‘Tories, Whigs, and ‘blue-water’ Radicals’, the fate of the Tunnel was indicative 
of the anxiety creeping into British defence policy and a symptom of demands for increased 
naval spending.22 These historians of Liberalism do little more than place the Tunnel in a broad 
political context, however, and are brief and vague in their appreciation of its defeat. It remains 
the case that no historian has used this political perspective to revisit the Channel Tunnel scare 
in detail. David Hodgkins’ otherwise excellent biography of Watkin (2002), for example, 
contains many of the ingredients for a study of how its subject’s Manchester Anti-Corn Law 
upbringing drove his spirited defence of his Tunnel, but ultimately fails to draw the link.23 Pick 
similarly neglects to apply his own close reading of Cobden to the Tunnel, while Hadfield-
                                                          
18 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Capital 1848-1875 (London: Abacus, 1997), pp. 15-16. 
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23 David Hodgkins, The Second Railway King: The Life and Times of Sir Edward Watkin, 1819-1901 
(Cardiff: Merton Priory Press, 2002). 
134 
 
Amkhan’s discussion of the Tunnel’s ‘political discourse’, which does identify many of the 
arguments of both sides, is devoid of contemporary political context.24  
Structure and Arguments of the Case Study 
The following case study provides a detailed reinterpretation of the ruin of Sir Edward Watkin’s 
Channel Tunnel attempt. As explained above, existing histories of the 1880s scheme largely 
ignore the pro-Tunnel case, instead focusing overwhelmingly on the ‘insular’ and ‘military’ 
anti-Tunnel fears. The present analysis corrects this neglect and places the controversy in its 
proper ideological context by giving equal attention to both the pro- and anti-tunnel arguments. 
Building on the conclusions of Howe, Parry and Hilton, Chapter Four argues that Watkin and 
his supporters were motivated by a profound belief in the teachings of Richard Cobden, around 
whose philosophy the case for the Channel Tunnel was built; far from a simple fixed link 
between London and Paris, both its advocates and many of its detractors regarded the Tunnel as 
an example of British liberal internationalism made manifest. In the context of this conclusi, 
the second half of the chapter re-examines Wolseley’s arguments against the Tunnel. 
Questioning the characterisation of the anti-Tunnel case as mere insular xenophobia, it is instead 
argued that Wolseley was driven by a fierce belief in the ‘realist’ school of international 
relations. By assuming that nations naturally existed in a state of conflict and struggle, Wolseley 
argued that a railway line between Britain and the Continent would increase, rather th n prevent, 
the risk of warwar, tempting an adversary into launching a surprise attack: in short, the very 
antithesis of Watkin’s Cobdenism.  
Switching to a more narrative approach, Chapter Five applies this political context to the wider 
public sphere and provides the first close study of the 1882-13 invasion ‘scare’.  It rejects the 
widely held assumption that British society was unanimously opposed to the Tunnel, and argues 
that the debate was much more even-handed. Instead of a spontaneous and popular uprising 
against the SCRC, the chapter identifies how Wolseley and his elite supporters in the armed 
forces, press and ‘society’ used the exclusionary and authoritative language of ‘expertise’ and 
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‘public opinion’ to portray themselves as the sole voice of the nation, ignoring or concealing the 
substantial evidence of working class support for the scheme. The resultant press reaction 
provides an insight into the power which fear of ‘panic’ held within the defence discourse. This 
chapter therefore materially expands our understanding of the strength of liberal 
internationalism and defence ‘optimism’ in Britain, especially among the trade union movement, 
during this period. It also offers an important illustration of how newspapers and ‘respectable’ 
opinion dominated and directed the ‘national’ discourse. 
Chapter Six is split into two substantive parts. The first reconsiders the governmental 
abandonment of the Tunnel in 1883, highlighting the importance of external influences such as 
public opinion on what has hitherto been regarded as an affair driven predominantly by official 
inquires. It emphasises the speed with which Wolseley’s public and private attacks on the 
Tunnel struck the government and examines the resultant split within the Cabinet. Despite 
strongly believing in the Tunnel himself, Gladstone failed to act publicly in defence of his 
internationalism, and was ultimately forced to accept the majority view of his colleagues. The 
second part of the chapter turns its attention to the five parliamentary debates and divisions on 
the Tunnel, 1884-1890, which historians have never subjected to scrutiny. It shows how the 
Tunnel produced heated discussion and intense interest in the Commons, revealing much about 
MPs’ attitudes to international relations, free trade, public opinion and the position of the armed 
forces in society. In analysing the divisions, it shows that Liberal opposition was by no means 
as overwhelming as has been assumed; indeed, the evidence suggests that by 1890, at least half 
of the parliamentary party was supportive of the idea. Meanwhile the Conservatives 
overwhelmingly opposed the project, illustrating the extent to which the party had adopted 
Wolseley’s anti-internationalist and pessimistic world view. Overall, the case study shows the 
Channel Tunnel question to have been an important milestone in the transformation of British 
defence policy during the later nineteenth century, an ideological, social and political 






The Ideological Context to the Channel Tunnel Controversy 
 
As it’s not a mere suspicion 
That our insular position 
Has its comforting fruition 
In our safety, common sense 
Will admit there’s no occasion 
To facilitate invasion 
By avoidable erasion 
Of our natural defence. 
Though there be no present danger 
Of intrusion of the stranger 
Future time may prove a changer 
Of the colour of affairs, 
So that every Briton’s son’ll 
Much regret that blessed funnel 
Of a precious Channel Tunnel 
As the cause of many cares. 
If the bonus to the nation 
Of the costly speculation 
Be the simple obviation 
Of the pangs of mal-de-mer 
To a few unstable qualiers 
Who, unqualified as sailors, 
Would be likely to be ailers –
Better leave us as we were! 
As we’ve failed in ascertaining 
How the country will be gaining 
By the boring and the draining 
Of this tunnel down below, 
Do obligingly inform us 
(just to interest and to warn us) 
What’s the gain that’s so enormous? – 
As we should be glad to know. 
 




Though historians have not tended to stress the Channel Tunnel’s ideological facets, for 
contemporaries such matters were at the forefront of the discussion. As Gladstone reflected in 
1888, the Tunnel was a subject which hung on ‘ultimate principles and modes of thinking which 
are fixed on one side and fixed on the other’.1 This chapter examines these ‘ultimate principles’, 
reconstructing the ideological case for and against the Channel Tunnel as presented to the 
government and the public by Watkin, Wolseley and their respective supporters. By 
approaching it from this perspective, the Tunnel scare emerges as a struggle between two 
antithetical geopolitical visions, cosmopolitanism and anti-internationalism, optimism and 
pessimism. More than a footnote to the history of British insularity, it instead provides an 
important window into the position of liberal internationalism during the 1880s. 
Sir Edward Watkin and the Case for a Channel Tunnel 
A subject of engineering interest since the 1830s, it was not until the 1870s that a railway tunnel 
underneath the bed of the English Channel came to be talked of as a serious possibility.2 In 1872 
the Channel Tunnel Company (CTC) was registered under the chairmanship of Lord Richard 
Grosvenor, and in 1875 it was empowered by Parliament to acquire land in St. Margaret’s Bay 
in Kent. At the suggestion of the Conservative Foreign Secretary Lord Derby, an Anglo-French 
Commission was set up to look into the question, producing a draft treaty of agreement in 
1876.3 With government approval and an enthusiastic press, construction appeared imminent. 
Proof of technical viability was still lacking, however, denting investor confidence; stymied by 
financial problems, the CTC had achieved little serious progress by 1880.4 
It was during this time that the project attracted the attention of Sir Edward Watkin, 
independent-minded Liberal MP for Hythe and one of the most famous railwaymen in the 
country. Although closely involved with the CTC and serving for a time on its board, Watkin’s 
poor working relationship with Grosvenor led to him independently initiating trial borings o  
SER land midway between Folkestone and Dover in 1880. In late 1881 Watkin formed the 
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Submarine Continental Railway Company with a capital of £250,000 to oversee this work, 
enormously outstripping the £30,000 with which the CTC had begun.5 This was not the only 
SCRC advantage. Its pneumatic tunnelling machine, designed by Colonel Beaumont and his 
fellow Royal Engineer officer Captain Thomas English, was superior to anything the CTC had – 
a modified version of it was quickly adopted by the French company operating from Sangatte – 
and undersea geology made the SCRC plan far more viable. Indeed, although some opponents 
tried to claim otherwise, there were few serious doubts as to whether the SCRC possessed the 
technology and expertise to complete the Tunnel during the 1880s.6 Furthermore, Watkin’s 
organisational and publicity skills made the new company a far more confident and dynamic 
concern than the CTC. He assembled a ‘scientific and legal committee’ of ‘eminent men’ to 
give his company the gravitas and authority of overwhelming professional expertise. This 
committee included three lawyers, seven civilian engineers, a mining expert, the President of th  
Royal Society, the famous geologist Professor W. Boyd Dawkins and five retired military 
officers, although it is difficult to ascertain how many of these individuals were active 
participants.7 With the tunnelling making good progress and Watkin busy promoting his 
scheme, the project quickly became one of the most widely discussed engineering works of its 
day.     
On 16 June 1881 Watkin announced his belief that a cross-Channel ‘experimental’ Tunnel, 
seven feet in diameter, could be completed within five years.8 By this time both the CTC and 
SCRC had Bills before the Commons, requesting permission to continue tunnelling beyond the 
foreshore. The speed with which the project was now moving appears to have surprised the 
responsible department, the Board of Trade and its President Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain 
established a Committee, chaired by the Board of Trade and involving the War Office and the 
Admiralty, to consider what position, if any, the Liberal government should take. As part of this 
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inquiry, Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet Wolseley was asked to submit a memorandum of his 
views on the Tunnel. In February 1882, large parts of this document appeared as a Nineteenth 
Century article, vehemently attacking Watkin’s scheme. It was in response to this article that 
Watkin and his supporters stepped up their pro-Tunnel propaganda campaign. 
Aside from his many passionate speeches to SCRC shareholders which were widely reprinted in 
the press, and his evidence before the Board of Trade and Parliamentary Select Committees, 
Watkin also gave two papers on the subject. The first in April 1882 was read at a ‘crammed’ 
meeting of the Society of Arts in London, while the second was presented in November before a 
similarly well-attended meeting of the Royal Institution, at Hull.9 Watkin’s supporters were also 
hard at work. Most prominent among these was Watkin’s friend Edward Hugessen Knatchbull-
Hugessen, first Baron Brabourne, the former Liberal MP for Sandwich and a figure absent from 
the existing historiography. At Watkin’s request in March 1882 Lord Brabourne published a 
long and enthusiastic defence of the Tunnel in the Contemporary Review.10 Colonel Beaumont, 
who was also a former Liberal MP, also produced a short piece on the defence of the Tunnel for 
the Nineteenth Century, while Professor Dawkins wrote a piece for the Contemporary Review 
and gave a paper to the Manchester Geological Society. The following section uses these and 
other sources to reconstruct the pro-Tunnel case. 
In the first place, Watkin’s motivation for sponsoring the Tunnel was naturally commercial, 
anticipating high passenger and freight demand for a swift London to Paris route which avoided 
the widely feared Channel crossing.11 In his evidence to the Select Committee of 1883 he 
suggested that the line could carry between thirteen and fourteen million people a year and 
twenty or thirty million tons of goods, at a rate of perhaps 250 trains a day.12 Over the next 
decade he would forward a number of other arguments in its favour, including its benefits for 
the security of British food supply in a maritime war and the possibility of building a direct 
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railway line to India. Yet, although he never lost sight of its commercial aspects, in constructing 
both the justification for and defence of his project Watkin instinctively reached for the 
philosophy which he had espoused since his youth: Cobdenism, a theme which is inexplicably 
absent from the existing historiography.  
Like his party politics, the exact nature of Watkin’s world-view is difficult to characterise. He 
was not a member of the ‘Peace Party’, and had a certain imperialist streak; a few months before 
the 1880 General Election he had been challenged by members of his local party because of the 
support he had given to the Conservative government’s wars in Zululand and Afghanistan, 
which he defended on grounds of ‘patriotism’.13 Yet, despite these attitudes, he was at heart a 
passionate Cobdenite free trader. Born in 1819 in Manchester he worked closely with Richard 
Cobden in the Anti-Corn Law League, during which time he acquired a lifelong admiration of 
Cobden’s politics and philosophy.14 Looking back from 1891, he remembered Cobden as a ‘new 
light shining in our dark places’.15 Indeed, it is possible that Cobden himself sparked Watkin’s 
interest in the Channel Tunnel. Watkin was in regular contact with Cobden while the latter was 
negotiating his free trade treaty in France, and, according to a later account by Watkin, the two 
men had discussed the possibility of a submarine railway which Cobden hoped would become a 
‘true arch of alliance’ between Britain and France, a phrase which Watkin quoted at every given 
opportunity.16  
Richard Cobden himself had certainly looked favourably on the prospect of a Channel Tunnel. 
In 1861 he met the inventor James Chalmers, who the previous year had published a short book 
promoting a ‘Channel Railway’.17 Cobden remained in contact with Chalmers until the former’s 
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death, expressing the view that future generations would construct a Tunnel.18 Cobden 
apparently introduced the subject to Michel Chevalier, his collaborator on the 1860 Anglo-
French treaty, who later served as chairman of the French Channel Tunnel Company until his 
death in 1879.19 Nor did the Channel Tunnel’s links with the leading light of the Manchester 
School end there. John Bright was a staunch supporter, giving at least three pro-Tunnel 
speeches following his resignation from the government in July 1882.20 Another of Cobden’s 
Anti-Corn Law contemporaries, the former Cabinet minister Thomas Milner Gibson, also 
privately expressed pro-Tunnel views.21 More directly involved in Watkin’s publicity drive was 
John Slagg MP, former President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce and Cobden’s 
godson, who seconded Watkin’s parliamentary Bills in 1885 and 1888. Slagg was keen to root 
his pro-Tunnel position in his status as ‘a humble follower of Mr. Cobden’.22 Watkin clearly felt 
that closely identifying his project with Cobdenism would win him the support of Gladstone and 
his ministers, whom he pointedly referred to as ‘disciples of the policy of the late Mr. 
Cobden’.23 From its inception, therefore, Channel Tunnel was an explicitly Cobdenite 
undertaking, regarded by its promoters as a continuation of the great man’s work; on at least one 
occasion, Watkin favourably compared his Channel Tunnel advocacy with his earlier work in 
the Anti-Corn Law League.24 
The central argument in favour of the Tunnel was a simple reiteration of Cobden’s most 
optimistic teaching that peace, prosperity and civilisation thrived on communication and free 
trade. This outlook was summarised by Watkin in his Society of Arts paper, in language typical 
of Cobdenite millenarianism: 
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I take it for granted, that increase in the means of intercourse, or journeyings (sic) to and 
fro between nations, means – as cause is to consequence – the augmentation of wealth, 
and the expansion of civilisation. It means a great breaking down of barriers, a great 
letting in of light, the softening of national prejudices, and extension of career for the 
workman especially, but for all men of work alike – all tending to peace and goodwill 
amongst men.25 
There was, argued Brabourne, no ‘law of Nature which obliges Frenchmen and Englishmen to 
be enemies’.26 Increased cross-Channel communication as a consequence of steam power had 
already showed the ‘fancied antagonism of olden times’ to be a crime and a blunder; the Tunnel 
would allow this realisation to ‘permeate through the masses’ of both countries, who, due to 
improved education, were already coming to understand that peace was in their best interests. 
The Tunnel, declared Brabourne, in a traditional Cobdenite attack on aristocratic militaris , 
was ‘emphatically a People’s question.’27 In support of this argument Watkin and his supporters 
repeatedly quoted another of Cobden’s observations in favour of the Tunnel, to the effect that it 
was their duty to encourage friendship between the British and French ‘masses’, by 
‘multiply[ing] all the means of incessant contact which will certainly put an end to 
superannuated prejudice and old ideas of antagoism.’28 Indeed, an understanding of the 
‘people’ as an essentially trusting and tolerant force underpinned the entire pro-Tunnel cause. 
If Watkin and his supporters sought to directly link the Tunnel with the cause of peace, they 
also attempted to paint opposition to it as little more than war advocacy. It was with this aim in 
sight that one of John Bright’s speeches was published under the title ‘Peace or War with 
France?’, and that Watkin opened the Commons debate of 1884 by demanding to know whether 
the government wanted a ‘cordial and intimate alliance with France, or whether they preferred a 
policy of isolation and separation, the logical end of which must be strained relations, and 
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probably war?’29 In 1883 he went so far as to tell one meeting of the SCRC that, were the 
Tunnel not built and an Anglo-French war subsequently declared, all those present would be 
‘guiltless. Whatever happens, we have done our share’.30 Anyone against the Tunnel was 
accused of ‘anti-Gallican’ prejudice and spreading distrust of foreigners, in the same high-
minded tone with which Manchester Radicals had railed against the invasion scares of the mid-
century.31 Speaking at Hull, Watkin referred obliquely to these past controversies, framing the 
present struggle as between the ‘old’ spirit of peace and the ‘modern’ realist outlook: 
There were the old fashioned people who agreed that God made of one blood all nations 
of men to dwell upon the face of the earth; then there was the modern school who said 
that quarrels would in future begin without any reason and without any declaration of 
war, and if we did not keep awake all night we should be found with our throats cut in 
the morning (laughter).32 
For Watkin, any suggestion that the French would use the Tunnel to attack Britain unawares – 
that is, before a formal declaration of war – was contrary to his entire understanding of 
international law. Although Watkin and Beaumont always attempted to mix this optimism with 
assurances as to the ease with which the proposed railway might be destroyed, flooded or 
blocked, Lord Brabourne preferred to avoid dwelling on such contingences, which he 
considered contrary to the ‘present state of the world’s civilization’.33 Brabourne argued that a 
joint agreement neutralising the Tunnel, signed by the Great Powers, would be more than 
enough to guarantee Britain’s safety. As all nations would quickly develop an interest in 
keeping this ‘highway of the world’ open for traffic, any attempt to exploit it for warlike 
purposes would instantly make the aggressor a common enemy of all Europe. The Tunnel 
would thereby encourage inter-governmental trust and co-operation.34 In this view, the Tunnel 
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therefore fitted as much with the Gladstonian vision of Europe as a family of nations as it did 
Cobden’s more universalist creed. 
One interesting consequence of this staunchly internationalist outlook was its implication for 
attitudes towards the English Channel itself. In the context of the commercial spirit of the age, 
the Channel was not a protective ‘silver streak’ but a ‘break, retarding and embarrassing the 
great interchanges of nations’, excluding Britain from the Continental transport system and 
pushing the island further into isolation.35 Undoubtedly the most enthusiastic proponent of this 
view was the economist Professor Leone Levi, another former friend of Cobden, who argued in 
1883 that the ‘dreaded Channel’ had created a ‘moral chasm’ between Britain and France, 
driving them apart in politics, commerce and culture.36 He pointed out that millions of years 
previously Britain and the Continent had been joined by a land bridge. ‘Provident nature 
designed our union’, he argued, ‘A volcanic agency broke it asunder. Why not endeavour to 
restore the link?’37 This idea of the Channel Tunnel as a divinely inspired project, in the same 
vein as Cobden’s characterisation of free trade as ‘God’s diplomacy’, was a particular favourite 
of Watkin’s. In one speech he claimed that the Tunnel would restore ‘the physical union which 
the Almighty bequeathed to mankind in the morning of the world’.38 In another, he challenged 
MPs with the question ‘whether they thought Providence had made an accidental mistake in 
originally annexing England and France as one Continent?’39 Later, in 1887, he claimed that he 
had explained the geological facts to the late Archbishop of Canterbury, presumably the liberal 
Archibald Tait, who had told Watkin that he b lieved ‘Providence had placed that wonderful 
material [the grey chalk] between the coasts of England and France with a view to ultimate 
intercommunication.’40 Through these appeals to morality and providence, Watkin was 
articulating a politico-religious world-view which was not too dissimilar to Gladstone’s own, 
and which certainly owed something to the Liberal leader’s crusading, moralistic rhetoric. 
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Although Watkin’s defence of the Tunnel repeatedly emphasised the importance of international 
unity and progress, it was also buttressed with a patriotic message which sought to more directly 
address Britain’s national interests. For him the Tunnel stood not only in the same tradition as 
Cobden’s 1860 commercial treaty but also the 1851 Great Exhibition, which, he pointed out, 
had likewise experienced insular and military opposition.41 I deed, one name which appeared in 
the pro-Tunnel arguments almost as often as Cobden was Prince Albert, the driving force 
behind the Exhibition, who, it was claimed, had been a supporter of a Channel Tunnel in the 
years before his death.42 Similarly, Watkin also attempted to co-opt Queen Victoria – a known 
opponent of the Tunnel since 1875 – who had subsequently described the exhibition as a ‘peace 
festival’ which united the industry of the world.43 Echoing her, Watkin claimed the Channel 
Tunnel as a step towards creating a ‘permanent “peace festival”’; as the Exhibition had 
overcome ‘vulgar, selfish, ignorant’ prejudice, so the Tunnel would work towards the same 
aims of liberty and progress which, so far as he was concerned, were the secret of Britain’s 
economic, military and imperial success. The Channel Tunnel, argued Professor Dawkins in a 
paper to the Manchester Geological Society, was a project ‘consistent with all those 
undertakings which have made this country what it is. This country did not become great 
through fear.’44 An important part of this message was an attempt to market the Tunnel as a new 
weapon in Britain’s foreign policy arsenal, helping to spread British values of liberty and free 
trade across the European mainland. ‘It is as a Christian and a patriot’, said Lord Brabourne at 
one SCRC meeting, ‘that I feel it desirable that English notions and English views should 
become more powerful on the Continent, and I believe that they will become more powerful in 
the measure that access between peoples is facilitated.’45 For John Slagg the Tunnel would 
break down tariffs by allowing continental citizens to more easily discover the cheapness of 
British goods, while he also hoped that it might ‘civilise’ the French railway system’s many 
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‘barbarisms’.46 Far from bringing Continental values and dangers to England, then, the Tunnel 
would annex the mainland to the British Isles, and help to move Europe towards a peculiarly 
English vision of world unity. 
The case for the Channel Tunnel was therefore founded on a serious belief in the civilising 
potential of trade and communication, and the honesty and goodwill of humanity. It would 
enrich Europe while also furthering British interests across the Continent and provide a practic l 
demonstration that peace, not war, was the guiding principal by which nations conducted their 
affairs. More broadly it was to be the ultimate expression of the nineteenth century confidence 
in the power of scientific and technological progress, in the great tradition of the Suez Canal –
Ferdinand de Lesseps was a strong Tunnel supporter – or the Mont Cenis and Gotthard rail 
tunnels through the Alps, which, it was pointed out, had caused little anxiety among the Swiss, 
French or Italians.47 It is perhaps no surprise that the 1883 annual dinner of the Institute of Civil 
Engineers loudly and repeatedly cheered a vehemently internationalist pro-Tunnel speech by 
John Bright.48 To go against the Tunnel was, in Dawkins’ view, to ‘go back in the scale of 
civilization’.49 This language of scientific triumphalism was most passionately deployed by 
Lord Brabourne at the conclusion of his 1882 article: 
In spite of all opposition, science ever advances; in such an issue as the present, 
civilization and Christianity are marching hand in hand; the obstacles suggested, and 
perhaps for a time sustained, by insular prejudice and professional pedantry, will pale 
and fade away before the spirit of the age; and, in the triumph of the Channel Tunnel, 
one more step will be accomplished in the uniting and knitting together the hearts of 
nations, and in the nearer approach to the full and blessed recognition of the universal 
brotherhood of mankind!50 
Sir Garnet Wolseley and the Invasion Danger 
Like its modern descendant, the Channel Tunnel project of the 1880s faced a multitude of 
objections. Commercial factors were heavily debated: while some questioned if the Tunnel 
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could ever be viable, others argued that it had the potential to damage Britain’s maritime trade 
and industrial production by monopolising freight carriage and flooding the market with cheap 
foreign goods. However, although these views had significant sympathy in some quarters, there 
is little evidence to show that they were decisive. From a more extreme perspective, a small 
number of Tunnel opponents argued that the project would bring dangerous political or social 
influences to Britain. The Conservative MP and protectionist William Farrer Ecroyd, for 
example, feared that the construction of a Tunnel would more easily facilitate French 
‘propaganda of an atheistic and socialistic kind’ among British workmen.51 This attitude has 
been seized upon by some historians, notably Daniel Pick, to characterise the Tunnel’s 
opposition as built on a fear of cultural as much as military invasion from the Continent.52 Y t 
this ignores the fact that Ecroyd’s was a lone voice within the anti-Tunnel movement. More 
usual was the attitude of General Sir Frederick Roberts, who downplayed any risk of social or 
political corruption in favour of the military argument, believing the submarine ra lway ‘would 
not appreciably, if at all, increase the flow of continental mischief-makers to London’.53 Far 
from Ecroyd’s cultural isolationism, the objections to the Tunnel as outlined by Wolseley and 
his supporters were rooted in a political rejection of Watkin’s Cobdenite mantras. What they 
feared was not French atheism, but French soldiers. 
If Watkin’s campaign encompassed a significant number of high-profile Cobdenites, the 
movement against the Tunnel was dominated by the societal group against which Cobden 
himself had spent much of his life struggling: armed forces officers. The leader of this 
movement was the then Quartermaster-General of the Army, Garnet Wolseley, whose output on 
the subject was prodigious. In December 1881 he sent a memorandum encapsulating his views 
to the Board of Trade Committee. In February 1882, modified excerpts from this memorandum 
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were published in The Nineteenth Century by Lord Dunsany, a man known for his pessimistic 
view of Britain’s national defences.54 Not only was Wolseley clearly identifiable as the author 
of this piece, but the General also gave an interview summarising its salient points to the Central 
News Agency early that same month, a public intervention of which historians have hitherto 
been unaware.55 In March Dunsany published another article containing his own thoughts and a 
further passionate piece by Wolseley.56 Wolseley was by no means the only high-ranking Army 
officer publicly opposed to the Tunnel in 1882. Both the former Commandant of the Staff 
College Sir Edward Hamley and the Governor of the Royal Military Academy Woolwich Sir 
Lintorn Simmons published pieces in the May issue of The Nineteenth Century, while the 
Army’s Commander-in-Chief the Duke of Cambridge wrote a memorandum to the 1881 
Committee, subsequently published in the parliamentary Blue Book of August 1882. The 
Admiralty, although it was never moved to the same extent as the War Office, was represented 
by the Senior Naval Lord Admiral Sir Astley Cooper Key, whose firm letter of opposition to the 
First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Northbrook also appeared in the Blue Book.57 Examining 
these documents, this section considers the philosophical outlook which underpinned the 
military’s opposition to the Channel Tunnel between 1881 and 1883.  
At face value, the military case against the Tunnel constituted a straightforward strategic 
concern about the loss of insularity, a dystopian interpretation of Watkin’s claims that the 
submarine railway would abolish the Channel.58 If the Tunnel could remove all impediments to 
trade, then an enemy in possession of both ends might thereby render the Royal Navy, in the 
words of Cooper Key, ‘a helpless spectator’, solving the problems of supply and reinforcement 
which had hitherto posed such a challenge to potential aggressors.59 Thi  scenario allowed 
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Wolseley ample opportunity to repeatedly denounce the state of Britain’s land defences. The 
nation, he said, was in an ‘entirely undefended condition’ and ‘unprepared for war’.60 He 
particularly relished explaining how utterly inadequate were the defences surrounding Dover, 
stressing the ease with which the Castle might be taken by a few thousand soldiers.61 In thi  he 
was provided with the firm support of the Duke of Cambridge, who considered that the initially 
positive reaction to the Tunnel illustrated the extent to which the British public was deluded 
about the strength of its own defences.62 For these officers, the Tunnel issue provided a rare 
opportunity to bring their criticisms of the national defences before the public in dramatic 
fashion, and they clearly viewed it as a chance to normalise the idea that the Army was weak 
and in need of improvement. 
Consider these anxieties in the context of Watkin’s arguments, however, and the protests of 
Wolseley and his supporters emerge in a profoundly anti-internationalist light. Wolseley’s case 
against the Channel Tunnel was established upon a reading of diplomatic and military history 
that completely rejected the link between free trade, communication and peace. Questioned on 
this point in his Central News interview, he pointed out that the Northern and Southern United 
States had been closely linked by rail and road, as had Prussia and Austria, and France and 
Germany; if anything, the ease of cross-border travel had ‘intensified the conflict and swelled 
the carnage.’63 Employing familiar tropes of foreign jealousy, he suggested that the Tunnel 
might serve to tempt an ‘adventurous’ foe, a man in the mould of Napoleon or Frederick the 
Great, into launching an attack on London, famously the only unfortified capital in Europe.64 
Furthermore, reasoned Wolseley, were France to successfully invade Britain the English 
entrance would naturally be demanded as an indemnity, just as Germany had retained 
possession of Strasberg and Metz after 1871.65 Annexed to the continent and unable to recover 
                                                          
60 Wolseley before Board of Trade Committee, Correspondence, p. 223. 
61 Wolseley before Board of Trade Committee, Correspondence, p. 224. His assertions about the Dover 
defences were challenged at length in Beaumont, ‘A Reply’. 
62 ‘Observations by His Royal Highness the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief’, Correspondence, pp. 
299-305, hereafter referred to as the ‘Cambridge Memorandum’ (p. 304).  
63 Birmingham Daily Post, 6 Feb. 1882, p. 5. 
64 Dunsany, ‘Proposed Channel Tunnel’, pp. 296-297. 
65 Dunsany, ‘Proposed Channel Tunnel’, p. 295. 
150 
 
behind its protective moat, Britain would face ‘national annihilation’.66 ‘The existence of this 
tunnel would, therefore, I contend, be a constant inducement to the unscrupulous foreigner to 
make war upon us, as it would hold out to him hopes of a conquest the like of which the world 
had never known before’, he wrote.67 For Wolseley, the ‘specious cry of universal brotherhood’, 
was little more than dangerous utopianism: 
The nation that would shirk the responsibilities of independent national existence, and 
would hide its want of manhood and its patriotism under these pretty words, deserves to 
exist, and will exist, no longer than the moment at which its theoretical security is 
touched by the rough practical hand of the enemy, who will laugh at the cries of “breach 
of faith” when the “confidence trick” ends in the way it has always ended, in the 
robbery of the deluded victim.68 
Where Watkin saw goodwill and international harmony, Wolseley and his supporters suspected 
a foreign plot. Dunsany, for example, was keen to point out that continental generals and 
statesmen were relaxed at the prospect of a road ‘connecting them with the richest and, in a 
military sense, the weakest country of Europe’.69 Similarly Wolseley noted that shares in the 
SCRC were available for purchase abroad, running the risk that the company might be 
dominated by foreign citizens who could act against British safety.70 ‘The road to our ruin’, he 
wrote, ‘is paved with what look like good intentions’.71  
This attitude was obviously founded on the premise that the international system was not 
maintained by the rule of law, but the rule of might. A nation which depended for its security on 
‘paper treaties’, wrote Wolseley, ‘is far down on the decline that leads to national ruin’.72 
Certainly, he agreed that, were the French simply to march a force through the Tunnel upon the 
declaration of war, its mouth could held by fifty men against an army of 100,000.73 But this was 
not what he feared. Instead, the Quartermaster-General envisioned a surprise attack during a 
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period of ‘profound peace’, with no warning and without an official declaration of war, ‘whilst 
we gentlemen of England were abed, dreaming of the time when the lion and the lamb are to lie 
down together’.74 A small group of men might easily cross the Channel on a dark night and 
seize the British entrance in a ‘coup de main’.75 Worse, a battalion or two of French soldiers 
could be secretly entrained and sent on a ‘filibustering undertaking’ to take the Tunnel before 
the British authorities had realised what was happening, in direct contravention of any 
neutralisation treaties.76 The Duke of Cambridge drew attention to the possibility of Fenians 
attacking the railway in support of a French attempt, and General Hamley also raised the 
possibility of treason.77 Furthermore, by the time he came to testify before the Select Committee 
in 1883, Wolseley felt able to speak of such a surprise operation from personal experience. On 
20 August 1882, without a formal declaration of war, troops under Wolseley’s command seized 
the Suez Canal, to the shock of the Egyptian nationalist government and in the face of protests 
from the Canal’s creator Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had promised the Egyptians the waterway 
would remain a neutral zone.78 Not only did Wolseley cite this as an illustration of the ease with 
which great engineering works might be abused for military ends, but he also pointed out that 
the Egyptians had had ample time to block the waterway beforehand, and had failed to do so.79 
As discussed in Chapter One, Wolseley’s determination to prove to the Select Committee that 
such surprise attacks were the norm rather than the exception in warfare eventually led him to 
commission Colonel Maurice to write that fierce attack on the ‘civilised’ interpretation of 
warfare, Hostilities without Declaration of War.  
As is noted by historians, the opponents of the Tunnel used the surprise attack argument to cast 
doubt on any and all schemes for its defence.80 There was, argued Wolseley, no complete 
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guarantee: even ‘the strongest fortress in the world may be taken by surprise, or may be 
surrendered through cowardice or treachery.’81 The 1882 War Office Committee, which itself 
had suggested the Tunnel be defended by an enormous range of measures from a portcullis to 
poison gas, warned of defences becoming lax and vulnerable during a long period of peace and 
concluded that it would be ‘presumptuous to place absolute reliance upon even the most 
comprehensive and complete arrangements’ for its security’.82 While these fears tell us much 
about the vivid imaginations of Britain’s senior officers, historians have neglected to highlight 
the deeper criticisms of the British attitude towards defence which they contained. Cambridge, 
for example, spent some time explaining the necessity of a European-style ‘first class’ fortress 
overlooking its mouth, which he estimated at a minimum of three million pounds, not including 
the cost to garrison and maintain it.83 Noting the difficulty the armed forces already had in 
obtaining necessary funds, neither he nor Wolseley thought Parliament would ever vote 
sufficient money.84 Not surprisingly, the two men demanded that all decisions taken in the 
construction or defence of the Tunnel must be referred to the ‘military authorities’; in this way 
they would be able to secure a veto over the project by simply demanding measures so 
expensive that politicians would never agree to them. Listening to this evidence during the 
Select-Committee hearings, Lord Lansdowne immediately grasped its significance. In his 
notebook, underneath a comment from the Duke of Cambridge, he simply wrote: ‘civilians v 
soldiers?’85 
The ‘professionals’ quickly warmed to this theme. For Wolseley, the ‘peculiar condition’ of 
British civil-military relations could prove disastrous if the government hesitated o destroy the 
tunnel in an emergency – clearly a veiled reference to his wish for a serviceman as Minister for 
War.86 Dunsany likewise attacked ‘the nature of our institutions’ which, he was sure, had left 
the Royal Navy unable to command the Channel. If the government could not be trusted to 
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secure command of the sea, how could it be trusted to protect a Tunnel?87 Indeed, many of these 
criticisms contained suggestions that Britain’s liberal political culture and even its national 
character were temperamentally ill suited to maintaining the Tunnel’s security. ‘Owing to our 
belief in the virtuous intentions of others,’ wrote Wolseley, ‘we live in a constant condition of 
unpreparedness for war’.88 Cooper-Key referred to ‘our well-known national characteristics 
which lead us to despise dangers till they come upon us’, while Lord Dunsany argued that, in 
British military history, ‘careless confidence is the rule, wise precautions the exception.’89 ‘No 
one acquainted with the form of our Government, or with the English character, can suppose 
that we should ever be prevailed upon to make such arrangements as would render it practically 
impossible for an enemy to seize the Dover end of the tunnel’ wrote Roberts privately.90  
That the British had survived and prospered for so long with such an apparently flawed 
constitution was due to the ‘Silver Streak’. By removing this protection, the Tunnel would not 
civilise Europe as Watkin had claimed, but continentalise Britain, exposing its fragile liberal
society to the dangerous reality of European politics. ‘Nothing’, wrote Cambridge, ‘perhaps 
shows more clearly the extent to which our population, immersed in peaceful pursuits, remains 
unaware of the military condition of neighbouring states than the tone which was at first 
adopted on this question by many of the public.’91 The Tunnel would smash this sense of placid 
security by creating a popular awareness that, however small the likelihood, Britain was 
exposed to the possibility of a land invasion. The result, concluded Wolseley, would be to infect 
the country with ‘the horrid malady from which all nations having insignificant armies, and very 
powerful neighbours, suffer periodically’: panic.92 If the rationality of the people was the 
bedrock of the case in favour of the Tunnel, their sensitivity was an important part of the case 
against it. Any movement by French troops near Calais might spark fear in Britain that an att ck 
was imminent. By warning against a Tunnel, Wolseley was trying to prevent, not stir up a scare. 
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‘Who’, he asked, ‘is the real panic-monger? Is it he who would have us create a work that must 
be the prolific parent of panics, or is it the man who strives to warn his countrymen against such 
an error?’93 The impossibility of developing a failsafe defence system would, Wolseley argued, 
trap the nation into an escalating series of panics, each of which ending with a ‘rush’ to 
enormous military spending programmes.94 
However, such programmes would never be enough to place the British Army on an equal 
footing with its French or German counterparts. If the Tunnel were to make Britain a European 
land power– and Wolseley’s reductionist logic allowed for no other interpretation – then it 
necessarily called for a European safeguard: ‘the industry crushing system of universal 
service’.95 Only a mass conscript army would give Britain the ability to face its French 
counterpart, and so only such an army would suffice to provide security for the terrified British 
populace.96 The Tunnel would eventually panic the nation into abandoning its liberties. This 
point was brought home at every possible opportunity. European nations, Wolseley reminded 
his readers, were forced to: 
convert their territory into a camp, to offer up annually all their youth on the foul altar 
of the grim god of war, and to drain their coffers and their impoverished people of their 
last farthing in order to support the monster – the army – they have thus created, which, 
like an insatiable ogre, calls out day and night, “Give, give; more, still more;” the 
vampire that sucks the lifeblood of prosperity from the people, that is not satisfied a  
long as there are men, or any class of men, yet left for him to prey upon.97  
The conscription argument provided a direct rebuttal to the idea that a Tunnel would spread 
British values across Europe. Instead, Britain would be forced to adopt the least desirable 
attributes of its continental neighbours. Universal service would outweigh any economic 
benefits, ‘lesson our powers of production and change the whole nature of our institutions’, in 
                                                          
93 Dunsany, ‘A Rejoinder’, p. 332. 
94 Wolseley Memorandum, p. 213. 
95 Dunsany, ‘Proposed Channel Tunnel’, p. 300.  
96 Redford, ‘Opposition to the Channel Tunnel’, p. 106. 
97 Dunsany, ‘Proposed Channel Tunnel’, p. 300. Wolseley repeated this same characterisation of 
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Gazette, 23 May 1882, p. 10; Kochanski, Wolseley, p. 123. 
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the words of General Simmons.98 Wolseley observed that such an army would be impossible 
under Britain’s currently existing form of government, a suggestion, perhaps, that the Tunnel 
would do away with Parliamentary democracy itself.99 In this reading the greatest threat posed 
by the Tunnel was not necessarily the horrors of an invasion, but the economic and societal cost 
of insuring against it. 
In summary, the position that Wolseley and his fellow Army and Navy officers took during 
1882-1883 was built upon a profound antipathy to the idea that improved communications and 
trade were of universal benefit. In place of Watkin’s optimistic prophesy of Anglo-French 
amity, Wolseley substituted his own appreciation of inter-state relations which stressed 
humanity’s inherently violent and ruthless nature. As steam had brought with it fears of invasion 
after 1840, so the Tunnel would jeopardise Britain’s security, and even threaten to transform its 
liberal free trading society into an analogue of the ‘armed camp’ of the European mainland: 
Why, therefore, incur even the possibility of this new peril? What are the new 
advantages, the direct benefits we are to receive, which should induce us to accept any 
fresh risk to our national life? Surely, John Bull will not endanger his birth-right, his 
liberty, his property, in fact all that man can hold most dear, whether he be a patriot or 
merely a selfish cosmopolitan, and whether this subject be regarded from a sentimental 
or from a material point of view, simply in order that men and women may cross to and 
fro between England and France without running the risk of sea-sickness.100 
The Nature of the Debate 
As should now be clear, Gladstone’s characterisation of the debate as a clash between two fixed 
world-views was a much more accurate reflection of the controversy than that provided by 
subsequent historians. There were, however, similarities between the language employed by 
Watkin and Wolseley which both reflected and encouraged this ideological binary. Rhetorically, 
both relied heavily on hyperbole and exaggeration. It was in the interests of both, for example, 
to overemphasise the technical feasibility and haulage potential of the railway. Although 
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Watkin’s own estimations as to the Tunnel’s passenger and freight capacity are comparable with 
the twenty-first century Eurostar and Eurotunnel services, Anthony Travis points out that there 
was no evidence that the compressed air locomotives which Beaumont proposed to use would 
have been capable of pulling fully loaded trains for the entire length of track, although electric
trains would have gone some way to solving this issue within two decades.101 Certainly it seems 
unlikely that the commercial revolution promised by the pro-Tunnellers would have developed 
in the manner they predicted.  
If Watkin’s arguments were suspect then Wolseley’s defence pessimism was at times almost 
unbelievable. As Michael Bonavia observ s, Wolseley’s discussions of railway operations were 
‘woolly’ and at times simply incorrect, demonstrating little awareness of the true requirements 
of such manoeuvres.102 For example, he never directly addressed the logistical problems facing 
an invader who wished to supply an army of sufficient strength to subdue a nation of thirty-five 
million people via a single double-tracked railway tunnel. This point was raised by the Royal 
Engineer Sir Andrew Clarke in February 1882, who could not think of a single example where a 
railway had ‘served to advance an entire army’.103 The idea that an invasion might be organised 
and launched in total secrecy, declared Clarke, was a ‘simple impossibility’, and even if the 
Tunnel had been seized the length of time it would take to deploy an army from it would give 
ample opportunity for the British to retake the entrance. For his part, Clarke believed that 
steamship would remain the only method by which an enemy could successfully invade Britain, 
with or without the Tunnel. Similar points were made by Sir John Adye of the Royal Artillery in 
evidence before the Board of Trade Committee, where he had made clear that he regarded 
Wolseley’s fears of treachery and invasion as absurd and fanciful.104 Wolseley never addressed 
these concerns, relying instead on literary dash to carry his points. He also repeatedly appealed 
                                                          
101 GetLink Group, ‘Traffic Figures: Traffic Volumes for the Past 10 Years’, 
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104 Adye’s memorandum and evidence to the Committee was shorter and lacked the rhetorical punch of 
Wolseley’s, probably because he found the Adjutant General’s attitude so ridiculous. See 
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Evidence of Sir John Adye, pp. 227-232. 
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to the transformative effect which railways had had on European warfare, Prussia’s ‘railway’ 
wars against Austria and France clearly having made an enormous impression on his mind. Yet, 
as Clarke pointed out, no recent war had demonstrated that railways had the kind of potential 
Wolseley attributed to them. In stressing the weakness of Dover or the danger of sudden attack, 
Wolseley was simply ignoring the most serious problems with his scenario of invasion. The 
only reason that Wolseley’s ignorance of railway questions were sustained was that, occasional 
notes by Clarke or Beaumont accepted, they went largely unchallenged within the public sphere, 
lending them credence they did not deserve. By such simple means of rhetoric and persistence 
did Wolseley turn a provably implausible assertion of British vulnerability into a pervasive 
myth that would not be finally put to rest until after 1945.  
One other theme which linked the language of Watkin and Wolseley was a determination to 
position themselves as selfless, disinterested, and rational patriots, working with the interests of 
Britain at heart. From the outset Watkin was keen to stress how backing the Tunnel involved for 
him a level of self-sacrifice: ‘I have given my time, now, for a great many years, gratuitously, of 
course; I have invested my money; my friends and relatives have done the same.’105 He always 
emphasised that he would have preferred the project to be undertaken by the state, and that it 
was only due to inaction from this quarter that the SER had decided to step in.106 He was 
pursuing the Tunnel ‘as an Englishman, loving my country and no other’, a further illustration 
of how Cobdenites saw no contradiction between patriotism and internationalism.107 Their 
opponents, in Beaumont’s words, were paranoid scaremongers, pushing fears which were 
‘purely imaginary’ and which were making Britain the laughing stock of Europe.108 For his part, 
as we have seen, Wolseley damned the Tunnel’s promoters as ‘selfish cosmopolitans’ willing to 
destroy the nation’s ‘birth right’ of insularity in order to enrich themselves. He declared himself 
to be speaking not only from a military point of view but also in the interests of the British 
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taxpayer.109 Hamley was particularly keen to emphasise this dualistic clash between ‘the gains 
of private speculators and the interests of the nation’, arguing that those who opposed the 
Tunnel, because they had no personal interest in it, were more likely to view it from a 
dispassionate ‘national’ point of view.110 For both sides the aim of this rhetoric was to claim the 
patriotic mantle while painting the other as holding views inimical to the public good. Cynthia 
Behrman is broadly correct in concluding that the two sides ‘rarely listened to each other’; they 
were, instead, aiming for a much wider constituency.111 To this end, neither wanted to be seen to 
be lecturing the public, or lobbying the government to the exclusion the wider country. Their 
respective broadsides were framed as simple explanations of the facts of the case; both 
pointedly left the ultimate decision ‘to the common sense of the public’.112  
Conclusion 
By the time the initial clash was over in the first three months of 1882, the Tunnel had obtained 
an ideological significance far beyond its status as an addition to Britain’s already extensive 
system of underground railways. As this chapter has shown, far from a simple matter of military 
defence or insular prejudice, the Channel Tunnel produced a highly charged ideological clash 
between optimistic internationalism and pessimistic realism. By thus polarising the discussion, 
it demanded that individuals make a choice as to which world-view they ascribed to and what 
sort of nation they thought Britain was. Were world affairs governed principally by peace or 
war? Might foreign nations be easily ‘tempted’ to attack Britain? Was British society strong and 
confident enough to face the increased susceptibility to panics which a tunnel appeared to 
entail? These were the questions with which the Channel Tunnel confronted Britons during the 
1880s. They were questions which cut to the heart of British identity, and especially Liberal 
identity, offering those who believed in the Gladstone-Cobden interpretation of world affairs  
practical opportunity to support a project which claimed to embody them. In the same way the 
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Tunnel had consequences for the meaning of patriotism – if it was likely to boost national 
income, was the patriotic response to support it, regardless of any possible defence 
implications? In the next chapter, this thesis will examine the manner in which the British 






Public Opinion and the Channel Tunnel 
 
Sir Edward Watkin formed a wish to tunnel under sea, 
‘No, no!’ exclaimed the editor of the Nineteenth Century: 
‘The French will come and kill us all while chatting o’er our tea, 
By my distinguished magazine I swear it shall not be.’ 
Agnostics and philosophers and clergymen by scores, 
And other persons qualified to guard our native shores, 
They rallied round the patriot Knowles in that heroic cause; 
Now, if Sir Edward wants to dig, he’ll have his choice of bores. 
 




                                                          
1 Omne Tulit Punctum [wins every hand]: from Horace, ‘Ars Poetica’. ‘He wins every hand who mingles 
profit with pleasure, by delighting and instructing the reader at the same time.’ 
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The conventional view among historians of the Channel Tunnel scare is that the British people 
were overwhelmingly hostile to the project. For I.F. Clarke, ‘opposition to the proposed 
Channel Tunnel was a popular and national movement that affeced every level of society’.2 
However, as Richard Grayson observes, no detailed work has been done on public attitudes to 
the Tunnel in the press or elsewhere.3 Instead, information about public debate is drawn almost 
entirely from the work of one man, the influential editor of the Nineteenth Century, James 
Knowles, upon whom Gladstone would later confer the title ‘murderer of the Channel Tunnel’.4 
Although his journal was officially neutral, Knowles himself was vehemently anti-Tunnel, 
fearing that it would destroy ‘the sacred sanctuary of freedom formed by nature herself & held 
as such by generations of Englishmen’, thereby forcing Britain into a United States of Europe.5 
His anti-Tunnel campaign of early 1882 was therefore his first sustained attempt to influence 
public opinion.6 During February-May 1882 the Nineteenth Century carried no fewer than seven 
anti-Tunnel essays including those by Lord Dunsany and Wolseley, as well as Beaumont’s pro-
Tunnel reply. In April and May it printed a ‘protest’ against the project in the form of a 
substantial petition, signed by many famous public figures. In early 1883 Knowles republished 
this protest, alongside the Nineteenth Century articles and excerpts from thirty-one anti-Tunnel 
newspapers in The Channel Tunnel and Public Opinion, a 136-page pamphlet.7 ‘Intended to 
show the strength of public feeling in this country against the Channel Tunnel scheme’, 
Knowles used the pamphlet to paint those in favour of the project as, at best, deluded fanatics of 
‘universal brotherhood’, and at worst unpatriotic ‘company-promoters’.8 In either case, he was 
clear that they were completely outnumbered by the nation’s ‘common sense’ majority. 
Recognised by its contemporaries as an important record for future generations, Knowles’ work 
has dominated the historical memory of the 1880s Channel Tunnel attempt, despite the fact that 
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it was very clearly one of propaganda; it is the basis, for example, of I.F. Clarke’s evaluation of 
anti-Tunnel feeling.9  
The following chapter aims to provide the first substantive study of British opinion on the 
Channel Tunnel since Knowles’ 1883 pamphlet. Opening with the attitudes of the press during 
the 1870s, it shows how, up to early 1882, feeling towards the project was almost universally 
positive. This perspective is then used to contextualise Wolseley’s 1882 media campaign, 
illustrating how radically he was able to change the direction of the conversation through 
exploiting his position as a non-partisan ‘expert’. The chapter then follows the development of 
popular feeling through to the end of 1882, examining in turn the press, the Ninet enth Century 
petition and the attitudes of commercial organis tions, trade unions and the ‘public’. Ultimately, 
it is seen that the Channel Tunnel did not elicit the universal insular distrust claimed by 
Knowles, but instead split opinion much more evenly. In the process, the chapter provides both 
a study of popular support for internationalist ideals across British society, and serves as an 
important illustration of the limited nature of nineteenth century ‘public opinion’.  
The Spirit of 1876 
If sufficient funds had been forthcoming during the 1870s, it is not unlikely that the Channel 
Tunnel would have been open by the end of the nineteenth century. By the time the joint Anglo-
French commission completed its draft treaty at the end of May 1876, a substantial level of 
enthusiasm had built up behind the venture. This was driven by a narrative which, although 
tempered by financial concerns, regarded the Tunnel as a project of peace and prosperity, the 
latest chapter in the heroic age of civil engineering. The Times heartily supported what it 
regarded ‘an honourable example of persevering scientific effort and of international co-
operation for the common good.’10 The Daily News considered it ‘desirable from every point of 
view’ and the crowning enterprise of contemporary science.11 Even the usually reactionary 
Morning Post strongly encouraged investors to come forward and support ‘a scheme so 
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desirable for the benefit of two great nations’.12 The Graphic produced images of the 
engineering and surveying work, describing the project as ‘a splendid evidence of the 
determination and perseverance with which obstacles and impediments are met by the scientific 
men of the present age’ [Figures 12; 13].13  
  
                                                          
12 Morning Post, 1 Sept. 1875, p. 4. 














Figure 13: The CTC steamship Ajax  taking soundings in the Channel. 
The Graphic, 8 July 1876, p. 44. 
Figure 12: The French Channel Tunnel Company works at Sangatte. 




Figure 14: ‘Sir Edwin Watkins’s (sic) Remedy for the Invasion Scare’ 
‘Drowning the French Pharaoh in the Channel Tunnel’. Penny Illustrated Paper, 30 
July 1881, pp. 72-3. 
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The idea that the Channel Tunnel was opposed out of sheer irrational insularity is clearly 
undercut by the enthusiasm of the 1870s. Similarly, suspicion of foreign motives is largely 
absent from the Tunnel discourse of this period. Instead, the press looked forward to the day 
when Europe’s two great ‘liberal’ powers would be linked permanently under the Channel. 
There was little evidence that this enthusiasm had been dampened when the SER began 
experimental borings in 1880. Throughout that year the press maintained regular coverage of the 
activities at both Dover and Sangatte; at no point were any concerns raised. It was thus out of a 
clear sky that, in June 1881, the day after Watkin announced that he believed the Tunnel could 
be completed in five years, The Times produced a thunderous editorial citing security concerns. 
Proclaiming that ‘the silver streak is our safety’ the paper highlighted a number of possible 
risks, arguing that ‘it is not Sir Edward Watkin and the South-Eastern shareholders who have 
the only right to a voice here.’14 Yet, despite many of its points being identical to those which 
Wolseley later raised, the paper earned only a short rebuttal from Watkin, a small number of 
other letters, and the incredulity of many of its peers.15 On the evening of the editorial’s 
publication, the Pall Mall Gazette produced a front page column dismissing it as the 
‘exaggeration of a panicmonger’.16 No less an organ than the United Services Gazette offered its 
support to Watkin, arguing that the country must be ‘degenerate’ if it was willing to object to a 
commercial enterprise for fear of invasion.17 The Penny Illustrated Post took the opportunity to 
mock the ‘timorous old gentleman who now rules the roast at the Times office’ with an 
engraving showing Watkin drowning an invading French army [Figure 14].18 Most other papers 
simply ignored the fears, continuing to report on the Tunnel’s progress with encouragement. 
Only the Daily Telegraph followed The Times’ lead, although it did so in remarkable style. On 
18 June, the day the Times’ piece went to press, the T legraph carried a long leader hyperbolic 
in its praise of the Tunnel, concluding that any attempt to damage it would be comparable to 
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bombarding the Parthenon or pulling down the Pyramids.19 Three days later, however, the paper 
produced another editorial completely at odds with the first, expressing deep concern that 
Britain’s military safety would be at the mercy of anyone who might capture the Tunnel.20 This 
editorial proved as ineffectual at that of The Times. The public danger-cry had been decisively 
rejected, appeals to insular security and Continental intentions proving no match for the 
optimistic spirit of progress represented by the Tunnel. Nevertheless, the episode illustrated the 
speed with which the press might turn on the Tunnel if given adequate reason, while within the 
halls of government The Times had had a much greater effect, as the following chapter will 
show. 
Up until late 1881, then, British public opinion was happily excited rather than troubled by the 
prospect of a Paris to London railway. Not only does this fact emphasise the extent to which the 
following months and years would see a transformation in attitudes, but it also draws attention 
to the central role played by armed forces officers in driving that change. Despite its best efforts, 
not even a newspaper as powerful as The Times had the influence with which to whip up a war-
scare. Nineteenth Century newspapers followed, not created, ‘public opinion’; it required a 
concurring statement from some eminent military or naval figure to provide credibility. On 11 
October 1881, the following letter, addressed to a correspondent in Paris, was published in The 
Times: 
Horse Guards, War Office. 
Sir,– I should be very sorry if any letter of mine should be published, but I have no 
objection to its being stated in every newspaper that I earnestly trust the Channel Tunnel 
may never be carried out, as I feel its construction would be a lasting source of danger 
to this country. 
Very faithfully yours, 
Garnet Wolseley.21 
                                                          
19 Daily Telegraph, 18 June 1881, p. 4. 
20 Daily Telegraph, 21 June 1881, p. 5. 
21 The Times, 11 Oct. 1881, p. 5.  
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Although only a single sentence, this provided a clear foretaste of what was to come. It 
illustrated Wolseley’s determination to use the media to spread his views, and his lack of 
misgivings about doing so. Most notably, by dating it from the War Office itself, Wolseley was 
clearly acting to invest his opinions with the gravitas that came with his official position as 
Quartermaster-General. This tactic was not lost on Watkin, who, speaking in the Commons in 
1884, complained that Wolseley had abused his privileged position and breached the political 
neutrality of the armed forces in an attempt to ‘interfere’ with government policy. ‘If peaceful 
men could not be allowed to promote communication between nations without letters being 
written and dated from the War Office by high military authorities’, he argued, ‘it was quite 
time that Parliament began to consider the relative positions of the civilian and military classes 
in the country.’22 Indeed, writing to Gladstone in 1883, he expressed his conviction that 
Wolseley’s letter destroyed not only the Channel Tunnel, but that the increased tension in 
Anglo-French relations during the 1880s might be directly traced to this single epistle.23 
Unfortunately for Watkin, this apparent conflict of interest was never addressed during the 
Channel Tunnel debate. Rather, Wolseley proved himself adept at exploiting his rank and 
reputation to direct and define the discussion within his own understanding of geopolitics and 
international relations, achieving a victory for the supremacy of the ‘military classes’ in the 
process. 
The Importance of Expertise 
In February and March 1882, Wolseley ran what could only be described as an organised public 
campaign against the Channel Tunnel directly out of the War Office, with the explicit support of 
many in the department.24 His memorandum to the Board of Trade Committee of 1881 had 
always been intended as magazine article, and the excerpts published by Lord Dunsany in 
February were done so with the full sanction of the Duke of Cambridge, who had reached an 
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agreement with the Minister of War Hugh Childers to allow them to be released.25 Most 
remarkable of all was Wolseley’s Central News interview, which dispensed entirely with the 
pretences of privacy, anonymity, or official enquiry that had lent a fig leaf of propriety to his
previous interventions. The crowning moment of his personal campaign was the publication of 
the Blue Book of Correspondence in August, which, although adding little to that which had 
already been made public, provided a final gloss of official respectability to his views.  
The crucial importance of Wolseley’s reputation as a distinguished officer and military expert 
was immediately apparent. Dunsany’s article was summarised and discussed in almost every 
newspaper in the country, with Wolseley widely identified as the author, and this time the press 
reaction could not have been more different to that which had greeted The Times’ editorial of 
June 1881. For the St. James’ Gazette, for example, Wolseley’s status as a soldier of the 
‘modern type’ meant that he was unlikely to suffer from alarmism ‘merely because the Duke of 
Wellington would have been afraid’ – a reference to 1848. As far as the paper was concerned, 
the General’s expert opinion was the only reason needed to abandon the scheme.26 The extent to 
which military authority was suddenly thrust to the fore of the debate was revealed on 13 
February, when the views of Sir John Adye and Sir Andrew Clarke appeared in the press.27 Both 
men completely rejected the idea that the Tunnel represented a danger, with Clarke, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, drawing upon his extensive knowledge of railways and fortifications to 
pick apart Wolseley’s concerns. These interventions from ‘scientific officers of eminence’ – 
Adye was the Surveyor General of Ordinance and Clarke was appointed Inspector-General of 
fortifications in June 1882 – gave new heart to the pro-Tunnel press. The Liv rpool Mercury 
expressed relief that ‘the scientific men are arraying themselves against the alarmists’, 
contrasting Adye’s and Clarke’s ‘special’ training and extensive careers with the younger, less 
experienced Wolseley.28 On the other hand, for the anti-Tunnel press Adye’s and Clarke’s 
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arguments simply highlighted the importance of Wolseley’s emphasis on reducing the matter to 
military ‘probabilities’. The Morning Post dismissed Adye and Clarke with the simple statement 
that ‘the most that can be said in favour of these arguments is that they are probably sound, not 
that they are indubitably so.’29 More generally, however, their interventions demonstrated how 
the subject had been transported suddenly and irrevocably from the realm of civil to military 
engineering; questions of trade and communication were now forced to play second fiddle to the 
military debate. The most telling illustration of this change was the view of the Manchester 
Guardian, which, in its commentary on Adye and Clarke’s views, considered the question was 
now ‘eminently one to be decided by professional authority’, the paper concluding that it would 
only be satisfied if a large majority of military experts came down in Watkin’s favour.30 The 
traditional Liberal distrust of professional expertise had, in the face of Wolseley’s onslaught, 
completely collapsed. 
Once the centrality of armed forces opinion had been established there was little hope of a 
resolution in Watkin’s favour. Adye and Clarke were unusual soldiers in that they were known 
for their liberal and humanitarian views, especially towards international relations. Adye had 
won the Légion d'honneur during the Crimean War, while Clarke had served as a British 
representative on the international committee on the Suez Canal. Both would subsequently stand 
unsuccessfully for parliament as Liberal Party candidates.31 A  such, they showed how an 
individual’s world-view defined their attitude to the project. The Liverpool Mercury observed 
that Clarke was ‘well disposed to the tunnel on political grounds’, while Adye’s evidence before 
the Board of Trade Committee had been articulated in language which was not to dissimilar to 
that of Watkin. For example, he expressed incredulity, when informed of Wolseley’s ‘bolt from 
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the blue’ fears, that a nation would go to war ‘for sheer robbery’.32 Unlike these men, the 
majority of Army and Navy officers were anti-internationalists likely to share Wolseley’s 
attitudes, a fact which became apparent, as the debate progressed.  
At the same time the new focus on military opinion also seriously damaged the influence of 
Watkin and his own ‘experts’. Once fearless and energetic men of industry, the Tunnel’s 
promoters were now disparaged as ‘capitalists’, willing to subject the nation to invasion or 
conscription simply so that they would be able to have ‘another mass of stock to manipulate at 
discretion.’33 Combining Watkin’s Cobdenism with his financial interest, the Daily Telegraph 
concluded that ‘England cannot afford to surrender her insular security to please any number of 
theorists or to foster the commercial speculations of a few interested and selfish individuals.’34 
Politically this accusation was especially damaging because it appealed to both Conservatives 
and Radicals. For example, although Reynolds’s Newspaper was extremely contemptuous of the 
invasion scare which it assumed was a ruse to obtain an increase in the defence budget, it also 
found the space to describe Watkin’s own patriotism as ‘nothing more than pounds, shillings 
and pence’.35 The idea that the Tunnel represented the interests of private investors and not 
those of the nation was helped along by the established stereotype of railway speculators and 
directors as complacent, immoral and greedy, an image problem which Watkin himself had long 
struggled with.36 This was particularly compromising when compared to Wolseley’s and 
Dunsany’s own positions as apparently disinterested military and naval officers. Following the 
publication of Colonel Beaumont and Lord Brabourne’s essays in March, the Daily News spoke 
for many moderate newspapers when it noted with ‘disappointment’ the fact that both men were 
‘notoriously interested in the schemes for carrying the project into completion’, something 
which was not helped by their articles’ attacks on the rival CTC.37 The power of this argument 
was illustrated by the fact that James Knowles used it as a central theme in his introduction to 
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The Channel Tunnel and Public Opinion, condemning out of hand the ‘company-promoters’ 
who he accused of attempting to push their Bill through parliament over the heads of a patriotic 
public.38 Watkin’s financial interests thus contradicted any claims he might have made to be 
acting in the national interest, leaving the patriotic high ground firmly in the hands of Wolseley 
and the War Office. 
A Certainty, a Probability and a Possibility: The Press, February-December 1882 
The nature of the change that Wolseley’s intervention wrought on press attitudes was 
remarkable. Watkin’s speeches continued to be widely circulated, and SCRC activities reported 
with even greater diligence. But the admiring language of the 1870s had all but disappeared, 
replaced with serious discussions on international relations, military strategy and the merits of 
the ‘silver streak’. ‘It is not often that the mind of Englishmen makes itself up so rapidly on any 
subject as seems to have been the case in regard to the Channel Tunnel’ observed the Saturday 
Review after reflecting on the press reaction to Dunsany’s February article. ‘It is a curious 
feature of the case that the more it is examined the worse it looks.’39 An important element of 
this about-turn was obviously a heightened awareness of the likelihood of invasion were the 
Tunnel to be built, something which affected newspapers of all political views. The Times 
treated its readers to sweeping editorials on the importance of the Channel to Britain’s national 
survival, while the Morning Post, never one to miss a chance to talk down Britain’s defences, 
eagerly endorsed Wolseley’s analysis of the nature of international relations.40 The Scotsman, 
still sceptical of the invasion threat, nevertheless r minded its readers that the Channel was a 
‘sure protection against the covetous inclinations of great military powers’, and even the Radical 
Leeds Mercury, initially a strong supporter of Watkin’s, eventually came to the view that the 
Tunnel would constitute ‘a vulnerable spot in the heart of England’ and a temptation to the 
French.41 Editorials from papers such as this showed that the liberal vision of peace through 
communication was visibly crumbling under Wolseley’s determinedly pessimistic onslaught, 
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and reflected the ease with which the British were able to adopt the idea of invasion when it 
presented itself. Indeed, for some Conservative organs the Tunnel presented an opportunity to 
reject the entire Cobdenite thesis, as The Spectator did in an 1883 leader which argued that 
‘until the point has been reached at which two peoples are really fused into one, closeness of 
intercourse, far from averting the dander of conflict, greatly enhances it.’42  
However, when the press reaction is considered in its totality, it is clear that the changof 
opinion was the result of a more complex process of reasoning which emphasised economic and 
social risks as much as the military threat. These three, equally significant concerns, were 
summarised by Knowles in his introduction to Public Opinion. According to him, opposition to 
the Tunnel was rooted in a ‘certainty’ that military expenditure and therefore taxation would 
have to be increased to defend it; a ‘probability’ that the nation would experience more invasion 
panics; and, lastly, the ‘possibility of an irretrievable disaster from invasion.’43 Despite the 
prominence given to the former two reasons by Knowles, only the invasion fear itself has 
received significant attention within the existing historiography, through the lens of iularity. 
This is unfortunate, because an appreciation of the socio-economic reasons can tell us much 
about contemporary anxieties regarding the internal strength of Britain’s liberal society. The 
‘certain’ cost of any necessary defences, for example, was a subject of increasing concern 
throughout the Tunnel debate, and it is rare to find an editorial which did not touch upon it. As 
we have seen, the security measures demanded by the War Office would have come to millions 
of pounds on their own, without considering the possibility of conscription. Obviously, such an 
outlay would have added a substantial burden to the Army estimates and seriously strained 
Britain’s financially driven model of defence spending, a powerful incentive for many Liberals 
and Radicals to oppose the scheme. For the Dundee Advertiser, one of the most notable 
strengths of the War Office case was that it came from a perspective that the British taxpayer 
was likely to appreciate.44 To many it appeared as though the SCRC investors were prepared to 
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see defence spending massively increased in order that they might line their own pockets, and 
the scheme was regularly condemned as ‘Edward Watkin’s pet project for relieving travellers 
between England and France from sea-sickness at the cost of a great addition to our military and 
naval expenditure’.45 Indeed, it was often suggested that if the project were to go ahead these 
fortification costs would have to be borne predominantly or entirely by the SCRC shareholders 
themselves, a stipulation guaranteed to destroy investor confidence. 
The issue of cost would not have had the significance it did were it not for the wider fear of 
panic. While panic was not key to Wolseley’s argument, once the idea was introduced into the 
public sphere it quickly became one of the most widely cited reasons for opposition, a fear 
rooted directly in the Britain’s historical experience of these events. In its first leader following 
the publication of Wolseley’s opposition, the Spectator summarised the potential military 
dangers and concluded that ‘the English people, without reasoning, feels the magnitude of that 
danger, and is, consequently, of all peoples the one most liable to panic.’46 For the magazine, a 
serious panic had the potential to be as damaging as an actual invasion, arresting trade for years 
and wrecking Anglo-French relations. The Times predicted that ‘the change…in the position of 
this country would be distinct, and we should quickly detect the effects in general malaise, new 
liability to panics, a suspicion of all military operations on the part of our neighbours, and a 
general demand for the increase of our armaments.’47 The paper stressed this point again 
following the publication of the Select Committee’s findings in 1883, drawing a direct link with 
the scares of the 1850s: 
All those who remember the years of 1858 and 1859 can judge how far we, as a nation, 
can go in the direction of national uneasiness; and none will wish to revive that state of 
mind, with all the additional excuse that this tunnel would give it for existing.48 
 Nor were these views limited to Conservative papers. John Morley’s Pall Mall Gazette stated 
that, regardless of what it considered to be the in rent absurdity of invasion fears, ‘no one can 
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deny that the Tunnel would increase the impact of every French threat upon the English ear’, 
and it thus opposed the project on these grounds.49 The Manchester Guardian, which initially 
brushed aside fears of invasion and panic as ‘absurdly illogical’, eventually came to accept that 
an increase in the latter would be unavoidable. ‘This fact being certain, nothing more is needed 
to guide the government to a decision.’50 The Leeds Mercury’s London correspondent 
summarised the situation thus: 
The soldiers are opposed to it, because they believe it would really add to the risks of 
invasion, and the peace party object to the tunnel because its existence would cause 
frequent panics, and would be used as a pretext for greatly increasing the armaments of 
the country.51 
As The Scotsman concluded, ‘at present the alarmists are kept at bay by the demonstrable 
security which the sea affords. Remove or lessen that security, and they will become so much 
stronger that it will be difficult to resist their demands.’52 There were few better examples of the 
deep, ingrained apprehension towards panic in Britain than the reaction of these newspapers. 
For them, British society was simply incapable of surviving exposure to the reality of its own 
fragility, at least compared to the ‘militarised’ societies of continental Europe.   
Most papers, however, were not immediately convinced by Wolseley’s first article. During 
February he was openly mocked, especially within the satirical press where he was branded an 
alarmist by Funny Folks and a ‘Timid Hare’ by Punch [Figures 15; 16]. Papers such as these 
were not easily convinced by theoretical military arguments, but instead eventually turned 
against the Tunnel in reaction to the alarm of their peers, which appeared to give a practical 
demonstrations in the ease with which the nation might be panicked. In this context the Liberal 
Daily News provides an interesting case study into how ‘panic’ spread and developed within the 
nineteenth century news media. During the previous decade the paper had been an enthusiastic 
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supporter of the ‘great international roadway’.53 When Wolseley’s brief letter of October 1881 
was published the paper dismissed it, instead using its editorial to imagine the moment when the 
last piece of chalk would be broken and the workers ‘stand suddenly face to face with their 
comrades from the opposite shore.’54 The News appears to have been given advance notice of 
Dunsany’s February article, for on 30 January it published a discussion of the piece. It identified 
a ‘certain illiberality in objecting to greater freedom of communication between nations’ and, 
while not completely dismissing Wolseley’s objection, was not inclined to accept them.55 
However, by 13 February there was a visible change in the paper’s stance. Although it remained 
firmly opposed to a policy of ‘exclusion’ and deeply sceptical of any invasion threat, it had 
clearly been shaken by the speed with which the invasion scare had taken hold. ‘Is it worth 
while’, it asked, ‘to run the chance, or rather to incur the certainty, of these scares with their 
consequent expenditure for the sake of a Channel Tunnel?’56 It observed that the railway might 
affect the steadiness of the London stock exchange, and expressed disappointment that the 
promoters had, in its view, relied more on emotion than reason in defence of their scheme. On 
27 February it published a full discussion of Brabourne’s and Beaumont’s articles in a leader 
which was dominated by the subject of panic. The invasion scare, it was sure, had been 
‘fostered by persons who have nothing to gain by fostering it’ – a reference to Wolseley’s status 
as an ‘expert’ – while Watkin and his supporters were characterised as ‘interested’ parties. ‘The 
fears of Lord Dunsany and Sir Garnet Wolseley may be utter folly’, it continued, ‘but they exist, 
they are shared by hundreds and thousands of other people, and they are not of a nature to be 
quieted, but to be exasperated by the actual creation of the Tunnel.’57 The Tunnel, as one letter 
to the paper made clear, was increasingly being discussed in Liberal circles as a threat to British 
society: 
Surely the vast majority of your readers must feel that those institutions of freedom an  
those opportunities of progress in furtherance of which your voice is always 
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consistently raised are themselves endangered by the tolerated pursuance of this short-
sighted scheme, in which the Continent has everything to gain and England has 
everything to lose.58 
On 18 March, in a piece which opened with a forceful attack on Watkin’s self-interest, the paper 
declared conclusively against the Channel Tunnel, specifically on the issue of panic. The 
Tunnel, it was now sure, meant ‘constant alarm, constant expense, constant diversion of the 
national attention and the national purse from useful objects to useless ones.’59 In concluding, it 
observed that no one acquainted with the history of British public opinion could deny panic’s 
dangerous power, clear evidence of how the memory of past scares inspired and reinforced the 
anxieties of the present.  
By the time of the 18 March Daily News editorial, Watkin had lost the support of much of the 
British press, London and regional; certainly by the summer the vast majority had turned against 
him [Figure 17]. The nature of the papers which remained favourable to the Tunnel were 
indicative of how isolated his position was. Reynolds’s Newspaper continued to support the 
idea, although this was as much to do with its antipathy towards the rest of the media and the 
‘stupid and ridiculous’ War Office than anything else.60 The only other major London title in 
favour was the Illustrated London News, which on 4 March ran a strongly pro-tunnel piece 
incorporating text from Beaumont’s article and accompanied by a set of illustrations, including 
one showing how easily the Tunnel might be defended.61 This was clearly a propaganda piece 
inserted on Watkin’s behest, however, for he was closely associated with the paper, having 
managed it during the 1860s.62 Inevitably this overwhelming media bias came to be seen by 
some as representative of the nation as a whole. As early as late February Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper reflected that, however fine the idea of an Anglo-French railway, politicians, the 
military and the public were generally against it; by April The Standard felt able to write that 
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the SCRC ‘are the only persons really interested in its success.’63 For James Knowles, the 
opposition of the press was ‘but the echo of the talk of ninety-nine out of every hundred 
unbiased men who have considered the subject.’64 These assumptions of national unity reflected 
the contemporary tendency to treat the press as a mirror of the national mood. Certainly, there 
was a strong and growing feeling in the country against the Tunnel, but the true situation was 
much more complex than the unanimity painted by Knowles and endorsed by subsequent 
historians. 
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Figure 15: ‘Hopes and Fears; or, a Dream of the Channel Tunnel.’ 
Wolseley, depicted as a ‘timid Hare’, and the Duke of Cambridge, who has a prominent 
‘white’ feather in his hat, take fright at Lord Richard Grosvenor and Sir John Hawkshaw, both 





Figure 16: ‘The Channel Tunnel Scare’. 
Top row, left to right: Dunsany followed by Wolseley attempts to stop the Tunnel co struction; 
Watkin confronts Dunsany; a sentry at Dover confronts the ‘alarmist bogey of the future’; The 
French soldier asks for directions to the train to London. Bottom row, left to right: Bismarck and 
Moltke examine Calais entrance in ‘another alarmist picture’; the German Army invades Britain in 
the 10:45 fruit train; a ‘bar parlour sage’ proposes using the Tunnel as an enormous gun to stop the 






Figure 17: ‘Rule Britannia’. 
Britannia, representing the will of the people, puts an end to Watkin’s digging. Punch, 15 July 
1882, p. 15. 
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‘Public Opinion’, 1882-1883 
For most nineteenth century political issues, judging the opinion of the public is largely limited 
to newspaper editorials or public speeches. In this respect the Channel Tunnel was different, 
because it inspired a wide range of responses which allow for a more far-reaching analysis of 
attitudes. The first indication that the controversy had created a larger than usual public reaction
was the famous Nineteenth Century petition protesting the ‘military dangers and liabilities’ of 
the Tunnel, organised by Knowles himself and published in April and May 1882.65 
Remembered seven years later as ‘more influentially signed as anything of the kind which had 
ever been put forward in this country’, and described by Hadfield-Amkhan as ‘comprehensive 
and representative’, it contained over a thousand signatures, and Knowles claimed that only a 
lack of space had precluded him from printing more.66 The most notable effect of the petition 
was to confirm the depth of feeling within the armed services and especially among soldiers. 
173 army and thirty-three naval officers signed, including fifteen full generals and ten admirals, 
apparently confirming the Duke of Cambridge’s assertion that the military was overwhelmingly 
opposed to the scheme.67 In this respect the petition probably represented the most significant 
example of collective political action by Britain’s armed forces between the abolition of 
purchase in 1871 and the Curragh incident of 1914. Whether or not this was the case, it was 
certainly true that only a tiny number of serving or retired army officers offered Watkin public
support in 1882, limited almost entirely to Adye, Clarke and Beaumont. It is probable that far 
more officers opposed the Tunnel than put their names on the petition; Cambridge himself, for 
example, did not appear on it, despite Knowles’ wish to have the Duke at its head.68 This did not 
reflect any want of intimacy between the Nineteenth Century and Horse Guards, however. At 
the end of May the Duke invited Knowles to the War Office to talk with him in anticipation of 
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the former’s appearance before the Lansdowne Committee, an indication of how closely the 
military establishment and the press worked together in their opposition to the Tunnel.69 
The list also included dozens of peers and knights, over fifty Justices of the Peace, and more 
than 200 clergymen including the Archbishop of York, two Church of England Bishops, and a 
small number of Nonconformist and Catholic ministers including Cardinals Manning and 
Newman. This strong religious showing is especially notable in the context of Watkin’s 
attempts, discussed above, to portray the Tunnel as a project sanctioned by divine will. 
Although not a strong theme in the oppositional discourse, these claims were publicly objected 
to on a number of occasions, and the significance of the Channel as a defensive feature created 
by ‘Providence’ was a natural ingredient of the vocabulary. During his 1882 paper at the 
Society of Arts, for example, Watkin was challenged by a retired Admiral who compared the 
grey chalk under the Channel to Eve’s apple, a temptation created by God to test the British 
nation.70 Later that year one Reverend Thomas Burney went so far as to print a twelve-page 
open letter to Gladstone, sent to every Member of Parliament, which declared the Tunnel to be 
an act of ‘rebellion’ against God proved through the interpretation of certain unspecified ‘sacred 
prophecies’.71 With its insular geography so vital to its security, religion was never far from the 
British national defence discourse. This being said, it is interesting to note that beyond 
Knowles’ petition and the maverick Burney, religious figures were entirely absent from the 
Channel Tunnel debate. Research for this chapter uncovered no letters to the press or other 
expressions of opposition from clergy, including the Bishops in the Lords. Whether this 
indicated a genuine reluctance to engage in public controversy or a more practical recognition 
that the matter was better left to the military experts is difficult to tell; what is clear, however, is 
that feeling against the scheme was reached the very top of Britain’s religious elite. Of course, 
considering the feeling against the Tunnel within high society and the Conservative party, with 
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which the Church of England was closely intertwined, this religious opposition may be less 
surprising than it first seems. 
Other prominent signatures included establishment pillars such as the Poet Laureate Lord 
Tennyson and the Governor of the Bank of England H.R. Grenfell, through to the editors of The 
Spectator, St. James’ Gazette and The Morning Post. The renowned philanthropist Baroness 
Angela Burdett-Coutts, a childhood friend of the arch-alarmist Wellington, also signed, 
appearing alongside only six other signatories who can be identified as female, an important 
reminder of the fundamentally male nature of the nineteenth century public sphere.72 Twenty-
seven MPs put their names down, thirteen of whom were Conservatives including the former 
Home Secretary Richard Assheton Cross and three men who would go on to hold prominent 
ministerial posts in Salsibury’s next government, Edward Stanhope, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, 
and Arthur Balfour – a clear indication that Tunnel opposition had become the majority view 
within the Party.73  
More surprising, however, were the remaining fourteen MPs, all of whom were Liberals. 
Among the latter were the scientist John Lubbock, the industrialist L.L. Dillwyn, the French-
born Pandeli Ralli and, much to the chagrin of his fellow trade unionists, the Radical Thomas 
Burt; a number of others were noted for the strength of their support for Cobdenite free trade 
principles.74 Knowles had also succeeded in securing a number of other Liberal notables, such 
as the editor of Lloyd’s Weekly News Blanchard Jerrold, the evolutionary scientist Thomas 
Huxley, the social theorist Herbert Spencer, the poet Wilfred Blunt, and the historian Goldwin 
Smith, all of whom were prominent internationalists. Smith, a passionate member of the 
Manchester School, published a short essay explaining his opposition in the March issue of The 
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Nineteenth Century, alongside Dunsany’s second piece.75 The Channel, he wrote, was perhaps 
the most historically significant geographical feature on the globe. It had protected British 
liberties, and allowed the British to aid those on the Continent struggling against tyra ny. He 
also argued, in an important admission for a follower of Cobden, that the opinions of civilians 
counted for nothing on military matters. ‘On the pacific influence of commerce’, he concluded, 
‘rather too much has been placed; nations, like men, are often governed by their temper as by 
their interests’. Smith’s essay was a significant gain for Wolseley, not least because it appears to 
have pushed the Daily News towards its own opposition, but it also represented a more grievous 
loss for Watkin.76 By arguing for the importance of the Channel in securing British liberties, 
Smith essentially twisted Watkin’s own appeals to liberalism back on himself. Furthermore, in 
appealing to the unreliable ‘temper’ of nations, Smith illustrated how otherwise dyed-in-the-
wool liberals could be turned against the Tunnel if their fear of populism, jingoism, or panic 
was stronger than their belief in the rationality of the people.77 In a similar manner, it is likely 
that this lack of faith in the public inspired many other liberals to sign the petition, as the 
Scotsman was quick to point out:  
It is safe to say that Professor Huxley and Mr. Herbert Spencer do not share the fears of 
those who think invasion likely; but they know that the expression of these or like fears 
has given rise to panics which have cost the country millions of money and brought us 
sometimes to the brink of war … The alarmists sign because they are alarmists; the non-
alarmists sign because they do not wish the country to be alarmed.78  
As a document, then, the Nineteenth Century’s petition offers a fascinating indication of the 
extent to which ‘public opinion’ was beginning to move, willingly or not, away from the 
optimistic outlook of the 1870s. It reflected a basic nervousness towards the nation and its 
people which would be so successfully exploited by the alarmists of the following three 
decades.  
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However, a closer consideration of the petition suggests another interpretation, one which raises 
a number of questions about the meaning, scope and influence of ‘public opinion’ in nineteenth 
century Britain. Certainly, there were a great many names from high society, but this was hardly 
a surprise when one considers Knowles’ own importance within the nation’s elite. A substantial 
number of the signatories were drawn from those who had previously contributed to the 
magazine, and eleven particularly prominent names had been members of the famous 
Metaphysical Society, of which Knowles had been the founder.79 Similarly, Knowles was 
involved in charity work with Burdett-Coutts and wrote to her in April 1882, asking her to 
approach her friends about the Tunnel.80 An architect by trade, Knowles even convinced the 
master plasterer on his latest building project to sign.81 The petition thus reveals much about the 
importance and effectiveness of personal networks, but a focus on these famous names distracts 
from the fact that Knowles’ attempts to convince many from outside this exclusive set were far 
from fruitful. In particular he was determined to obtain the support of ‘trades societies’, both 
Chambers of Trade and Trades Unions, and to this end he dispatched requests for support to 
such bodies across the country, with the aim of reflecting the ‘overwhelmingly strong’ opinion 
which, he was sure, existed in all layers of society.82 
The reaction of the commercial community was, to say the least, mixed. No Chamber of 
Commerce gave its official support to Knowles’ petition, reflecting what seems to have been a 
wider lack of consensus among men of industry and commerce. As a commercial proposition 
the Tunnel was obviously not a scheme to be dismissed out of hand, especially, as the Chamb r 
of Commerce Journal reminded its readers in April 1883, if a repeat of the costly British 
opposition to the Suez Canal were to be avoided.83 In 1875 seventy three separate Chambers 
were said to have endorsed the Tunnel, support which Watkin was still claiming in 1888.84 
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Certainly, many remained enthusiastic. The Sheffield Chamber and the board of directors of the 
Manchester Chamber passed supportive resolutions, while Newcastle’s president gave a speech 
praising the scheme’s ‘enormous commercial advantages’.85 Interestingly, considering their 
geographical proximity to the proposed Tunnel mouth, the assembled members of Canterbury’s 
Chamber of Trade heartily welcomed a speech mocking invasion fears.86 When one of Watkin’s 
associates approached a number of Chamber of Commerce directors to see if they would give 
evidence to the Select Committee he received supportive letters from Bradford, Nottingham, 
London, Glasgow and Derby.87 On the other hand, the chairman and several members of the 
Edinburgh Chamber opposed the scheme for fear of an increase in military spending and panics, 
Wolverhampton was ‘adverse’ to it, while Southampton actually passed a resolution against it, 
albeit for reasons of a very local nature, namely the fear that the increased railway freight would 
damage their port’s trade.88 Significantly, considering Chamberlain’s pivotal ministerial role, 
the Secretary to the Birmingham Chamber reported that none of its members were in favour.89 
 Such division was not limited to differences between Chambers, but also within them. The 
Aberdeen, Huddersfield, and Bristol Chambers could not come to an agreement on the issue, 
although the latter’s president did sign Knowles’ petition.90 Even in Manchester the Chamber’s 
board was challenged by one member who accused it of failing to represent the opinions of its 
constituents, who, according to him, were afraid of conscription.91 In his evidence to the Select 
Committee the following year, John Slagg, as ex-President of the Manchester Chamber, 
admitted that the City’s commercial community was divided by the invasion scare.92 The 
London Chamber, along with many others, does not appear to have ever discussed the subject.  
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Most directors approached by the SCRC in 1883 either referred the issue to someone else or 
were otherwise unable or unwilling to give an opinion, a position also taken by the Central 
Chamber of Commerce when contacted by the Lansdowne Committee.93 In all likelihood, the 
contentious nature of the issue encouraged most to leave the matter to the government; one 
director of the Derby Chamber wrote to Watkin’s associate in 1883 that, as the matter had 
become one of ‘imperial interests’, it would be ‘unwise to interfere at present’.94 Thus, while it 
is clear that Knowles’ appeals failed to elicit the widespread outpouring of hostility he had 
anticipated from the commercial community, the scare had nevertheless succeeded in muting 
many influential voices. 
Knowles was similarly keen to see working class organisations represented in his petition. In 
this respect he was sorely disappointed, for only a handful of minor trade associations were 
present in the final document, although he did manage to net the labour leaders Thomas Burt 
and George Howell, both of whom had written for the Nineteenth Century on other topics.95 Far 
from apathy, however, Knowles’ circular actually uncovered a substantial level of support for 
the Tunnel within the trade union movement. When, in April 1882, his letter was discussed at 
the London Trades’ Council, the Council instead adopted a resolution condemning the ‘absurd’ 
opposition and declaring that Watkin’s project would be of great benefit to the people of Britain 
and France.96 The Secretary of the Council was George B. Shipton, a leading member of a 
number of trades organisations, noted peace campaigner, and editor of the Labour Standard, a 
paper which Friedrich Engels tellingly dismissed as ‘predominantly Gladstonian’.97 Galvanised 
by Knowles’ letter, Shipton set about communicating and organising meetings with other trades 
councils around the country, resulting in pro-Tunnel resolutions passed at meetings in 
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Birmingham, Liverpool, Leeds, Bristol and Manchester.98 On 3 July Ferdinand de Lesseps, who 
had recently been given a tour of the Tunnel workings by Watkin, was met in London by a 
deputation of union leaders including Shipton. Claiming to represent half a million workers, the 
deputation passed a resolution declaring that the Tunnel would ‘promote closer union between 
the industrial classes of England and France’.99 In August George Potter, former editor of the 
influential trade unionist Bee-Hive, published The Channel Tunnel and International Progress, 
which argued for the working class to make its voice heard:100 
…the working classes, who have the deepest interest in the matter, should speak out 
unreservedly and emphatically on every point of the question, and especially as one 
vitally affecting the brotherhood of mankind, the amity of nations, the widest extension 
of commerce, and the unbounded expansion of the field of remunerative labour.101  
On 16 September the Amalgamated Labourers Union convened a special meeting in London 
which described the Tunnel as an ‘incalculable boon to the labouring classes’, a resolution 
which they sent to the Prime Minister.102 A few days later the annual meeting of the National 
Trades Union Congress was held at Manchester. Although the Congress itself did not discuss 
the Tunnel, the Congress President and a substantial number of other prominent labour leaders 
from across the United Kingdom signed a separate declaration calling the military fears 
‘unworthy of very serious consideration by the nation at large’. A ‘Workmen’s Channel Tunnel 
Committee’ was set up with Shipton as its Secretary, and was soon in contact with French trade 
unions. In September 1883, it sent a deputation to Paris to express their support for the Tunnel. 
In France they were fêted wherever they went by representatives of French trade unions, were 
introduced to the President and Prime Minister by the British Ambassador, and were 
enthusiastically welcomed by a list of names as glittering as that which had signed The 
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Nineteenth Century’s protest, including De Lesseps, Victor Hugo and the editor of the Revue 
Nouvelle, Juliette Adam.  
In 1883 an account of this delegation, a list of pro-Tunnel labour resolutions, a summary of the 
Workman’s Channel Tunnel Committee and the text of John Bright’s speech to the Institute of 
Civil Engineers was published as The Channel Tunnel and Industrial Opinion.103 Addressed 
directly to ‘fellow workmen’, the pamphlet claimed to reflect an ‘unbiased and spontaneous 
popular expression of opinion in favour of constructing the Tunnel’.104 It ‘fearlessly asserted’ 
that the majority of Englishmen were in favour of the Tunnel, and accused Knowles of 
misrepresenting this fact. In an explicit riposte to Knowles’ Public Opinion it also included an 
extremely critical review of the Nineteenth Century pamphlet.105 It pointed out the paucity of 
names on the petition outside of armed forces officers and ‘parsons’, condemning the latter as 
believers in ‘faith rather than science’, and was similarly contemptuous of Wolseley and his 
fellow officers. In a passage which could have been drafted by Cobden himself, it accused the 
armed forces and upper classes of hijacking British foreign policy:  
We are not constrained to allow the military, naval, and aristocratic authorities, together 
with a sprinkling of the clergy, magistracy, and journalists of the Press devoted to the 
upper-class ascendancy, to dictate for us the industrial policy of England … Our 
mission is to destroy the necessity for soldiers and dismiss them altogether, rather than 
hold them up as councillors to guide the international policy of a pre-eminently 
industrial nation.106 
Read in full, Industrial Opinion shows a trade union leadership determined to forge a voice for 
itself equal to that of ‘society’. It illustrates, furthermore, how fiercely many within the 
movement held Cobdenite interpretations of both free trade and anti-militarism.107 In this 
respect, the pamphlet took a firmly internationalist line, repeatedly emphasising how the 
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interests of the British and French peoples were ‘mutual and identical’. The printed speeches of 
the British deputation in France were defined by humanitarianism, liberty, and progress, and 
looked to the Tunnel as the first step towards an Anglo-French union.108 In his speech, Shipton 
argued that by creating an ‘intimate alliance of the two most liberal nations’, the Tunnel would 
constitute the foundation stone of the Federated States of Europe.109 This Francophilia contrasts 
interestingly with the less enthusiastic internationalism of others within the British trade union 
movement, who distrusted the pronounced revolutionary Marxism of their continental 
counterparts.110 In this respect the Workmen’s Channel Tunnel Committee was an example of 
an attempt to unite British and French trade unionists under the banner of liberalism during a 
period when the two nations’ labour organisations were often politically divided.111  
Trade union support for the Channel Tunnel was active and substantial. While it is difficult to 
judge the extent to which these labour leaders reflected the views of their members, it is telling 
that only the shipping workers of the Port of London appear to have held a meeting against it, 
and this because they were concerned it would take trade from the Port.112 As a result of his 
work, George Shipton was invited to give evidence to the parliamentary Select Committee, 
where he argued that the ‘popular sentiment of the working classes’ was in favour of the 
Tunnel.113 Over the following decade trade unions and societies continued to make their voices 
heard: in June 1885, for example, the Association of Permanent Way Inspectors passed two 
resolutions in favour of the Tunnel, which they believed would make an Anglo-French war 
‘almost impossible’.114 On first consideration, then, it seems remarkable that no historian is 
aware of the depth and extent of working class feeling.115  Looking more broadly, however, it is 
clear that this omission is simply a reflection of contemporary biases. Of the 1883 Parliamentary 
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Joint Select Committee’s seven reports not one referred to Shipton’s evidence or the wider trade 
union movement. Newspapers were generally contemptuous of the working class agitation, 
often accusing it of being in the pay of Watkin, a charge angrily rejected in In ustrial 
Opinion.116  Watkin himself appeared to be unaware of the extent of the trade union support in 
his evidence to the Select Committee, and there is no evidence that he and Shipton ever met 
during this period.117 Only in later years, as we shall see, was the working class dimension 
raised in Parliament. That ‘industrial opinion’ was so roundly ignored is indicative of the 
contemporary view of public opinion, which could be easily constructed so as to exclude 
anyone from outside the upper and upper middle classes. Having differed from the fashionable 
view of the establishment, the working classes were disregarded in favour of ‘representative’ 
newspaper editorials and Lord Tennyson’s signature.  
One other interesting indicator of public attitudes was the popularity of the Channel Tunnel as a 
subject for local debating and ‘parliamentary’ societies, a hobby which had become widespread 
by the early 1880s.118 Looking back in 1887, The Globe remembered the Tunnel as ‘the question 
of the day’, on which ‘excited speeches [were] made in every debating society in the 
kingdom’.119 Unfortunately reporting on debates was very patchy, but a search of digitised local 
newspapers identified seventeen Tunnel debates in England in the years 1882 and 1883 
[Appendix 1].120 Of these twelve resulted in motions against the project and five in favour, but 
the headline figures conceal some very close and popular discussions. For example, the 
Colchester Parliamentary Debating Society opposed the Tunnel on a vote of thirty-five to thirty-
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nine, after a debate with an attendance of about 160 people.121 On the other side of the country 
the Debating Society of the Somerset hamlet of Washford voted against the Tunnel by a 
majority of one after a two-day debate which saw a ‘capital attendance’ of both men and 
women.122 The subject continued to be popular over the following years, evidentially regarded 
as a model debating topic. In 1884 the Swindon Debating Society was exactly split after a long 
and enthusiastic exchange, while in 1887 two debating clubs in Kent returned opposite votes on 
what was obviously an issue of substantial local interest.123 In 1891 the Folkestone Society came 
down by a large majority against the scheme, although this was after a poorly attended debate 
on what by then must have been a subject which the town had long since exhausted itself.124 
The attractiveness of the Channel Tunnel as a debate question pointed to the interest 
commanded by the questions it posed about Britain’s position in the world. Where the debates 
themselves were reported in the press, it was clear that the subject fell along the lines defined by 
Watkin and Wolseley; between trade and friendly intercourse on the one hand, and the danger of 
war, expense and panic on the other.125 As the Chairman of the Wellingborough Debating 
Society opined on introducing that society’s debate, the Channel Tunnel was ‘a very good 
subject for every Englishman to express his opinion on’.126 With the caveat that debating was an 
obviously middle-class hobby, these debates offer another window through which a more 
representative appreciation of the national picture can be acquired.  
The conclusion to be drawn from the above evidence, then, is that the Channel Tunnel debate 
was much more evenly balanced than historians have hitherto suspected. Other, less public 
examples might also be cited. Following a visit to the Tunnel in May 1882, twelve Oxford 
academics, six of whom were professors including the Sedleian Professor of Natural 
Philosophy, wrote to the Board of Trade to insist that the ‘important and interesting scientific 
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experiment’ be allowed to continue.127 Another supporter was the military historian Colonel H. 
Montague Hozier. A Liberal, Hozier wrote to Lord Lansdowne during the 1883 Select 
Committee to argue that the Tunnel would further encourage the ‘comity of nations’, although 
he also suggested that, were the French to attempt an invasion, ‘a few loose engines, with 
scythes on their wheels’ might keep the Tunnel clear without damaging it.128 In 1889 Hozier 
delivered a powerful rebuttal to Wolseley’s fears in a paper to the Society of Arts, during which 
he received the public support of the influential retired naval officers Rear-Admiral Philip
Colomb and Admiral Erasmus Ommanney, further illustrating that the defence establishment 
was not unanimously in favour of Wolseley and Cambridge.129  
Conclusion 
The image of Britain united in insular fury against Watkin’s Tunnel does not hold up to close 
scrutiny. Rather a combination of press reaction, James Knowles’ publicity skills, and 
historians’ limited use of primary sources has served to give a false image of popular sentiment. 
It is remarkable, for example, that the Workman’s Committee deputation to Paris is absent from 
the academic literature, as it was widely reported in the national press. Further problems have 
been caused by an overreliance on existing secondary literature. A notable example of this is the 
claim, taken from Thomas Whiteside’s Tunnel under the Channel and repeated by a number of 
subsequent historians, that a mob smashed the windows of the CTC’s offices in 1882.130  Not 
only is no primary evidence forthcoming for this claim, but there is no evidence that either the 
CTC or SCRC ever possessed offices of their own to be attacked.  
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While it appears that a majority of Britons who considered the issue eventually decided against 
the scheme during the 1880s, evidence from the press during the 1870s illustrates that this was 
by no means an inevitable result. Trade union enthusiasm points to a strong class divide in 
opinion. On the other hand, geography does not seem to have played any significant role, as 
evidenced by a comparison between the pro-Tunnel feeling of the Canterbury Chamber of 
Trade, a group which one may have thought would be more susceptible to invasion fears, and 
the opposite feeling in its Edinburgh counterpart. Similarly, Watkin’s continuance as MP for 
Hythe until 1895 suggested that those living closest to the proposed Tunnel entrance were not 
seriously concerned by their representative’s leading role in its advocacy.  
Much depended, then, on Wolseley’s intervention, and his successful use of the media to exploit 
his own position as a disinterested military expert. Meanwhile the pro-Tunnel lobby lacked a 
leader of similar stature and thus suffered from a disastrous newspaper ‘panic’, driven, 
ironically, by the fear of panic itself, which rapidly annihilated Watkin’s support in this crucial 
area. Due to its exclusion from the prevailing idea of ‘public opinion’, even substantial trade 
union support could not make up for this deficiency. As the establishment turned against the 
scheme, it is likely that many otherwise pro-Tunnel figures, such as those within business or 
academic circles, were reluctant to speak in its support for fear of being tarred with the same 
brush as Watkin. As an illustration of the speed and success of this conversion, in June 1883, 
Judy’s Parliamentary sketch writer felt comfortable in describing the ‘general public’ as 
‘overwhelmingly’ against the scheme, the magazine illustrating this observation with a cartoon, 
which, two years earlier, might quite easily have been read as a pro-Tunnel piece [Figure 18].131  
Watkin himself was in no doubt as to the demographics of the Tunnel opposition. In 1892 he 
laid the blame firmly at the door of ‘those who called themselves “society”’, such as the affluent 
individuals who had signed Knowles’ protest.132  ‘There was nothing’, he declared, ‘more 
tyrannical, selfish, or ignorant than what was called “society”’. Watkin never abandoned the 
conviction that the great mass of the country was in favour of the Tunnel, an assumption which, 
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as we shall see in the following chapter, guided many of its supporters in Parliament. The truth 
was probably closer to a more even split in opinion, a fact which, as Funny Folks shrewdly 
observed in April 1883, did not suggest a favourable outcome for the project: 
Said Sir Edward Watkin to Lord Wolseley the other day: “Your opinion 
notwithstanding, one half of the inhabitants of the British Isles are in favour of the 
Channel Tunnel.” “That may be so,” replied his lordship; “but you must remember that 
one half doesn’t make a ’hole.”133 
  
                                                          






Figure 18: ‘The Channel Tunnel Question.’ 
‘What is the use of having a ‘tight little island’ if this sort of thing is possible underground?’ 
Three Frenchmen, two Germans, a Russian, a Turk and a Boer sneak through the Tunnel. Note 





Government, Parliament and the Channel Tunnel 
  
“Will you walk into my Tunnel?” said the Spider to the Fly, 
“’Tis the handiest little Tunnel that ever you did spy. 
You’ve only got to pop your head inside and peep, no more, 
and you’ll see many curious things you never saw before. 
Will you, will you, will you, will you, walk in, Grand Old Fly?” 
Now, this particular Grand Old Fly was very “fly,” you know, 
And had clear business notions and ideas of quid pro quo. 
Says he, “About your Tunnel patriots doubt, alarmists chafe; 
of course, it’s most ridiculous, but will you swear it’s safe? 
Oh, will you, will you, will you, will you?” said the Grand Old Fly. 
Said the Spider to the Fly, “It’s most absurd, upon my soul, 
To see so big a nation scared about so small a hole. 
To share the scare that’s in the air is worthy, don’t you know, 
Not of a Grand Old Fly like you, but of a midge like JOE!1 
Then won’t you, won’t you, won’t you, won’t you, plucky Grand Old 
Fly? 
“Will you show the feather white and vote with Joseph, Grand Old 
Fly?” 
“No, if I do, may I be shot! It may be, by-and-by, 
I’ll ask you – but no matter; with you now my lot is cast.” 
The Spider laughed, “Ha, Ha! My boy, I’ve got you safe at last!  
You will then, will then, wil then, will then, really Grand Old Fly!” 
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Through examining the ideological framework of and public reaction to the Channel Tunnel, the 
previous two chapters have provided context absent from other studies. They have shown that 
the debate was both more extensive and politically fraught than historians have supposed. Just 
as significantly, the second chapter illustrates the suddenness of the change in public opinion 
which Wolseley’s intervention inspired – a suddenness which is somewhat at odds with the 
more sedate narrative followed by historians. By applying this new context to the existing 
narrative, the first half of this chapter provides a more complete picture of the government 
rejection of the Tunnel. It shows that the suddenness of the change that overcame the public 
sphere in February-March 1882 was mirrored within the government, and suggests that the War 
Office’s anti-Tunnel campaign was more organised and coordinated than hitherto assumed. 
Overall, it argues that the decision to abandon in July 1883 was a direct result of Wolseley’s 
public campaign, which forced Gladstone to submit the issue to Parliamentary Committee in 
order to avoid the disunity within his government becoming public.  
The second half of this chapter carries the story to the end of the decade. All previous histories 
of the nineteenth century Channel Tunnel attempt end with little more than a nod to the period 
after 1883. Yet, as David Hodgkins observes, the Channel Tunnel was ‘the single most 
important theme in the last ten years of Watkin’s parliamentary career.’3 Between 1884 and 
1890 the Commons voted five times on Watkin’s Channel Tunnel Bills, divisions which were 
well attended and closely scrutinised. By analysing these votes and the debates which preceded 
them, the chapter argues that parliamentary support for the Tunnel was not as niche as might be 
assumed. However, while its support among Liberals steadily increased, within the 
Conservative party, which was in government during three of the divisions, opposition to the 
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The Board of Trade Committee 
As has already been touched upon, prior to 1882 successive British governments had 
maintained a relaxed if detached position towards the Channel Tunnel. Gladstone’s first 
government was supportive and Disraeli’s ministry provided official sanction in 1874, although 
its failure to follow this with either a comprehensive concession or public money seriously 
limited investor confidence.4 In 1875 the War Office had produced a small number of 
memoranda which argued that the Tunnel was a potential threat to Britain’s tr ditional 
‘insularity’, but the department was largely excluded from the Anglo-French discussions and the 
CTC project was abandoned before any more serious opposition could be developed.5 Inde , 
when, in 1873, Gladstone addressed a short note to Lord Granville discussing Grosvenor’s first 
proposals, he observed that a Tunnel was preferable to improved ferry services because the 
latter might provide an excuse for the French to construct a large naval base at Calais.6 The Tory 
Foreign Secretary Lord Derby was similarly unconcerned, neatly summarising the Conservative 
position the following year: 
I say, no objection, provided they [the CTC] don’t expect government help: in a military 
point of view it leaves us where we were: since it can be drowned at either end in a few 
minutes. Commercially it may do some good, but the rates will probably be too high for 
ordinary traffic: politically, it brings more foreigners into England, which may not 
altogether be a gain, but it is too late to imitate Japan.7 
Strictly speaking, the final decision on the Channel Tunnel rested with Parliament, not the 
government. To allow the completion of the project, parliamentary sanction was needed to put 
the draft treaty of 1876 into effect. More immediately, both the SCRC and CTC required an Act 
to allow borings beyond the foreshore and out under the Channel.8 Prior to 1882, however, 
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Hansard records practically no interest in the Channel Tunnel. The Bill of 1875 had passed both 
Houses without comment, and there were few indicators from elsewhere that parliamentarians 
had any firm opinions on the scheme, let alone opposed it.9 Before Wolseley’s protests, it 
seemed likely that any line taken by the government would be endorsed by the Commons and 
the Lords. By 1881 both companies had Bills before the Commons, overseen by the respective 
company’s chairman, Watkin for the SCRC, and Grosvenor, who was at this time the Liberal 
Chief Whip, for the CTC. It is in this context that Watkin’s optimism in January 1882 should be 
understood.  
Unfortunately for the companies, the Board of Trade was not willing to allow the project to go 
ahead without conducting one further inquiry. During July and August 1881 the department 
contacted the War Office and Admiralty to suggest the formation of a Committee, chaired by 
the Board’s Permanent Secretary Thomas Henry Farrer, to examine the question. As Wilson and 
Culham observe, Chamberlain had evidently been surprised by Watkin’s confident assertion on 
16 June 1881 that the Tunnel would be completed in five years.10 They ascribe the creation of 
the Committee to this surprise alone, apparently unaware of The Times’ 18 June editorial. 
Although it had had little effect within the public sphere, the 1882 Blue Book correspondence 
reveals that The Times’s anti-Tunnel outburst was clearly a major driving factor behind the 
Board of Trade Committee. This correspondence referred to The Times’ editorial, and gave 
‘public susceptibility…as to possible danger to this country’ as one reason for the Committee’s 
creation.11 The fact that this ‘public susceptibility’ was, as shown in the previous chapter, 
limited at best, illustrates not only the importance of The Times as the paper of choice for 
ministers and civil servants, but also suggests how large ‘public opinion’ – however narrowly 
conceived – loomed in the official imagination. Set up in order to address this public concern, 
the Committee instead created the perfect forum for Wolseley to forward his alarmist agenda. 
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In this context, it is important to emphasise that there is no evidence any senior figure at the 
Board of Trade was ever convinced that the Tunnel would prove a unique danger to national 
defence. Farrer himself was a thorough Cobdenite and considered the Tunnel to be a project of 
‘reason and common sense’, while Robert Giffin, the head of the Board’s Commercial 
Department, provided the Select Committee with strongly pro-Tunnel evidence in 1883.12 
Chamberlain’s own relaxed attitude is evidenced in a letter of 24 December to CTC supporter 
Henry Labouchere, which was not reproduced in the Blue Book – in all likelihood because it 
contained Chamberlain’s personal opinions – and thus not previously consulted by historians. 
Chamberlain confirmed that the government was concerned with two issues: the ‘military 
question’, and the danger of the Tunnel becoming the monopoly of a single railway company.13 
While he referred to Wolseley’s memorandum, which had been submitted on 10 December, and 
admitted that if the Tunnel were shown to be a danger it would not be allowed to proceed, he 
concluded: ‘personally the objection on this score appears to me absurd and I do not think it will 
ultimately be suffered to interfere with the undertaking.’ Of Watkin Chamberlain exhibited 
nothing of his later animosity: ‘he professes to be governed entirely by patriotic considerations 
and I have as yet no information which entitles me to dispute the sincerity of his motives.’ 
Overall, the letter is more concerned with the monopoly issue than defence, its tone indicating a 
Minister occupied with the legal conditions under which a Tunnel might be built, rather than 
questioning whether it should be.  
The exact course of events during the following two months is significant, as it illustrates the 
sheer speed with which Cambridge and Wolseley pushed home their opposition, pointing to a 
real awareness of how to employ political pressure in both the public and official spheres. Sir 
John Adye submitted his pro-Tunnel memorandum to the Committee in early January; Wolseley 
was interviewed on the 25th, and Adye on the 26th. By this time Cambridge had organised for 
                                                          
12 T.H. Farrer to Lord Lansdowne, 2 July 1883, BL, Add. MS 88906/23/1; Robert Giffin, Select 
Committee, pp. 178-196.  
13 Joseph Chamberlain to Henry Labouchere, 24 Dec. 1881, Cadbury Research Library, University of 
Birmingham (hereafter CRL, UoB), JC/50/3. Chamberlain had made the sam points in a letter to Watkin, 
15 Dec. 1881, CRL, UoB, JC5/76/20. 
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Wolseley’s memorandum to be published by Dunsany, leaving the Committee with five days to 
digest the diametrically opposing views of two distinguished military men before the media had 
delved into the issue.14 On 31 January, Admiral Cooper Key sent his letter of opposition to Lord 
Northbrook, coinciding, whether intentionally or not, with the publication of Wolseley’s views 
in the Nineteenth Century. On 1 February, Farrer wrote to Chamberlain and explained that, as 
his War Office and Admiralty colleagues were now anxious for further military and naval 
evidence, new instructions were required.15 The timing of this letter can hardly have been a 
coincidence, as prior to it there was no indication that the Committee was not to have produced 
a report; it seems likely that Farrer had been thrown by the sudden publication of Wolseley’s 
evidence. Chamberlain thanked Farrer for his service and referred the matter to ‘the 
responsibility of the Government as a whole’ on 3 February.16 Wolseley’s Central News 
interview appeared in the papers three days later. The political effect was magnified by the 
Duke of Cambridge on 8 February, when, in proposing a toast to ‘the Houses of Parliament’ at a 
public dinner in aid of Richmond Hospital, he expressed hope that the legislature would not 
support the ‘unwise and dangerous experiment’.17 Within the space of three weeks, the British 
armed forces had delivered a series of hammer blows to the Channel Tunnel project in a pincer 
movement which struck the government simultaneously from within and without. The 
suddenness of this onslaught is not appreciated by historians, principally because the full public 
context has not previously been investigated.  
On 10 February the issue was first raised in the Commons, when the strongly pro-Tunnel 
Liberal MP Sir Alexander Hamilton-Gordon asked the government to confirm whether the 
reports of Wolseley’s opposition were true, and ‘if so, whether Her Majesty's Government 
intend, on that account, to disapprove of a scheme so eminently calculated to promote peaceful 
relations between the two Nations?’18 Childers replied by confirming the existence of the 
                                                          
14 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 36-37. 
15 Correspondence, p. 192. 
16 Correspondence, pp. 192-193. 
17 Daily Telegraph, 9 Feb. 1882, p. 3. 
18 Hamilton-Gordon, Parl. Deb., 10 Feb. 1882, cols. 383-384. 
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Committee, and reminded the House of the endorsement of 1875. It was clear, however, that 
what was once the preserve of the Board of Trade was now a problem for the entire government. 
The following day the Tunnel was discussed for the first time in Cabinet. In a list which has not 
before been consulted by Channel Tunnel historians, Gladstone recorded his impressions of 
each minister’s ‘Channel Tunnel Leanings’ as follows: 
Against: Selborne, Kimberley, Harcourt, Granville?, Hartington, Carlingford, 
Chamberlain?, Forster? 
For: Childers, W[illiam].E[wart].G[ladstone]., Bright, Northbrook. 
Silent: Dodson, Spencer.19 
Even taking into account Gladstone’s uncertainty on five members, and the interesting fact that 
both Childers and Northbrook, heads respectively of the War Office and Admiralty, were in 
favour of the scheme, such a split in Cabinet opinion appears remarkable. It stunned John 
Bright, as he recorded in his diary: ‘Cabinet at 2 o’clock: discussion…on Channel Tunnel. 
Astonished at objection of some at terrors which, to me, are ridiculous and purely imaginary.’20 
Nor were such sudden expressions of opposition limited to the Cabinet; as Keith Wilson shows, 
by early March practically all the senior figures at the Foreign Office, politician and civil 
servant alike, had turned against the Tunnel, fearing invasion.21 This included Sir Charles Dilke, 
at this time the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and a close ally of Chamberlain, 
who cited a range of military, diplomatic and social concerns including surprise attack, the 
chance of Germany seizing the French end during a second Franco-German war, and, perhaps 
most importantly, ‘that the creation of it might lead to panic’.22 On that final point even 
Gladstone’s private secretary Edward Hamilton concurred, writing that, in spite of his chief’s 
confidence, he himself was ‘half-hearted’ about the project, ‘mainly on the ground that its 
                                                          
19 Mathew, Gladstone Diaries, vol. X, p. 210. Punctuation in original. 
20 Walling, Bright, p. 475. 
21 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 29-32. 
22 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, p. 29; Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of Sir Charles W. 
Dilke, vol. I (London: John Murray, 1917), p. 427. Dilke also claimed to have turned the Prince of Wales 
against the Tunnel. 
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tendency will be to create panics and further military extravagances’.23 What was notable about 
these feelings was their suddenness. All are dated February or March 1882, a strong indication 
of officialdom’s profound sensitivity to shifts in newspaper opinion. ‘We have all been rather 
surprised by the explosion of hostile feeling’, wrote Childers to Lord Roberts on 17 March, 
‘considering that the idea has been before the public and the Army for ten years’.24  
On 14 February the Conservative MP William Bromley-Davenport asked whether the 
government should not now refer the issue to a Joint Committee of both Houses. Gladstone 
responded with reference to the Tunnel’s recent history, observing that ‘when Her Majesty's 
Government came into Office, and, indeed, until lately, this question appeared to present the 
aspect of a settled matter.’25 Bromley-Davenport’s question appears to have been inspired by 
Grosvenor, who was demanding that Watkin be ordered to stop work and that an immediate 
Select Committee be appointed to decide the issue. ‘So excited is our worthy whip about this,’ 
wrote Labouchere to Chamberlain in February, ‘that he says that if nothing is done, he will 
himself have to go down to Dover on a filibustering expedition, and pour water into Watkins 
hole.’26 On 21 February the subject was raised for the first time in the Lords, where Lord 
Brabourne and the Marquis of Bath, who later appeared at the head of the Nineteenth Century 
petition, had a sharp exchange of words.27 Reflecting in his diary, Brabourne observed that the 
peers appeared to ‘doubt the wisdom’ of the Tunnel, hardly a surprising position for a chamber 
containing so many military and naval representatives.28 The following day, Childers ordered 
the establishment of the War Office ‘Channel Tunnel Defence Committee’.29 
Apart from asking Brabourne to produce his counter-article, Watkin’s immediate response to 
this sudden outburst of hostility was to step up his charm offensive by inviting large numbers of 
                                                          
23 Dudley W.R. Bahlman (ed.), The Diary of Sir Edward Walter Hamilton, 1880-1885, vol. II (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1972), p. 420. 
24 Spencer Childers, The Life and Correspondence of the Right Hon. Hugh C. E. Childers, 1827-1896, 
vol. II (London: John Murray, 1901), p. 78. 
25 Bromley-Davenport and Gladstone, Parl. Deb., 14 Feb. 1882, cols. 637-638. 
26 Labouchere to Chamberlain, 14 Feb. 1882, CRL, UoB, JC5/50/1.The antipathy was mutual, to the 
detriment of both the SCRC and CTC. See Hodgkins, Railway King, pp. 527-528. 
27 Parl. Deb., 21 Feb. 1882, col. 1218-1223. 
28 Brabourne Diary, 21 Feb. 1882, KHLC, U951/F25/35. 
29 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, p. 33. 
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parliamentarians to the Tunnel, as well as Journalists including artists from the Graphic and 
Illustrated London News [Figure 19]. By the end of February 1882 sixty MPs had visited the 
works at Dover, and a further 100 had put their names down to go.30 Gladstone, Salisbury, and a 
substantial number of other serving and former Cabinet members attended on 11 March.31 
Gladstone noted in his diary the ‘beautiful’ electric lighting, and how interesting he had found 
the entire experience; that same day he read the anti-Tunnel invasion novel How John Bull Lost 
London, perhaps with the intention of getting a feel for the opposition.32 After his visit the local 
Sevenoaks Chronicle reported that the Prime Minister had ‘stated that he believed the work 
would be successful’, something which, surprisingly, was not picked up by other papers.33 
Regardless, the readings of both Channel Tunnel Bills were postponed, and on 31 March the 
Board of Trade was ordered to warn Watkin against any further progress.34 Within the space of 
two months, Wolseley had succeeded in completely transforming both the public and political 
discourse, throwing an established government policy into confusion, and casting serious doubt 
on the viability of what in January had been regarded as the greatest achievement of modern 
engineering.  
  
                                                          
30 Hodgkins, Railway King, p. 524.  
31 The Standard, 13 Mar. 1882, p. 3. Three days later Cambridge and Wolseley also inspected the works. 
32 Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, vol. X, p. 220. 
33 Sevenoaks Chronicle and Kentish Advertiser, 17 Mar. 1882, p. 8. 





Figure 19: ‘The Channel Tunnel Works at Dover’. 
Showing a visit to the Tunnel and a cross-section of the works under the sea.  
Illustrated London News, 4 Mar. 1882, p. 217. 
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The Lansdowne Committee 
The War office Committee reported on 12 May 1882. Identifying serious concerns over the 
Tunnel’s defensibility as measured by the department’s own exacting standards, it concluded 
that the scheme should only be allowed to go ahead if a very large number of security measures 
were adopted.35 Public pressure had, as we have seen, been kept up in the meantime, and in June 
Cambridge delivered his own substantial memorandum to the government.36 Throughout this 
period the SCRC had refused to cease tunnelling operations, and after a long exchange of letters 
Chamberlain had eventually been forced to take Watkin to the High Court, obtaining an 
injunction ordering the work to stop.37 Watkin’s typically bullish response was to declare his 
willingness to go to jail for the project.38 In the event the injunction simply earned Chamberlain 
the ‘implacable and undying animosity’ of Watkin, who apparently promised to erect an 
enormous stone pillar on the site of the Tunnel works, upon which was to be inscribed a 
description of how ‘Joseph Chamberlain, of Birmingham’ ordered them to be stopped. ‘“Joseph 
Chamberlain” and “Birmingham” are each to have a line of bad preeminence to themselves,’ 
reported the Parliamentary diarist Henry Lucy, ‘for Sir Edward Watkin does not know which is 
the more hateful in the ears of good men and honest politicians’, a reflection Watkin’s own 
laissez-faire outlook and his hatred of Chamberlain’s Birmingham Radicalism.39 
At Cabinet on 12 August Childers suggested a compromise solution: that the Tunnel should not 
be opposed on condition that the suggestions of the War Office Committee were enforced and 
the scheme put to a ‘strong & probably a Joint Committee.’ A note left by Gladstone in his 
Cabinet minutes is revealing: ‘we are fighting on your side. The other alternative is recalling the 
proceedings of [18]72 & 74-5’.40  Evidentially he and Childers were prepared to submit to a 
substantial military presence at Dover, rather than see the project entirely abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the Cabinet rejected the proposal. The two Bills were to be disposed of, and it was 
                                                          
35 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 33-36; Bonavia, Channel Tunnel Story, pp. 34-35. 
36 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 37-38. 
37 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 40-41.  
38 Daily News, 3 July 1882, p. 2. 
39 Henry W. Lucy, A Diary of Two Parliaments, 1880-1885 (London: Cassel, 1886), pp. 265-266; see also 
Watkin’s comments on the same theme in Meeting of the SCRC… December 23rd 1885, pp. 3-4. 
40 Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, vol. X, p. 311. 
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agreed that a Joint Committee would be appointed the following year. This decision was 
conveyed to the Commons by Chamberlain on 15 August, the same day on which the Blue 
Book containing correspondence and the findings of the Board of Trade and War Office 
Committees were published. The following day, after being found in contempt of court, the 
SCRC finally agreed to turn off its boring machine.41 
The decision to turn to the mechanism of a Select Committee was an unusual move. As Lord 
Salisbury pointed out, the Channel Tunnel question touched upon matters of foreign policy that 
the government was both expected and obliged to take responsibility for.42 This view was held 
by Liberals and Tories alike, reflected in the fact that the motion to create a Committee passed 
by a margin of only thirty-four in the Commons.43 Considering the obvious wish of the House to 
debate the matter, Gladstone’s later excuse that Conservative ‘obstruction’ and other factors 
meant that there was no available parliamentary time seems somewhat disingenuous.44 Rather, it 
is clear that, as Edward Stanhope observed, the government was ‘hopelessly divided in itself, 
and could not offer an unanimous opinion to the House’, something which Gladstone eventually 
admitted in 1888.45 Even following Bright’s resignation in July over the Egyptian War the 
Cabinet remained in a stalemate, and the creation of an external decision-making body in the 
form of the Committee provided means through which it could avoid publicly revealing this 
rift.46 While this says much about Gladstone’s personal determination not to oppose the Tunnel, 
it also points to a significant fragility in the Cabinet’s commitment to the spirit of 1880, as well 
as the Prime Minister’s own strength of leadership. Within days of being exposed to the fears of 
the military authorities and a panicked press, a substantial number of ministers – th  great 
majority of whom, it should be remembered, were members of the Cobden Club – had 
abandoned any support they may have held for this Cobdenite undertaking. ‘Some of us were 
                                                          
41 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, p. 41. 
42 Salisbury, Parl. Deb., 26 Feb. 1883, col. 813. 
43 See the remarks of Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Parl. Deb., 3 Apr. 1883, cols. 1371-
1372, 1380. 
44 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 42-43. 
45 Stanhope, Parl. Deb., 3 Apr. 1883, col. 1382; Gladstone, Parl. Deb., 27 June 1888 cols. 1459-1460. See 
also Manchester Courier, 23 Apr. 1883, p. 5. 
46 This is suggested by Culham, ‘Channel Tunnel Project’, p. 103.  
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what I should call not quite sound and others of us were’, reflected Gladstone in 1888, keen to 
emphasise the difficulty of the position he and the other pro-Tunnel Ministers found themselves 
in. ‘Whether or not we ought to have shown more heroism I do not know. But we thought it idle 
to persevere in a hopeless struggle.’47 
The Select Committee was chaired by the Liberal peer Lord Lansdowne, an archetypical Whig 
who had recently resigned as Under-S cretary for India over Gladstone’s Irish policy, and it 
consisted of six Liberals and four Conservatives.48 After interviewing forty witnesses, its verdict 
was delivered on 10 July 1883.49 As is well known, Lansdowne’s report was in favour of 
construction, waxing lyrical on the expected commercial benefits of such a ‘great industrial 
enterprise’.50 Although not a military man himself, Lansdowne had accumulated a large quantity 
of private military evidence during his inquires including detailed and extremely critical 
comments on all the interviews conducted with Army and Navy officers by one or more 
unnamed military experts.51 This was put to good use in his report, which attacked the military 
objectors for assuming the ‘presence for every condition favourable to the view which they 
entertain, and the absence of every condition unfavourable to it’, and castigated other military 
criticisms as ‘purely political’. In short, it provided both a well-founded criticism of defence 
pessimism and an excellent ‘liberal’ defence of the Tunnel. However, when it came to the final 
vote only three other members supported Lansdowne: Lord Aberdare, a keen reformer whose 
political outlook was founded on his ‘confidence in the people’; William Baxter MP, the 
Radical President of the Co-operative Congress and a fervent Cobdenite; and Arthur Peel MP, a 
Liberal whose early career had been defined by ‘Peel–Gladstone politics’.52  
                                                          
47 Parl. Deb., 27 June 1888 cols. 1460. 
48 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 20-21. 
49 Wilson, Tunnel Visions, pp. 43-47. 
50 Select Committee, pp. ix-xxviii. 
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In an unusual turn, every other member of the Committee submitted his own report opposing 
the Tunnel, three of which were shorter than a page in length.53 The two most substantial were 
those of the Liberals Sir Henry Hussey Vivian MP and Lord Camperdown. Although 
referencing the invasion arguments, they focused on the costs the Tunnel threatened in terms of 
fortifications, garrisons and the ‘gigantic evil’, in Vivian’s words, of conscription. Meanwhile 
the much shorter reports of the Conservatives Sir Massey Lopes MP, Edward Harcourt MP, 
Lord Shute and Lord Devon, while not neglecting these ‘cost’ issues, spent more time on the 
dangers of surprise attack, treachery, panic and the possibility of an enemy seizing both ends of 
the Tunnel. In the event none of these reports were adopted, and on Camperdown’s suggestion 
the Committee submitted all of the draft reports to Parliament with the conclusion that the 
majority were against the Tunnel. It is obvious that the state of public opinion was given much 
weight by the majority of the Committee. Vivian’s report, for example, emphasised the lack of 
pro-Tunnel communications or petitions from Chambers of Commerce or other ‘representative’ 
bodies, while Lopes laid stress on the disinterested nature of those who opposed the project.54
This points to a certain failure on the part of Watkin to effectively mobilise his supporters, 
especially those unconnected to the SCRC or CTC. However, it also reflected the way in which 
Shipton’s evidence had been ignored by the Committee, most of whom evidently attributed little 
weight to the views of trade unions. 
The Committee’s judgement, thought the Times, would surprise no-one. Although it was sure 
that ‘the mass of the nation’ opposed the Tunnel, it also noted that:  
If ever there was a case in which the disputants, advancing from opposite directions, 
contemplated the two sides of the shield, and while some declared it to be silver others 
affirmed it to be golden, it is with respect to this matter of a submarine communication 
between the shores of Britain and of the European Continent.55 
For the London correspondent of the Manchester Guardian the inquiry had brought the matter 
to a ‘rather lame and impotent conclusion…the practical outcome is that the projected tunnel 
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212 
 
stands very much where it did before the committee was appointed.’56 The Cabinet agreed to 
accept the result on 19 July; on 24 July Chamberlain withdrew both Channel Tunnel Bills. 
Watkin was not present, but Grosvenor accepted the result with the observation that ‘the present 
feeling of the House and the country was such that it would be impossible to go on with the 
Channel Tunnel scheme this year’.57 It is important to note, however, that the Liberals gave no 
definite reason for stopping the work, hiding behind the Select Committee’s vote and focussing 
instead on Watkin’s legal obstinacy during 1882. Nevertheless, the practical result was a 
complete victory for Wolseley and his supporters. Overawed by the dominance of defence 
pessimism in the press, Gladstone’s Cabinet had submitted to the demands of the armed forces 
and reversed government policy with little more than a whimper. 
Parliament: 1884-1890 
Following its 1883 rejection, the Channel Tunnel is generally regarded by historians to have 
been a ‘lost cause’.58 If this were true, however, Watkin refused to believe it; he possessed, 
according to The Times, ‘a quality which never fails to command the respect of Englishmen. He 
does not know when he is beaten.’59 In 1886 the CTC and SCRC merged under the name 
Channel Tunnel Company Limited, leaving Watkin as the sole leader of the project.60 B tween 
1884 and 1890 he introduced five Channel Tunnel Bills into the Commons on his company’s 
behalf, all of which were opposed by the incumbent President of the Board of Trade and 
defeated on their second reading. The remainder of this chapter will examine these debates and 
divisions, and consider Parliamentary attitudes to the Tunnel more broadly.  
By 1884 it was obvious that Parliament inclined firmly, although not unanimously, against the 
Tunnel. As early as June 1881, the London correspondent of the York Herald reported that there 
was a ‘very strong feeling’ against the project at Westminster, although this observation was not 
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repeated by other papers.61 The twenty-seven MPs who signed Knowles’ petition showed that 
opposition could come from across the political spectrum, while the publication of the Joint 
Select Committee reports inspired the Manchester Guardian to observe that ‘the balance of 
opinion in the Committee appears about to coincide with that which prevails in Parliament.’62 
On the other hand, while opposition to the Tunnel quickly gained a cross-bench character the 
same could not be said of its supporters. Watkin himself characterised the SCRC’s Board as a 
majority of Liberals and ‘Tories of a very Liberal character’ such as the peer Lord Alfred 
Churchill, a longstanding Tunnel advocate.63 The CTC was similarly constituted, its 
shareholders in July 1881 including three Liberal MPs and two Tories, the latter being the 
Francophone art collector and philanthropist Richard Wallace and Lord Randolph Churchill.64 
As such, it was not clear, when he introduced his first Bill on 14 May 1884, that Watkin would 
be able to rely on many MPs beyond a minority of cosmopolitan-minded individuals. 
Tables 1-5 show the results of all five Channel Tunnel divisions, broken down by party. Table 6 
gives the majority by which each Bill was defeated, and also shows overall Commons turnout. 
The Channel Tunnel divisions were well attended when compared with the average turnout for 
divisions in the 1885-1886 parliament of 255 members, or thirty-seven percent.65 By far the 
most popular debate in terms of speakers was that of 1884, when, despite complaints in the 
press that it was a waste of parliamentary time, twenty-nine members from all three parties took 
the opportunity to air their views in a four-hour debate which completely dominated the day’s 
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proceedings.66 On the other hand the 1887 debate was rushed to a division after the third speech 
to allow more time for the Irish Land Bill, something which probably accounts for the low 
turnout on this vote. The extremely high turnout in 1888 is explained by Gladstone’s 
intervention in the Tunnel’s favour, something he also did in 1890, when only himself, Watkin 
and the President of the Board of Trade Michael Hicks-Beach spoke. The Strangers’ Gallery 
was well attended on both these occasions, and in 1890 it was expected that Wolseley and the 
Duke of Cambridge would be present.67 Although widely regarded as a forgone conclusion, 
each vote was anticipated by frantic lobbying on behalf of both sides, and the result was closely 
scrutinised in the next day’s papers for evidence of any shift in opinion.  
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Tables 1-6: Parliamentary Divisions on Channel Tunnel Bills, 1884-1890.  
(Tellers indicated in brackets) [Appendix 2; 3] 
   
Table 1: 
14 May 1884 
 
Table 2: 
12 May 1885 
Party Aye No Party Aye No 
Liberal 54 (1) 119 (2) Liberal 59 (2) 133 (2) 
Conservative 5 (1) 100 Conservative 9 145 
Parnellite 25 3 Parnellite 30 3 
Total 84 222 Total 98 281 
  
Table 3: 
3 August 1887 
Table 4: 
27 June 1888 
Party Aye No Party Aye No 
Liberal 39 13 Liberal 89 (2) 33 
Conservative 14 (1) 125 (2) Conservative 9 232 (2) 
Parnellite 48 0 Parnellite 63 0 
Liberal Unionist 6 (1) 15 Liberal Unionist 4 42 
Total 107 153 Total 165 307 
   
Table 5: 
5 June 1890 
Table 6: 
Majorities and Turnout 
Party Aye No Year Majority Turnout 
Liberal 97 (1) 29 1884 138 46.5% 
Conservative 11 (1) 179 (2) 1885 183 57.8% 
Parnellite 38 0 1887 46 38.8% 
Liberal Unionist 6 26 1888 142 70.4% 
Total 152 234  1890 81 57.6% 
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Watkin as a Parliamentary Promoter 
Before examining the positions of the Parties on the Tunnel, it is worth considering the role of 
the central actor himself. Watkin was famous for his unquenchable conviction that his project 
would eventually win through.68 By 1885 he was becoming known as the ‘member for the 
Channel Tunnel’ – or, as the Parliamentary columnists for Funny Folks and Punch would have 
it, ‘Lord Tannel Chunnel’.69 He was no mere fanatic, however, and made sure to put his long 
experience of lobbying on behalf of railway legislation to good use, aided by the fellow SCRC 
director and Tory MP for Whitehaven George Cavendish-Bentinck in the Commons, as well as 
Brabourne and Alfred Churchill in the Lords. Before each vote the SCRC printed and circulated 
among MPs a pamphlet explaining and defending its Bill, and a month before the 1888 vote a 
public meeting was organised in London in its favour.70 In 1887 Watkin even provided a piece 
of grey chalk for the House to inspect, in order to prove its waterproof qualities.71  
Watkin’s initial aim in 1884 and 1885 was to force the Liberal government into expressing an 
opinion of its own. On both occasions he dwelt upon the ‘curious changes of opinion’ which 
Chamberlain had undergone, and directly challenged Gladstone to state whether he ‘was still in 
favour, as he used to be’.72 In 1885 he promised that, if the Prime Minister publicly stated his 
opposition, he would withdraw his Bill and wait for a new Parliament which would be ‘more in 
harmony with the views of the country’.73 He returned to this latter theme in 1887 when, faced 
with an openly hostile Conservative government, he placed hope in the new ‘Democratic’ or 
‘working men’s’ parliament of the 1884 Reform Act, presenting the vote as a chance to find out 
‘whether the idea of peace and fraternity between nations permeates the mind of the new 
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democracy and their representatives.’74 By 1888, perhaps more confident in the support of the 
Liberals, Watkin made a more concerted effort to appeal to Tories, even making a hopeful if 
somewhat misguided attempt to exploit Lord Charles Beresford’s criticisms of British naval 
strength, arguing that the Tunnel could become a secure route for foodstuffs in the event of 
war.75 His 1890 speech was also more forceful on imperial and defence matters. This being said, 
all of Watkin’s speeches were founded on the same themes he had been using since 1881. In 
their substance they consisted largely of appeals to the inherent goodness of the project itself, 
long descriptions of the views of the many eminent men – Cobden, Prince Albert, Disraeli – 
who had allegedly supported it in the past, and detailed justifications of the SCRC’s dealings 
with the Board of Trade, accompanied by voluminous quotation from private correspondence, 
official reports and newspaper cuttings. He took every opportunity to demand whether the 
House was for ‘peace and union’ or ‘isolation and separation’, and always emphasised the pains 
his Company had gone to treat the Tunnel ‘patriotically in a national, and not a money-making, 
spirit.’76  
An important complicating factor in the Parliamentary votes, however, was the unpopularity of 
Watkin within the House.77 More determined to follow his railway interests than any whip, his 
vehement laissez-faire economic libertarianism meant he was fiercely opposed to 
Chamberlain’s brand of collectivist Radicalism even before the two men clashed over the 
Tunnel.78 An ‘independent’ Liberal at the best of times, he voted against the Home Rule Bill in 
1886, but never obviously acted in the Liberal Unionist interest and maintained a close 
friendship with Gladstone.79 By the time of his retirement in 1895 all three parties had cause to 
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claim incumbency in Hythe, so unclear had been his political allegiances.80 The problems this 
unpopularity caused for the Tunnel were obvious throughout the debates. Watkin’s 
intransigence during 1882-1883 provided Chamberlain and his Conservative successors with 
ample material with which to paint him as an untrustworthy and unscrupulous capitalist. In 1884 
Henry Labouchere and the maverick Tory Robert Peel used their speeches to define the division 
as a vote of confidence in Watkin himself; despite his CTC shares, Randolph Churchill was said 
to have become an opponent of the entire Channel Tunnel idea on the back of his personal 
hatred for Watkin.81 Watkin’s theatrical repudiations of a profit motive were regularly mocked, 
with Sir Edward Hamley satirising the amalgamated CTC as a ‘benevolent association’ in 
1888.82 The 1884 and 1885 votes were also marked by rivalry between the SCRC and the CTC. 
Every MP with an interest in the CTC voted No in one or both of these divisions, and the 
appointment of Grosvenor as the Teller for the Noes in his capacity as Liberal Chief Whip 
caused a ‘good deal of amusement’ in 1884. Watkin himself did not see the funny side, 
threatening ‘all manner of dreadful consequences’ to Ministers in the lobby that evening, 
because of his treatment at the hands of Chamberlain.83 Controversy over Watkin’s relationship 
with the Irish Nationalists also affected the 1888 vote, as discussed below. More intangibly, it is 
possible that the sheer regularity of Watkin’s Bills created a certain level of fatigue among 
members, the ‘recurring nuisance’ preventing any chance of a period of reflection which might 
have allowed passions to subside and provided  the SCRC a fairer hearing.84 While this does not 
detract from the ideological significance of the Tunnel project, and clearly did not prevent a 
substantial number of MPs from acting in Watkin’s favour, such personal factors must be 
considered when evaluating the outcome. 
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Watkin’s Bills repeatedly split the Liberals, although in all three post-1886 votes over seventy 
percent of those who voted sided with the SCRC. Even in 1884, almost double the number of 
Liberals spoke for the Tunnel than against it. The remarkable drop in Liberal Noes in the last 
three votes reflected a move in line with the party leadership. In 1887 the former Cabinet 
Minister George Shaw Lefevre voted for the Bill, while in 1888 Gladstone, Childers, Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, John Morely and Anthony Mundella followed his example, although the 
Party was not whipped on these occasions. Indeed, considering the Liberals had roughly 200 
MPs after the 1886 General Election it is clear that by 1890 a full fifty percent of the 
parliamentary party was willing to support Watkin, with no more than fifteen percent opposed. 
This makes for a stark contrast with the comparatively few Liberal MPs – certainly no more 
than forty percent of the entire party – who were willing to follow their leaders in 1884 and 
1885, indicating a discomfiture with obstructing a project so closely linked to their own 
ideological outlook. It is clear, therefore, that historians’ assumptions relating to the popularity 
of the Tunnel in Liberal circles post-1882 must be substantially reversed. Of particular note is 
the fact that, while twenty-one individual Liberals voted for the Tunnel in every post-1886 
division, only four went through the opposing lobby the same number of times, a fact hardly 
indicative of widespread and sustained antipathy. The great majority of the former group were 
Radicals and thirteen were members of the International Arbitration League (IAL) in 1891 – in 
every division, Radicals constituted at least sixty percent of the Liberal Ayes.85 It i  important to 
be careful when generalising the Tunnel supporters as determined Radicals, however. For 
example, one of the twenty-one was Sir Edward Reed, former Director of Naval Construction 
and a firm ‘big navy’ man, who nevertheless proved to be a fervent Tunnel advocate, designing 
his own ‘submarine tubular railway’ in 1891 in an attempt to allay military concerns.86 
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The obvious strength of Liberal support was reflected in the language used by Chamberlain to 
oppose the scheme in 1884 and 1885, which, as William Baxter observed, was ‘carefully 
vague’, avoiding anything which tied the government to the view that the Tunnel might prove a 
military danger.87 Instead he stuck resolutely to the line that the government was to be guided by 
Parliament alone, suggesting that any apparent change in his own, Gladstone’s or the 
government’s opinions were ‘entirely a figment of his [Watkin’s] own imagination’.88 Much of 
Chamberlain’s 1884 speech was dedicated to further obfuscating the government’s position by 
criticising Watkin personally for his defiance towards the Board of Trade during 1882.  
The awkwardness of Chamberlain’s tiptoeing rhetoric in the context of Gladstonian Liberalism 
was obvious. As the Parnellite T.P. O’Connor pointed out in 1885, the Liberals had come to 
power in 1880 with the aim of improving European relations and encouraging peace, and a 
Channel Tunnel seemed to him to fit naturally with this policy.89 The Liberal Charles McLaren 
could hardly conceive of anything more unfortunate than ‘the Minister of Trade and Commerce 
getting up in that House and using his official and moral influence in opposition to a scheme 
calculated to prove so highly beneficial to the country’.90 And indeed, when they were given a 
chance to speak, Liberal MPs from across the party took the opportunity to express their belief 
in the Tunnel as an agent of progress and peace, and to castigate the forces holding it back. The 
project was praised as the embodiment of the age of railways, tunnels and bridges in a display 
of Liberal confidence in the benefits of technology.91 The mechanical engineer and member for 
Monmouth, Edward Carbutt, explained:   
Before the age of railways there was that feeling among the ignorant inhabitants of a 
place to “fling half-a-brick"” at the head of a stranger. Railways opening the means of 
constant intercourse did away with that feeling; and with a railway by which they could 
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visit France, and Frenchmen could visit England, they would entirely get rid of that 
antagonistic feeling.92 
The Tunnel was compared to the Suez Canal, the British opposition to which, Baxter reminded 
the House, had made the country the ‘laughing-stock of Europe’, and which his fellow Radical 
Charles Hopwood marked out as a moment of shame for the nation.93 Such attitudes 
characterised all of the Liberal pro-Tunnel speech s: to this extent, at least, Watkin’s emphasis 
on Cobdenism had paid dividends.  
The main motivating factor behind the pro-Tunnel Liberal speeches was outrage at the invasion 
scare. ‘It was discreditable’, said the Radical William Willis, echoing Cobden, ‘to say that the 
French would act like corsairs and bandits’; such opinions ‘ought to be relegated to a barbarous 
past, and not uttered at a time when Christian doctrines were mitigating and softening the hearts 
of men.’94 These accusations of prejudice were not, however, directed against the British people, 
but rather the armed forces. ‘Whenever there was a question of the interests of civilization, so 
far as they were involved in the intercourse of nations and the maintenance of friendship,’ 
argued Willis, ‘military men were always on the wrong side.’95 John Slagg developed this point 
further in 1885, when he lamented that ‘upon every policy nowadays the Military and Naval 
Authorities were invariably referred to as the arbiters.’96 Armed forces officers – the Duke of 
Cambridge was specifically singled out a number of times – were accused of insulting France, 
spreading panic and exceeding their authority by attempting to direct government policy.97 For 
many Liberals, the Tunnel was clearly an important prize in the struggle between civilians and 
professionals for control of defence policy. 
Fundamental to these criticisms was a belief that ‘the people’ were not accurately represented 
by invasion alarmism. The problem, insisted the Radical anti-armament campaigner Alfred 
Illingworth, was not with the people but the Commons, which mainly represented the 
                                                          
92 Carbutt, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, cols. 368-369. 
93 Baxter, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, col. 325; Hopwood, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, col. 343. 
94 Willis, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, col. 347-349. 
95 Willis, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, col. 338. 
96 Slagg, Parl. Deb., 12 May 1885, col. 334. 
97 Alfred Illingworth, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, col. 355. 
222 
 
‘miserable’ and ‘prejudiced’ opinions of the upper classes.98 Both he and William Baxter looked 
forward to a near future when a more sympathetic public would consider the question without 
prejudice.99 Three years later – ironically the time when Baxter thought such a change would 
have occurred – Sir Wilfrid Lawson exhibited a more cautious but still optimistic evaluation of 
the state of public opinion. For him, parliament did not exist simply to reflect national 
prejudices, but should set an example for the country to follow: 
The only argument that can be used against it is that if we make this tunnel it may 
increase the chances of scare and panic, from which we are always suffering in this 
country. But surely my Hon. friend must have arrived at the conclusion that people will 
not always be as silly as they are now. Surely the nations will get wiser as time goes on. 
At any rate, it is our duty to teach them the folly of their ways.100 
Not all Liberals spoke in favour of the Tunnel, however. Before every vote except 1888, letters 
attacking Watkin’s scheme as a farcical waste of parliamentary time and a danger to the public 
finances appeared in the London press signed by ‘A LIBERAL’ and dated from the Reform 
Club, each concluding by urging MPs to attend the House and vote against it.101 Like Watkin’s 
supporters, his opponents came from all areas of the Party. Of the four repeat Liberal opponents 
of the Bill, two were Radicals and three members of the IAL, including its President and 
signatory of Knowles’ petition, Thomas Burt.102 The fourth was R.C. Munro-Ferguson, Lord 
Rosebery’s private secretary and future ‘Liberal Imperialist’, who went through the division 
lobby in 1888 alongside two other ‘Limps’, Edward Grey and Sydney Buxton – an indication of 
the ideological direction these young MPs were taking.103  
Many of Watkin’s Liberal opponents were afraid of a direct invasion. The Radical Philip 
Muntz, for example, spent some time in 1884 warning of how a secret French expedition might 
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seize the English entrance.104 More broadly, however, their concerns were rooted in the social 
and economic burdens which had already been aired by the Liberal press. Sir Hussey Vivian 
predicted ‘perpetually recurring panics’ were the Tunnel to be completed and emphasised his 
own concerns about conscription, taking the opportunity to defend the views of the military 
which his fellow Liberals had pilloried.105 Similarly Henry Wiggin, who had supported the 
Tunnel prior to 1882, admitted that the views of the naval and military authorities had 
convinced him that the project would increase taxation.106 A railway director and strong 
advocate of closer Anglo-French relations, Wiggin was exactly the sort of man Watkin should
have been able to count on for his vote; instead, Wiggin voted against the Tunnel in 1884, 1885 
and 1888.107 Wiggin’s line of reasoning typified the problem which the Tunnel posed for 
Liberals, forcing them to choose between their belief in the power of commerce and 
communication on the one hand, and their fears of expense, panic and militarism on the other. 
The choice was too much even for some of the party’s staunchest pacifists. For example, the 
Quaker and former president of the Peace Society Sir Joseph Pease abstained on all votes after 
1884, explaining that he did not believe the British people had sufficient confidence in their 
neighbours for the project not to lead to massive defence expenditure. He advised Watkin to 
withdraw the Bill ‘until the state of Europe offered greater inducements for such a work than it 
did now.’108 Such views reflected both the strength of Wolseley’s campaign and serious 
difficulties which many liberal internationalists experienced in answering it. 
Gladstone 
1887 proved the turning point in Watkin’s relationship with the Liberal Party. With the 
amalgamation of the SCRC and the CTC he secured the backing of the influential Radical 
backbencher Henry Labouchere.109 Labouchere’s fellow member for Northampton, Charles 
                                                          
104 Muntz, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, cols. 327-329. 
105 Vivian, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, cols. 331-333; Parl. Deb., 27 June 1888, cols. 1478-1491. 
106 Wiggin, Parl. Deb., 14 May 1884, cols. 364-365. 
107 In 1888 Wiggin signed a petition, alongside Watkin and a number of other MPs, asking the Earl of 
Derby to chair an organisation advocating closer Anglo-French relations, including ‘the promotion of 
readier intercourse’. TNA, RAIL 779/40. 
108 Pease, Parl. Deb., 12 May 1885, cols. 342-3. 
109 See correspondence in TNA, 779/23.  
224 
 
Bradlaugh, also joined the cause by publishing an unequivocally Cobdenite pro-Tunnel 
pamphlet that same year.110 With the support of these men the Tunnel was confirmed in its 
position as a Liberal ‘fad’ holding substantial Radical support.111 However, the highpoint of 
Watkin’s year was Gladstone’s public declaration for the Tunnel, made a few days after the 
1887 vote as part of a toast marking the start of construction of a railway bridge near 
Hawarden.112 The following year Watkin wrote to ask Gladstone if he would speak in its favour, 
which he agreed to do.113 Promising to provide him with information on the scheme, Watkin 
also took pains to remind Gladstone that John Slagg, the Bill’s seconder, was Cobden’s godson, 
clearly playing to the Liberal leader’s increasing veneration of the Radical leader.114 
Much of Gladstone’s 1888 Commons speech on the Channel Tunnel echoed that which had 
gone before.115 He spoke movingly of the benefits of trade and communication; he praised the 
‘dignity and self-respect’ of the French, who, he was keen to point out, historically had far more 
to fear of the British than the British did of them; he listed many examples where military 
authorities had been subsequently proven wrong in their warnings. At the core of his speech, 
however, was an incisive deconstruction of the 1882 scare which probed contemporary 
understandings of ‘panic’ and ‘public opinion’. He commenced by describing the military 
opposition. Once that had begun, he said, ‘a great ferment began to prevail…the literary 
authorities were brought to back up the military authorities…to intimidate their countrymen by 
conjuring up phantoms of danger.’ To these two forces was added a third, ‘society’, which was 
‘always ready for the enjoyment of the luxury of a good panic.’ It was this trinity, he contested, 
which had created and indulged the Tunnel scare: 
These speculative panics — these panics in the air — have an attraction for certain 
classes of minds that is indescribable, and these classes of minds, I am bound to say, are 
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very largely to be found among the educated portion of society. The subject of this 
panic never touched the mind of the nation. These things are not accessible to the mind 
of the nation. They are accessible to what is called the public opinion of the day — that
is to say, public opinion manufactured in London by great editors and clubs, who are at 
all times formidable, and a great power for the purposes of the moment, but who are a 
greater power and become an overwhelming power, when they are backed by the 
threefold forces of the military and literary authorities and the social circles of London. 
Well, Sir, these powers among them created at that period such a panic that even those 
who were most favourable to the Tunnel, of whom I was one, thought it quite vain to 
offer a direct opposition.116 
For Gladstone, defence panics were exclusive and artificial phenomena, representative only of 
the ‘educated’ metropolitan elites who created and encouraged them as much for their own 
amusement and profit as for any genuine concern for the safety of the country. The language of 
‘public opinion’ was therefore nothing more than a dishonest attempt to make a matter of 
limited concern appear as though it were a national issue. While he was certainly under no 
illusion as to the power and influence of the newspaper press, neither did he believe, as did so 
many of his fellow politicians, that it was an accurate mirror of the national mood. Indeed, in 
the case of the Channel Tunnel it was quite the opposite: Gladstone was aware, for example, of 
organised working class feeling, having been sent pro-tunnel trade union resolutions by Shipton 
during 1882.117 The morally ‘uncorrupted’ masses were, for him, far better judges of issues of 
foreign policy.118 As his speech made clear, the Channel Tunnel was to him an obvious instance 
of the ‘masses against the classes’, and he was, belatedly, determined to take a public stand with 
the former. 
Gladstone’s apparent ‘conversion’ – or, as Punch would have it, capture [Figure 20] – 
transformed the debate from an amusing side-show into a major political event.119 It also 
brought James Knowles once more into the struggle with a long letter on Watkin’s renewed 
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‘folly’.120 The speech itself was regarded by many as a triumph, and it clearly had a powerful 
effect on the Liberal Party. To take but one individual example, Cyril Flower, who signed 
Knowles’ petition in 1882, voted in favour in both 1888 and 1890, an obvious consequence of 
his personal admiration for Gladstone.121 According to Watkin, who quickly arranged for the 
speech to be reprinted with a forward by Sir Francis Lawley, no less a political opponent than 
Lord Hartington had told Henry Fowler that it was ‘the finest he had ever heard’.122 But it was, 
of course, not enough. The debate, reflected the Pall Mall Gazette, ‘was as brilliant and 
entertaining as the division was decisive’.123 For The Times, ‘Mr Gladstone is, perhaps, the only 
man in the country capable of persuading himself that there is no danger of an outcry in France 
which might precipitate a war.’124 Nevertheless, Gladstone’s intervention, and his subsequent 
speech in 1890, appeared to augur well for the scheme. Reflecting on the 1890 vote, the Daily 
News felt able to report that ‘there is a striking agreement of Liberal leaders on the side of the 
tunnel’.125 Future, as well as present leaders: Henry Herbert Asquith and David Lloyd George 
both supported the Bill in 1890, although Harcourt, importantly, abstained in all three post-1886 
votes. 
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Figure 20: ‘The Watkin Spider and the Gladstone Fly’. 
Gladstone, centre, is lured into the Tunnel by Watkin, right. On the left, a fly labelled 




H.C.G Matthew’s suggestion that the Tunnel was generally opposed by the Whigs is given 
some credence by the voting record of the Liberal Unionists after 1886, of which Watkin was 
technically a member. Following a poor showing in 1887 a majority of the Party voted against 
the Bill in 1888, although turnout slumped again in 1890. Radical Unionists, led by 
Chamberlain’s continued opposition, were also more likely to vote against. However, in an 
illustration of how internationalism continued to maintain a toehold within the party, 
Chamberlain’s fellow Birmingham Radicals Jesse Collings, George Dixon and Joseph Powell-
Williams all voted in favour at least once. Repeat Liberal Unionist opponents were few, 
although it is worth noting that none were Radical, and repeat supporters even fewer – other 
than Watkin himself, only the anti-imperialist Leonard Courtney voted three times for the 
Tunnel. Generalisations about the nature of the Liberal Unionist position are difficult, however, 
because other than Watkin no members of the group spoke in any of the debates.  
It can, however, be said for certain that two factors directly influenced the Liberal Unionist 
voting record. The first, Irish policy, will be discussed below. The second was the position of 
the Conservatives, who voted against the Tunnel in such numbers and with such regularity so as 
to dismiss any suggestion that this opposition came from any particular group or clique, such as 
the service or Volunteer members. Indeed, the Tories brought a greater proportion of their MPs 
through the No lobby than the Liberals even when the latter were in government. Interestingly, 
the Conservatives made as little attempt as the Liberals to forge an ‘official’ policy towards the 
Tunnel during 1882 and 1883. Neither Sir Stafford Northcote nor Lord Salisbury, the two 
figures vying for the Party leadership during this time, expressed a personal view of the Tunnel. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Salisbury, who was familiar with the Channel Tunnel 
idea from his time working alongside Watkin as Chairman of the Great Eastern Railway 
Company during 1868-1872, was actually a supporter of it, possibly a case of his Francophilia 
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and suspicion of experts outweighing his distrust of internationalism.126 Nevertheless, the 
Conservative party appears to have been whipped in every division, especially in 1888 and 1890 
when most Cabinet ministers were in attendance, forcing many who may have sympathised with 
Watkin to toe the Party line.127 
‘Conservatives are naturally opposed to progress of any kind,’ reflected one Parliamentary 
sketch writer in 1882, ‘whether under the sea or over it.’128 For the Tory party, opposition to 
such an obviously ‘liberal’ project came easily. In contrast to Chamberlain’s awkward 
avoidance of the invasion issue, his Conservative successors as government spokesman on the 
Tunnel, Baron Henry de Worms in 1887 and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in 1888 and 1890, 
clearly relished the chance to rail against the ‘temptation to an invasion of this country’ which 
the Tunnel represented.129 In language which would be almost unimaginable coming from a 
minister in any other context, they described the Tunnel as a ‘military frontier’ and pointed 
directly to the danger of a surprise attack by France.130 In this, however, they were only 
reflecting the views of Tory backbenchers who enthusiastically adopted Wolseley’s 
anticipations of future warfare. ‘If the French were at war with us,’ opined retired Admiral Sir 
John Hay, ‘they would be unjust to their country if they did not attempt, by every means in their 
power, by surprise, by every strategy which could be conceived, to bring destruction upon us 
and success to themselves.’131 Sir Henry Selwin-Ibbetson and Percy Wyndham reminded the 
House that no declaration of war had been issued when the French invaded Tunis, Madagascar 
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or Indochina– nor, indeed, when the Royal Navy bombarded Alexandria.132 War, when it came, 
would be sudden and brutal, and Britain, lacking a population organised under conscription, was 
in no position to resist such a strike without the Channel shield. 
The debate was more than an opportunity for Tories to lecture the country on a future war with 
France, however. It also allowed them to display their contempt for the Cobdenite thesis of 
international relations. For them, the Tunnel was more likely to create ‘jealousies and political 
combinations’ in Europe and increase tensions with France than allay them.133 The comparison 
with the Suez Canal, which had been introduced by Baxter and Hopwood, came in for particular 
scrutiny. Far from a blessing, Wyndham argued that the Canal had been a ‘curse’, for it had 
resulted in the British invasion of Egypt and plunged the empire into the Sudan crisis.134 George 
Gregory asserted the Canal had damaged British commerce, while Selwin-Ibbetson and David 
MacIver invoked Lord Palmerston’s argument that it had increased the strategic vulnerability of 
British India, just as the Tunnel would do the same for Britain.135 Also notable was the strong 
vein of protectionist rhetoric which characterised many of these Conservative interventions, a 
perspective which was slowly growing in confidence in the Party during this period.136 E ward 
Hicks warned that the Tunnel might damage British manufacturing by facilitating an increase in 
cheap French goods, and Charles Newdgate argued that the project was yet another example of 
commercial interests being promoted at the expense of agriculture.137 Most remarkable of all 
was MacIver’s speech, in which he characterised British trade with France as the act of 
‘breaking our own heads in regard to many of our industries’, and denied that the British 
working classes gained anything from cross-Channel trade.138 As his fellow Tory John Puleston 
observed, MacIver’s argument went some way towards ‘reversing all their preconceived ideas 
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of trade’.139 In a bizarre conclusion to his rambling and somewhat contradictory speech, 
MacIver revealed that he had actually decided to vote in favour of the Bill, as part of a personal 
vendetta against the Board of Trade, even though he ‘emphatically’ opposed the Tunnel. This 
aside, what was significant about MacIver and the other protectionist MPs was the way in which 
their ideas, alongside the other attacks on liberal internationalism, reflected a wider tren  in 
Conservative political thought, towards characterising international relations, and Anglo-French 
relations in particular, as existing in a perpetual state of rivalry and struggle. This was the 
central theme of the final speech of the 1884 debate, made by the Tory MP for Bridport Charles 
Warton, who discarded any remaining niceties in a vehement rejection of the proposed Entente
Cordiale: 
He did not wish to say anything harsh about France; but he must say deliberately that he 
had no confidence in the peace of seventy years with France. He believed their interests 
clashed with ours all over the world, and they were trying to extend their power in every 
way they could. He did not believe in an alliance with France; our position and interests 
forbade that; and we must not live in a Fool's Paradise, or cry “Peace, Peace!” where 
there was no peace. It was because we must resolutely maintain our insular superiority, 
and believe in ourselves and not in the smooth promises of French statesmen, that he 
should oppose this measure.140 
Contrary to the broadly cosmopolitan outlook of the Liberal pro-Tunnellers, Watkin’s few Tory 
backers defy easy generalisation. Some, such as Sir Henry Tyler, a railway director and former 
Royal Engineer who had been involved in the Anglo-French negotiations of 1875, supported it 
for its ‘humanizing and civilizing’ potential.141 Other Conservative supporters from the ‘railway 
interest’ included the Manchester MP Sir John Maclure, who acted as Teller for the Ayes in 
1890.142 Others, however, found their own distinctly ‘Tory’ reasons for voting for the scheme. 
John Puleston, for example, while echoing Liberal astonishment that the country appeared 
determined to ‘stand still’ in the face of progress, was also keen to stress the importance of 
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Britain maintaining its position as ‘the foremost commercial nation in the world’.143 The most 
interesting example of a similar perspective was that of SCRC director George Cavendish-
Bentinck, a sponsor of the 1884 Bill. Cavendish-Bentinck did not ascribe to the idea that the 
Tunnel would improve Anglo-French relations and frankly admitted that French jealousy of the 
British was probably ineradicable.144 He was himself a ‘fair trader’ and clearly had little truck 
with Watkin’s Cobdenism.145 Nevertheless, he also criticised those who feared invasion, 
pointing out that previous invasion scares over steam power had proved unwarranted. For both 
Puleston and Cavendish-Bentinck the Tunnel was a matter of preserving British economic 
power, rather than fostering international peace. This was a view which the likes of Watkin and 
Brabourne struggled to articulate without resorting to the language of Cobdenism, language 
which instinctively turned most Tories against their proposals. In this respect Cavendish-
Bentinck represented an underused weapon in the SCRC’s arsenal. He was little in the public 
eye before and during the scare of 1882, when an unquestionably Conservative pro-Tunnel 
voice was sorely needed. By the time he came to speak in 1884, the project had become too 
closely linked to Liberal utopianism in the eyes of its detractors.  
 The Parnellites 
At first glance, it might be assumed that the Channel Tunnel was a subject far removed from 
Irish society and Irish politics. As the Dublin Daily Express observed, Irish public opinion had 
been somewhat apathetic even during the height of the 1882 scare.146 Such apparent apathy did 
not stop Irish papers reporting extensively on the Tunnel, however, even if they avoided 
editorialising on it. Nor, as Alan O’Day has noted, was this apathy reflected by the Irish 
Nationalists at Westminster.147 Even before Parnell took full control of the party in 1885 it had a 
good turnout and strong voting discipline in support of the Tunnel, and it is evident that many in 
the party felt strongly that the railway should be constructed. Three Parnellites spoke in 
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Watkin’s favour during 1884 and 1885, one of whom, T.P. O’Connor, became closely involved 
with the amalgamated CTC and was invited to visit the Tunnel in 1886 alongside Labouchere 
and Bradlaugh.148 The following year a group of Irish MPs visited the French workings at 
Sangatte, and in 1888 and 1890 Parnell himself voted for it.149 
Ideologically, the Channel Tunnel fitted naturally into the Irish Nationalist view of international 
affairs, which generally differed little from that of moderate Liberals.150 O’Connor, for example, 
described himself as an ‘optimist’, and spoke strongly on the potential of the Tunnel to increase 
international goodwill.151 The Radically-inclined William Redmond echoed Liberal appeals to 
working class opinion, arguing that if the Tunnel were made an issue at the next general election 
the country would be seen to be ‘absolutely and completely’ in favour. ‘If the present Bill were 
not allowed to be read a second time,’ he continued, ‘it would be because the working classes of 
England were not represented in the House of Commons as they ought to be’.152 Where a 
distinctively Irish attitude emerged, it complemented this wider ‘liberal’ critique. This was the 
case in the speech of Charles Dawson, for whom opposition to the Tunnel formed part of a 
narrative of British prejudice towards ‘science’ stretching back centuries: 
How long was this opposition to the evidence of science, this opposition to the progress 
of civilization, to last? How long were these fearful prejudices to prevail when any great 
scientific work was proposed, or any great scientific discovery was made? This country 
opposed the introduction of the New Calendar, simply because it sprang from the 
Roman Pontiff—from the Court of Rome. How long was this country going on in its 
old ways?153 
Nationalists were not exclusively pro-Tunnel. The prominent member and future leader of the 
anti-Parnellite faction Justin McCarthy voted no in 1884 and abstained on all subsequent 
occasions. In 1884 the Carlow MP Donald Macfarlane cited fears of panic and quoted Wolseley 
in his attack on the idea that ‘the lion and the lamb were going to lay down together in the 
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Tunnel’.154 This was a peripheral attitude within the party, however, reflected in the fact that the 
Scottish-born Macfarlane was himself a marginal figure in Nationalist circles.155 
There was more than ideology at play in the Irish pro-Tunnel vote, however. Although officially 
a Liberal Unionist, Watkin’s relationship with the Parnellites was far from hostile, and by 1888 
he had clearly moved far from the Unionist camp.156 As that year’s vote on the Channel Tunnel 
Bill neared, it was reported that he had devised his own local government Bill for Ireland with 
the aim of providing a third way between the Unionists and Home Rulers.157 Then, the day 
before the Channel Tunnel vote, he abstained himself from an anti-coercion motion tabled by 
John Morley, rather than vote with his fellow Liberal Unionists.158 To complete the picture, he 
had also written a letter in support of Brabourne’s son as the Liberal candidate for the Thanet 
by-election.159 To the Unionist press, Watkin’s motivation was obvious: he had acted in order to 
secure continued Irish and Gladstonian support for the Tunnel.160 As a result, any support he 
may have gained for his project was somewhat nullified by Unionist revulsion.161 ‘It was freely 
stated in the Lobby to-day that, far as the Liberal Unionists were concerned, this line of action 
would not tend to further the second reading of the Channel Tunnel Bill’, reported the Dundee 
Courier’s London Correspondent. ‘Sir Edward would find that he cannot serve two gods, 
Gladstone and Hartington.’162  
Conclusion 
The rejection of the Channel Tunnel by Gladstone’s government in 1883 demonstrated the 
power which ‘public opinion’ held over foreign and defence policy. It showed, too, how adept 
the armed forces had become at shaping and directing public concern to compliment more 
traditional official channels. Easily spooked by even the limited efforts of The Times in 1881, 
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policymakers and civil servants alike were rapidly driven to redirect the course of the 
government in response to the deeply pessimistic world-view forwarded by Wolseley, 
Cambridge and others. From the limited perspective of those within Whitehall, concerns about 
invasion and panic seemed to sweep the nation, reflected in the ‘mirror’ of the press which was 
their only real connection with wider feeling. Finding himself in a minority in the Cabinet, 
Gladstone was forced to retreat from the internationalist ideals which had helped take him to 
power in 1880. 
As we have seen, the British nation was not unanimously opposed to Watkin’s railway during 
1882-1883. Similarly, this chapter’s examination of Parliament during the following six years 
has revealed a far more even-handed debate than historians have assumed. Regardless of the 
judgement of ‘public opinion’, substantial numbers of Liberals and Irish Nationalists were 
willing to stand up against the invasion scare which appeared to hold many of their fellow 
parliamentarians in its grip. The objective of this chapter has not been to completely rejct 
previous understandings of political attitudes to the Tunnel. Regardless of changes in Liberal 
opinion, it is clear that the Commons of 1890 was broadly similar in opinion to that of 1882. 
What had changed was the freedom and willingness of pro-Tunnellers to more openly express 
their support. More generally, by providing MPs with an opportunity to engage with the issue of 
Britain’s place in Europe, the Tunnel debates tell us much about the direction of the parties 
during this time. While the Liberals continued the struggle between cosmopolitan idealism and 
Palmerstonian caution which had always been a hallmark of the party, the Tories demonstrated 
their relative unanimity under an imperialist, anti-internationalist umbrella which also indicated 
the first signs that the Party was moving towards a rejection of Free Trade. As such, this more 
nuanced appreciation of the Tunnel debates further illustrates the extent to which Cobden’s 













On the afternoon of 27 May 1889, the House of Lords opened a debate on the Second Reading 
of the Naval Defence Bill. That it was up for examination at all was something of a novelty. As 
the former First Lord of the Admiralty Earl Northbrook observed, the Upper House was rarely 
given the opportunity to discuss defence policy.1 However this was no ordinary Bill, a fact 
which Lord Salisbury was keen to emphasise in introducing it.2 It nvolved, he assured the 
House, sums of money ‘very much in excess of that which can be called ordinary expenditure’ 
and in its methods marked a ‘new departure’ in British public spending. Indeed, the proposed 
expenditure far outstripped the previous post-1815 record for a single British defence 
programme, the fortifications consequent of the 1859 scare, and marked an unprecedented 
increase in overall naval spending.3 The Royal Navy was to receive an extra £21,500,000 over 
five years, for a total increase of seventy warships. Of this, £11,500,000 was to be obtained in 
the usual way via the annual estimates and spent in the Royal dockyards. However, the real 
reason for Salisbury’s claims to innovation lay with the remaining ten million, which was to be 
issued from the Consolidated Fund directly to private shipbuilders. This, he insisted, was to 
avoid ‘certain Treasury arrangements’; in other words, by removing the money from the annual 
budget and instead placing it directly in the hands of the Admirals and naval architects, the 
effect of ‘political influences’ – the ‘desire to save money’ or a ‘panic’ – would be minimised. 
Of this financial mechanism his audience hardly needed reminding, for a Liberal amendment to 
remove it had been narrowly defeated in the Commons on 4 April by thirty-three votes, and the 
Opposition remained furious about the loss of Parliamentary oversight. In total, the Bill 
represented an average annual increase on naval spending of £2,600,000.4 
Moving on from this sensitive subject, the Prime Minister outlined what this unprecedented 
programme hoped to achieve. ‘It has been laid down as a sort of general rule or maxim for the 
guidance of this country as a great maritime nation’ he declared, ‘that we ought always to have 
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at our command a Fleet which would be equal to a combination of any two great powers which 
might be brought against us. I think, on the whole, this ideal state will have been reached in 
1894.’ This was the famous two power standard, which defined British naval policy until 1909.5 
The assumption underlying Salisbury’s speech was that Britain was not currently in this position, 
although at no point did he make any reference to current naval strengths. Indeed, besides the 
arbitrary goal of outnumbering Britain’s European neighbours the only justification Salisbury 
could provide for his programme was a vague appeal to future uncertainties and foreign 
jealousies. There were, he said, ‘territories coveted and not possessed…past wounds not yet 
healed’, while modern science assured that danger would come ‘like a thief in the night’. ‘There 
is’, he concluded, ‘a real and genuine risk’. That there was widespread support for the 
programme among the Lords was unsurprising considering the enormous Unionist majority 
there. The only dissenting voice was that of the Liberal leader in the Lords, Lord Granville, who 
argued that the scheme was based upon fears which he considered to be ‘very largely 
exaggerated, if not chimerical’.6 The veteran of three Gladstonian Cabinets, who had never 
wavered in calling on the government to ‘think a little of finance’, considered that Salisbury had 
provided ‘very little defence’ for his proposals.7 Nevertheless, the Bill was not brought to a 
division, and entered into law on 31 May.  
This debate, dismissed as ‘desultory’ by the Daily News, marked the end of what had been a 
remarkable seventeen months in Britain’s defence discourse.8 Although Salisbury’s pessimistic 
outlook regarding the European threat was no novelty, his acceptance of the need for such a 
large increase in naval spending was a remarkable about turn from his position during the 
previous year, when he had seemed entirely at ease with the state of the national defences. It 
was an even more radical change from the words uttered by the First Lord of the Admiralty 
Lord George Hamilton in February 1888, when he had presented a glowing assessment of the 
country’s naval strength and declared that ‘our relative superiority to other fleets is greater now 
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than it has been for years past.’9 The decisive factor which had worked to so utterly transform 
the political discourse was a highly successful public campaign initiated by the resignation of 
the popular and populist naval Captain, Lord Charles Beresford MP, from the Board of 
Admiralty in January 1888. Culminating with two influentially-attended meetings in London in 
May and June 1888, the campaign used a mixture of theoretical arguments, alarmist rhetoric and 
‘public opinion’ to drive the government from its position of contented security and force it, in 
November 1888, to announce the policy shift which resulted in the passage of the Naval 
Defence Act. 
Historiography 
Lord Salisbury’s assumption of British naval weakness, informed by Beresford and other 
‘experts’, holds a powerful place in the historiography of later nineteenth century Britain, a 
position established by Arthur Marder’s Anatomy of British Sea Power 1880-1905.10 Marder 
contends that the Royal Navy suffered a ‘gradual weakening’ during the 1870s and early 1880s, 
a process encouraged by public and political apathy and exacerbated by an ‘intensive’ French 
naval programme.11 Marder’s remained the standard interpretation of the period for more than 
five decades, most notably restated in 1976, when Paul Kennedy confidently claimed that 
France and Britain ‘were almost equal in numbers of first-class battleships’ in 1884.12 Indeed, 
despite the appearance of more up-to-date work Marder’s book has continued to be used to 
support the description of the Royal Navy in 1888 as ‘highly unsatisfactory’.13 Working from 
this assumption of naval weakness, historians have been kind to both the navalist agitation of 
Beresford, and the Act itself, seeing it as a necessary ‘re-establishment’ of the two power 
standard which had been abandoned immediately following the Napoleonic Wars.14 As Marder 
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summarises, the weak position of the Royal Navy, combined with the troubling European 
situation made the scares of 1888 ‘inevitable’.15  
Fascinatingly, however, more detailed study has demonstrated that the image of the Royal Navy 
presented by contemporary experts, the government and thus the historiography inspired by 
Marder, was and is mistaken. As long ago as 1928, Caroline Playne pointed out that British 
naval spending easily outstripped the French total in 1888, suggesting the Naval Defence Act 
was unnecessary.16 More recently in 1997, John Beeler’s close analysis of the Royal Navy in the 
Gladstone-Disraeli era has demonstrated in detail that, far from being a mere ambition in 1889, 
the ‘ideal state’ of the two power standard was actually an accurate reflection of the 
contemporary position of the fleet.17 By the later 1880s the Navy lacked only two coast-defence 
vessels and two armoured cruisers, information which Beeler points out has long been available 
to historians.18 Similarly Britain far outstripped its individual rivals in terms of naval spending, 
while its 1888 budget was only £618,544 short of the combined Franco-Russian total of 
£13,618,439.19 Britain began constructing thirteen armoured warships between 1883-1888 while 
the French only laid down two. Even had they attempted to do so, French dockyards could 
never have matched the speed and efficiency with which their British counterparts launched 
vessels.20 Ironically, therefore, the panics of 1884-1888 occurred at the moment when the Royal 
Navy was stronger than it had been for years. The logical conclusion to draw from these facts, 
argues Beeler, is that ‘far from being responses to legitimate threats to British maritime 
supremacy, the naval scares of 1884-85 and 1888-89 were internally generated and based on 
illusions that could have been refuted at the time.’ ‘It is hard to see’, he continues, ‘why the 
public and press bought into the navalist argument when they did’.21 The following case study 
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aims to provide an answer to this problem, by arguing that the explanation lies in large part in 
the political situation of the late 1880s.  
Beeler’s short deconstruction of the Naval Defence Act has since been followed by Robert 
Mullins and Roger Parkinson, whose work emphasises the use of naval theory and history by 
Beresford and his fellow officers in their campaign to convince the government. Mullins’ book, 
edited from his PhD thesis (2000) in partnership with Beeler, provides a detailed examination of 
the Royal Navy’s strategic outlook during the 1880s.22 Applying this persepctive to a narrative 
of the public campaign and private lobbying of 1888/1889, Mullins illustrates how this shifted 
the discourse away from finance and towards a strategy-dominated naval policy. Importantly, 
Mullins attacks the idea that France and Russia posed a legitimate threat during this period, and 
provides ample evidence that sailors, civil servants and politicians within the British Admiralty 
were fully aware of the weaknesses of the French and Russian fleets in comparison with the 
Royal Navy.23 He shows how, by the time the 1888 scare had got underway, the already remote 
prospect of a Franco-Russian alliance had disappeared, and that by 1889 the tense European 
situation had cleared.24 French preperations during this period were defensive, focused on the 
danger of an Italian-German combination, something the British government fully understood.25 
Mullins’ conclusion, which this thesis further develops in Chapter One, substantially changes 
our understanding of the Naval Defence Act. Not only was there little reality in the danger of a 
Franco-Russian threat to Britian during the 1880s, but, crucially, there is little evidence that 
Britons believed in such a threat.26 Such a conclusion strongly supports Beelers suggestion that 
the naval ‘scares’ of this period were created by internal, not external factors. 
Although more limited in scope and analysis, Parkinson’s work is very strong in its 
conclusions.27 As far as Parkinson is concerned, in 1888 British naval policy was ‘seized by a 
small group of ‘young Turks’’ who played upon the false perception of Britain’s naval 
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weakness to run a successful lobbing campaign, convincing Salisbury’s reluctant government 
into establishing a ‘proactive naval policy in place of the cautious reactive policy that had lasted 
for three-quarters of a century.’28  
However, this exisiting historiography still takes for granted the strength and popularity of the 
navalist propaganda campaign of 1888, which they regard as dealing the government a heavy 
blow in January 1888 from which it never really recovered. Neither study includes a truly 
detailed investigation into the state of ‘public opinion’, despite the fact that the popularity of 
Beresford’s campaign has been questioned by Steven R.B. Smith in a 1991 article.29 
Furthermore, the party political dimension of the Act has been almost entirely neglected. As 
such, a number of key questions are left unanswered. How did Beresford’s campaign, which 
prided itself on a ‘rational’ and ‘business-like’ approach to naval policy, succeed in obscuring 
the true state of the Royal Navy? What was the real state of ‘public opinion’? How did the 
government justify what was, in many respects, an entirely unnecessary policy? And where was 
the Liberal opposition to this greatest of all ‘alarmist’ projects? 
These last two questions are particularly pertinent, for despite the extensive literature 
establishing the importance of the defence scare of 1888 and the Naval Defence Act of 1889 
within naval history, the subject has received virtually no attention from political historians, 
whose gaze remains obscured by the Home Rule vote of 1886, the South African War, and the 
outbreak of the European war in 1914.30 Historians of the Salisbury ministry generally treat the 
Act uncritically as part of a ‘well-considered plan’ of national defence, an interpretation George 
Hamilton forwarded in his memoirs.31 Meanwhile work on the Liberal party almost completely 
ignores the defence concerns of these years, focussing instead on the Home Rule question. Of 
                                                          
28 Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, pp. 243-244. 
29 Smith, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 36, 42. 
30 The most remarkable omission is Robert K. Massie’s thousand-page Dreadnought (London: Vintage, 
2007), which unaccountably makes no mention of the Act despite dealing closely with the careers of 
Salisbury and Beresford.  
31 George Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886-1906 (London: John Murray, 
1922), pp. 107-112; Richard Shannon, Age of Salisbury, pp. 299-304; David Steele, Lord Salisbury: A 
Political Biography (London: UCL Press, 1999), p. 252; Roberts, Salisbury, p. 539-541. Roberts, in his 
incorrigible way, describes the Act as ‘splendid’. 
243 
 
Gladstone’s biographers only Richard Shannon considers the Act worthy of mention, observing 
simply that his subject’s less than active opposition was ‘curious’ in light of his later resignation 
over the navy estimates in 1894.32 Broadly speaking, the Act is considered to have been a 
popular programme, although little to no evidence is produced to support this assertion.33 
Perhaps the most remarkable historiographical gap is the virtual absence of information 
regarding the programme’s passage through Parliament. Every existing study bypasses the Act’s 
parliamentary stage altogether, or else simply repeats Marder’s vague assertion that it received 
‘almost unanimous’ support within the Commons.34 Significantly, it is widely assumed that the 
Liberal leadership voted for the Bill, which as the third chapter of this study shows, is simply 
untrue.35 Histories of the British peace movement also ignore the Act, a notable omission 
considering the central role played in its parliamentary opposition by peace movement stalwarts 
such as William Randal Cremer and Sir Wilfrid Lawson.36 The need for a developed political 
history of the Act is especially important when one considers that a large number of historians 
have suggested, to varying degrees, that it should be regarded as an important driver of, if not 
the original inspiration for, the naval arms race which preceded and encouraged the declaration 
of war in 1914.37 By teaching the British to conceive national security ‘almost entirely in terms 
of large battleships’, the Act was unquestionably important in transforming the politics of the 
defence during this period.38 For Playne, the Act signalled a decisive political and cultural shift, 
‘the outcome of a more conscious conception of imperialism than had prevailed before’, paving 
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the way for the ‘alarmed and fearful spirit’ of the 1890s.39 In its final chapter, this study shows 
that, after ninety years, Playne’s analysis remains correct in its essentials. 
Structure 
The following three chapters reconsider the genesis and passage of the Naval Defence Act. 
Chapter Seven examines the navalist campaign of 1888, focusing on its reception by the press 
and the ‘public’. Building on the work of Beeler, Mullins and Parkinson, the chapter argues that 
the navalists relied on the development and dissemination of an ideologically charged rhetoric 
of naval weakness, appealing to the same pessimistic, anti-internationalist feeling that Wolseley 
had so successfully mobilised against the Channel Tunnel. Finding that Beresford’s initial 
resignation had little serious impact, it dismisses the characterisation of 1888 as a year 
dominated by ‘panic’. Contrary to the claims of the agitators themselves, it finds that there is 
little evidence of popular enthusiasm for a programme of naval expansion in 1888-1889, 
contradicting the idea that the Naval Defence Act marked the beginning of the development of 
‘popular’ navalism in Britain. Instead, it is suggested that Beresford and his supporters took 
advantage of widespread public and political apathy towards the state of the armed forces, 
presenting themselves as the voice of an otherwise silent people.  
Chapter Eight moves the focus onto the political response, first of the Conservative government 
and then the Liberals. For much of 1888, Salisbury’s government was resolute in the face of the 
navalist onslaught, with George Hamilton and his Parliamentary and Financial Secretary Arthur 
Forwood capably contesting the exaggerated pessimist claims of naval decline. However, by 
considering Salisbury’s speech of November 1888, it is suggested that the limited, exclusionary 
idea of ‘public opinion’ was once again used to good effect by the agitators, eventually 
convincing the Prime Minister that strengthening the Navy had become a political, if not 
strategic necessity. In terms of the Liberal reaction, the chapter argues that this was practically 
non-existent, with the party obsessed by Irish issues throughout 1888. Although a number of 
individual Liberal voices were raised in opposition to the navy ‘scare’, they served only to 
                                                          
39 Playne, Pre-War Mind, p. 126. 
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betray the wider ideological inertia within liberal attitudes towards defence policy, and the poor 
state of the British peace movement. As a result, the party had failed to establish a proper policy 
when the government introduced its expansion programme in March 1889.  
Becoming more thematic in its construction, Chapter Nine tak s a close look at the 
parliamentary passage of the Naval Defence Bill. Hitherto, historians have assumed that it sailed 
through the Commons without serious opposition. In fact, the Bill received serious though very 
disorganised opposition from the Gladstonian leadership and a furious reception from the 
Radicals, who correctly identified it as a direct attack on the Liberal doctrines of economic 
parsimony, civilian control and a balanced, ‘gradual’ naval policy. In their last-ditch attempt to 
prevent ‘this mad and monstrous proposal’, these MPs revealed not only the fractious state of 
the Liberal party itself, but also the intellectual stupor of the Radical anti-armament cause. For 
the Tories, the Bill illustrated the extent to which most of the party had accepted the pessimistic 
‘realist’ view of international affairs, and was content to justify the programme via appeals to 
foreign ‘jealousy’. As such, the chapter broadly agrees with Playne’s analysis, and argues that 
the Act should be seen not only as a victory for imperialistic navalism, but also as a decisive 
defeat for liberal internationalism. In the process, MPs from both sides of the House struggled 
for the right to be seen to speak for both the public and, equally as importantly from an 
ideological point of view, the memory and reputation of Richard Cobden. Overall, the case 
study positions the Act as both a cause and symptom of the pessimistic, alarmist mentality 





The Navalist Campaign of 1888 
 
“Farewell!” cries Charles. “Away! away! 
In the Government vessel I’ll not stay. 
I can’t understand, in spite of your tips, 
The Hamiltonnage of your ships. 
So Belay! belay! Lord Salisburee, 
Farewell, farewell to the Admiraltee! 
If you experience doesn’t teach, 
You’ll lose the sea as you’ve lost your Beach.”1 
  




                                                          
1 Michael Hicks-Beach had stepped down as Chief Secretary of Ireland the previous year. 
2 See Part III title image. 
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The public campaign waged by Charles Beresford and a group of retired naval officers during 
the first half of 1888 has often been regarded as a popular movement, the inevitable result of 
widespread disquiet about the state of the Navy. Through a close reading of the newspaper press 
and political developments, this chapter rejects that interpretation. Instead, it shows how a 
determined navalist lobby group, armed with authoritative arguments and exaggerated rhetoric, 
succeeded in seizing the political agenda. Despite continued scepticism in the press, they 
captured the Unionist London commercial elites, building a platform upon which to pose as the 
voice of ‘public opinion’. As a result, the chapter seriously questions the common assumption 
among historians that the naval expansion of the 1880s was a popular cause.  
Beresford’s Resignation 
The national defence agitation of 1888 did not fall out of a clear blue sky. In many ways it was 
the culmination of a process begun in 1884 by W.T. Stead. In that year his Pall Mall Gazette ran 
the infamous ‘Truth about the Navy’ campaign, which ultimately succeeded in obtaining a 
supplementary naval estimate of £3,100,000 from Gladstone’s government.3  This campaign set 
a number of precedents without which the 1888 agitation could not have occurred. It was 
founded upon direct interviews with serving and retired naval officers, eager to attack the 
‘complacency’ of their ministerial masters.4 It reasserted the influence of the press over defence 
policy, influence which had declined since 1860, and introduced many of those officers, 
including Beresford himself, to the power of ‘public opinion’ as expressed through the press.5 It 
established a link between the London Chamber of Commerce and the naval reformers and, 
through the holding of a public meeting, constructed the model on which Beresford’s later 
campaign was based.6 Most importantly, it launched the ‘myth of naval weakness’, the ‘gigantic 
deception’ which took its place in the political discourse alongside the already existing 
perception of military weakness which the Channel Tunnel scare had reinforced.7 Th  strength 
                                                          
3 For a full account see Blumenthal, ‘The Navy Campaign of 1884’. 
4 Blumenthal, ‘The Navy Campaign of 1884’, p. 64. See also Baylen, ‘Politics and the New Journalism’, 
pp. 118-121. 
5 Beeler, British Naval Policy, pp. 267-68; Beresford, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 338. 
6 Smith, ‘Public Opinion’, pp. 31-36. 
7 Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, p. 92; Beeler, ‘In the Shadow of Briggs’ 
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and effectiveness of modern Royal Navy ships were belittled, while inferior wooden-hulled 
French warships were treated as frontline vessels.8 In hort, the 1884 campaign was built on a 
foundation of ‘misrepresentations, if not outright falsehoods’, propagated by its own officers 
and eagerly seized by Stead’s crusading ‘New Journalism’.9 
Despite this, 1888 did not open with the position of the Royal Navy in doubt. In the Admiralty 
there were no calls for a large building programme, while Hamilton and the First Sea Lord 
Admiral Sir Arthur Hood were relaxed in their attitudes towards France, both diplomatically 
and in terms of relative naval strength.10 When, on 9 January, Beresford resigned from his post 
as Junior Naval Lord, there was therefore little suggestion that a major policy shift mig t be 
demanded of the government. This was reflected in his resignation speech to his East 
Marylebone constituents on 26 January: far from a declaration of naval weakness, he insisted 
his resignation was a protest over cuts to the salaries of the Naval Intelligence Department 
(NID), and he initially focused his attacks on the powers of the First Lord of the Admiralty.11 
These powers he held ‘entirely’ responsible for the ‘disgraceful state of disorganisation’ in the 
Navy.  He wanted the First Lord to be forced to work more closely with his Board, which, he 
was sure, would immediately improve the efficiency of the fleet. He was keen to emphasise that 
his protest did not extend to a demand for more resources, but rather a better use of existing 
material. ‘It is not reasonable’, he declared, ‘to expect the taxpayer to contribute still more to the 
services when officers themselves are crying out that much of it is being wasted’. Admiral Sir 
Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, who was also in attendance, was even more explicit, assuring the 
audience that ‘they did not ask for more money; what they wanted was a more efficient 
expenditure of the existing grants.’ 
The most recent account of Beresford’s resignation and the responses to it is found in Mullins’ 
book, which argues that the Captain received strong support from the press, giving him political 
                                                          
8 Beeler, British Naval Policy, pp. 269-276; Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, pp. 90-93. 
9 Beeler, British Naval Policy, p. 270. 
10 Sumida, Naval Supremacy, p. 13; Mullins, Transformation, pp. 48-50. 
11 The Times, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 7. 
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impetus from the outset.12 To an extent this was true. As Mullins shows, The Times and St. 
James Gazette were particularly sympathetic, and Beresford’s record in government was widely 
praised. More evidence can be provided in support of this account. The Daily Telegraph also 
offered its endorsement, describing Beresford as ‘a typical specimen of the best kind of naval 
expert’, a man with practical experience of warfare and administration who cared ‘nothing for 
politics or party in comparison with the great interests of national defence’. It felt sure that the 
public would provide him with staunch support.13 Beresford received personal support from 
Wolseley and others; a collection of his letters held at the British Library includes one 
unsolicited letter of congratulation from a self-declared member of ‘the public’, for example.14 
He was also immediately contacted by the editor of Murray’s Magazine, asking whether he 
would like to contribute ‘what would certainly be a most popular paper’ on the state of the 
Navy, ‘to awaken the country’.15 In an example of the close links between the armed force and 
the press during this period, Beresford replied to the effect that he had already promised to writ  
for another periodical, presumably Knowles’ Nineteenth Century for which he later wrote three 
articles.16 
Unfortunately, however, Mullins’ account suffers from what Andrew Hobbs has termed ‘the 
deleterious dominance of The Times in nineteenth century scholarship’, for a more balanced 
investigation of  contemporary press reactions reveals that the Captain was generally regarded 
as a well-meaning but misguided political lightweight.17 Indeed, with the exception of the three 
staunchly pro-Beresford organs listed above, few papers thought that his reasons, however 
principled, really justified resignation.18 The Tory Manchester Courier argued that he had 
chosen the ‘wrong road to achieve a desirable end’, and, in common with many papers, hoped 
                                                          
12 Mullins, Transformation, 121-125. 
13 Daily Telegraph, 27 Jan. 1888, pp. 4-5. 
14 Bennett, Charlie B, p. 147; William C. Brooks to Charles Beresford, 28 Jan. 1888, BL, Add. MS 
63117. 
15 Edward A. Arnold to Charles Beresford, 21 Jan. 1888, BL, Add. MS 63117.  
16 Note by Beresford in BL, Add. MS 63117. The three articles were ‘The Admiralty Confusion and its 
Cure’; ‘A Workable Admiralty’ and ‘The British Fleet and the State of Europe’, Nineteenth Century (Jan. 
1889), pp. 1-11. 
17 Hobbs, ‘Deleterious Dominance of The Times’. Mullins problematically characterises The Times as ‘the 
most widely circulated and influential journal in Britain’. Transformation, p. 122. 
18 See the representative leader in the Nottingham Evening Post, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 2. 
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and expected to see him back in office in due course.19 Liberal papers were often openly hostile, 
the Daily News running an editorial in support of civilian authority under the provocative 
heading ‘Lord Charles Boulanger’.20 Admitting the, at this stage low-key, support of Admiral 
Hornby and others, Beresford remained isolated politically.21 The East Marylebone 
Conservative association did not attend Beresford’s resignation speech, something which the 
Captain himself described as a ‘slap in the face’, and he does not appear to have received the 
support of any prominent political organisations.22 The initial feeling within the government 
appears to have been relief that he was gone tinged with irritation at his ‘unmanageableness’.23 
This was reflected in the confident and relaxed speeches of Hamilton in January and February, 
in which the First Lord emphasised the strength and efficiency of the Navy.24   
An important reason for the lukewarm reception given to Beresford’s resignation was the public 
perception of his position as a junior officer and minister, against which he struggled to 
establish himself as an authority of comparative statue to, for example, Wolseley. The high 
regard in which he was held by the T legraph proved to be a minority view. The Morning Post, 
while sympathetic to Beresford’s complaints and never doubting his patriotism, wrote him off 
as an ‘impetuous’ and inexperienced officer, ignorant of the organisation he sought to criticise – 
a heavy blow from such an important Conservative daily.25 Just as damagingly, Beresford’s 
resignation speech received immediate and scathing attacks from former First Lord Northbrook 
and the retired Admirals Sir Robert Spencer Robinson and Sir George Henry Richards, all of 
whom had extensive experience of the Admiralty’s internal workings and outranked him in 
terms of professional and intellectual authority.26 All three repudiated Beresford’s 
characterisation of the Admiralty’s lack of organisation for war and expressed hope that his 
                                                          
19 Manchester Courier, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 7. 
20 Daily News, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 5. 
21 Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences, pp. 92-93. 
22 The Times, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 7. According to Bennett, ‘many of his friends and constituents begged him 
not to resign’, Charlie B, p. 147. 
23 Nancy E. Johnson (ed.), The Diary of Gathorne Hardy, later Lord Cranbrook, 1866-1892: Political 
Selections (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 690; Mullins, Transformation, pp. 99, 103, 122; 
see also comments of Prince of Wales quoted in Bennett, Charlie B, p. 148. 
24 The Times, 12 Jan. 1888, p. 7; 19 Jan, p. 5; 4 Feb, p. 12. Mullins, Transformation, p. 126. 
25 Morning Post, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 4. 
26 The Times, 28 Jan. 1888, p. 10; 31 Jan., p. 8. 
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allegations would be put to rest by the government; as far as Richards was concerned, Beresford 
had strayed out of his ‘proper element’. In a strong editorial, The Standard succinctly explained 
why the view of the Captain – and, by extension, any serviceman – must necessarily be 
outranked by that of a Cabinet Minister: 
Lord Charles’s opinion, on any professional topic, is entitled to weight, and we have no 
doubt that the greatest deference has been paid to his representations. But it is only one 
opinion out of many, and it is a strictly professional opinion. Lord George Hamilton, as 
First Lord, in council with his colleagues of Cabinet rank, has to take into account an 
infinite number of considerations which the Sea Lord [Beresford] is quite entitled to 
overlook.27  
Arthur Forwood, the Admiralty’s Parliamentary and Financial Secretary, provided a similar 
though more forthright argument in a speech at the beginning of February. In a direct rebuttal to 
claims that defence policy was best directed by ‘expert’ serving officers, Forwood contrasted 
the speed and excellence of British shipbuilding with the inefficiency of France’s naval 
administration, which until recently had been headed by an Admiral.28 The extent to which this 
criticism succeeded in painting Beresford as well-meaning but relatively insubstantial 
government critic, lacking in serious public support, was captured by a February Moonshine 
cartoon, in which Beresford, piloting a tiny wooden dinghy, is shown attempting to ram the 
enormous ironclad Admiralty, captained by a serene Lord Salisbury [Figure 21].  
 
 
                                                          
27 The Standard, 20 Jan. 1888, p. 5. 




Figure 21: ‘Lord Charles Beresford & the Government.’ 
‘The little boat to the big ship: “Admiralty Ahoy! Surrender or I’ll run you down!”’ 
Moonshine, 4 Feb. 1888, p. 52. 
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The Navalist Propaganda Campaign 
By the beginning of February, then, it appeared that Beresford’s attempt to shake the naval 
establishment had failed. ‘Public opinion’ had largely dismissed or ignored his concerns, and 
continued to do so during March.29 Nor had the support of Hornby had any serious effect. 
Although he was apparently one of the most highly respected officers in the Royal Navy, his 
presence at Beresford’s resignation speech went unremarked in the subsequent newspaper 
coverage.30 However, Beresford and a growing band of retired naval officers persisted in their 
criticisms, maintaining a steady irregular warfare across the letter columns of The Times, and in 
public and parliamentary speeches.31 Throughout most of 1888 Beresford largely confined 
himself to attacking ‘scares and panic and the most wicked and scandalous waste’, and as late as 
11 May he was reported to have insisted that the present estimates would be enough if only the 
Navy were given a more efficient administration.32 Indeed it is clear that, on the issue of 
‘civilian’ control of the Admiralty, he was having some effect, securing a better hearing from 
the press and, most notably, a Commons Select Committee in March.33 Alt ough somewhat 
uncomfortable for George Hamilton, this argument over the administrative structure of the 
Admiralty remained divorced from any serious discussion about the strength of the Navy itself, 
and was not obviously leading to an increase in the estimates, something which flies in the face 
of most historical accounts of the agitation. It was not until the heavyweight authorities f 
Colomb and Hornby became directly involved that the discourse changed from one of reform to 
that of expansion.34 Between them these two men succeeded in exploiting the results of a 
‘strategic paradigm shift’, which had been emerging in British naval thought over the previous 
                                                          
29 See for example Morning Post, 13 Mar. 1888, p. 4. 
30 For a discussion of Hornby’s reputation see Lambert, Admirals, pp. 282-283. 
31 Mullins, Transformation, pp. 138-140. See in particular Captain C.C. Penrose Fitzgerald’s remarkable 
letter to The Times, 30 Mar. 1888, p. 4. 
32 Beresford, Parl. Deb., 12 Mar. 1888, col. 938; Morning Post, 11 May 1888, p. 3. This was quoted 
approvingly by Randolph Churchill in a speech on ‘public economy’, Morning Post, 17 May 1888, p. 2. 
See also Beresford’s speech and Hamilton’s reply in Parl. Deb., 4 June 1888, cols. 1057-1064. 
33 See the summary of press opinions in St. James’ Gazette, 13 March 1888, p. 14. 
34 Smith, ‘Public Opinion’, p. 37. For an excellent example of the careful presentation of this 
‘heavyweight’ expert naval authority see the essays by Admiral Sir Thomas Symonds, G. Phipps Hornby 
and Lord Alcester on ‘What Our Navy Should Be’, Fortnightly Review (Nov. 1888), pp. 557-580. 
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decade, to make the public case for a massive spending increase.35 Although the nature of this 
shift has been extensively analysed, a large amount has been left unsaid on the precise details of 
the navalist tactics of distortion, deception and hyperbole. In particular, the sheer unreality of 
the navalist characterisation of the Royal Navy, especially in their public statements, is still 
often underplayed by historians. The following deconstruction of the 1888-1889 naval 
propaganda is therefore necessary not only to contextualise the subsequent public and official 
responses, but also to clearly restate the extent to which Beresford and his supporters sought 
mislead the nation into acquiescing in further armament spending. 
The full navalist barrage was not released until May 1888. The first step was to deconstruct the 
‘bricks and mortar’ school, a task which Colomb skilfully set about in a famous paper on ‘The 
Naval Defences of the United Kingdom’ at the Royal United Services Institute on 18 May.36 In 
a direct attack on the fortification school of defence, and drawing heavily on Britain’s historical 
experience, he made a rare attempt to define what the phrase ‘naval supremacy’ meant in reality. 
The result was a strategy based on a blockade of French ports, combined with a strong reserve 
fleet and coastal defence ships.37 While certainly comprehensive, such a scheme necessitated an 
enormous number of warships to cover the French coast and relied on bottling up the enemy 
rather than on defeating them on the high seas, a potentially wasteful and ineffective method, 
especially in the age of steam. Ultimately, it was a strategy which demanded an enormous 
expansion of the Royal Navy; although Colomb himself did not attempt to estimate the number 
of new warships needed, he concluded by observing that in a war with France alone, Britain 
would not have the ships to spare to defend its own commerce.38 Tellingly, he supported this 
assertion not with an analysis of the contemporary naval situation, but instead with a table 
showing the size of the Royal Navy in 1805.  
                                                          
35 Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, p. 89; Mullins, Transformation ̧pp. 159-160. 
36 P.H. Colomb, ‘The Naval Defences of the United Kingdom’, Journal of the Royal United Services 
Institute (May 1888), pp. 565-601. For its importance see Schurman, Education of a Navy, pp. 46-48; 
Moon, ‘Invasion of the United Kingdom’, pp. 34-44; Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, p. 99; Mullins, 
Transformation, pp. 145-148. 
37 For the Navy and blockade at this time see Marder, Anatomy, 110-113; Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, 
pp. 84-88; Mullins, Transformation, pp. 84-85. 
38 Colomb, ‘Naval Defences’, p. 582. 
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‘Public opinion’ was now ripe for exploitation, a blow administered ten days later by Admiral 
Hornby at the ‘City Defence Meeting’. Building on Colomb’s arguments, and in keeping with 
wider naval opinion, Hornby rejected the convoy system of trade defence.39 I stead, he 
advocated deploying ships at fixed points across the globe, a comparatively inefficient system 
which demanded fast modern cruisers to have much chance of success. By combining this 
theory with historical comparisons drawn, once again, from Britain’s Nelsonian navy, Hornby 
arrived at the view that under his scheme Britain required a minimum of 186 cruisers of at least 
sixteen knots. At that time, he said, the Royal Navy possessed ‘only’ forty-two; it was therefore 
deficient by 144 ships.40 British vulnerability was thus ‘proven’, without reference to the 
strength of the French Navy itself. In this way, Hornby built an apparently compelling case for 
serious naval expansion, rooted firmly in ‘practical’ theory.  
In hindsight, the flaws in Colomb and Hornby’s strategies are readily apparent, something 
which, as we shall see, a number of contemporaries pointed out. They had set the Royal Navy 
an unnecessarily difficult task – that of defending all points of the Empire, the home islands and 
blockading the French coast, while protecting Britain’s massive merchant fleet in an inefficient 
manner – with little reference to diplomatic likelihoods, geo-strategic realities, or the actual 
strength of the French fleet.41 Little wonder, then, that the Navy failed the test they had set it. 
This appearance of vulnerability was reinforced through repeated appeals to history, especially 
the benchmark of the massive Nelsonian fleet, with little acknowledgement of subsequent 
technological changes. These problems are, of course, easy to condemn in retrospect, and the 
initial reaction is to adopt an attitude of incomprehension that this approach was so successful. 
However, once one understands the wider context of the defence debate in Britain over the 
preceding decades the strength of these arguments for contemporaries, and their own apparent 
gullibility, is more easily appreciated. As we have seen, up until 1884 national defence, when 
                                                          
39 Bryan Ranft, ‘The Protection of British Seaborne Trade and the Development of Systematic Planning 
for War, 1860-1906’ in Bryan Ranft (ed.), Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860-1939 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), pp. 1-22. 
40 The Times, 29 May 1888, pp. 11-2. 
41 See also Mullins, Transformation, pp. 132-133. 
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publicly discussed at all, had largely focused on land defences, the principal subject of the mid-
century invasion scares. While soldiers had been active in advocating fortifications and the 
effectiveness of the Volunteers had come in for much scrutiny, the Navy had been, in terms of 
press and political attention, relatively neglected. Although the true state of strategic awareness 
and war planning in official circles is disputed by historians the fact was that the subject had 
been largely absent from public discourse, a situation which Beresford rightly railed against and 
which gave his other complaints a degree of plausibility. Compared with the pessimism of 
Dunsany’s 1880 ‘Silver Streak’ essay, or the Army’s inconsistent invasion anxieties, Colomb 
and Hornby’s clear strategic vision shone like a ray of light: finally, a rational, detailed and 
thoroughly ‘business-like’ scheme of defence appeared to have been worked out. In the 
theoretical vacuum of the late 1880s, with little practical experience of naval warfare but for the 
occasional fleet manoeuvre, flawed ideas could easily take on a convincing validity, especially 
if they were endorsed by the majority of the relevant ‘experts’.  
Deceptive naval theory was important, but it was clear that if Beresford and his supporters were 
to secure some genuine increase to the Navy they would need to show that, even under the most 
favourable conditions, the fleet was not up to the task. This they did through a second tactic, 
parallel with the development of the new strategic visions and no less powerful. While not in 
themselves an obvious dishonesty, Colomb and Hornby’s views provided the materials with 
which other navalists were able to construct a deeply pessimistic and objectively erroneous 
picture of the Royal Navy in relation to its French counterpart. The most prominent deception 
was constructed by Beresford himself. After first suggesting that Britain had a deficit in 
warships in March, Beresford put solid figures to this weakness in a Ni eteenth Century article 
of January 1889 [Figure 22].42 He projected that by 1890 Britain would have a total of 36 first 
and second class battleships in Europe, and France thirty, while his ratio for cruisers stood at a 
similarly alarming 101 to seventy-five. These figures, he informed his readers, ‘absolutely prove 
that we have no reasonable argument to adduce for considering that we could defend our coasts 
                                                          




against France alone.’ Yet, compared with both contemporary NID evaluations and Oscar 
Parkes’ later work, Beresford’s figures are seriously questionable.43 He omitted a number of 
British battleships and six coastal defence ships, while including all six French coastal ironclads. 
By comparison with Beresford, the NID estimated that by 1890 Britain would have forty ocean-
going battleships to twenty-four French, a figure with which Parkes’ figures – though, 
confusingly, not his analysis – broadly agree. Beresford further reinforced the image of British 
weakness by listing Royal Navy battleships by name and annotating a number with apparent 
inferiorities, while for the French he simply provided aggregate totals, neglecting to mentin 
that the great majority of France’s second class battleships and a similar proportion of its 
cruisers were wooden-hulled ironclads, and therefore markedly inferior to their British 
counterparts.44 He also included French warships that would not actually be launched in 1890, 
surely a fatal error when calculating that country’s naval strength. Beresford’s cruiser figures 
were equally problematic. Although his headline figures appeared worrying, his actual focus 
was on ships capable of fifteen knots and over: in comparing these, the less concerning figures 
of sixty-eight British and thirteen French are arrived at, while the NID figures show this itself to 
be an exaggeration. If one were inclined to be charitable, the problems in Beresford’s numbers 
might be put down to ignorance. Indeed, in his 1888 constituency speech he had admitted that 
despite ‘hours and hours’ of study, he had failed to understand the naval estimates.45 Ship 
design does not necessarily require budgetary acumen, however, and even allowing for this 
personal mathematical deficiency it is difficult to describe Beresford’s picture of the Royal 
Navy as anything other than a conscious attempt at deceiving the public, using methods which 
were an exact repetition of the 1884 Pall Mall Gazette campaign.  
In December 1888, Beresford used these figures to introduce his own twenty million pound 
compromise scheme, demanding 74 new vessels including fourteen battleships, the first time he 
                                                          
43 The NID figures are republished in Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, pp. 107-108; Parkes’ comparison 
can be found in British Battleships, pp. 352-353. 
44 Parkes, British Battleships, p. 353; Beeler, British Naval Policy, pp. 205-208.  
45 The Times, 27 Jan. 1888, p. 7. 
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had unambiguously called for naval increases.46 Perhaps stung by previous attacks on his 
expertise, he heavily emphasised the thoroughness of his proposals, using, for example, the term 
‘plan of campaign’ no fewer than fifteen times in his speech. Within the space of a year, 
Beresford and Hornby had gone from calling for a simple reorganisation of the Admiralty, to 
demanding a massive increase in the Navy, built on apparently solid statistics and theory. 
Crucially, all references to the reality of the Franco-Russian threat had been kept to an abs loute 
minimum. It was in this way that naval officers during and after the passage of the Act felt able 
to describe the two-power standard as the ‘minimum’ necessary.47  
  
                                                          
46 Beresford, Parl. Deb., 13 Dec. 1888, cols. 124-146.  





Figure 22: Beresford’s ‘Assumed Distribution of British and French Navies in 
1890-91’. 
The British ships are individually criticised, while equally out of date Fr nch 
warships remain anonymous. Nineteenth Century (Jan. 1889), p. 2. 
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The final aspect of the deception, and one which is particularly underemphasised in the 
secondary literature, was ‘navalist hyperbole’, the pessimistic rhetoric which was both justified 
by, and helped to conceal the weaknesses in, the arguments of Colomb, Hornby and Beresford.48 
The chief aim of this language was to give the impression that Britain was not merely on an 
equal footing with France, but actually in a position of naval inferiority. One unsigned article, 
for example, informed the public that ‘France has an actual superiority over us at the present 
moment in modern armoured battleships.’ Any other interpretation was merely the product of 
officials desperate to defend themselves from the ‘indignation of the country’.49 Retired Rear-
Admiral and Conservative MP Richard Mayne similarly declared that Britain was unable to 
equal France in battle ‘even if we were to send out all our lame ducks and obsolete ships.’50 The 
Earl of Carnarvon spoke of the Navy’s ‘total inadequacy’, accusing the government of living in 
a ‘fool’s paradise of fancied security’.51 Sir Charles Dilke weighed in with an article which 
condemned the state of the Navy and soberly observed that France was in a position to launch 
an immediate invasion if Britain were to lose command of the Channel for a single day.52 
Fitzgerald assured readers of The Times that nine out of every ten Royal Navy officers agreed 
that the Navy was inadequate.53 Perhaps the closest thing to a navalist manifesto appeared on 10 
May, in the form of the notice announcing the ‘strictly non-political’ ‘City National Defence 
Meeting’. This asked the reader to consider the following statements: 
The Naval and coast defences are quite inadequate to the absolute requirements of the 
nation. 
The country is to-day unprepared for war, and would risk a serious reverse were such to 
occur. 
Our commerce would be at the mercy of an enemy in the present weak state of the 
Navy.54 
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51 The Times, 29 May 1888, p. 12. 
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After demanding an inquiry into the Navy, the notice called upon ‘Englishmen of all classes and 
politics’ to ‘take immediate action in this matter, and to learn the whole truth about our naval 
deficiency and unpreparedness for war’ from the ‘leading and most able officers’.  
Key to this alarmist language was the assumption that future wars would come suddenly and 
without warning. The notice of 10 May concluded with the declaration: ‘a great war may at any 
moment burst upon us, in which we may have to fight for our very existence.’ Unlike in the 
Channel Tunnel scare of 1882, however, this was not the cause of any significant dissent or 
argument, a testament to the influence that the outlook embodied in Frederick Maurice’s 
Hostilities without Declaration of War now held in the military and political elites. As Captain 
Fitzgerald told the meeting of 5 June, ‘the highest authorities told us that wars in the present day 
would be short, sharp, and decisive, and that they would break out suddenly and with little 
warning.’55 Importantly, it is clear that Lord Salisbury himself was entirely convinced of this 
outlook, which was also commonly held within the ranks of Tory MPs; in this respect, at least, 
the navalists were pushing at an open door.  
Understanding the nature of this rhetoric is important if one wishes to appreciate how the 
navalists managed to rapidly seize control of the defence discourse, distracting from the reality 
of comparative naval statistics and successfully recasting the agenda in terms of British 
weakness and foreign strength. The resulting confusion, and ultimate success of the navalists’ 
approach, is well illustrated by a comparison of the two most influential London newspapers. In 
May 1888 the Daily News published tables comparing Britain’s war fleet with other major 
European powers, showing a large superiority, notably 45 British ironclads to 33 French. ‘We 
might, with advantage, have more ships;’ the paper concluded, ‘but to say that we are in danger 
because of the smallness of our fleet is surely to talk nonsense’.56 A month and a half later The 
Times provided its own evaluation: 29 British battleships to 26 French, a latter number which it 
admitted it had only reached by including even the most inferior warships and all of France’s 
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coastal defence ships.57 This discrepancy was symptomatic of the problems which bedevilled 
any attempt to produce a like-for-like comparison of naval strength during the later nineteenth 
century. With navies of the period exhibiting little uniformity in the type of warships they 
possessed, and a rapid rate of technological obsolescence, there was no widely accepted 
yardstick available for analysists, amateur or otherwise, to use. In such a serious, complex and 
emotionally charged subject as national defence, uncertainty could only benefit those who 
wished to emphasise the country’s weaknesses. 
 ‘Public Opinion’ and the Navalist Campaign 
The prevailing view of the navalist campaign, originating with Marder, argues that Beresford 
and his supporters were carried by a wave of popular support and ‘panic’ to press naval 
increases upon a reluctant government.58 This view is repeated by both Jon Sumida and 
especially Mullins, who argues that Beresford’s campaign ‘rallied public opinion’ in support of 
strategic awareness.59 This interpretation is also supported in the wider historiography on the 
British Army and civil-military relations, which has attached to 1888 the ambiguous label of 
‘invasion scare’.60 However, in an examination of the public meetings of April and May 1888, 
Steven Smith suggests that the naval agitation was ‘essentially the work of the London Chamber 
of Commerce’ and a few naval officers, in the face of ‘very limited support’ from the public.61 It 
is therefore necessary, if one wishes to appreciate the true nature of the Naval Defence Act, to 
consider in more detail the actual state of ‘public opinion’ during this period. This allows us to 
better judge not only the pressures on Salisbury’s government, but also the state of the country 
as a whole in its attitude towards defence matters. 
The view of 1888 as a victory for the people appears to have originated during the 1890s with 
Beresford himself, who was keen to emphasise the decisive role of the public sphere. Speaking 
to a Birmingham crowd in March 1896, he gave a brief narrative of the 1888 campaign: 
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For years the country had been in a state of panic, and millions of money had been spent 
after those in authority had stated that the fleet was adequate. It was not the Government 
that had increased the fleet, but the Press and public opinion. (A Voice: “That’s you.”) 
No; he merely put the fuse into the haystack and the people blew it up.62 
What is interesting about this account is that, as the heckler makes clear, even to a crowd of 
loyal Unionists Beresford was struggling to maintain the argument that the ‘press and public 
opinion’ were ultimately to be credited with the spending increases. This should not be 
surprising, for this story of public support was in fact an invention, only adopted by Beresford 
in 1889, when the spending increases seemed assured. Nor did such language appear in the 
press until retrospectives on the Naval Defence Act were produced during the 1890s.63 At no 
point during 1888 did Beresford himself openly claim the support of ‘public opinion’, let alone 
that of the country as a whole; as we have already seen, nothing that had occurred during 
January-May 1888 suggested that he possessed such support. This is reflected in the words of 
the agitators themselves, who were constantly unsure as to their position vi -à-vis public 
opinion. Were they seeking to awaken it, or satisfy its demands? Although the City meetings 
referred vaguely to great concern in ‘the country’ it is difficult to ignore the fact that these 
gatherings consisted largely of armed forces officers and London capitalists. Beresford’s 
Chamber of Commerce meeting on 28 May was a case in point. Although Carnarvon took great 
pleasure in declaring that the country was ‘unanimously anxious, without distinction of party or 
political creed’, Beresford himself had opened the meeting by admitting that ‘what we really 
want is that the British public, who are somewhat drowsy on this great question, should be 
roused from their lethargy’, a view echoed by the President of the Institution of Mechanical 
Engineers.64 The meeting itself passed a resolution which admitted that it was representative 
only of the commercial and shipping interests of the City of London. Although the mood was 
slightly more confident at the following meeting on 5 June, Captain Fitzgerald nevertheless took 
the opportunity to lament the fact that the estimates remained at the mercy of a public which, in 
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its ignorance and ‘indifference’, still preferred an economical ‘popular budget’ to a larger 
navy.65 Among the resolutions passed at this meeting was one which claimed that any scheme 
put forward by the government ‘may be assured of the hearty co-operation of all classes’, surely 
a statement which necessarily assumed the support of people the navalists could not possibly 
have consulted.  
As soon as one begins to search for the usual signs of wider public support, any illusions 
quickly collapse. Unlike the earlier Channel Tunnel debate, Beresford’s campaign produced no 
petitions for or against his proposals. Beyond London, no Chamber of Commerce appears to 
have thought the matter worthy of discussion, and only Birmingham and Grimsby were listed as 
having sent representatives to the City Meeting of 28 May.66 Indeed it appears that the notice 
announcing the meeting was itself only sent to The Times and Daily Telegraph, despite the 
organiser’s claimed intention to appeal to a national audience.67 Likewise no working class 
organisations or trade unions felt moved to come out for or against the agitation, despite the 
proliferation of navalist propaganda emphasising the threat to Britain’s food supplies and the 
obvious boon the spending would bring to shipyards. Aside from a number of London-based 
shipowners, bankers and organisations with an obvious and direct interest in the design and 
construction of warships – the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, for example – no groups 
from the wider commercial or industrial communities were represented at the public meetings.  
This attitude of widespread public and political indifference was reflected in the results of two 
contemporary by-elections with strong links to Beresford’s agitation. The first came in May 
1888 when the sitting Tory MP for Southampton, naval officer Sir John Edmund Commerell, 
resigned his seat to take up an appointment as commander-in-chief at Portsmouth. Commerell 
had long been an advocate of naval increases and it would not have been unreasonable to expect 
this vote, in an important port constituency on 23 May at the height of the navalist agitation, to 
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have been strongly influenced by talk of naval policy.68 The result was certainly a ‘bitter 
disappointment’ for the Conservatives, who saw their majority of 741 collapse into one of 885 
for the Radical ‘Gladstonian Liberal’ and shipping magnate Francis Evans, himself a strong 
navalist.69 One should not be mislead by Evans’ navalism, however, for when reports of 
political meetings and canvassing are examined the dominant issue in the strongly 
nonconformist constituency is revealed to have been the licencing clauses of the Local 
Government Bill, while the subsequent consensus among the local and London press was that 
the election had revealed a remarkable lack of interest in issues beyond the temperance debate.70  
Even more disappointing for Beresford’s cause was the Govan by-election eight months later, 
fought following the death of the sitting member and owner of the Fairfield shipyards, 
Conservative Sir William Pearce.71 On 12 January Beresford himself gave a strong navalist 
speech at the Fairfield Works in favour of the Liberal Unionist candidate, no less a figure than 
Sir John Pender.72 While Pender busied himself with pledges to ‘do all he could’ to increase the 
Navy, his Liberal opponent John Wilson – a staunch Radical and IAL member – produced the 
usual attacks on Admiralty inefficiency, condemned those who encouraged ‘suspicions’ of 
France, and urged the working class electors of Govan to reject ‘jingo hoodwinking’ and vote in 
the ‘interests of reform and retrenchment of our public expenditure’.73 This they emphatically 
did, returning Wilson with a majority of 1071. If Southampton illustrated how irrelevant 
national defence and the preservation of the Union could be in the face of local politics, Govan 
demonstrated how ineffective navalist propaganda could be when it was deployed. Indeed, as 
T.G. Otte observes, foreign policy and defence issues had little influence in by-elections 
throughout this period, a possible consequence of the lack of foreign wars at the end of the 
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1880s.74 This perception was further reinforced when the Tories lost the Kennington by-election 
of March 1889, despite running on a high-profile navalist platform during the opening of the 
Naval Defence Bill’s parliamentary debates.75 As devoted members of the Radical 
parliamentary bloc, Evans and Wilson went on to vote repeatedly against the Naval Defence 
Bill, a clear indication that the holding of a seat with strong links to the Navy did not necessarily 
mean that an MP felt the need to support the service come what might.  
To a large extent, the press reaction to the 28 May ‘City Defence Meeting’ confirmed this sense 
of popular scepticism and apathy. Certainly, across the Unionist press, Colomb and Hornby’s 
mix of strategy and history was welcomed. ‘Admiral Colomb’s plan will be popular’, observed 
the Birmingham Daily Post. ‘It is in the grand style of the English spirit. It well beseems the 
proud mistress of the seas. It recalls the great deeds of an heroic past.’76 For the Morning Post, 
Hornby’s address, ‘coming, as it does, from one whose experience and capacity are beyond 
cavil, ought to do more to arouse public attention than any number of purely official reports.’77 
Sober demands for inquiries into naval administration and the national defences were a strong 
theme during the following week.78 ‘We are not counselling a resort to panic,’ concluded the 
York Herald, ‘but the adoption of such measures as will prevent panic from arising.’79 
Such demands, however, came with qualifications. The Tory papers hoped that the agitation 
would strengthen the government’s hand in its current and future policy of reform, rather than 
leading to a large naval expansion. It is clear that few were contemplating a programme on the 
scale of what would become the Naval Defence Act. Indeed, when the Morning Post returned to 
the subject in early June, it was to note with satisfaction a statement from Hamilton that Britain 
possessed double the French number of modern cruisers, and to point out the impossibility of 
the taxpayer meeting Hornby’s demands for hundreds more.80  On the other hand the Liberal 
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press, while always keen to support any attempt to introduce efficiencies into what was widely 
regarded as a wasteful and corrupt department of state, was deeply sceptical, at times derisiv, 
of the navalist cause. The Saturday Review opened with a strong leader on the 26th, accusing the 
‘Chronic Alarmists’ of misusing history, ignoring facts and peddling ‘craven and dangerous 
nonsense’.81 Nor was it alone in suspecting that the Navalists had knowingly ignored the real 
state of the fleet, as Punch made clear [Figure 23]. More moderate Liberal commentators 
repeatedly pointed out that Hornby’s use of the Nelsonian Navy as a yardstick against which to 
measure the current fleet was neither proportionate nor practical, and would, if indulged, only 
encourage the ongoing European arms race. Hornby was attacked for assuming ‘that all the 
world is likely to combine against us’, ‘that we should have no allies’ and that ‘all the 
disadvantages would tell against ourselves alone’.82 ‘We have spent money enough on our army 
and navy to make both services twice as strong as they need be for our purposes’, concluded 
The Scotsman, in a vehement condemnation of the ‘faddist’ alarmists, whom it characterised as 
peddling mere ‘professional demands’ for ‘enormous expenditure’ while lacking a coherent plan 
for defending the nation.83 In short, the City meeting had revealed much appetite for inquiry and 
reform, but also a genuine suspicion of the cry of ‘England in danger’. It is little wonder that 
Beresford later wrote to Hornby warning that demands for hundreds of new cruisers would 
result in the country ignoring their proposals.84 
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Figure 23: ‘England’s Invisible Armada’. 
Beresford  knowingly ignores the strength of the fleet. Punch, 26 May 1888, p. 243. 
269 
 
However, it is at this point important to stress the limited and top-down nature of nineteenth 
century ‘public opinion’. Beresford and his allies may have failed to carry with them either ‘the 
country’ or much of the press, but in regard to the organs that wielded the most influence over 
government policy – The Times, the ‘clubland’ papers and the literary magazines – the agitators 
were overwhelmingly successful. The Times used the opportunity to establish the hearty Blue-
Water outlook which it held for the rest of the century.85 The Pall Mall Gazette lamented the 
‘refusal of officialism (sic) to take the public into its confidence’, and the St. James’ Gazette 
dedicated one editorial to a strong defence of the ‘Chronic Alarmist’ pilloried by the Saturday 
Review.86 The Daily Telegraph, which enthusiastically adopted Colomb and Hornby’s 
‘Nelsonian’ vision of naval defence, condemned the government for failing to ‘welcome and 
utilise the awakened anxiety of the public mind’.87 In an excitable display of self-congratulation, 
the paper continued: 
We made ourselves the channel of a deep and widespread national misgiving, to which 
we gave articulate expression and the reinforcement of hard facts. The British people 
are now beginning to comprehend the prodigious danger into which we have drifted, 
and they will not be put off from seeing that adequate measures are taken, and quickly 
taken, to avert that danger.88 
The impression of widespread concern among ‘society’ was further enhanced by the publication 
of June’s literary magazines, featuring a wide selection of pieces condemning the state of the 
nation, predominantly from Army officers fearing invasion. The effect of these was, according 
to the Globe, all the greater for the fact that the rest of that month’s crop of essays made for 
‘rather dull reading’.89 The contemporaneous invasion ‘scare’ stoked by Wolseley and endorsed 
by a wide array of ‘journals of opinion’ also added to the overall effect.90 Most important of all 
was the attendance at the meetings of 28 May and 5 June, which although reported as ‘large and 
influential’ and ‘thoroughly representative’, in fact reflected the overwhelmingly Conservative 
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shade of City politics at this time. Of the thirty-three MPs publicly involved in Beresford’s 
campaign thirty were Conservatives, the majority retired or serving military and naval officers.91 
Especially prominent was the former Lord Mayor and current MP for the City of London, the 
Tory Sir Robert Fowler, who had publicly supported Beresford from the outset.92 Lord 
Salisbury was thus faced with the twin powers of London ‘Society’ and his own backbenchers. 
As we shall see in the following chapter, it was a combination he found difficult to ignore. 
Conclusion 
Looking back from 1889, Beresford prided himself that he had ran a campaign built on ‘facts, 
figures and practical proposals.’93 As this chapter has shown, this was far from an accurate 
depiction of the navalist arguments of 1888. Indeed, it is particularly clear that, left to his own 
devises, Beresford would never have achieved any substantial success. At no point during 1888 
did he manage to establish himself as an authoritative ‘expert’, or even produce a consistent set 
of criticisms and demands. Only following the interventions by Hornby, Colomb and the 
London Chamber of Commerce did his cause gain any obvious momentum. Even then, this 
momentum was of a limited, exclusionary nature, reliant on his fellow officers, Tory MPs and 
the commercial classes of the City of London. The British press did not experience a ‘panic’ 
during May 1888 comparable to that which had occurred the Channel Tunnel in 1882, or even 
over the Navy in 1884. Nor, were ‘the people’, ‘the country’ or many in the press obviously 
convinced by the myth of naval weakness, a conclusion which complements Jan Rüger’s recent 
suggestion that generalisations about popular navalism in the age of imperialism have often 
been overstated.94 Nevertheless, despite these shallow foundations, in retrospect the events of 
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May 1888 clearly marked the beginning of the end for serious government resistance to the 
navalist demands. Beresford’s campaign had been limited, but by May 1888 it had succeeded in 
acquiring just the support needed to gain the ear of the Prime Minister; just as importantly, it 
was operating in a political environment distracted by Irish issues and lacking the necessary 






The Political Response 
 
Hurrah! Hurrah! John Bull’s awake, 
And you may take your Davy 
That, spite of Rads and nincompoops,1 
At last we’ll have a navy. 
In vain our wooden walls of yore 
Did foemen spend their fire on; 
Our iron walls as vainly they 
Henceforth will spend their ire on. 
The mettle of our metal fleet 
Who tries will surely rue it; 
Britannia now may rule the waves, 
She’s got the ships to do it. 
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The ‘well-considered plan’ of Conservative historiography notwithstanding, the Naval Defence 
Act has long been recognised by naval historians as something forced upon a reluctant 
Ministry.2 Nevertheless, the reasoning behind Salisbury’s decision to embark on a major project 
of naval expansion in 1888 is poorly understood. The following chapter considers the reception 
of and response to the navalist campaign by both Conservative and Liberal politicians during 
1888, hitherto overlooked by historians. It argues that, while the Conservative ministry 
possessed the capability to refute the navalist rhetoric, ‘public opinion’ eventually told on Lord 
Salisbury, who, ever the consummate politician, came to embrace the naval expansion as a 
political necessity. Shifting focus onto the Liberal Opposition, the chapter then argues that 
internationalist and anti-armament opinion remained subdued throughout the year despite given 
an excellent opportunity to launch a counter-crusade in favour of the existing defence 
settlement. Distracted by the Home Rule question, Liberals had little interest in devoting time to 
defence matters. The result was a substantial defeat for the principle of a civilian-led defence 
policy. 
Political Context 
Seen in hindsight, the political establishment should have been prepared for the events of 1888. 
W.T. Stead’s 1884 campaign produced a number of political lessons which Liberals in 
particular would have done well to heed. Stead had fully exploited the navy ‘weakness’ in the 
Liberal platform, making good use of navalist statements from both Cobden and Gladstone.3 
The resulting combination of liberal principals, patriotism, and ‘scandal-mongering alarmism’ 
proved a potent mix, brushing aside scattered protests from the ‘Friends of Peace’ and 
successfully masking the underlying weakness of the overall argument.4 As such, 1884 revealed 
the feebleness of contemporary Liberal anti-armament sentiment and ideology, the 
ineffectiveness of the likes of the Arbitration League or the Peace Society, and, ultimately, the 
ease with which the party itself might roll over and accept naval increases demanded from 
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outside. Although Gladstone successfully managed to keep the more extreme Admiralty 
demands at bay, he did not publicly attack the underlying myth of naval weakness.5 The 
expense itself was accepted by a diverse number of Liberals including Lord Northbrook and 
Campbell-Bannerman at the Admiralty, justified as simply an extension of the party’s policy of 
developing command of the sea ‘steadily year by year’, in Campbell-Bannerman’s words.6 As a 
result, the political lessons of ‘the Truth about the Navy’ went largely unlearnt, and when in 
1888 this principal of moderate spending was more directly challenged, politicians in both 
major parties found themselves without the experience, organisation or conceptual tools to repel 
the threat.7 
Naval critics were kept busy over the intervening years. The Navy’s tardy response to the 1885 
Panjdeh crisis with Russia came in for much criticism, for example, while elements within the 
press continued to push the apparent demands of public opinion.8 For most politicians, however, 
naval matters were rarely top of the agenda, and, along with so many other issues, were pushed 
even further down by Gladstone’s 1885 conversion to Home Rule, an issue which had lost little 
of its potency by the later 1880s.  Throughout 1888 and 1889 Irish affairs and the the Pigott 
forgeries case dominated both the Commons and the press, a subject to which the Naval 
Defence Bill, perhaps to the government’s relief, was forced to play a poor second fiddle.9 Even 
the most fervent defence advocates recognised that the ‘preservation of the Union’ came before 
all other issues.10 On the other hand, many commentators were wont to regard the growing 
defence agitation as an entertaining distraction from Ireland. ‘The new movement is by no 
means unwelcome to politicians generally’ observed The Manchester Courier’s London 
correspondent in May 1888, ‘for the Home Rule question, which has held the field for so long, 
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has grown stale of late.’11 The most important effect of the Irish problem, however, was its 
influence over Gladstone, whose speeches during this period rarely referred to anything else.12 
In seeking to understand why the Liberal party in particular made such a poor showing in 
opposing spending increases, and therefore why the Naval Defence Act has made such little 
mark on political histories of the period, the all-pervasive nature of the ‘Irish Question’ must be 
appreciated. 
The Government Response, 1888 
In early 1888 the calm which reigned in the Admiralty was reflected across the Cabinet. 
Salisbury, famously dismissive of ‘expert’ opinions had little interest in spending a large sum on 
the Navy, while his Chancellor George Goschen had, according to Beresford, said that any 
proposal to increase the Navy was both preposterous and unwanted.13 A  the Admiralty, George 
Hamilton was a decent administrator with two years of experience dealing with the Admirals by 
1888. Certainly Hamilton was no passionate economiser, having opposed Randolph Churchill’s 
demands for reductions in the estimates, but neither was he a man likely to roll over and accept 
a large increase in them.14 Importantly, he was ably assisted by the Liverpool MP Arthur 
Forwood, the first shipowner ever to become an Admiralty minister, who took a tough, 
confrontational approach towards dealings with the officers on the Admiralty Board.15 As Paul 
Smith has shown, Forwood was fully cognisant of all aspects of naval administration, and his 
expertise and competence earned him a grudging respect from even the most anti-civilian naval 
officers.16 During January-April 1888, Hamilton and Forwood appeared repeatedly on platforms 
up and down the country, defending themselves, to some praise, against the various claims of 
Beresford and his supporters. During this time, they effectively contained the Navalist campaign. 
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May opened with the government position as apparently determined as it had ever been. On 4 
May the Leader of the Commons W.H. Smith, who had already privately appealed to the 
agitators to cease their campaign, informed the House that ‘the government are by no means 
willing to admit the dangerous weakness of the Army and Navy, nor the inefficiency of either of 
those Services’, and ruled out an inquiry into the state of the national defences.17 On 11 and 14 
May, in his only substantial interventions into the controversy, Lord Salisbury quoted recent 
naval spending to support the contention that ‘there is no ground whatever for the implied 
reproach of parsimony and that we are neglecting the defences of the country.’18 ‘I deprecate the 
idea that it is possible for any government to lay down an absolute standard of safety’, he 
argued on the 14th. ‘You must know what your enemy is likely to be before you know whether 
your preparations are likely to be sufficient’.19  Salisbury clearly understood that British naval 
strength could not be dealt with in a vaccum, but must be evaluated with reference to the 
resources of it potential rivals andthe government’s diplomatic policy. In light of Salisbury’s 
later defence of the Naval Defence Bill these statements of May 1888 make for remarkable 
reading.  
However well founded, the result of Salisbury’s attitude was a perception among the navalists 
that the government was ignoring their concerns. A shrewd government might, at this stage, 
have instituted some high-profile Admiralty reforms, and perhaps commissioned a modest 
increase in cruiser strength. An excellent opportunity was soon to present itself in the form of 
the final report of the Commons Select Committee into the naval estimates, chaired by Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman. Published in August, this produced a qualified victory for civilian 
authority, recommending that the Sea Lords be given a greater advisory role in the creation of 
the estimates, without actually submitting to any substantial increase in naval spending.20 
Instead the government stuck to its position: the public meetings of that month can be seen as a 
direct consequence of this official refusal to act. 
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Subtle evidence of a split within the government emerged during May, when a speech by the 
arch-imperialist and ‘big-navy’ Civil Lord of the Admiralty Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett appeared to 
give some credence to the agitators’ demands.21 Indeed, the navalists were not without at least 
one ally within the Cabinet, as the Queen’s journal for early May shows that W.H. Smith, who 
had proven his pessimistic credentials through prominent involvement in the 1884 agitation, 
‘felt anxious as to the state of our Army and Navy, and said some decided steps must be 
taken.’22 According to Victoria, Smith, who at this time was still publicly following the 
government line, did not think that either Stanhope at the War Office or Hamilton were ‘strong 
enough’, always declaring ‘all is right, which we know it is not.’23 It is likely that Smith was 
closely involved in the decision-making process which led to the Naval Defence Bill, something 
which historians have missed.24 
Ashmead-Bartlett and Smith do not appear to have been representative of the rest of the 
government, however. Further research demonstrates that both Hamilton and Forwood 
maintained their position against the navalists throughout May, and that they easily had the 
measure of their opponents. On the 28th itself, the First Lord gave a speech at a gathering of 
Conservative Associations at Derby in which he laboured at some length to show that Britain far 
outclassed France in shipbuilding terms. Defiantly attacking ‘a certain number of naval officers’ 
for creating a ‘panic exactly at the moment when we were stronger than we had been for the last 
ten years’, he concluded with the declaration that the government would not have their policy 
dictated by outside influences.25 A week later, during the Commons debate on the government’s 
proposed programme of fortifications for coaling stations, he returned to the subject after being 
directly challenged by Beresford over his Derby remarks. The result was an incisive and concise 
speech which tore up much of the navalist propaganda.26 Beresford and his supporters, Hamilton 
charged, were sensational because that was the only hope they had of success. He accused 
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Beresford of misleading the public by exaggerating the amount which might be saved through 
reform, and Hornby of demanding 186 sixteen-knot cruisers when France in 1888 possessed 
only five. Indeed, he made much of the fact that in France at that moment, naval officers were 
demanding increased expenditure on the basis that Britain far outclassed the French fleet in 
cruiser strength. Rejecting a policy of mass shipbuilding – in part, ironically, because Hornby’s 
proposed scheme would come to twenty-one million pounds – Hamilton appeared to reaffirm 
the established policy of maintaining a naval programme ‘well within our financial compass’. 
He concluded with a warning against the ‘unreliability of public opinion’. The strength of his 
speech was reflected in the tribute paid to him by Shaw Lefevre, who pledged himself in 
complete agreement with the ‘firm stand’ Hamilton had made.27 At first glance, Hamilton’s 
speech appeared to mark the end of the affair. The London correspondent of the Dunde  
Courier reflected:  
Lord George Hamilton has been very generally complimented upon the speech in which 
he replied to the panicmongers last night. It was an admirable survey of our naval 
position, and completely disposed of the alarms of Sir Geoffrey Hornby and the 
jeremiads of Lord Charles Beresford. The panic is now an end, and in a few days it will 
have been forgotten by all but its discomfited authors.28 
There was, however, a problem with this interpretation. At the conclusion of his speech, 
Hamilton had said: ‘we agree that the Navy at the present moment has not arrived at the 
standard of strength which we hope it will attain, and when attained will be kept.’ While vague, 
this was clearly a significant change of tune. ‘What is all this but to confess that we are weak to-
day?’ demanded the Standard. ‘There are too many indications’, it continued, ‘that the 
programmes of the Admiralty and War Office have been shaped, not by a conscientious 
recognition of our requirements, but by financial rule of thumb.’29 In hindsight, Hamilton’s 
speech was not the death-kneel of the agitation but a preparing of the ground for a new direction
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in British naval policy, something which was recognised by the attendees at the second City 
meeting of 5 June.30 
Hamilton’s criticisms were reiterated and expanded upon by Forwood at the Liverpool Chamber 
of Commerce on 9 July. Speaking in his capacity ‘as a merchant and shipowner’, Forwood 
launched into a scathing attack on Beresford, Hornby and Colomb.31 Calling for a moderate 
increase in the size of the fleet through the estimates, he pointed out that the British fleet 
remained ‘far in advance of other nations’ and proceeded to annihilate Hornby’s 144 cruiser 
proposal with a comparative evaluation of the British and French fleets, demonstrating an 
awareness of realities such as France’s inferior wooden hulled ships and coaling station 
deficiencies which outmatched that of the professional ‘experts’. Importantly, he also followed 
Hamilton’s criticisms of public opinion,‘those popular agitations which are often so prejudicial 
to good administration’: 
Unfortunately, the spirit of the age tempts people to exaggerate: unless a statement is 
sensational it receives but little attention at the hands of the public. Hence we have 
over-coloured speeches and newspaper articles, which do more harm than good, for 
their very extravagance deters sober-minded men from paying proper regard to the 
modicum of facts on which they may be based.32 
His audience clearly agreed, passing a supportive resolution – seconded by William Gladstone’s 
brother, Robertson – and expressing confidence in the government to root out any existing 
inefficiencies in naval administration. The Liverpool Mercury also endorsed Forwood’s words, 
which it saw as an example of ‘self-possession and calm confidence’ in contrast to the ‘alarmist 
panic’ and ‘downright folly’ of Admiral Hornby.33 The Daily News confidently described the 
speech as the ‘last nail in the coffin of the panic’, but there was little evidence that his words 
had been absorbed by the political establishment, and he received no obvious support from 
either the government or Opposition.34 The St. James’ Gazette – a noted Beresford ally – ran an 
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editorial critical of Forwood, while most papers simply printed his words without comment.35 
The Times completely ignored it: instead it busied itself with a discussion of the preparations for 
the following month’s naval manoeuvres, in a report which repeated the naval weakness myth 
as fact.36 To an extent, Forwood’s characterisation of the ‘spirit of the age’ had been proven 
correct: his calm, clear-headed analysis of the situation had failed to match the alarmist 
hyperbole of the authoritative, patriotic and ‘non-political’ naval officers.   
The above narrative of Ministerial attitudes towards the naval agitation, when placed in the 
context of the relatively lacklustre nature of that same agitation, serves to emphasise the 
suddenness of the government’s decision to adopt the Naval Defence Bill.37 During June, 
Salisbury conducted a Cabinet-l vel defence review. On 1 July Lord Cranbrook, Salisbury’s 
Lord President of the Council, recorded in his diary: ‘Our Cabinet yesterday much occupied by 
G. Hamilton & responsibility. Large estimates loom before him.’38 That same day Arthur Hood, 
the First Sea Lord, submitted what would become the basis for the Naval Defence Act to 
Cabinet, and the main body of the programme took shape during November, taking into account 
the lessons of the August naval manoeuvres.39 A meeting of the responsible Ministers 
provisionally agreed the expenditure of twenty million pounds on the Navy on 11 December, 
although the Bill itself was not finalised until March 1889.40 The decision to substantially 
expand the Navy was therefore taken by Salisbury at some point during June, and no more than 
a month following the meeting of 28 May.41 Once he had decided to expand the Navy, Salisbury 
remained reluctant to admit that he had been forced to do so by Beresford and his supporters. 
On 12 June, for example, he wrote to the Queen, assuring her that ‘the efforts of the country 
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should be concentrated on a well-considered plan, and not be frittered away by the divergent 
counsels of various Admirals and Generals’.42  
It seems likely that Salisbury was pressured into his decision by trinity of elite public opinion, 
his own backbenchers and the Sea Lords. Yet the logical reasoning behind the government’s 
change of policy remains elusive. The intention to embark upon a new naval programme was 
confirmed publicly on 9 November 1888, at the Lord Mayor’s day Guildhall banquet.43 
Traditionally a time for Ministers to reflect on the year past, the state of the Navy was the 
foremost subject of interest. Introducing Hamilton as the first speaker, the new Lord Mayor, the 
Liberal James Whitehead, referred to the ‘grave doubts…expressed in well-informed quarters’ 
about the naval defences, and argued that ‘all classes of the people’ would support the 
government in any measures it may deem necessary, a marked departure from the attitudes of 
his predecessor. Hamilton’s speech was short and to the point. With Northbrook’s 1885 
programme now complete and the government equipped with the experience and lessons of the 
recent manoeuvres, ‘I hope that during the next 12 months’, he said, ‘we may be able to make a 
new and bolder start and a more sustained effort towards bringing up the strength  of Her 
Majesty’s Navy to that standard at which, in the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government, it ought 
to be permanently maintained.’ This policy shift was echoed by Salisbury. After reflecting on 
the ongoing European arms race – stressing how the result of any great war must necessarily be 
the ‘national annihilation’ of the defeated – the Prime Minister addressed the state of public 
opinion in Britain: 
I do not say that this should diminish our confidence in peace, but I feel that there is a 
general impression pervading the community – one of those wide public impressions 
affecting every mind and every class which carries by its universality the warrant of its 
truth – which tells us that in the midst of so much preparation we must not remain 
unprepared.44 
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As far as his interpretation of public opinion goes, this passage is a typically Salisburi n 
political calculation. It is impossible not to c mpare it to Gladstone’s condemnation of 
‘speculative panics’ in the Channel Tunnel debate earlier the same year. What the Liberal leader 
regarded as the trumped-up concerns of a moneyed minority, Salisbury interpreted as the 
reflected view of the entire nation.45 The navalists attempt to use the limited nineteenth century 
understanding of public opinion to appropriate the voice of the nation appeared to have 
succeeded spectacularly.  
In actual substance, neither Hamilton nor Salisbury’s speech explicitly detailed a large naval 
expansion. Salisbury was determined that no details of the programme should be leaked until 
the First Lord introduced it to Parliament.46 Nevertheless, the implication of Salisbury’s words 
were clear, discussed not only in the British press, but across Europe. ‘Lord Salisbury has 
simply at last opened his eyes to the permanent facts, and acts accordingly’, opined the Pall 
Mall Gazette, which looked forward to Hamilton’s ‘unanswerable case’ for more ironclads 
when next he presented the estimates to Parliament.47 O e member of the Guildhall banquet 
audience was especially happy. ‘After last night’s speeches of Salisbury and Hamilton I am 
delighted’, wrote Beresford to his friend Colonel John Ardagh on 10 November. ‘The 
Government have completely given in to my demands and my resignation has borne good 
fruit.’48  
Yet as a justification for the Naval Defence Act Salisbury’s speech rang extraordinarily hollow, 
especially in light of his professions of British naval strength made only a few months earlier.
The Royal Navy is weak, he appears to argue, because the people believe it to be so. This was 
particularly peculiar in the context of the rest of the speech, in which he argued that the only 
danger the peace of Europe must fear was a ‘burst of uninformed feeling among the masses of 
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the people, who in every country can, if they will, control the action of their rulers’.49 In one 
breath he was praising the rationality of the people’s fears and in the next condemning their 
power. It was a strangely illogical line of reasoning for a Prime Minister who so prided himself 
on his firm and sensible governance. 
It seems fair to say that the Naval Defence Act was an opportunistic move, designed to appease 
what Salisbury may have genuinely regarded as a national sentiment, whether or not he really 
believed that sentiment was rational. On the current evidence, it is difficult to say whether he 
ever seriously agreed that the Royal Navy needed strengthening. As the next chapter shows, that 
he and his government continued to shy away from explaining the reasoning behind their 
programme suggests that he was all too aware of his policy’s dubious foundations. In light of 
this conclusion, attention must be turned to the position of the Liberal opposition. If the 
government’s position was so weak and its support base vague, why did the Liberals not jump at 
the chance to exploit these problems in what rapidly became one of the defining policies of the 
Salisbury government? 
The Lord Mayor and the Liberals 
For the most part, Beresford and his fellow agitators limited their ire to past and present 
governments and the political system itself. Only on one or two occasions during the City 
Defence Meetings did they depart from this line to attack the Radical ‘peace hallucination’, 
while the Liberal party itself was mentioned only within condemnations of wider ‘party 
exigencies’.50 Certainly, this focus on the government was intentional – it was, after all, alleged 
flaws in current naval policy against which they were protesting. This was not to say, however, 
that they were consciously ignoring the Radicals. Rather the lack of attention paid to what in 
previous scares had represented the predominant ideological opposition to increased estimates 
was due in large part to the total failure of the Liberal party in general and Radicals and peace 
campaigners in particular to offer any sort of meaningful commentary on, let alone criticism of, 
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the agitation. Other than the usual editorial comment, one searches the pages of the press 
between January and May 1888 in vain for serious criticisms of the agitation from prominent 
Liberals, Radicals or peace campaigners. It was not until mid-May that any such rebuke was 
offered to Beresford’s campaign, and this only appeared as a result of direct provocation. 
Beyond this incident, Liberal critiques were few and far between, lacking in both coordination 
and, in many cases, intellectual force.  
On 14 May, at the suggestion of Rear-Admiral Mayne, the organisers of the ‘City National 
Defence Meeting’ resolved to approach the Lord Mayor of London to request the use of the 
Guildhall, at which it was planned to put a resolution expressing ‘grave anxiety’ in the state of 
the national defence. It was also unanimously agreed that the Mayor himself should be asked to 
preside over the meeting, presumably in order to give the proceedings an air of officialdom and 
to reinforce the image of citywide concern.51  
Unfortunately for Mayne, the office of Lord Mayor was held in 1888 by a man diametrically 
opposed to the pessimist outlook.  Born in Belgium and brought up in London, the owner of the 
largest hotel in the city and a man prominently involved in the promotion of Anglo-Belgian 
relations, Polydor de Keyser was London’s first Catholic Mayor since the Reformation.52 
Variously described as a man of ‘liberal and tolerant views’ and an ‘enthusiastic Liberal 
Unionist’, De Keyser’s outlook was reflected in his forceful reply to Mayne’s request, circulated 
in the press on 18 May.53 Not only did he deny any knowledge of widespread public support for 
Beresford, De Keyser went further and challenged the meeting’s claim to represent popular 
opinion. ‘I believe there is a strong feeling among them [the public]’, he wrote, ‘that the 
discreditable panic which has recently been created in the manner of the national defences has 
gone too far already.’ Arguing that the concerns of the meeting should be raised through 
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Parliament  and the ballot box in the ‘constitutional and proper ways’, De Keyser concluded his 
remarkable broadside with a refusal to be party to ‘fomenting an unpatriotic agitation which is 
unworthy of this great nation.’ The Lord Mayor’s letter attacked the very foundations of 
nineteenth century defence agitation, directly questioning its popular, legal and patriotic 
legitimacy. For De Keyser, Beresford and his ilk were little more than anti-democratic 
panicmongers, intent on using extra-constitutional pressure to force the elected government into 
a change of policy. It was within this context of support for representative democracy that he 
charged the agitators with a lack of patriotism; for him, any attempt to whip up a panic was an 
unpatriotic act in of itself, regardless of the motives which lay behind it.  
The response to this letter revealed both how polarised the national defence debate had become 
and how thick-skinned one had to be in order to enter it. The Morning Post led the way the 
following day with an editorial which declared the affair a ‘black mark’ against De Keyser’s 
Mayoralty; the Mayor, argued the paper, had shown a ‘grotesque misapprehension of his 
functions’ and had proved himself ‘entirely out of touch with the vast mass of public opinion.’54 
This view was echoed by a number of prominent letters in The Times, most notably one by 
Admiral Algernon De Horsey, who wrote to articulate the ‘indignation’ which he was sure ‘all 
loyal citizens of London’ must have felt in reaction to De Keyser’s refusal of the Guildhall.55  
‘What movement could be more patriotic’ he asked, ‘than a strictly non-political endeavour’ to 
encourage the public to ‘support’ the government in improving the national defences? De 
Horsey was also quick to point out the Mayor’s foreign nationality in a veiled reference to De 
Keyser’s own questionable loyalties. While some were thus ready to condemn the Mayor for a 
lack of patriotism, the Pall Mall Gazette considered that he had on the contrary been ‘too 
effusively patriotic’, displaying confidence in the government which the paper did not consider 
to be justified– an excellent illustration of how confused concepts of patriotism could become 
within the national defence context.56 Beresford himself quickly moved to seize the moral high 
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ground, lamenting the Mayor’s language, which he portrayed as the misguided statements of a 
man who was ‘only desirous of saying what was right’, while declaring that he himself was 
‘perfectly willing to be tried by court-martial if he had said anything which was not true or 
which was discreditable’.57  
De Keyser’s letter was forthright, confident, and widely reported. For some in the Liberal press, 
it seemed for a time to mark the end of the ‘scare’.58  The Mayor’s letter was loudly cheered at 
the annual general meeting of the Peace Society on 22 May, and the meeting unanimously 
passed a resolution condemning the defence scare as ‘utterly groundless and discreditable’.59 
Addressing the meeting, the Radical MP Halley Stewart sought, as De Keyser had, to wrestle 
the right to speak for the ‘people’ from the navalists, declaring the public ‘quite as competent to 
judge the defences of the nation as was the Duke [of Cambridge]’. If ‘newspaper editors who 
created war panics’ had an obligation to fight, he continued, ‘they would be less disposed to 
invent these scares’. This apparent backlash was crowned six days later by Hamilton’s speech of 
the 28th. However, these individual examples of support should not be regarded as indicative of 
a wider trend. The fact was that, in the mocking words of Lord Carnarvon, De Keyser’s letter 
remained a ‘singular literary curiosity’.60 No prominent Liberal figure came out to support him. 
Distracted by Irish issues and unwilling to wade into the rhetorical quagmire which the debate 
had become, the Opposition, like much of the government, remained silent. Most significantly, 
many clearly felt hat, given its lack of evident support, Beresford’s campaign was dying a death 
on its own: in August, Campbell-Bannerman confidently declared that the attempt to encourage 
a scare had failed.61  
Far from showing the weakness of the navalists, however, August actually secured their final 
victory. That month saw much anticipated naval manoeuvres testing strategies of blockade, with 
the papers full of accounts of ‘the enemy’ bombarding northern English and Scottish coastal 
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towns in accordance, the Admiralty claimed, with French Jeune Ecole tactics.62 In truth, the 
manoeuvres were purposefully designed so as to present a ‘worst-case scenario’, exaggerating 
French strengths and British weaknesses.63 Nevertheless, that the Navy had been powerless to 
stop the carnage was presented in the subsequent Admiralty report as the most powerful 
argument present thus far in favour of expansion. Cementing the victory which the navalists had 
already won within the government, the report demanded a minimum of a 5:3 ratio in British: 
French battleships, and 2:1 in cruisers – despite the fact that the Royal Navy was already in this 
position.64  
Too late, the Liberals realised the political significance of these wargames. In a lengthy l tter to 
the Times Campbell-Bannerman, who had previously protested in the Commons that the 
manoeuvres had interrupted Sunday services in Greenock, not only expressed incredulity that a 
‘civilized power’ would ever stoop so low as to attack defenceless civilians, but outright 
accused the Admiralty of conspiring to rig the manoeuvres in order to ‘frighten the British 
public’ and so boost the ‘political movement’ for more warships, an evaluation which seems 
correct in its essentials.65 Replying in defence of the Navy, retired Admiral George Elliot poured 
scorn upon Campbell-Bannerman’s ‘optimist opinions’ and faith in the ‘sanctity of civilized 
warfare’. As far as he was concerned, the politician’s anger was merely a ‘measure of his dread 
of the British public becoming enlightened’ to the true state of the naval defences.66 Campbell-
Bannerman’s protests, supported in the Commons by Lawson’s description of the manoeuvres 
as ‘absurdities’, marked a nadir in public relations between the Liberal party and the Royal 
Navy. Few incidents so clearly highlighted how out of touch and naive Cobdenite appeals to 
civilisation, and the general Liberal approach to the armed forces, could appear in contrast to the 
‘realist’ perspective of the new imperialism, obscuring the otherwise perceptive criticism of the 
manoeuvres which Campbell-Bannerman’s letter had exhibited.  
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Similarly counterproductive was the attitude of many in the Radical press, led by Reynolds’s 
Newspaper. While ridiculing the navalists’ ‘stupid and discreditable’ motives was nothing out 
of the ordinary, by June the paper had adopted a decidedly antagonistic tone towards the 
gullibility of the British people: 
All this outcry is raised for the benefit of those who have hitherto, and will again, profit 
by the panic they help to create – personal, not patriotic, motives governing their 
conduct. Unfortunately millions are led away by the specious language and arguments 
of knowing knaves, who prey upon the multitude of asses that Providence, for some 
mysterious reasons, has introduced in the scheme of creation.67 
However fine the prose, hurling abuse and insults at the electorate while grossly exaggerating 
the size of Beresford’s popular support was hardly a sensible method by which to rally support 
against him. Yet this attitude was symptomatic of the shallow nature of Radical opposition to 
spending increases, concerned more with pursuing the ideological attack against capital, 
aristocracy and Admiralty ‘corruption’ than with contradicting the pessimists’ ‘facts’. Although 
a minority view within the press, the paper’s fulminations were a foretaste of what was to come 
in the Commons, and a symptom of the wider malaise affecting Radical anti-armament politics. 
In an article for the Contemporary Review, the editor of the Manchester Examiner, Henry 
Dunckley, accurately summarised the scattered and ineffective nature of the Radical response to 
the navalist propaganda surge of May. ‘If the Radical party are to carry with them the 
sympathies of their countrymen,’ he wrote, ‘they are bound to have a policy which admits of 
being defined and vindicated. It will not do to deal in mere negations, nor to fire off shots at 
random, nor to hint at solutions which nineteen men in twenty will reject as absurd.’68 As far as 
Dunckley was concerned, the lack of serious opposition to the claims of the armed forces had 
contributed not to panic, but rather a widespread sense of ignorance, helplessness and 
indignation. As civilians and taxpayers, the majority naturally wished to side with the politicians. 
Yet they had been provided with neither the information nor the leadership to have the courage 
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to disagree with the experts. ‘At present’, he concluded, ‘we are in a muddle…We pay thirty 
millions a year [on the Army and Navy combined], and all we get for it is that knowing men 
shake their heads, and tell us that we are all but utterly defenceless. Our soldiers say one thing, 
our sailors say another, and there is no competent man or body of men to decide between 
them.’69  
The Leeds Times, a Saturday paper with a strong editorial line on working class issues, provided 
an equally perceptive analysis of the navalist victory.70 Although it had spent 1888 mocking the 
invasion idea as ‘as wild an improbability as an invasion of Greenland by the Zulus’ and 
accusing the Tories of stirring up a scare in order to distract from their own ‘sins’, by early 1889 
the success of the agitation had encouraged the paper to look beyond the absurdities of its 
opponents and into the failure of its own cause, producing a thoughtful and introspective leader 
on the subject on 9 February.71 Why, it asked, were there so few habitually vocal opponents of 
increased estimates in Parliament? It could list only five by name.72 If reduced spending really 
was in the public interest then there ought to be ‘scores’: that there were not indicated a ‘great 
apathy on the part of the public.’ What the scare of 1888 had revealed was that the navalists 
were far more sophisticated that their opponents in propaganda and organisation. ‘When those 
persons chiefly interested in raising panics, and in reaping their fruit, are most ostentatiously 
prominent, both in and out Parliament, the Government is not unreasonably warranted in 
drawing the inference that “The Alarmists have it.”’  
Having diagnosed the problem facing opponents of increased expenditure, the L eds Times set 
about understanding how it might be rectified. The alarmists’ strength lay in their ability to 
produce vocal and well-organised support from across the press, armed forces and prominent 
sections of the business and political communities, exploiting the apathy of the electorate to 
dominate public discourse. Working on the principle that ‘Parliament never manifests alacrity to 
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take vigorous action, except under outside pressure’, the paper argued that the counter lay in 
coordinated, collective and popular action: 
This is emphatically a taxpayers' question—a matter for the people of every town and 
district and county to move for themselves. Protests from merely several localities are 
utterly insufficient. Neither can the central representatives of any body, whether the 
Peace Society, or any other, effect much. It is a question which demands widespread 
individual and local action throughout the kingdom, in the form of persevering pressure 
upon members of Parliament separately, and upon the Government.73 
The paper was right to dismiss individual pressure groups such as the Peace Society or the new 
and growing IAL, for neither possessed anything like the presence at either constituency or 
parliamentary level which was required for a mass protest of the type envisioned.74 The only 
successful counterfoil to the naval agitators’ claims on ‘public opinion’ was the mobilisation of 
that self-same opinion against them.  
Unfortunately for its own political allegiance, the analysis of the Le ds Times was all too correct. 
Not only were the lobbying strengths of the navalists and the apathy of the public all too clear, 
but also in its implied criticism of Liberal weaknesses. Indeed, it was becoming obvious that the 
naval weakness myth had succeeded even within the upper reaches of the Opposition. On 10 
January 1889 Edward Walter Hamilton, former private secretary to Gladstone and now head of 
the Treasury’s Finance Division, spent the evening talking with Lord Rosebery and John 
Morley, the latter perhaps the staunchest of Cobden’s later generation of disciples. Hamilton 
recorded in his diary: 
We had a good deal of talk about the Naval question and the probable demands for 
more money to be spent on our Naval Defences. J. Morley was not opposed to a 
considerable outlay, provided that there was some guarantee against a waste of money, 
that a real case for strengthening our Navy was made out by the Government and that 
the expenditure was made out of income. I expect this feeling will be widely shared by 
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the Liberal party; though I doubt if Mr. G[ladstone] will be able to face any really big 
sum.75 
Naval expansion was, of course, not necessarily incompatible with Cobdenism. Furthermore as 
a Member for the shipbuilding centre of Newcastle, Morley may have had other, more prosaic 
reasons for supporting such a policy. Nevertheless, his willingness to give the pessimistic 
outlook a hearing was significant, and, as Hamilton guessed, representative of a substantial 
body of feeling within the party, although not, importantly, of its leader. Already in early 1889 
it was clear that Liberals, lacking the organisation and unity to directly challenge the assertion  
of the naval officers were preparing to avoid the issue altogether. Indicative of this was 
Campbell-Bannerman’s speech to his Stirling constituents on 24 January 1889. Retreating from 
his earlier attacks on the Admiralty, he instead that, as the government was i  possession of ‘the 
very highest and technical advice’, it was to them alone that the question of military and naval 
strength should be left. ‘He awaited their decision before expressing any strong opinion of his 
own.’76 
Conclusion 
Salisbury, Hamilton and Forwood would all later claim, with memories as selective as that of 
Beresford, that they took the initiative during 1888 and were responsible for the decision to 
replace a financial with an Admiralty-led naval policy.77 The first half of this chapter confirms 
the view of naval historians that these statements are misrepresentations. However, building on 
the conclusions of the previous chapter, it also brings a new perspective to bear on the reaction 
to the navalist campaign of January-May 1888. Remaining strong in the face of the agitators up 
to June and July, Hamilton and Forwood’s efforts were undermined by their Prime Minister’s 
sudden change of heart.  
Why Salisbury decided to introduce such a wide-ranging naval expansion when he did remains 
a burning question. As we have seen, in Campbell-Bannerman’s select committee report he had 
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76 Dundee Courier, 24 Jan. 1889, p. 3. 
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an excellent opportunity to make significant reforms to Admiralty administration, reforms 
which would have found support from the Liberals and probably would have allowed him to 
avoid any substantive increase to the size of the fleet. It is possible that the attention he was 
forced to direct onto the matter of Home Defence during mid-1888 led him to rapidly change 
the views on Home Defence, a subject he had hitherto happily avoided. Surrounded by Generals 
and Admirals – as well as his close ally W.H. Smith – demanding a quick resolution to an 
apparent defence ‘crisis’, he may have felt forced to ‘pick a side’ in the ongoing debate between 
the Army and Navy over Home Defence.78 A naturally pessimistic man, Salisbury probably felt 
much affinity with the geopolitical vision articulated by the navalists. The apparent strength of 
support the naval lobby had within the press, the public and especially among his own 
backbenchers certainly helped him along the road to the Naval Defence Act; the lack of any 
organised Liberal resistance further encouraged this policy shift. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in the chapter’s second half, the failure of Liberal and Radical opinion 
to mobilise against Beresford and his supporters was a crucial factor in the genesis of the Naval 
Defence Act. Attempts to dispute the navalist theories, figures and rhetoric had been scattered 
and ineffective, sparking little more than rueful reflection among Liberal commentators who 
were all too aware of the weaknesses of their cause. The result was that Beresford and his 
supporters were able to assail the government without distraction, encouraging the idea tat they 
spoke for the majority. The last chance for the Liberals to redeem themselves and offer a united
front against the proposed naval increases was therefore in its passage through parliament. This, 
as the next chapter shows, this they completely failed to do. 
  
                                                          





The Parliamentary Passage of the Naval Defence Bill 
 
There are surely few people who haven’t heard tell 
About Sindbad the Sailor, and all that befell 
That adventurous wight in earth, water, and air – 
More especially, p’r’aps, his performances rare 
With the horrid Old Man of the Sea. 
And, respecting the Naval Defence of our shore, 
Poor John Bull seems to suffer like Sinbad of yore, 
For he’s squeezed very hard till his money drops out, 
And he’s made to keep painfully trotting about 
By a wily Young Man of the Sea.1 
Now, the Old Man was finally ousted, I think, 
By the sailor’s supplying him freely with drink; 
And if Number Two Sinbad would ‘scape from the weight 
On his back, he’ll – but, no! don’t let’s hint at the fate 
Of the artful Young Man of the Sea. 
 




                                                          
1 ‘Young Man’: Lord George Hamilton. 
2 See figure 25. 
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The Naval Defence Bill marked an important stage in British Conservatism’s embracing of the 
anti-internationalist, imperialist school of international relations. As this chapter demonstrates, 
in its scale, method and justification, the Bill offended almost every tenet of nineteenth century
Liberalism. It was a clear and direct attack on the principles of small government expenditure, 
democratic accountability and the foundations of liberal internationalism itself. Meanwhile, for 
students of late nineteenth century British Liberalism, the parliamentary debates which 
culminated in the passage of the Naval Defence Act provide a fascinating snapshot of the state 
of both the party and the wider ideology at one of its most fractious and trying times. Particular 
attention is paid to the actions of leading Radicals William Randal Cremer and Henry 
Labouchere, the latter of whom was practically leading an open rebellion against the Liberal 
leadership during this period. The debates revealed a profound divide between the ‘Gladstonians’ 
and the Radicals, who between them failed to organise their opposition to what was a 
remarkably weak and vulnerable government policy. While the Gladstonians produced some 
excellent and analytical, if largely uncoordinated, criticisms, the Radicals deployed their entir  
internationalist armoury in a barrage which took the pages of Hansard from the incisive to the 
absurd. This process showed just how far the Radicals, still largely reliant on Cobdenite 
optimism, had to go to match the pessimistic imperialist world-view of their opponents. It also 
demonstrated, above all else, how contentious and painful the subjects of national defence and 
navalism remained within the wider Liberal world view. In the final consideration, this chapter 
shows that the Act’s passage was far from the mere rubber-stamp confirmation of the Two-
Power Standard historians have characterised it. Instead, it was a vehement and protracted 
parliamentary clash between internationalism and imperialism. 
The Votes 
The Naval Defence Bill passed through the Commons in two stages. A resolution proposing that 
£21,500,000 be spent on seventy warships over five years was first tabled by George Hamilton 
on 7 March. Due to government secrecy, this was the first sight that the Commons and the 
country had of the details of the programme, including its provision for handing money directly 
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to the Admiralty separate from the annual estimates. The resolution passed its first reading, after 
a destructive amendment proposed by Cremer, the founder of the IAL, was defeated by 256 
votes to 85 on 1 April. The government’s greatest hurdle was passed on 4 April, when an 
amendment to the proposed financial mechanisms, tabled by Hugh Childers on behalf of the 
Liberal leadership, was defeated by 159 to 125. Hamilton’s resolution was confirmed and the 
Bill itself introduced on 8 April, passing its second reading on 7 May and, following a relatively 
smooth passage through the committee stage on 13 May, finally passed out of the Commons on 
20 May. Strong Unionist whipping made sure the result of the second and third readings were 
never in doubt. The third reading comfortably defeated the die-hard Cremer’s final attempt to 
block it by eighty-two votes. The Bill sailed through the Lords without a division on 27 May, 
passing into law on the 31st. Discussed in Parliament on ten separate occasions totalling almost 
190,000 spoken words, the passage of the Bill was therefore hardly the seamless Unionist 
victory parade hitherto described by historians. Generally speaking, the ‘moderate’ Gladstonian 
opposition largely confined itself to the initial resolution stage, with the exception of the large 
turnout of 7 May. The debates on the bill itself, as shown below, were dominated by the 
Radicals. 
Far from demonstrating ‘almost unanimous’ cross-bench support, a breakdown of the Naval 
Defence Bill votes [Tables 7-12] in fact demonstrates a highly partisan split between Unionists 
on one side and the Liberals and Irish Nationalists on the other. The Liberals began poorly and 
in a state of obvious disagreement on 1 April, when thirty-two percent of the party voted in 
favour of Cremer’s motion and nine percent against. This was replaced on 4 April and 7 May 
with respectable Liberal turnouts against the Bill, although the opposition remained focused on 
the Radical core, who massively outnumbered ‘moderates’ in every division. Tellingly, 
Gladstone himself only voted once, against the Bill on 7 May. The lacklustre Irish vote, turnout 
for which only rose above forty percent on Childers’ amendment, probably reflected an overall 
lack of interest in the issue from a party still digesting its recent vindication in the Pigott case. 
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Parnell himself never voted and no Irishman spoke during the debates, so it is difficult to know 
if the party had any developed attitude towards the bill at all.  
Compared with the Opposition, the Unionists generally performed strongly in the division 
lobbies, with the notable exception of Childers’ amendment on 4 April which, as discussed 
below, tackled the most controversial aspect of the proposals. In a testament to the strength of 
the Unionist alliance, the Liberal Unionist turnout on 7 May constituted seventy-five percent of 
the party’s MPs. As with the Irish Nationalists, the precise attitude of the Liberal Unionist party 
towards the Bill can only be guessed at for not a single Liberal Unionist spoke during the 
Commons debates, although Northbrook, who sat for the party in the Lords, later expressed 
approval of the Bill in its entirety.3 Chamberlain himself had avoided making any public 
reference to naval policy in the months preceding the introduction of the Bill, merely 
commenting in January that he was in favour of ‘some considerable extension’ of ‘our resources 
for defence’.4 Nevertheless it is significant that, considering the illiberal nature of the 
programme, only one Liberal Unionist briefly broke ranks to vote against it. 
The identity of the few MPs who voted against the bulk of their respective parties serves as an 
interesting indication as to wider trends. The largest such ‘rebellion’ occurred on 1 April, when 
eighteen Liberals, among them Campbell-Bannerman, Childers, Morley, Edward Marjoribanks 
the Liberal Chief Whip and a number of prominent Liberal Imperialists such as Henry Fowler, 
Ronald Munro-Ferguson and Edward Grey, voted against Cremer’s amendment and in support 
of the resolution’s first reading. Some of these men were ‘diehard’ Liberal navalists, although 
not all. Campbell-Bannerman and Childers, for example, seem likely to have acted more out of 
a genuine reluctance to attack the proposal on its first reading, especially as they planned to 
amend it at a later stage.  
1 April also saw the only defections from the Liberal Unionist and Irish parties. The former was 
Lewis Fry, a Quaker and a Radical, MP for Bristol North. He went on to vote against the 
                                                          
3 Northbrook, Parl. Deb., 27 May 1889, cols. 1073-1074.  
4 The Times, 24 Jan. 1889, p. 9. 
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resolution’s first reading, and then abstained on all subsequent votes. Meanwhile the Irishman, 
retired Army Colonel John Philip Nolan, MP for Galway North and one of the only Irish MPs 
with a background in the British armed forces, voted only against Cremer’s amendment before 
returning to the fold, voting against the government on 4 April and 20 May.5 By their actions, 
these two men show how far these votes were a partisan affair, and how ideologically distinct 
from the party norm an MP had to be in order to publicly oppose the measure.  
The final rebellion took place on 7 May, during the Bill’s second reading, when four Liberals 
defied the bulk of their party to vote with the government. These men were Frederick Lambert, 
Earl of Cavan, a retired Royal Navy Officer and MP for South Somerset; Charles Milnes-
Gaskell, a magistrate who sat for Morley in West Riding; Sir Charles Mark Palmer, industrialist 
and shipbuilder, the member for Jarrow; and Sir William Plowden, a retired Indian Civil 
Servant and MP for Wolverhampton West. Both Milnes-Gaskell and Plowden had voted against 
the government in previous Naval Defence votes, while Cavan had abstained. Only Palmer, who 
somewhat paradoxically had built warships for the Royal Navy and was also a member of the 





                                                          
5 Nolan had a history of championing military matters. See O’Day, Ir ish Nationalism, p. 165. 
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Tables 7-13: Parliamentary Divisions on the Naval Defence Bill, April – May 1889 
[Appendix 4].6 
   
Table 7: 
Cremer's Amendment, 1 April 
 
Table 8: 
Hamilton's Resolution, First 
Reading, 1 April 
Party Aye No Party Aye No 
Liberal 18 65 Liberal 16 59 
Conservative 197 0 Conservative 194 0 
Liberal Unionist 40 1 Liberal Unionist 40 1 
Parnellite 1 19 Parnellite 0 15 
Total 256 85 Total 250 75 
  
Table 9: 
Childers' Amendment, 4 April  
Table 10: 
Hamilton's Resolution, Second 
Reading, 4 April 
Party Aye No Party Aye No 
Liberal 0 87 Liberal 0 99 
Conservative 133 0 Conservative 184 0 
Liberal Unionist 25 0 Liberal Unionist 31 0 
Parnellite 0 38 Parnellite 0 29 
Total 158 125 Total 215 128 
   
Table 11: 
Naval Defence Bill, Second 
Reading, 7 May 
Table 12: 
Naval Defence Bill, Third Reading,  
20 May 
Party Aye No Party Aye No 
Liberal 4 117 Liberal 0 71 
Conservative 222 0 Conservative 148 0 
Liberal Unionist 51 0 Parnellite 35 0 
Parnellite 0 19 Nationalist 0 30 
Total 277 136  Total 183 101 
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Table 13:  
Majorities and Turnout 
Vote Majority Turnout 
First 171 50.9% 
Second 175 48.5% 
Third 33 42.2% 
Fourth 87 51.2% 
Fifth 141 61.6% 
Sixth 82 42.4% 
 
The Government Justification for the Naval Defence Bill 
In introducing his resolution, Hamilton acknowledged the ‘very great assistance which we have 
received from our naval advisors’, and his speech, which stressed defence of expanding trade 
and the importance of battleships over other vessels, was clearly drawn up based on the 
assumption of weakness presented by the Admiralty and the naval agitators. Yet, despite 
indulging the House with a speech of over 10,000 words, he did not once produce any 
comparative data, refer to foreign shipbuilding figures or point to any alarming differences in 
Anglo-French naval spending. He made only a brief reference to the ‘unceasing’ expenditure of 
European powers, hardly a novel revelation.7 I  fact, Hamilton’s defence of the programme 
rested solely and dubiously on the ‘apprehension of what might occur’: in short, upon the 
‘realist’, pessimistic and suspicious approach to foreign politics despised by so many Liberals. 
Although declaring ‘that our relations are friendly and cordial with all nations’, Hamilton 
nevertheless observed: 
it requires no very deep student of history to know that there are certain sections of 
opinion and of influence in foreign countries which are unfriendly to this country, 
owing to jealousy of our  prosperity and envy of our great colonial expansion, with our 
immunity from conscription and all its attendant evils and the like; and if any one of 
these influences, these cycles of opinion, happen temporarily to become predominant, 
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we cannot ignore the fact that increased naval armaments may be available for our 
annoyance and injury.8 
This was undoubtedly a cautious and heavily qualified statement, but the tone should not 
distract from the fact that the largest expenditure in the history of nineteenth century Bri ish 
defence policy was justified not by any specific threat, but with an appeal to foreign ‘jealousy’. 
This statement is particularly interesting in light of Mullins’ conclusions as to the lack of a 
genuine Franco-Russian threat at this time. Hamilton knew that any attempt to point directly at a 
dangerous international situation would place his programme on shaky foundations. The Pall 
Mall Gazette, which was otherwise cautiously supportive of the proposed expansion, 
nevertheless gave voice to this problem in an editorial a few days later.  ‘It is a great misfortune 
for the Government’, it observed, ‘that no one can pretend at the present moment that there is 
any urgent fear of attack from any of our neighbours’.9 
Undeterred, the theme of future uncertainties was subsequently developed in different directions 
by two other member of the government, the arch-imperialist Civil Lord of the Admiralty Ellis 
Ashmead-Bartlett, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and former Liberal First Lord of the 
Admiralty, George Goschen. For his part Ashmead-Barlett revelled in the confrontational nature 
of the Bill and directly attacked the Radicals on the benches opposite. Declaring that Europe 
was living in ‘the days of sudden and fatal blows’, he argued that the proposed spending was 
required to ‘guarantee our Imperial power’.10 On the other hand, Goschen attempted to appeal to 
Liberal sensibilities by emphasising how the Bill would strengthen the Royal Navy’s traditional 
role of deterrence at home and maintaining peace and liberty abroad. ‘Nothing can produce a 
more powerful influence in favour of peace than the knowledge that Great Britain is strong’, he 
argued. ‘I agree that if it could be done it would be a work worthy of any Government to bring 
nations into conference and induce them to disarm, but I am afraid that in these days it would be 
a Utopian attempt.’11 The implication was clear: internationalism, whether moral or institutional, 
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was unrealistic. In the new Europe defined by struggle and competition, the sharpened trident of 
the Pax Britannica was the only proven guarantor of a liberal peace. Yet despite these arguments 
the government remained on thin ice. The case for the Naval Defence Bill was built on little 
more than an unfocused rejection of liberal internationalism, and stood vulnerable to any serious 
attempt to interrogate the true state of the Navy, or even the state of international affairs: 
Goschen himself pleaded with the House to trust the government and ‘not press us too much on 
the diplomatic side of the question.’12 It was, therefore, from the very start, a highly ideological 
programme, and a direct challenge to Gladstonian Liberalism.  
Conservative Critics 
The Parliamentary reception of the government’s proposed programme of naval increases was, 
contrary to Marder’s description, anything but ‘unanimous’. Indeed, a study of Hansard reveals 
hardly a single MP other than government Ministers willing to praise the scheme in its entirety, 
and this included Conservatives. The first to speak following Hamilton’s introduction of the 
resolution was Randolph Churchill, at this stage still a weighty and authoritative figure in the 
Commons, especially on matters of finance.13 He closely interrogated the proposals, which he 
feared would ‘startle the public mind’ and ‘alarm’ foreign powers, and questioned whether a 
Bill committing future parliaments to the spending was not ‘practically beyond our power’.14 
Already more Radical that Conservative on defence spending, this speech earned the approval 
of Radical anti-armament opinion [Figure 24].15 Churchill remained interested and involved 
over the three months of debates, asking regular questions, but he voted with the government 
only on 1 April, abstaining even on 7 May when he was present in the House. Although 
Churchill accepted the need for some form of naval expansion he obviously regarded 
                                                          
12 Goschen, Parl. Deb., 25 Mar. 1889, col. 791. See Mullins’ commentary in Transformation, p. 48. 
13 Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 350. 
14 Churchill, Parl. Deb., 7 Mar. 1889, cols. 1192-1195. 
15 Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, p. 359. 
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Hamilton’s programme with suspicion and remained extremely critical of the ‘condemned and 
unreformed Admiralty to which the money was to be entrusted.16 
Another regular attendee was Charles Beresford, who voted with the government four times and  
claimed in his Memoirs that Hamilton’s scheme was identical to that which he had presented to 
the House in December 1888.17 If he thought this in 1889, however, he concealed it well. On 7 
March he accused the government of presenting a ‘phantom addition’ to the fleet, which lacked 
proper strategic vision and had more than a whiff of panic about it. ‘I would honestly prefer to 
wait another year and do the thing in a proper, business-like manner,’ he concluded, ‘and let the 
people understand how the defences stand, than to proceed in a haphazard way, without any 
definite reason being given to the public why these proposals are made.’ 18 Fundamentally he 
did not think that the Admiralty’s proposals adequately reflected the terrible state into which he 
believed the Royal Navy had fallen – although, as we have seen, his own views on that score 
were neither clear nor consistent.  
It was this pessimistic broadside which moved the second Conservative criticism, this time from 
the Member for Oldham James Maclean, a strongly independent man who had sat on Campbell-
Bannerman’s Select Committee and voted against the navalists in that capacity.19 Maclean was 
determined to reassert ‘the confidence which belongs to a truly Imperial people’, alone if 
necessary, against what he saw as little more than a panic whipped up by a ‘Syndicate of 
Admirals’ who were undermining British maritime and imperial pride, not to mention the 
principle of government by civilians.20 In words which would have matched the party line only 
a few months previously, but now virtually constituted an attack on the government, he declared 
that the Empire was ‘never more strongly, or better defended, than at the present moment’. 21 
For this sentiment he received the unlikely praise of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, who described it as a 
                                                          
16 Churchill, letter to The Times, 9 Mar. 1889, p. 10. See also the exchange between Hamilton, Churchill 
and Illingworth, Parl. Deb., 7 May 1889, cols. 1403-1404. 
17 Beresford, Memoirs, vol. II, p. 361. 
18 Beresford, Parl. Deb., 7 Mar. 1889, cols. 1202-1203. 
19 Mullins, Transformation, p. 134. For Maclean’s character see Gerard Charmley, ‘‘The Costly Luxury 
of Protesting’: The Deselection of J.M. Maclean, MP’, Parliamentary History, 31 (2012), pp. 378–395. 
20 Mullins quotes extensively from Maclean’s speech in Transformation, pp. 161-166. 
21 Maclean, Parl. Deb., 1 Apr. 1889, cols. 1310-1317. 
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‘rattling Radical speech’. 22 Throughout the debates, there were few moments more indicative of 
the extent to which optimistic confidence in Britain’s national defences had come to be regarded, 
by the Conservatives at least, as a misguided, minority and ideologically suspect position, than 
this. Indeed, as the voting patterns show, Conservative MPs were solidly behind the 
government’s programme, even if relatively few of them spoke in the debates. Setting aside the 
views of Mavericks like Churchill and Maclean, the great bulk of the party, led by the 
substantial group of naval pessimists who had been involved in the agitation of 1888, had 
swallowed the myth of naval weakness whole. 
  
                                                          




Figure 24: ‘Another Put-Up Job. 
‘P.C. Randolph: “It’s all up, you fellows! I see your little game and I’ll expose it – if you don’t 
‘square’ me!”’ 
 Randolph Churchill, dressed as a police officer, confronts Lord Salisbury and the ‘Admiralty’ 
(possibly Arthur Hood), as they attempt to fool John Bull into giving the Navy £21,000,000. 




One important factor which eased the path for the government during the debates was the 
relatively subdued response from the press. That this was the case was due to a multitude of 
reasons, all of which worked in the government’s favour. Most obviously there was the crowded 
news environment. The Special Commission on the Times Parnell forgeries continued to claim 
the lion’s share of political reportage: Richard Pigott’s suicide had occurred only a week before 
Hamilton introduced his programme to the Commons. Indeed, one northern Liberal paper 
accused the government of using the naval programme to distract from the collapse of the case 
against Parnell.23 
More directly, by early 1889 most of the Conservative and Unionist press had committed itself 
to supporting any programme Salisbury would announce. The myriad differing estimates of 
British naval strength which had been printed over the preceding year only further served to 
reinforce this support for the government. ‘Until the moment when Lord George Hamilton 
placed the House in possession the actual figures many guesses had been made as the probable 
amount of the credit that would be asked’, reflected the Sheffield Daily Telegraph. ‘The guesses 
had varied from ten millions to one hundred millions sterling. The Ministerial proposal hits the 
happy mean.’24 The St James’ Gazette hailed it as ‘an honest endeavour to show that democracy 
is not altogether inconsistent with warlike effectiveness’, and there was much admiration 
expressed for Hamilton’s ‘copious, lucid and cogent’ speech.25 His justification for the 
programme was ‘moderate and dignified’, concluded the Morning Post, ‘and his elucidation of 
the details of the proposed scheme of ship-building was clear and exhaustive.’26 Certainly there 
was regret from some Tory quarters – most notably the Daily Telegraph – that the programme 
did not go further and use the opportunity to establish British naval power ‘beyond dispute or 
cavail’, but this was relatively subdued.27 Such support for the government was further 
                                                          
23 Shields Daily Gazette, 11 Mar. 1889, p. 3. 
24 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4; see also Birmingham Daily Post, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4. 
25 St. James's Gazette, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 3; The Times, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 9. 
26 Morning Post, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4. 
27 Daily Telegraph, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4. 
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entrenched by the criticism which Hamilton immediately received from both navalists and 
Radicals in and out of the press. For the likes of the The Scotsman and the Saturday Review, 
both of which had previously attacked Beresford’s alarmism in strident tones, the ‘mutually 
destructive’ criticisms Hamilton encountered proved that he had set a sensible course.28  
Unsurprisingly, many in the Liberal press viewed Hamilton’s proposals with a sceptical and 
hostile eye. It was quickly observed that Hamilton had ‘studiously avoided’ and explanation or 
justification for his programme, and there was some concern that it would lead immediately to a 
new European arms race.29 Even Liberal papers that accepted the need for some form of fleet 
expansion, were extremelly concerned that the money was to be handed over to an unreformed 
Admiralty which they regarded as a swamp of corruption and inefficiency.30 The overall Liberal 
view was summarised by the Shields Daily Gazette: 
The new policy, to put the case briefly, is brought forward at the wrong time, is intended to 
further party objects, is not justified by anything which the Government is able to say in its 
behalf, is coupled with limitation the power of the House of Commons and an extension of 
the power of the House of Lords, and is to be administered by an Admiralty which the 
nation believes to be extravagant and incapable.31 
Yet, considering the size and scale of the Naval Defence Bill, the Liberal response was 
surprisingly subdued. Such had been the demands of the alarmists that some papers appeared 
almost relieved that the programme was not larger.32 Even Reynolds’s Newspaper initially 
responded to the announcement with only the most limited and stereotyped protests, while, 
surprisingly, Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper even expressed support for the scheme, perhaps out of 
embarrassment towards the Radical position in parliament.33 The Liberal uncertainty on how to 
respond to the proposals was obvious and, for their opponents, quite amusing.34 There were two 
principal reasons for this reaction. In the first place, such had been the secrecy surrounding the 
                                                          
28 The Scotsman, 9 Mar. 1889, p. 8; Saturday Review, 9 Mar. 1889, p. 273. 
29 Derby Daily Telegraph, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 2; Daily News, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4;  Liverpool Echo, 8 Mar. 
1889, p. 3. 
30 Manchester Guardian, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 5. 
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32 See for example Daily News, 8 Mar. 1889, p. 4. 
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34 The Observer, 10 Mar. 1889, p. 4. 
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proposals that it took a while for many in both press and parliament to recognise their full 
import, and it took a long time for many to realise the Hamilton had no intention of ever fully 
justifying them. More importantly, however, was the marked lack of leadership emanating from 
Gladstone and his front bench.35 Many Liberal papers were clearly waiting for mobilisation 
orders which never came. The Daily News, for example, did not begin to seriously critique the 
government’s position until the debates were substantially over. It was in this way, then, that the 
Naval Defence Bill became accepted by the British press. Journalists did not support the 
government on the back of any overwhelmingly convincing arguments, but through revulsion 
against the navalist and Radical extremes, and a lack of leadership from the Gladstonian front 
bench.  
The Liberal Party in 1889 
Quite aside from the sheer scale of spending it authorised, the Naval Defence Bill was 
unprecedented in two ways. Firstly it represented an official endorsement of the ‘two-power’ 
naval standard in modern warships, placing the emphasis firmly on hardware rather than monies 
spent, as had hitherto been the case.36 Secondly, once the Bill was made law, £10,000,000 of it 
was to be issued directly from the Consolidated Fund without being subjected to the ‘ordinary 
routines of Treasury and parliamentary control of expenditure’ as were the annual estimates.37 
Although this method of funding did not result in any immediate increases in taxation or 
borrowing it nevertheless represented a significant loss of democratic accountability to the 
Admiralty, a body deeply distrusted by Liberals.38 Indeed, the reason such a mechanism was 
adopted was to make sure that any future Radical-ominated administration would be ‘locked’ 
into the programme.39 This marked a ‘decisive and irreversible shift’ from a defence policy 
based on financial expedience to one defined by ‘defence needs’ as perceived by the Admiralty, 
a change which seemed to give free reign to the pessimistic and, in the eyes of Cobdenites, 
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paranoid outlook of senior officers.40 In addition to the Bill itself, the government’s defence of it 
could easily be perceived as a slight towards the traditional Liberal naval policy emphasising 
defence and deterrence.41 There was therefore plenty for the Liberal party to sink its teeth into 
immediately as Hamilton had sat down on 7 March.  
Yet despite the many aspects of the Bill that should have unified the Liberals, it was introduced 
to Parliament at an unfortunate time for the parliamentary party. Already heavily outnumbered 
by the Unionists, by March 1889 the party was adrift, its leadership lacking co-ordination or 
even satisfactory communication.42 Gladstone was exhausted and his mind concerned with little 
else other than the ‘Irish obstruction’, while family illness and bereavement in May placed him 
in no position to pursue a vigorous opposition.43 The Grand Old Man’s health reflected the 
position of his leadership team as a whole, whose inaction on recent Unionist policies had led to 
a collapse in relations with many of the party’s backbenchers.44 In January 1889 Gladstone 
wrote to Henry Labouchere, the most prominent of the ‘extreme’ Radicals, who appears to have 
suggested that Gladstone table a motion against the annual Naval Estimates.45 Citing Unionist 
numerical strength, Gladstone merely replied that he was unconvinced ‘the time has come for an 
active policy on our part’, while he was concerned that a motion on the Navy vote would be 
seen as a vote of confidence in the government on which the Opposition would be pointlessly 
defeated.  All the Liberal Leader could offer by way of a strategy was a waiting for the ‘right 
time’ to introduce a new Home Rule Bill, hardly the sort of approach which appealed to Radical 
firebrands such as Labouchere. This letter is vital for understanding the Naval Defence debates,
for the disorganisation and disunity which characterised the Liberal response to the Naval 
Defence Bill can be seen as a direct result of this clash in attitudes, and, ultimately, Gladstone’s 
own failings as leader during this time.  
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Gladstone’s attitude would have been problematic at the best of times, but in the context of the 
party’s fractious state in 1889 it had the potential to seriously undermine his leadership. This 
was due to the strong and confident position of the Radical interest in the Commons in early 
1889, which by any measure constituted the majority of Liberal MPs.46 Indeed, it might be more 
apt to speak of two separate Liberal parliamentary parties during this period, the ‘moderate’ and 
the Radical. In May, Labouchere, no doubt inspired in part by Gladstone’s January letter, 
launched a semi-official ‘Fourth party’, replete with whips and mustering approximately 
seventy of the more ‘malcontent’ Radical MPs.47 The express aim of this movement, which was 
nicknamed the ‘Jacobyns’ after one of its whips, was to force a dissolution through 
obstructionist ‘guerrilla warfare’, bringing divisions wherever possible.48 The result, in the 
absence of Gladstone’s unifying influence, was a general failure of coordinated action.  
It was in this context that the Liberal party attempted to formulate a response to the Naval 
Defence Bill. On 29 March, former Liberal Cabinet Minister Lord Kimberly recorded in his 
diary: 
Last week a meeting at Granville’s to discuss course to be taken on Naval Estimates. 
Gladstone not there.49 Agreed to press for reasons of Govt. for increased expenditures 
&c. &c. but not as a party to oppose, except as to proceeding by bill instead of the 
ordinary manner. The Radicals will vote against all increase, but many of our party 
would not go so far, and rightly. [Sir William] Harcourt harangued us in his finest vein 
of peace at any price rhodomontade (sic), after which J. Morley quietly asked, is not the 
question whether one naval force is sufficient or not?50 
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This account is consistent with both Hamilton’s diary for January quoted in the previous chapter, 
and the course of the debates themselves. Not only were many reluctant to take any serious 
action for or against the Bill, but it is also clear that a substantial number of Liberals, including 
Morley and Kimberly, were inclined to agree with the necessity of the programme – and, 
perhaps just as importantly, vehemently objected to Labouchere’s tactics.51 The only point on 
which the party agreed was on its opposition to separating the spending from the annual 
estimates. These divisions in the party affected the entire hierarchy, contrary to historians’ 
claims. Gladstone himself admitted in April that his frontbench had not come to a ‘collective 
resolution’ on the issue, and the meeting at Granville’s appears to have been the only time the 
Liberal leadership met as a group to discuss it.52 
The Position of the Liberal Leadership  
The central importance of the Naval Defence Act to British historiography revolves around its 
defining legacy, the ‘formalisation’ of the two-power standard, with the result that the Bill itself 
has been characterised by historians s a simple vote on this measure. As such, when they have 
paid any attention at all to the debates, historians have been searching for confirmation that the 
Liberal party supported the standard, and this, to their own satisfaction, they have found. Both 
Marder and Semmel, for example, alight on the speech of Campbell-Bannerman, who did 
indeed accept the standard, and both have cited this as reflective of wider Liberal policy.53 Th s 
it emphatically was not; as has been explained, the Liberal party did not have an establishd 
policy towards the Naval Defence Bill. In fact, of the five ex-Cabinet Liberals to speak – 
Campbell-Bannerman, Childers, Gladstone, George John Shaw Lefevre and Sir William 
Harcourt respectively – only Campbell -Bannerman explicitly accepted the standard, and he 
admitted that he was only speaking for himself.54 On the other hand, the Radical Shaw Lefevre, 
a man more in tune with Gladstone on naval issues than any of his colleagues, appeared to go 
some way towards dismissing the standard entirely instead arguing that the Royal Navy should 
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maintain what he considered to be the widely accepted principle of a three-to-two superiority 
over France.55 Meanwhile neither Childers, Gladstone nor Harcourt made any mention of the 
standard, or any other relative measurement of naval strength, in their respective speeches.  
Indeed, even a cursory reading of the Naval Defence debates shows that the two-power standard 
was not regarded by front- or backbench Liberals as an important aspect of the Bill, while the 
leadership, although hardly united in its criticisms, was overtly hostile towards the proposed 
programme. In particular, the speeches of Shaw Lefevre, Harcourt and Campbell-Bannerman 
contained all the necessary ingredients for a concerted and comprehensive repudiation of the 
naval pessimism of Beresford and Hamilton. Between them, these three men held a wealth of 
experience in dealing with comparative naval spending, statistics and analysis. Campbell-
Bannerman and Shaw Lefevre had both served in the Admiralty under Childers and Northbrook 
during the early 1880s, while Harcourt was a keen student of naval history and strategy whose 
antagonistic attitude to armed forces spending had earnt him not a little hostility from military 
and naval circles in the past.56 Stung into action on 17 May, Harcourt outright refused to accept 
the country’s naval defences were wanting, using the Admiralty’s own figures to show that the 
government had been driven from the confident position i had held only a year earlier by ‘an 
entirely artificial scare’, led by the ‘sweet little cherub that sits up aloft’, a reference to 
Beresford’s position on the backbenches.57 
Harcourt’s contribution contained much force, but the real work of methodically destroying the 
government’s case was left to the able duo of Campbell-Bannerman and Shaw Lefevre. Both 
provided comparative analyses of British and French shipbuilding figures, showing that Britain 
far outstripped France in spending by at least a third, if not half.58 They also demonstrated that, 
by Hamilton’s own admission, Britain was on course to exceed the two-power standard by 1890 
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without the proposed programme – Campbell-Bannerman correctly observed that the standard 
was, in fact, already an established reality.59 In a detailed discussion of the French Navy, he 
pointed out that French politicans were equally convinced of the weakness of their own fleet, 
and that so many of France’s wooden vessels were ‘fast passing into that picturesque category 
which the French style, “Sans valeur sérieux.”[without serious value]’ 60 ‘On the mere 
comparison with other nations taken by itself’, he declared, ‘I can find no justification for any 
large extension of our naval strength.’61  ‘I challenge the Secretary to the Navy to get up and say 
that he believes this expenditure is really necessary’, said Shaw Lefevre, after quoting 
Forwood’s July Liverpool speech. ‘I am perfectly certain he cannot and will not do so.’62 
Arguing that the construction of seventy warships at once would only provoke foreign navies to 
respond in kind, quickly making the British ships obsolete, the two men concluded with strong 
defences of the gradual, ‘prudent’ policy of naval expansion.63 
The analyses of Shaw Lefevre and Campbell-Bannerman were the most complete, but they were 
only two of many Liberal MPs who showed that the government’s proposals did not stand up to 
even a cursory analysis. Labouchere, for instance, also observed that the Royal Navy currently 
met the two-power standard, while Francis Evans and Sir George Otto Trevelyan attacked the 
‘suicidal policy’ of building seventy ships concurrently, when, as Trevelyan pointed out, the 
Admiralty’s own estimates showed the life expectancy of a cruiser to be not much more than a 
decade.64 Practically every Liberal to speak made a point of contrasting Hamilton’s many 
confident statements of 1887-1888 with both his own newfound pessimism, and the hyperbolic 
proposals of Admiral Hornby and the navalists. In short, the Liberal party showed itself to be 
replete with men fully capable of revealing the unstable foundations of the government’s 
proposed programme, displaying a competency with comparative naval spending and figures 
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which Hamilton’s defence of the scheme was conspicuously lacking. As Campbell-Bannerman 
observed, the government provided ‘no data whatever’ to justify its proposals: nor, indeed, did 
Hamilton or his Secretaries ever dispute the facts and figures cited by the Opposition.65 
Unfortunately for the Liberals, however, their attacks on the Bill were compromised by the 
disorganised and disunited manner of the party at this time. Each Liberal speech constituted a 
separate criticism of the government, resulting in a piecemeal approach which revealed the lack 
of official Liberal policy towards the Bill. Despite his confident deployment of facts and figures, 
for example, Campbell-Bannerman’s speech contained so many technical qualifications and 
attempts to distinguish his own personal views from that of his party that Forwood felt moved to 
observe that ‘in the end, the Right Honourable Gentleman appeared to be somewhat in doubt as 
to which side of the fence he should come down on’.66 As discussed below, these efforts were 
further obstructed by the veritable typhoon of ideological rhetoric produced by the Radicals.  
At the root of the Liberal party’s problems was a lack of leadership from Gladstone himself. On 
4 April – the only time he spoke at any length on the proposals and a month after Hamilton had 
first introduced his resolution – the Liberal leader attempted to explain his own position:  
For my own part, I must own that I am not aware of a sufficient justification for this 
large expenditure. At the same time, I am aware that Her Majesty's Government have 
means of information and judgment on this subject such as I do not possess, and I do 
not think proper to take upon myself the responsibility of refusing on a question of 
confidence, as this necessarily is, a demand made by the responsible advisers of the 
Crown. I speak only for myself; it is the view I take.67 
An echo of his January letter to Labouchere, this statement was essentially an abdication of 
responsibility on Gladstone’s part, an impression he solidified by his failure to vote in either of 
the day’s divisions. For a man whose career and reputation was founded on the low-spending 
and anti-militaristic policies of Peel and Cobden, Gladstone’s position on the Naval Defence 
Bill was more than merely ‘curious’, as Shannon described it: it almost defies explanation. 
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Indeed, by admitting the possibility that the government might possess information to justify its 
programme, Gladstone had come dangerously close to admitting that Salisbury’s pessimistic 
view of international relations contained some merit. As Gladstone’s frontbench colleagues had 
made clear, there was no real justification for the government’s programme. His timidity 
explains the subsequent assumption that the Liberals acquiesced in and supported the passage of 
the Naval Defence Act. More importantly, by refusing to oppose the Naval Defence Bill 
Gladstone allowed the initiative in naval policymaking to pass to the Conservatives, who were 
now completely wedded to the myth of naval weakness. This shift had profound repercussions, 
both for British naval policy over the following two decades and for Gladstone’s own career. As 
the conclusion of this thesis will argue, through his failure of leadership during March-May 
1889 Gladstone laid the foundations for his own exit from politics in March 1894. 
Financial Objections 
Despite these failings, the Opposition did come close to seriously damaging the Bill on one 
occasion. On 4 April Hugh Childers, who avoided any references to naval strength or policy in 
his speech, introduced an amendment calling for the expenditure to be made ‘in accordance with 
the constitutional practice hitherto observed’.68In this attempt to force the government to adhere 
to the annual Navy vote he was supported strongly by Gladstone, who argued that the Bill 
planted ‘seeds of future evil’. There was ‘scarcely any conceivable abuse in the finance of a 
country which may not be covered and justified’ by the precedent set by the proposals, argued 
the Liberal leader.69 The spectre of handing over ten million pounds to the Admiralty with 
minimal oversight proved too much for even the staunchest Liberal navalists. Former Director 
of Naval Construction Sir Edward Reed, for example, felt forced to abstain because he deeply 
disapproved of the ‘unconstitutional’ method of funding, despite having been involved in 
Beresford’s 1888 campaign.70 As Henry Fowler later observed, ‘the Admiralty is hardly the 
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department to be trusted with the largest amount of uncontrolled expenditure’.71 The Radical 
Handel Cossham was more forthright: ‘those who administer the Admiralty’, he declared, ‘are 
the most incompetent and the most wasteful portion of the community.’72 Liberal repugnance 
for the financial precedent set by the Bill was widespread and genuine, and there was little 
obvious basis for Tory MP General Edward Hamley’s accusation that the Liberals were posing 
as ‘defenders of the Constitution’ in order to conceal their opposition to the two-power 
standard.73  
In terms of Commons arithmetic Childers’ amendment was the most interesting of the divisions, 
defeated by only thirty-three votes. At only forty-two percent the Unionist turnout was lo , 
especially when compared to the fifty-seven percent of Unionist MPs who voted in favour of the 
second reading of Hamilton’s resolution later that same day. This level of abstention was 
indicative of the unpopularity with which the Bill’s financial innovations were regarded on both 
sides of the House – and by many outside of it [Figure 25]. The voting pattern of the Radical 
Liberal Unionists was particularly telling. Of the twenty in Parliament, fourteen including 
Chamberlain voted repeatedly with the government in every division except Childers’ 
amendment. In the latter case only one, Sir Julian Goldsmid, supported the Tories: the rest 
abstained.  Yet, once again, the Liberals’ attempts were rendered futile by their own lack of 
unity, organisation and leadership. Only forty-three percent of Liberal party MPs followed 
Childers through the division lobby, squandering a relatively strong showing by the Irish 
Nationalists. Notable abstentions included Labouchere, Shaw Lefevre and Gladstone himself, 
despite his speech in its favour. Equally as curiously, Cremer and James Jacoby – the latter the 
member after whom the ‘Jacobyns’ had been named – were also absent, although both voted in 
the second division of 4 April. Had they been better organised the Liberals might have dealt the 
government a serious blow on this occasion. Instead, the opportunity slipped through their 
fingers, never to return.  
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Figure 25: ‘Lord George squeezing a few millions out of John Bull.’ 
Hamilton’s flag reads: ‘England in Danger/ National Defence’. A perturbed John Bull is shown 




Gladstone’s failure of leadership was noted with disgust by the Radicals. As early as 7 March, 
prominent Liberal backbenchers had threatened independent action against the Bill if their 
leadership was not prepared to do so.74 On 25 March, immediately following the introduction of 
Hamilton’s resolution, Cremer proposed an amendment which declared the expenditure 
unnecessary on the basis that ‘Her Majesty’s relations with Foreign Powers…were of the most 
peaceful character’. However, Cremer began his speech with an attack, not on the government, 
but on the leaders of his own party:  
Some of us had a right to expect that this very important proposal of Her Majesty's 
Government would have been met by sturdy opposition from above the Gangway on 
this side of the House. I cannot help expressing my deep regret that the Leaders of the 
Opposition have, as I conceive, neglected their duty towards the people of this 
country.75 
Despairing of their own party, the Radicals determined to meet the Tories head on, matching 
ideology with ideology and hyperbole with hyperbole, turning the debates into a clash between 
the internationalist and imperialist world views. In this they succeeded spectacularly, but in so 
doing they obstructed the more level-headed and analytical attacks of Shaw Lefevre, Campbell-
Bannerman and others. Other than the occasional attempt by Labouchere and Caleb Wright, 
Radical backbenchers made no serious attempt to engage with spending figures or comparative 
naval analysis. Lawson, for example, despite giving five full speeches during the debates, made 
no real attempt to exploit any of the many routes which the data opened out to him. Instead, the 
Naval Defence debates provide a case-study in optimistic internationalism, from the mouths of 
its most fervent advocates. 
Radical objections were built on the twin foundations of belief in the essential goodness of 
human nature, and the strength of international law.  Put simply, the Radicals believed that, at 
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that moment, Britain existed in ‘absolute security’.76 As Cremer pointed out, Lord Salisbury had 
repeatedly claimed that Britain was as peace with all its neighbours. If this was indeed the case, 
he not unnaturally wanted to know ‘where the foe is to be found who is desirous of invading our 
shores?’77 As far as he and his parliamentary allies were concerned, the government’s 
justifications amounted to little more than ‘innuendos’ and arrogance directed against Britain’s 
neighbours.78 James Picton, one of the most able Radical rhetoricians, summarised their outlook 
with his usual passion: 
Are we living in a world of pirates? Are foreign countries nothing but dens of robbers? 
(Ministerial laughter.) Hon. Gentlemen who laugh at our simplicity in this respect 
imagine that they are living in the middle ages, when every man’s hand was against his 
fellows. They forget altogether the advance of the world… Yes, that is the spirit in 
which foreign nations are dealt with. We are not to have peace, not quietness, nor 
friendliness, nor neighbourliness, but supremacy.79 
In these criticisms, the Radicals were largely correct: the government had not identified a 
specific threat, and had repeatedly cast aspersions on Britain’s neighbours. However, in their 
eagerness to turn the debates into a struggle for the zeitgeist, they were rejecting the more 
measured and analytical tone of the ‘Gladstonian’ leadership, and instead reducing themselves 
to the level of the government’s argument, enabling the Conservatives to paint the entire 
Opposition as unpatriotic, unrealistic and utopian. This was a struggle in which the radical right 
was more than willing to play its part. Rising to these objections, the Conservative MP and 
former Royal Navy Captain George Price provided a worthy match to Picton’s optimism: the 
threat, he said, emanated from no single foreign nation but rather ‘the warlike spirit of the 
age…Europe armed to the teeth’. The Bill, he continued, was not ‘a temptation to aggression’ 
[by Britain] as many of its opponents argued, but instead represented a policy of ‘defence, not 
of defiance’, the motto of the Rifle Volunteers.80  
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This latter comment was produced to contradict the second major Radical objection: that the
Bill, was a fundamentally aggressive proposal. Radicals did not object to the characterisation of 
Europe as an ‘armed camp’. What they disputed was that this camp was necessarily a threat to 
Britain. Following in the teachings of Cobden, their watchword was non-i tervention. ‘There is 
only one course open to us,’ observed Alfred Illingworth, ‘and that is to keep ourselves entirely 
aloof from the fray’.81 Britain’s Navy was strong enough: therefore, any dramatic increases 
could only be an attempt to increase the Empire’s offensive capabilities. As Picton had it, ‘those 
who are going to vote for an increased expenditure on the fleet are going to vote for a 
meddlesome foreign policy.’82 This point was driven home most forcefully by Labouchere, who 
characterised Britain’s past history as one of ‘meddling’, ‘annexation’, ‘folly’ and ‘wickedness’ 
and directly accused the Prime Minister of attempting to organise a ‘crusade’ against Russia.83 
Lawson agreed, going so far as to argue, in a remarkable passage which showed how easily non-
interventionism could veer into outright pacifism, that a stronger Navy would discharge the 
Army from home defence and allow it ‘to go about committing raids, annexations and robberies 
in every quarter of the globe.’84 Even if the Opposition did not unanimously believe that the 
explicit aim of the Bill was aggressive, there was widespread Radical agreement that it would be 
a destabilising force, the start of a new European arms race. Salisbury was accused of initiating 
a ‘policy of unlimited brag’, ‘a game of poker with all Europe, ships of war being the stakes’.85 
‘When is this mad race in expenditure to cease?’ asked the Quaker businessman and President 
of the Peace Society Sir Joseph Pease. Pease was quick to apply Cobdenite economic theory to 
the situation: the more money spent on armaments, the less there was for the ‘industries of 
peace’.86 These were not statements calculated to remove the derogatory label of ‘peace party’ 
from the Radical interest.  
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The Radicals completely denied that the Navy secured peace. Only a reduction in armament 
spending could do that. Instead, it was the language of arbitration, to which they turned in 
search of an alternative to naval power. Cremer led the way, arguing that an international 
conference on armament reduction would bring ‘everlasting glory’ to a government which 
initiated it. His was an outlook made of the very stuff of Cobdenite optimism. Parliament, he 
opined, was behind the times: it had failed to recognise that the ‘old order of things’ had passed 
away, that democracy now ruled, and that democracy was fundamentally peaceful.87 Once again, 
the pessimists provided the counter-argument by referencing the immovable militarism of the 
Continent. Responding to a particularly furious denunciation of the programme by Picton, 
Admiral Edward Field drily suggested that he be sent ‘as a special peace Commissioner’ to 
Bismarck.88 Far from winning converts to their cause, the debates had merely served to 
reinforce the image of arbitrationists as ‘unpractical and even mischievous dreamers’.89 In all, 
forty four members of the IAL went into the lobby in support of Cremer’s wrecking amendment, 
although in a sign of the gulf which now existed between the two Liberal parties, five Liberal 
Unionist IAL members voted against. In total twelve Unionist IAL members, including Sir 
Edward Watkin, voted with the government at least once over the six principal divisions. Just as 
defence advocates complained bitterly about party politics trumping the national interest, so too 
was the peace movement at the mercy of partisan concerns.90  
Radical pleas for an arbitrated arms reduction treaty were closely linked to the other great 
internationalist hope of maritime law. Throughout the debate Radicals made repeated references 
to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, with the aim of countering the government’s claim that the 
programme was needed for trade defence. The Treaty secured the right of neutral vessels to 
continue to trade with belligerents and abolished privateering. If this was indeed the case, 
argued the Radicals, then why should Britain spend enormous sums defending its trade routes? 
This argument was taken up with especial interest by Labouchere, who set about to show that 
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Britain, France and Russia would all have to abide by the Declaration or else risk the ire of 
neutrals, particularly the economic if not naval power of the United States.91 Under the 
Declaration, he argued, Britain’s ships could simply transfer to neutral flags; indeed, they would 
be forced to, owing to the enormous increase in insurance which British ships would 
immediately suffer on declaration of war. Therefore, he concluded, with the legalistic flourish 
for which he was famed, in wartime Britain would not need to worry about trade defence at all, 
for it would ‘have no commerce to defend’.92 The argument was as straightforward as it was 
naïve. Such advocacies of arbitration and maritime law, far from reinforcing their case, were in 
fact largely irrelevant as regarded the Bill before them, and instead simply strengthened 
Conservative resolve while obscuring the more legitimate criticisms made by so many Liberals. 
The initial interest thrown up by Hamilton’s resolution quickly waned. By the time the Bill 
itself was introduced Westminster’s traditional indifference towards the electorally unimportant 
area of defence policy had reasserted itself. Despite the significant financial and political 
interests at stake the Commons chamber was ‘lamentably empty’ as the Bill moved through its 
second and third readings, with most members content to leave the discussion to the experts, 
obsessives and cranks. In the derisive words of the Graphic, MPs were reluctant to spend their 
time listening to ‘orators of the stamp of Captain Price and Colonel Gourley.’93 Of the ten Tory 
MPs who defended the second and third readings six held military or naval rank.94 Conversely, 
virtually all of the eighteen Liberals who spoke over the same period were in some way 
identified with Radicalism, Trade Unionism or pacifist causes. Other than Harcourt, who rose 
only to say a few words in reply to a perceived slight from Hamilton, the only Liberal ex-
Cabinet member to give a full speech was the Radical Shaw Lefevre. The centre ground had 
vacated the chamber and the extremes held the floor. [Figure 26]. Unsurprisingly, such speakers 
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enthused the press as much as their fellow parliamentarians; when Labouchere or Ashmead-
Bartlett constituted the main event, the government could be assured of minimal media 
scrutiny.95  
This attendance was reflected in the language of the debates, the Radical contributions to which 
bordered at times on the unparlimentary. The Bill was declared an ‘evil in itself, vicious in 
principle, and calculated to precipitate an appeal to war’, by George Howell, while Picton, a 
Congregationalist Minister, described it as ‘unpatriotic’, ‘wasteful’, ‘retrograde’ and 
‘heathenish’.96 Not to be outdone, the fiercely independent member for Sunderland Richard 
Storey described the Bill’s financial mechanism as nothing short of an act of ‘treason’ against 
the Commons and a direct attack on the ‘people’s liberties’.97 ‘I shall offer’, concluded Lawson 
in his speech of 6 May, ‘a most determined opposition to this mad and monstrous proposal for 
augmenting the burdens of the people by fostering that military spirit, which has been the bane 
of civilization, of Christianity, and of progress.’98 Rising to this barrage, General Hamley 
declared that the objections of his opponents ‘bore the same relation to the business of this 
House as a burlesque at the Strand does to the legitimate drama’ while the speeches of other 
military and naval MPs showed similar levels of irritation with, not to say hatred of, the Radical 
members opposite.99 Needless to say, this was not an environment naturally conducive to 
reasoned and measured debate. Nor did it achieve anything other than reinforce the perception 
of the Radicals as uncompromising and out-of-touch, uninterested convincing their opponents. 
The sheer uselessness of the Radical diatribes was neatly depicted by an exchange between 
Hamilton and Lawson on 1 April. Following a particularly furious invocation of Cobdenite 
optimism from the backbencher, Hamilton wearily observed that ‘the effect of the hon. 
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Baronet's speech was a little marred by the fact that we have often heard it before’, to which 
Lawson defiantly replied that he would ‘hear it again.’100 
Not only did the Radicals dominate the debates, they were also the driving organisational force 
behind the divisions, which were conducted in ‘guerrilla’ style. Working with the peace 
movement stalwarts Edward Pickersgill, Sir Joseph Pease and George Howell, Cremer acted as 
a teller for the noes in every single division except Childers’ amendment on 4 April and the 
Bill’s second reading on 7 May. Of the latter two, only 4 April was organised by the official 
Liberal whip. Moved by Labouchere the 7 May vote appears to have been the first division 
organised by the ‘Jacobyns’, with Labouchere’s whips counting much of the Liberal frontbench, 
including Gladstone, through the division lobby, an example of the Radicals successfully 
‘leading the leaders’. 101 During the Bill’s later stages only Harcourt and Henry Fowler rose to 
represent the ‘responsible Opposition’, as The Times would have it.102 Outside of parliament 
much sympathy was in evidence for Fowler, whose speech on 6 May was widely recognised as 
one of the best of the debates, representing as it did the only serious attempt to present a 
balanced criticism of the Bill’s financial mechanisms while also offering a forthright defence of 
the Liberal party’s traditional support for navalism.103 The Morning Post echoed the views of 
many when it observed that the Liberal party to whose navalist traditions Fowler appealed was 
‘no longer represented by himself’, but had been hijacked by a group which ‘neither respects its 
traditions nor submits to the control of the leaders.’104 The Radical domination of the Liberal 
Parliamentary party, and the resultant disarray, was clear for all to see. 
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Figure 26: ‘Naval Prodigy’. 
‘Naval Prodigy’sits crying while ‘nurse Beresford’ (left) and ‘nurse Cremer’ (right) 
quarrel over its ‘supply’. Fun, 10 April, 1889, p. 154. 
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Contested Claims (i): Cobden 
For some on the radical right, the debates were little more than a clash between the ‘patriotic’ 
idea of naval supremacy and the ‘exaggerated descendants of the old “Manchester School”, who, 
as far as Ashmead-Bartlett was concerned, simply wished to wait ‘until we see other powers 
ready to attack us before we do anything to protect ourselves.’105  This, of course, was a gross 
oversimplification. In fact, far from showing his irrelevance, the Naval Defence Bill reaffirmed 
the central importance of Cobden‘s ideas to the British national defence debate. ‘The bulk of the 
Liberal party’, reflected the Manchester Guardian, ‘hold the [navalist] views to which Mr. 
Cobden in his day gave such emphatic expression’.106  For Liberals of a moderate hue, Cobden’s 
speeches and writings on the Navy provided a solid base of navalist ideology from which to 
launch their strategic, constitutional or financial attacks on the Bill. Both Francis Evansand 
Henry Fowler assured the House that their own views coincided with ‘Cobden’s doctrine that 
the Navy is our first, second, and third line of defence’, before using this as cover for their 
attacks on Admiralty waste and inefficiency.107 The Radicals took a similar line, keen to avoid 
the ‘peace at any price’ label which had been attached to Cobden himself during the Crimean 
War before he had openly embraced navalism.108 For them, Cobden’s caveat – that he would 
vote a hundred million pounds for the Navy only ‘if necessary’ – was key to their 
internationalist outlook, allowing them to express their support for the Navy while still opposing 
the increases of 1889. Indeed, it was on the back of Cobden’s analysis of British and French 
naval spending during the mid-century that Shaw Lefevre built his own criticisms of the bill, his 
advocacy of a three-to-two standard a self-conscious echo of Cobden’s own arguments in The 
Three Panics.109 
Cobden’s famous hundred million pound promise was contingent on the perception of external 
threats. As a ‘doctrine’, therefore, it was ripe for appropriation. Such was the aim of Rear-
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Admiral Mayne, who, provoked by Shaw Lefevre, was determined to claim Cobden’s 
posthumous support for the Bill with the simple application of his own pessimistic 
understanding of the state of the Navy: 
The right hon. Gentleman quoted Mr. Cobden as having said that our Navy should be to 
the navy of France as three to two; but why did he not add that Mr. Cobden said that if 
France attempted to alter that proportion he would be the first to vote: 100,000,000, if 
necessary, to maintain it. Why, Sir, France has already materially altered that ratio.110
Warming to his theme, on 20 May Mayne used an entire speech ‘solely for the purpose of 
giving the House the exact words of Mr. Cobden’, applying passages from one of Cobden’s 
speeches to the present ‘materially altered’ circumstances and concluding, somewhat dubiously, 
that the ‘revered statesman’ was an advocate of a two power standard.111 A provocative 
statement, it brought forth indignation from James Rowlands, Lib-Lab MP for East Finsbury, 
who pointed out the obvious truth that The Three Panics had been written to combat just such a 
proposal as the Naval Defence Bill. ‘What’, he asked, ‘has become of the author of The Three 
Panics? I wonder whether the gallant Admiral has ever read "The Three Panics" carefully and 
assiduously?’112 Rowlands protested not only the specific use of Cobden to advocate armament 
increases, but also lamented the manner in which his wider philosophy had been discarded in 
the struggle to claim his navalism: 
I shall go into the Lobby in support of the Amendment of my Hon. Friend the Member 
for Bethnal Green [Cremer] as one of the legitimate heirs of Richard Cobden. (Cries of 
“Oh!”) I should like to know how long hon. Gentlemen opposite have posed as the heirs 
of Richard Cobden, and have been proud of his deeds. I have yet to learn that they are 
admirers of his grand policy of Free Trade and non-intervention.113 
These debates undeniably illustrated the importance of Cobden’s memory for politicians of the 
later 1880s. But they also revealed the vulnerability and limitations of his non-interventionist 
principles, especially in the face of determined ‘new imperialism’. Reduced to a mere statement 
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of navalism, Cobden’s name had become a rod with which determined Tories like Mayne could 
use to beat his ‘legitimate heirs’. In this way, it was symbolic of the deeper and more 
fundamental problems in Liberal anti-militarist thought. The Radicals were paying the price for 
their overreliance on the thinkers of the previous generation. 
Contested Claims (ii): ‘Public Opinion’ 
The other great contested issue was that of public opinion. Conscious, perhaps, of wider public 
indifference, MPs from both parties went out of their way to claim to be speaking for ‘the 
people’. While the Radicals, invoking the ‘toiling millions of the country’, argued that the 
money ought instead to be spent on ‘the mouths, the pockets, the homes of the people’, the 
government was determined to bypass the ‘flatterers and would-be leaders’ on the benches 
opposite and instead appeal directly to the ‘purer patriotism’, as Ashmead-Bartlett described it, 
of the electorate itself. 114 Meanwhile the service members eagerly adopted the mantle of 
representatives of the people which the navalists had worked so hard to create for them in 1888. 
They were, after all, elected just as were the Radicals: ‘the democracy, whether in classes or in 
masses, always receive admirals in the same way’, declared Mayne, ‘and admirals are never 
afraid of going among them, or in any doubt of the reception they will get.’115 Beresford himself 
was determined to take his claim of public support and his claimed opposition to party politics 
to the extreme. Elaborating on his own preferred form of political ‘responsibility’, he expressed 
regret that the Bill did not put the First Lord of the Admiralty and the First Lord of the Treasury 
under a ‘contract with the people, so that if these ships fail, or are not ready at the stipulated 
time, they should both be hanged.’116 As far as Mayne, Beresford and the other service members 
were concerned, it was the government’s Bill, not the radical objections, which best represented 
the ‘real interest’ of the ‘classes and masses’. Whether either side truly represented working 
class opinion is impossible to tell; certainly at no point did any MP cite any evidence for his 
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claims about the nation’s opinion, probably because by 1889 the nation, like so many of their 
fellow parliamentarians, was largely uninterested in fate of the Naval Defence Bill. 
The subject of working class attitudes was also taken up in the Tory press, which eagerly seized 
the opportunity to set upon the Radicals for their failure to represent the perceived jingoism of 
the people.117 These attacks struck home. Responding in obvious frustration to one particular 
Times editorial, Sir Wilfrid Lawson aimed a barbed comment at the cheering Service members 
opposite,  inadvertently accepting his opponents’ claims to popularity and revealing his personal 
feelings of bewilderment towards an electorate which insisted on electing Tory soldiers and 
sailors who worked to waste its taxes on armaments. 
The working classes may reject it [Radical opposition to the Bill] with indignant 
contempt, but I should be a coward and a traitor if, to win the applause of the working 
men, I were to betray their real interest. The working men have the power in their own 
hands, and I am disappointed with them, for they fill the House with generals, colonels, 
and admirals.118  
James Picton concurred, warning the government that the people were not yet awake to their 
own interests and power; he predicted a day when the supporters of the Bill would be ‘swept off 
the Benches of this House’ by the popular will.119 These views were not all one-way, with 
Beresford at one point accepting that Cremer represented a ‘large number of people in the 
country’, working men included.120 One event which serves to illustrate this problem of working 
class attitudes was the publication in May of a strongly-worded piece in the Nineteenth Century 
by Lord Armstrong, founder and owner of the Elswick gun foundries and shipyards.121 Praising 
the ‘business-like’ attitude of the government while damning the Liberal opposition for their 
appeals to the ‘morality’ of nations, Armstrong concluded by arguing that the main benefactors 
of the programme would actually be the working classes, ‘chiefly at the expense of the 
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wealthy’.122 What Armstrong’s article certainly indicated was that the government had strong 
support from the warship building industry. The Elswick works eventually received orders 
amounting to £426,279 as a result of the Act.123  
The last word on the bill was, with a certain inevitability, uttered by Lawson, in his fifth speech 
of the debates. On 4 April he had furiously denounced the scheme as ‘one of the most odious 
which the classes have devised for the robbery of the masses.’124 Returning to this theme on 20 
May, he practically revelled in its ‘odiousness’ and even declared that he was not sorry that the 
measure had be passed, for it would ‘teach the people of this country what the Tory Government 
is capable of. It will teach the country that the Tory Government considers that working men 
were born simply to maintain fighting men.’ ‘Mr. Speaker,’ he concluded, ‘it is because I am 
heart and soul for the shoemakers, and heart and soul against the nobles, that I give my most 
hearty support to the Motion of my Hon. Friend [Cremer].’125 As true and pure as his motives 
may have been, Lawson’s final speech was a quintessential example of the failings of Radical 
anti-militarism: although he began with a nod to existing naval strengths, this quickly 
disappeared in a sea of rhetoric. Regardless of whichever side actually represented popular or 
public opinion, it was imperialism which enjoyed the upper hand both ideologically and 
politically. Radicalism had little to offer beyond contempt and invocations of the Cobdenite 
millennium.  
Repercussions 
 ‘Into the jaws of defeat walked the one hundred, - or, to be strictly accurate, the one hundred 
and one. They knew that to win was impossible, and to be beaten nothing less than disgraceful. 
But to their heroic souls, their labour was its own reward.’126  So the Spectator reported the 
‘collapse’ of the Liberal opposition on 20 May. The paper was certain as to the lessons which 
should be drawn from the three-month struggle: the Bill’s passage was nothing short of a 
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comprehensive defeat of the Radical ‘dream of insecurity’. ‘The time when defencelessness had 
charms for Englishmen is passing away,’ it concluded with satisfaction. ‘It may have altogether 
disappeared before Mr. Labouchere takes the first place at the Admiralty Board.’  
In truth, the result had already been decided by the government victory on 7 May. The 
opposition to the third reading was an exercise in futility in every sense. The Liberals who 
turned out, ushered through the lobby by Cremer and Howell, represented the hard-core of 
Radical internationalists, the majority members of the IAL. Of the leadership, only Shaw 
Lefevre was present. ‘There can be no doubt that divided counsels on the Liberal side have 
taken all heart out of the opposition to the Government’s naval programme’, opined the Pall 
Mall Gazette following that vote. As far as the paper was concerned, the affair had provided a 
salutary lesson in the unpopularity of the Radical approach to naval policy:  
Never was a Government more vulnerable than this one on its naval programme; but 
never will a Government escape the penalty of its faults so easily. We are not altogether 
sorry for the collapse of the Opposition in this matter; for it will at any rate serve to 
show how hopeless the Liberal position is when it lends any countenance whatever to 
the Little Navy school.127  
In general, Liberal attempts at comparative naval analysis had baffled the press, more used to 
the accessible rhetoric of the pessimists, while Radical fury simply gave the impression that 
much of the party was determined ‘to reduce the Commons to the condition of a large and well-
filled and very resonant parrot-house’.128 Such was the failure of the Liberal party’s Leadership 
to present a unified front on the Naval Defence Bill that by the end of May the Times, reflecting 
the opinion of a number of other papers, was wondering whether a ‘Gladstonian’ leadership in 
the Commons could be meaningfully said to exist at all.129 Punch provided the best summary of 
the affair: in a cartoon published in early June, Hamilton was shown triumphantly leading a 
racehorse, ‘Naval Defence’, through a crowd of politicians. On the left sulk the Liberals, while 
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on the right, Mr. Punch offers his congratulations to Lord Salisbury: ‘‘Naval Defence’ was 
bound to win;- the opposition stable wasn’t in it!!’ [Figure 27]. 
By failing to defeat the navalists, politicians had set a precedent which locked them into a spiral 
of confrontation with the Navy in which they were at a distinct disadvantage. The appetite of the 
sailors had been whetted, but they remained deeply unsatisfied, as Beresford’s behaviour during 
the debates demonstrated. Navalist grumblings emerged in the letters’ pages of the press even 
before the year was out, attacking the ‘gross illusions’ of ministers who dared to treat the Naval 
Defence Act as anything approaching a comprehensive solution to Britain’s defence 
problems.130 For the Navy, now almost unanimously converted to the Hornby and Colomb 
school of naval thought, the two power standard was regarded as a woefully inadequate 
compromise, which failed to provide any serious measure of defence. But it also demonstrated 
that ‘party exigencies’ and ‘popular budgets’ could be beaten. With the Conservatives now won 
over to the pessimistic view of naval strength and Liberalism further damaged in its position on 
the Navy, there was little preventing the coming decades of British naval policy from being led 
by the professionals at the Admiralty. The real disaster of the Naval Defence Act, then, was not 
simply that it had failed to materially improve the British situation, but that in so doing it 
encouraged the Admiralty on to demanding further excesses, in the hope that each new 
programme would solve the problems of the last – in short, an arms race mentality.131 
For the Conservatives, the Naval Defence Act can be seen as an important ingredient of the 
‘crisis of Conservatism’, which the party suffered from the 1890s onwards.132 Having adopted 
the myth of naval weakness as fact, the party’s view of defence became increasingly dominated 
by patriotic pessimists. In this respect the Naval Defence Act became a self-fulfilling prophesy 
for the Tories, driving international tension which it had been supposed to prevent, thereby
pushing the party further into the arms of the alarmists. Salisbury and Hamilton were frankly 
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naïve if they believed that their policy shift would not encourage a Franco-Russian response.133 
As the Daily News observed following the final passage of the Bill through the Lords, ‘if 
Europe were indeed the powder magazine which our Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
makes it out to be, he ought to be heavily fined for smoking on the premises.’134 
For the Liberals, the new understanding of the passage of the Naval Defence Bill helps to clarify 
aspects of the party’s defence policy into the early twentieth century. During the 1900s the party 
struggled with the two-power standard, wishing to return naval spending to a policy based on 
existing diplomatic realities, rather than apocalyptic visions of a future great war against all of 
Europe. This struggle has been characterised by historians as an attempt to reject the ‘traditional’ 
two-power measure.135 The truth is the opposite: in arguing for a redefined standard in 1906, 
Campbell-Bannerman was returning to the Liberal arguments of 1889, a reiteration of the 
Radical demands to know why and against whom Britain was supposed to be arming. More 
immediately, Gladstone’s resignation in 1894 over the naval estimates has always sat uneasily 
with his apparent support of the Naval Defence Act. As the conclusion of this thesis will explain, 
this new understanding of the Naval Defence Act allows us to better appreciate his actions 
during the final months of his fourth government. 
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Figure 27: ‘“Won in a Canter!” 
‘Mr Punch: “Congratulate you, my Lord! ‘Naval Defence’ was bound to win;- the 




Building on existing critiques of his work, this study has revealed Marder’s characterisation of 
the public debate which resulted in the passage of the Naval Defence Act to have been seriously 
flawed. Already revealed by more recent historians to have been an unnecessary overreaction, 
this study has rejected the idea that the Act met with ‘almost unanimous’ public or political 
approval. Instead of a popular surge, it shows Beresford’s navy campaign to have been 
somewhat of a damp squib, only making serious headway following the public meetings of May 
and June 1888. Indeed, rather than bowling the government over with unassailable facts and 
figures backed by popular approval, this thesis argues that the navalists ran a limited campaign 
which instead exploited the restricted nature of nineteenth century ideas of ‘public opinion’ to 
present itself as the voice of an otherwise apathetic public. That they were able to do this so 
successfully owed much to the failure of both the government and the Liberal Opposition to 
resist the navalist pessimism, despite clearly possessing the means to do so. This, to answer 
Beeler’s implied question, is how the British ‘bought’ the navalist argument in 1888 and 1889: 
through a failure of political oversight. In this respect, both Salisbury and Gladstone must share 
the responsibility. 
These conclusions are further supported by the study of the Parliamentary passage of the Naval 
Defence Bill. Tied to the pessimistic naval weakness myth, but lacking serious data to support 
their proposals, the government instead fell back on the anti-internationalist rhetoric of 
suspicion which characterised the ‘realist’ view of European relations. Although the Liberals 
opposed the Bill, their attempts to stop it were foiled by their own disunity and lack of 
leadership. From the very beginning of the debates, it was obvious that the Commons was 
hardly the place to begin a campaign of refutation based on comparative financial analysis; such 
a move should have begun in the press the previous year. The last-ditch Radical ‘guerrilla’ 
campaign succeeded only in earning its participants the derision of their opponents and the press 












The Channel Tunnel and Naval Policy, 1890-1894 
 
Now some time ago, as the Tories know, 
When Salisbury held the sway, 
How the Rads all curst if a boiler burst, 
Or a shaft or crank gave way; 
But old Gladstone’s cure is both sound and sure, 
Yes it hardly wants a think, 
We can make no ships, or can sink no ships, 
If we have no ships to sink. 
So search all your life until you are bound 
To the locker of good Old Davy oh! 
You may search the ocean, the strait, or Sound, 
But you’ll never find Gladstone’s Navy, oh! 
With my ho! Heave oh! 
You may whistle for Gladstone’s Navy, oh! 
We will not be slaves, and will rule the waves, 
Though how is not clear to me; 
But for trust we’ve grounds, a master of hounds, 
Yes Lord Spencer guards the sea; 
And though he no doubt knows nothing about 
The ocean, no need to tell, 
While his chief takes care that no ships are there, 
He will rule the Navy well. 
Though he works a ship as he hunts a hound, 
you may swear in your affidavy oh! 
While the Budget on Harcourt’s back is found 
You will never find Gladstone’s Navy, oh! 
With my ho! Heave oh! 
You may whistle for Gladstone’s Navy, oh! 
 





The fourth Gladstone government, from August 1892 to March 1894, could have provided an 
opportunity for the Liberals to push back against the anti-internationalist advance. Regardless of 
any weaknesses, Gladstone remained the ‘world leader’ of a passionately cosmopolitan free 
trade movement, ‘still able to offer the world the best model of international harmony’.1 As 
discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there is much evidence that the collection of ideas 
which constituted liberal internationalism were popular in the country. Although the margin in 
seats was small, the Liberal victory of 1892 nevertheless captured forty-five percent of the vote, 
only a few points short of the landslide of 1906. Any opportunity this moment offered was 
squandered, however. Rather than build an internationalist platform to face the defence 
pessimism of the Conservatives, the Liberals instead fought the election on Home Rule in the 
face of increasing public indifference.2 Indeed, fewer than half of Liberal candidates’ election 
addresses mentioned foreign affairs at all.3 Ailing physically, Gladstone remained obsessed with 
Ireland. Meanwhile his Cabinet had little conception of a developed foreign policy, whereas 
Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, possessed a strong Francophobia.4 Divided and embittered, 
even the staunchest cosmopolitans within the Liberal leadership were reluctant to support 
difficult policies they professed to believe in, their passion replaced with a pervasive sense of 
resignation.5 Consequently the administration put up limited resistance to the military and naval 
professionals who now dominated policymaking at the War Office and Admiralty. This chapter 
illustrates this fact through narratives of the fourth Gladstone government’s d alings with the 
Channel Tunnel and aftermath of the Naval Defence Act. In the former case it provides a 
narrative absent from any other study – in the latter, it offers a new perspective on the 
resignation crisis of 1893-1894. In both it stresses how a willingness to defend liberal 
internationalism against defence pessimism, the armed forces and ‘public opinion’ had had 
collapsed within the upper echelons of the Liberal party. With Gladstone’s resignation in March 
                                                          
1 Matthew, Gladstone: 1875-1898, p. 318.  
2 Searle, A New England?, p. 161. 
3 Taylor, Trouble Makers, p. 92. 
4 Taylor, Struggle for Mastery, pp. 341-342. For Rosebery’s attitudes to France see McKinstrey, 
Rosebery, p. 78 
5 Peter Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies: The Struggle for the Leadership of the Liberal Party in the 
1890s (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), p. xv. 
338 
 
1894 the ‘Peel-Cobden’ consensus which had dominated British politics since the mid-1860s 
suffered its greatest defeat, sending British liberal internationalism into a crisis from which it 
never truly recovered.  
The End of Watkin’s Tunnel Dream 
By 1888, Watkin’s ‘Channel Bore’ had become a staple of the satirical journals, often derided 
as an almost Sisyphean scheme.6 This impression was encouraged by his persistence in the 
Commons, where the Channel Tunnel Company applied to bring forward Bills in 1891, 1892, 
1893 and 1894, although all were withdrawn before MPs were given a chance to vote.7 
However, if the events of 1882-1890 have been given short shrift by historians, Watkin’s final 
four Bills have been entirely ignored.8 The 1891 and 1892 attempts, faced again with the 
determined opposition of the Conservative government and ‘military authorities’, had no chance 
of success.9 Gladstone’s resumption of power in 1892 offered new hope, however, and the 
Tunnel’s continued rejection did not appear to be a foregone conclusion, least of all to Watkin 
and Gladstone.  
With a Prime Minister publicly pledged to the scheme, the Tunnel was potentially closer to 
gaining parliamentary endorsement in 1893 than it had been since 1884. Indeed, the two 
ministers with greatest responsibility for the Tunnel, A.J. Mundella at the Board of Trade and 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the War Office, had both voted in its favour in 1888 and 1890. 
As a fervent Gladstonian and IAL member, Mundella in particular was exactly the sort of man 
Watkin would have hoped to support his cause. Watkin also spent time building his relationship 
with Gladstone, inviting him to Paris in 1889 and to his Chalet in 1892.10 During 1892 the two 
men were in regular correspondence on the subject, and on 1 October the Prime Minister asked 
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339 
 
Watkin to send him proposals to submit to the Cabinet.11 In another letter to Watkin later that 
month, Gladstone, ever aware of the importance of both public and ‘society’ opinion and 
conscious that this was a matter for collective Cabinet responsibility, explained the situation as 
he saw it: 
I think the recent movement of public opinion has been favourable; but I am not able to 
say whether it has been of such an extent as to warrant the return of the Executive to the 
position which it assumed at the first inception of the question; and again viewing the 
curious cleavage of political society upon this question, I am not able as yet to estimate 
the balance of personal opinions among my colleagues. 
I need not tell you which way my own wishes lean; but manifestly I have no title to 
press them beyond a certain point.12 
Watkin, of course, wanted the government to fully commit to the scheme. Speaking in late 
1892, he remained publicly confident that the government was ‘favourably inclined to the 
company’s enterprise’ and that the new Liberal majority in the Commons would support his 
Bill. 13 But Gladstone could not offer this. On 23 November the Cabinet agreed that any further 
votes in the Commons would be an ‘open question’, something confirmed publicly by 
Mundella, Harcourt, Campbell-Bannerman and Gladstone when questioned by Conservative 
MPs in March 1893; on 14 March, a Liberal, Thomas Henry Bolton, gave notice that he would 
move the Bill’s rejection, to great cheers from the Tory benches.14 
The government’s decision not to support the project was the result of important divisions 
within the Cabinet and the dominant position that the armed forces had established for 
themselves. Although a substantial number of ministers were on record as having voted for the 
Tunnel, the most influential Liberals after Gladstone, Lord Rosebery and William Harcourt, 
were opponents. The respective justifications offered by these two men mirrored their own 
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ideological differences, illustrating the range of problems that Liberals identified with the 
project. As the great hope of the ‘Liberal Imperialists’, Rosebery sympathised with the military 
protests. ‘I am anxious’, he had written to Gladstone in 1891, ‘to obtain the full advantage of the 
insular position with which providence has endowed us.’15 Meanwhile Harcourt articulated the 
more ‘Radical’ objection that the Tunnel might damage British liberties: ‘…I belong to the “old 
fogey” party on that question not from fear of invasion in time of War but of Continentilisation 
in time of peace’, he wrote in 1893.16 If these objections were not enough – and it is difficult to 
see, considering the stubborn natures of the two men, how they could have been surmounted – 
Gladstone had also accepted the right of the armed forces to continue to intervene.17 The fact 
that the alternative would at this stage had been practically unthinkable should not obscure the 
importance of this development for a man so disdainful of professional ‘interference’. The 
subsequent memorandums on the subject submitted to the Cabinet by the Adjutant-General 
Redvers Buller and the Inspector-General of Fortifications Robert Grant repeated most of 
Wolseley’s objections and emphasised the unanimity of military opinion on the issue.18 Watkin 
withdrew the Bill on 20 July 1893, unwilling to face the necessary parliamentary ‘tug of war’ 
and disappointed in his hope of government support.19 
The 1894 Bill met an identical end, crushed during the last weeks of Gladstone’s premiership by 
the weight of professional opposition.20 Remarkably, Campbell-Bannerman, that noted 
antagonist of the military and naval officer, was happy to oppose the scheme ‘on military 
grounds’, an indication of how the experience of government had changed the party’s 
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relationship with the armed forces.21 He rejected the scheme again when Prime Minister in 
1907, officially in deference to the Admiralty and War Office, although in a letter to the King he 
insisted that, while he had ‘never thought much of the so-called military objections’, he believed 
that its construction would lead to panic, a decision which his successor Asquith endorsed.22 In 
this, Campbell-Bannerman serves as a fitting representative of the Liberal party’s tortuous 
relationship with the Channel Tunnel scheme: sympathetic to its ideals and unwilling to admit 
the truth of Wolseley’s objections, but also suspicious of the danger it represented to British 
society and forced, ultimately, to bow to the armed forces and ‘public opinion’. 
The Channel Tunnel was not an irrelevant footnote to Gladstone’s final government. This was, 
after all, one of the most ambitious engineering projects of the century, with proven viability 
and the support of a significant lobby of businessmen, trade unions and politicians. Gladstone 
himself was obviously determined to do all he could for the scheme, pushing it in Cabinet and 
writing regularly to Watkin. His diary shows that he read Bradlaugh’s pro-Tunnel pamphlet in 
April 1893, presumably in anticipation of the planned Commons debate.23 There is no doubt, as 
indicated by his conduct in 1888 and 1890, that he regarded the Tunnel as an important 
ideological issue and a potential weapon on the side of peace and free trade. In light of his 
intense feeling for the ideology of Cobden, he must have regarded the withdrawal of the last 
Tunnel Bills as a defeat for this outlook and an indication of the new direction of British 
politics. One acquaintance recorded – presumably in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal 
of the 1893 Bill – that the Prime Minister was ‘“suffused with shame” about the conduct of the 
English in regard to the Channel Tunnel’.24  
For Watkin, of course, the defeat was all the greater. With Gladstone’s replacement by 
Rosebery it was obvious that there was little hope of the British government supporting a 
Tunnel in the immediate future. Ailing physically, Watkin retired from public life shortly afer 
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Gladstone himself. He had brought the idea of a fixed railway link between Paris and London 
nearer to reality than anyone else during the entire pre-1945 period. Britain would not have a 
pro-Tunnel Prime Minister until 1916 and David Lloyd George, who had voted in its favour in 
1888 and 1890. However, although Lloyd George actively pushed the idea during the peace 
negotiations in 1919, like Gladstone before him he was unable to carry the Cabinet.25 It was not 
until 1964 that the British government, in tandem with its attitude towards European unity, 
officially endorsed the making of a Tunnel, although actual work did not begin until 1974, and 
this was cancelled the following year.26 Ironically it was a Conservative government that finally 
ratified the Anglo-French Tunnel treaty in 1987, with the Tunnel itself finally opened in 1994, 
exactly a century after Gladstone and Watkin retired. In her speech marking the former 
occasion, Margaret Thatcher described the project as ‘a demonstration of how to go about the 
practical making of Europe and demolishing its barriers’.27 Cobden, Watkin and Gladstone, one 
assumes, would have heartily agreed.  
The Navy and Resignation: A Reassessment 
The Cabinet crisis which culminated in Gladstone’s final resignation in March 1894 has been 
chronicled a substantial number of times.28 As is well known, at its root was Gladstone’s 
stubborn determination not to accept First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Spencer’s naval 
estimates, the highest the country had ever seen in peacetime, part of a £21,263,000 five-year 
programme that was only marginally smaller than the Naval Defence Act.29 His ultimate 
capitulation in the face of his Cabinet colleagues – themselves facing an intractable Admiralty, 
an inflamed public opinion and an unsympathetic Conservative party – has long been regarded 
as the symbolic passing of the Peel-Cobden consensus which had dominated British defence 
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policy since the 1860s.30 For naval historians the crisis reveals both the political success and the 
practical failure of the Naval Defence Act. Success, in that it tied the hands of the Liberals and 
forced them to continue building at a similar rate to Salisbury’s government: failure, because the 
Spencer programme reflected the extent to which France and Russia, now formal allies, had 
managed to keep pace with the Royal Navy.31 It was clear that the Liberal and Radical criticisms 
of 1889 that argued the Act would promote and escalate a European naval arms race had proved 
correct.32 Administratively, Gladstone’s retirement also marked the conclusive seizure of 
policymaking by the armed forces. This is the theme of the most comprehensive account of the 
resignation from the perspective of the Admiralty, Paul Smith’s 1996 essay, which draws 
heavily from the letters of Lord Spencer and his Parliamentary Secretary, Sir Ughtred Kay-
Shuttleworth.33 After 1894, he argues, crossbench support for the two-power standard ensured 
that the Admiralty was a ‘near-independent power within the government as a whole’, free from 
close financial or political oversight.34 As Marder puts it, ‘the decks were now clear’ for the 
full-scale acceptance of Admiralty demands.35 
In light of the naval historians’ exposure of the myth of British naval weakness and the new 
understanding of the Liberal attitude to the Naval Defence Act established in Part III of this 
thesis, the Gladstonian resignation crisis is ripe for reassessment. Crucially, it follows that the 
events of 1893-1894 must be placed in the context of Gladstone and the Liberals’ attitude to the 
Navy stretching back at least to 1888. Previous chroniclers of the resignation have tended to 
regard Gladstone’s objections as a well-meaning but misjudged attempt to uphold financial 
consistency in the face of strategic reality. The truth, however, is more complex, for an 
awareness that the Naval Defence Act was an overreaction necessarily throws the Spencer 
programme into similar doubt. In this context, Gladstone appears less of a blind ideologue than 
historians have painted him. On the other hand, it also becomes evident that there is a direct link 
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between Gladstone’s failure of leadership against the Naval Defence Act in 1889 and the 
position he found himself in in 1894. What follows is a critical retelling of the resignation crisis, 
framed and directed by this new understanding. 
The technical and financial details of the Spencer Programme still await a full revisionist tudy.  
Unlike the events of 1888, however, the navalist agitation of 1893 has never been regarded 
uncritically by historians. In his account, Marder explains at some length how the navalists of 
1893 ignored or downplayed Franco-Russian weaknesses, demonstrating a critical awareness 
which is missing from his study of the Naval Defence Act.36 Importantly, Marder draws 
attention to the fact that British shipbuilders were able to produce a battleship in an average of 
twenty-one months faster than the French, for whom warship construction was also more 
expensive.37 This picture has been reinforced by Parkinson, who identifies how the Royal Navy 
was made to look weak in 1893 by adding outdated French ships to comparative naval returns, 
just as in 1884 and 1888.38 Indeed, by 1895 this policy appears to have been adopted openly by 
the Admiralty Board in its correspondence with Spencer.39 Even under conservative estimates, 
in 1894 British first-class battleship tonnage equalled that of France, Russia and Germany 
combined, while the numbers of European warships under construction did not suggest that the 
two power standard was under imminent threat.40 That year’s Brassey’s Naval Annual suggested 
that due to the withdrawal of obsolete warships, France’s proposed building programme would 
actually leave the French navy no stronger in 1900 than it had been in 1894.41 As Shaw Lefevre 
argued in his essay of 1891 and as Harcourt later asserted in the Commons, British ‘weakness’ 
of the early 1890s was an immediate question of geographical distribution, rather than 
shipbuilding.42 On the other hand the Liberal government was also faced with a range of new 
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factors which seriously undermined its ability to face down the Admiralty demands. Most 
significantly, the arms race initiated by the Naval Defence Act was now in full swing, 
necessitating some form of long-term increase in shipbuilding unless Britain was to achieve a 
thawing of relations with France.43 A government united on a strong platform of 
internationalism and economic parsimony, buttressed by a proper appreciation of Britain’s 
defence needs, could have done much to contain the spiralling naval estimates and mitigate the 
naval arms race spreading across Europe. This is not what happened. Instead, the Liberal 
government left office in 1895 having cemented the myth of naval weakness in place. 
In the first place, an understanding of the Liberal failure to formulate a naval policy during 
1888-1889 allows us to appreciate the position of the party as it took power in 1892. While 
Peter Stansky is right to point out that the Liberals attacked increasing military and navl 
spending in the run up to the 1892 election, this should not be mistaken for an established 
policy.44 The 1891 Newcastle Programme did not set out a position on defence, while Gladstone 
and Harcourt produced only the most limited and vague of public attacks on Conservative 
spending increases, advocating no clear Liberal alternative.45 There had thus been no concerted 
effort to challenge the myth of British weakness and anti-internationalist assumptions during the 
election campaign. The directionless state of Liberal naval policy was essentially unchanged 
from 1889. These problems were reflected in Gladstone’s decision to appoint John Poyntz 
Spencer, Fifth Earl Spencer, as First Lord. Spencer’s appointment has attracted little criticism 
from historians and has never been scrutinised in detail, despite the fact that he was clearly not a 
suitable man for the job, as Gladstone later admitted.46 A ‘moderate’ man principally concerned 
with Home Rule and holding no previous experience of naval administration, Spencer appears 
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to have been chosen as a result of Gladstone’s curious determination to balance the number of 
Peers and Commoners in his Cabinet.47 Within days of accepting the post, Spencer wrote to 
Gladstone to admit ‘my own ignorance of the great subjects involved’.48 Spencer immediately 
demonstrated that he had learnt none of the lessons of 1888-1889 by deciding to leave 
Hamilton’s Admiralty Board in place, the first time the Sea Lords had not changed with a new 
administration.49 Despite the fact that Gladstone, Harcourt and others in the government were 
aware of the need for strong civilian oversight of the ‘professional oppressors’, there does not 
appear to have been any attempt to challenge this decision.50 This meant that the Cabinet, 
already left with little room for manoeuvre as a consequence of the actions of the Salisbury 
government, was stuck with a Board schooled in the outlook of Beresford, Hornby and Colomb, 
determined to uphold the myth of naval weakness and led by men at odds with the Gladstonian 
approach to defence.51 From this point onwards a decisive clash between Liberal parsimony and 
Admiralty pessimism became inevitable, with the Admiralty holding all the advantages.  
The extent to which Spencer’s appointment was an avoidable mistake is further emphasised by 
the fact that a number of more appropriate alternatives existed. That the Admiralty would go to 
Spencer was far from inevitable; Harcourt, for example, was staunchly opposed to Gladstone’s 
decision to place ‘one of the greatest spending departments’ in the Lords.52 The three obvious 
alternative candidates were Henry Campbell-Bannerman, George Trevelyan and George Shaw 
Lefevre, all of whom were recognised by Spencer himself as ‘conversant with naval affairs’.53 
All three, importantly, had proven themselves able to resist the myth of naval weakness during 
the debates on the Naval Defence Bill. In the event, however, Campbell-Bannerman was given 
the War Office while the other two fell victim, alongside a fourth candidate Henry Fowler, to 
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Gladstonian snobbery.54 Algernon West, Gladstone’s Principal Private Secretary, thought that 
Fowler as First Lord would result in ‘a mutiny at the Nore’, while he dismissed without 
explanation the idea of Trevelyan or Shaw Lefevre – both now senior statesmen with extensive 
Admiralty experience – as ‘ridiculous’.55 Yet it seems unlikely that either of the latter two 
would have kept Hamilton’s Board in place as Spencer had done, or have lent the navalists such 
a sympathetic ear; as we shall see, Shaw Lefevre kept up his opposition to the Spencer estimates 
for as long as Gladstone himself.  
Spencer took enthusiastically to his work, determined to scrutinise the demands of the 
Admiralty Board and confident in his ability to keep down the estimates.56 Immediately as he 
assumed office, however, the Admiralty began the work of revitalising the myth of naval 
weakness. That the Admiralty was conspiring to provide an erroneous picture of the Royal Navy 
during this time there can be little doubt, for as much was later admitted by Seymour Fortescue, 
then on the staff of the Naval Intelligence Department, in a remarkable passage in his memoirs 
hitherto unused by historians: 
I remember being told to supply their Lordships with a statement of the combined 
strength of the Navies of France and Russia, against which had to be shown, ship by 
ship, our own Navy. I was given the hint that, the object being to wring more money for 
more ships out of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I was to make out as formidable a 
list as I could of our then possible enemies. Naturally, I did as I was told, and no old 
lame duck was too obsolete to be trotted out for the occasion.57  
Fortescue was ‘convinced that the device was too transparent to deceive a child’ and 
remembered being secretly delighted when the document came back to him covered with 
Harcourt’s own annotations. ‘I felt’, he continued, ‘that with all the knowledge of those Fleets 
that I had at the moment, I could not have made a better selection of the obsolete and useless 
vessels than did the Chancellor with his blue pencil.’ This or a similar occurrence was the 
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subject of a letter from Harcourt to Spencer in November 1892, in which the Chancellor 
declared that ‘the Admirals are up to their well-known “tricks and manners”’ – in this case 
including unbuilt French and Russian ships on a comparative return, which he had marked out, 
this time in red pencil.58 Labouring under the pessimistic illusion, historians have not tended to 
pay much attention to the detail of Harcourt’s arguments during this period, regarding him as 
‘intransigent’, an amateur naval enthusiast whose fierce and excitable outbursts were merely the 
usual protestations of a parsimonious Chancellor.59 It is clear, however, that the opposite is the 
case. Behind his bullish and sarcastic assertions about the strength of the Royal Navy equalling 
that of the entire world, Harcourt possessed a masterful understanding of the true state of naval 
affairs.60 Spencer, on the other hand, does not appear to have taken Harcourt seriously, 
describing him as ‘odd and extravagant’, possessing ‘every sort of theory’ and a ‘craze about 
ships’.61 Brushing off offers of support against his ‘professional oppressors’ in January 1893, 
Spencer wrote that he would be ‘extremely surprised if there is an excess of expenditure this 
year’, an observation which does not suggest the sharpest awareness of the recent political 
history of the Navy.62 
The political prelude to the Spencer programme was the Navy scare of 1893, the narrative of 
which is well understood.63 It was driven by public alarm, spread especially energetically by 
The Times, regarding the British position in the Mediterranean, where the French maintained a 
strong fleet at Toulon. In August it became known that the Russian Navy was planning a visit to 
the base, sparking fears that the Royal Navy was dangerously outnumbered in the Sea. The 
subsequent agitation was of a smaller scale than that of 1888, but this was in large part because 
the battle was half won before it had even begun. The mechanisms of panic were now fully 
worked out. The usual papers were quickly rallied and a City meeting was held on 13 
December, well-attended only b  the ‘propertied and commercial classes’ as Edward Hamilton 
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bitterly remembered.64 Freed from the moderating influence of government, the Conservative 
attitude to national defence was now dominated by the kind of pessimistic anti-internationalism 
espoused by Wolseley in the early 1880s. This was demonstrated by Lord Salisbury in Cardiff 
on 28 November, at a meeting connected to the annual conference of the National Union of 
Conservative and Constitutional Associations. Insisting that a single diplomatic blunder could 
lead to a sudden and calamitous war of aggression, he painted a picture of a Royal Navy which 
was well below the necessary strength and asked his audience to imagine an enemy fleet 
anchoring in Cardiff bay and demanding a ransom lest the town be ‘bombarded and burnt to the 
ground’. 65 In contrast to 1888, the meeting of 13 December occurred with the full support of the 
Conservative Lord Mayor of London. Gone was the uncertainty which marked the agitators’ 
attitude to the public in 1888, for the Naval Defence Act had put an end to any nagging doubts 
about whether or not the taxpayer would stomach such a programme. The meeting’s chairman, 
Albert Rollit MP, felt no embarrassment in describing the event as ‘the union of the nation and 
the Navy’, regardless of the fact that no evidence of wider national support had been 
forthcoming.66 Even the Queen felt emboldened, taking the ‘constitutionally extraordinary step’ 
of demanding that Gladstone read the Cabinet a letter from her demanding an increase in both 
the Army and Navy.67 
The culmination of the agitation was the Commons debate on the evening of 19 December 
1893, on a motion tabled by George Hamilton calling for a ‘considerable addition’ to the 
Navy.68  British sea power, he declared, was ‘in jeopardy’, and he warned that the Navy must be 
prepared for a sudden, unexpected naval combination against it – such an attack, he argued, was 
the ‘one object’ of the ‘foreign nations’ he was sure were plotting against Britain.69 In contrast 
to 1889 Gladstone was a man transformed, taking the fight directly to Hamilton’s statistics and 
his assumptions about the state of the world, which he attacked as ‘irrational and even absurd’, 
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noting, for example, the way in which wooden French ships had been added to the alarmist’s 
figures.70 This was the result of Harcourt’s influence, who with his son had ‘crammed’ 
Gladstone on the strength of the Royal Navy the previous week.71 The debate also saw the 
extent to which the history of 1889 was already becoming confused in people’s minds: the 
Liberals denied they had opposed the Naval Defence Act at all, while Forwood admitted that the 
two power standard had actually existed in 1889.72 The debate was concluded by Cremer, who 
sought to deconstruct the scare and the manner in which it had been ‘manufactured’.73 There 
was, he said, no evidence of any public alarm over the state of the Navy; no petitions had been 
presented to Parliament, nor had any ‘bonâfide working class organisation’ come out in support 
of the agitators, whose public appeal did not appear to extend beyond a few Unionist journals. 
Although the Strangers’ Gallery was crowded the benches were not, and the debate was 
interrupted twice in order to ascertain that enough members were present for it to continue – 
hardly indicative of widespread political interest.74 The Naval Defence Act had, Cremer 
concluded, brought about this ‘mad race for rivalry in armaments’, and he felt it his duty to raise 
a protest on behalf of the large section of the public opposed to such measures.  
Gladstone undoubtedly agreed with Cremer’s summing up. His amendment to Hamilton’s 
resolution had been passed with a good majority, but it was a vote split on party lines and hardly 
a counted as victory against the navalists.75 This he admitted that same day in a diary entry 
which reflected on the power ‘society’ and the ‘professionals’ now held over the nation, the 
latter he believed did not want substantial increases:  
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Moved my Amendment. Majority 36. The situation almost hopeless when a large 
minority allows itself in panic and joining hands with the professional elements works 
on the susceptibilities of a portion of the people to alarm.76 
It did not take long for the ‘professional elements’ to make their power felt. Over the preceding 
weeks the Admiralty Board had been intimating to Spencer and Kay-Shuttleworth that it was 
preparing to ask for a new shipbuilding programme even larger than that of the Naval Defence 
Act.77 As the government spokesman for naval policy in the Commons Kay-Shuttleworth was 
deeply worried that Gladstone or Harcourt would destroy the government by publicly espousing 
‘optimist views’ to which the Admiralty Board would object.78 This duly occurred when, during 
the 19 December debate, Harcourt cited ‘the responsible professional advisers’ in support of his 
claim that the present state of the Navy was satisfactory. This produced a protest from the Sea 
Lords, sent the following day to Spencer, in which they rejected Harcourt’s summary of their 
attitudes; the Chancellor was forced to make a clarification on 21 December.79 That January, 
Harcourt had observed that the professionals at the Admiralty and War Office were ‘absolute 
masters of the situation’. He had now discovered to his cost how true this was.80 A good 
indication of the Board’s thinking at this time was given in a letter from John Fisher to Austen 
Chamberlain on 22 December, in which the former described as ‘magnificent’ the profoundly 
pessimistic speech of Sir Charles Dilke, who had gone even further than the Conservatives and 
declared that ‘as matters stand there are all the elements of a national catastrophe’.81 Dilke 
himself had doubts as to whether Britain could hold its own against France alone: such was the 
nature of the alarmism with which Harcourt and Gladstone now found themselves faced.82  
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Spencer himself did not believe that Harcourt had been wrong in his statement that the Navy 
was weak in its present state.83 Nevertheless, as early as May 1893 he had become convinced by 
the Sea Lords’ argument that the Royal Navy would be outnumbered by France and Russia by 
1896.84 Thus although he worked hard to cut down the estimates for 1894, he was starting from 
an assumption of naval weakness which ensured that even the smallest programme would be 
practically the same size of the Naval Defence Act.85 The correspondence which passed from 
Harcourt to Spencer during September-December 1893 makes for fascinating reading.86 The 
Chancellor laid out, at great length, the naval superiority of Britain, arguing that this strength 
was confirmed even if the country did not build another ship for four years.87 He attacked the 
‘lying statements of The Times’ and the various other exaggerated examples of alarmism in the 
press, which were ‘everywhere put forward and universally believed’.88 The Sea Lords, he told 
any of his colleagues who would listen, were whipping up a panic by consciously 
misrepresenting the true state of the Navy to the public. He returned repeatedly to the tactic 
which the Admiralty and their supporters had developed for ‘lumping together… ships which 
will not be finished for four years and treating them on a par with ships which will be finished 
in a month’.89 He pointed out that France itself was undergoing a naval scare at that very 
moment.90 According to Fisher, Harcourt combined with Campbell-Bannerman to take the fight 
directly to the Board of Admiralty themselves.91 As Harcourt had suspected all along, however, 
his struggles were in vain. His arguments were well founded, but he was hamstrung by having 
to operate in a political framework defined by the myth of naval weakness which the Liberals 
had left intact and unchallenged by their failure of opposition going back at least to 1888. 
Whatever his efforts, the Chancellor had little support or precedent for a unified front against
demands for greater spending. In early January, Harcourt, still adamant he was in the right and 
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cursing the weakness of Spencer, but unwilling to cause the collapse of the government, 
submitted to the demands of the Admirals.92 
The adoption of Spencer’s estimates by the Cabinet was now inevitable. The only question was 
whether or not Gladstone, who had remained aloof until the end of December, could be 
convinced to stomach them.93 During January and February, the Prime Minister attempted to 
hold out against almost his entire Cabinet, fleeing at one point to Biarritz from where his 
colleagues continued to receive diatribes against the ‘mad and drunk’ proposals.94 He should 
not, however, be regarded as irrational, senile or obstinate during this time. Rather, his notes 
reveal a sharp mind completely aware of the geopolitical and strategic implications of the 
proposals.95 He pointed out how ‘absurd’ it was to ignore the three naval powers – Austria, Italy 
and Germany – who were ‘probably adverse’ to France and Russia when calculating the 
necessary British strength. He argued, not without good reason, that the programme would 
increase international tensions and jealousy of Britain, that it would stimulate Franco-Russian 
building and perhaps even push Britain towards the Triple Alliance. He believed it ‘beyond 
expectation’ of both the Liberal party and the public, and was ever aware of ‘the changed 
relations with the professional element’ which it implied. At the heart of his protests was a 
profound sense that the naval programme was a betrayal of the ideals which he argued – rightly 
or wrongly – he had spent most of his political life defending and to which he was now more 
closely bound than ever.96 Crucially, he had now become aware, as he had not been hitherto, of 
what a mistake the Naval Defence Act had been. The Act, he told Edward Hamilton, was solely 
responsible for the arms race that he believed was now leading Europe towards ‘catastrophe’.97 
Yet due to his failure to oppose that Act, Gladstone, like Harcourt before him, was unable to 
argue that the Spencer Programme clearly broke with party policy. ‘The N.D. Act was foolish’, 
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he wrote. ‘But is a thing done’.98 He formerly resigned on 3 March 1894, completing a process 
of events which had been set in motion by his abdication of responsibility during the debates on 
the Naval Defence Bill on 4 April 1889. 
As a final point, this reassessment of Gladstone’s resignation sheds new light on the Prime 
Minister’s one ally in the Cabinet. Shaw Lefevre, the First Commissioner for Works, is often 
ignored or belittled by historians, dismissed as ‘an admirable man much concerned with the 
preservation of open spaces’ who acted only out of his loyalty for Gladstone.99 While widely 
recognised as an excellent and energetic administrator he was not popular inside or outside of 
the Commons, often considered dull, long-winded and difficult to get on with.100 Yet in 
emphasising these factors it is easy to obscure his individualism, his passionate Cobdenism and 
his interest and expertise in naval affairs. His maiden Commons speech had been made, with 
Cobden’s backing, on the Alabama incident and he served as a junior Admiralty Minister three 
times between 1866 and 1880.101 In the early 1870s he did not shy away from presenting 
Gladstone with the facts of the steadily increasing costs of modern warship design, while in 
1880 he played an important role convincing the Prime Minister of the necessity of increasing 
the size of the fleet to compensate for recent French construction.102 As the first Liberal ex-
Cabinet member to vote for the Channel Tunnel and the only to vote against the third reading of 
the Naval Defence Bill, Shaw Lefevre emerges from the present study as the most committed 
and determined of Cobden’s front-rank parliamentary devotees. By 1892 he harboured hopes of 
becoming First Lord himself, hardly an unreasonable ambition in light of his experience.103 His 
article of 1891 demonstrated a complete awareness of all the various alarmist tactics for 
misrepresenting the state of the Navy.104 Far from a man with few interests beyond the 
development of public parks, Shaw Lefevre entered Gladstone’s fourth government as one of 
                                                          
98 Matthew, Gladstone Diaries, vol. XIII, p. 357. 
99 Jenkins, Gladstone, p. 612; Stansky, Ambitions and Strategies, p. 30; Marder, Anatomy, p. 201; Allen 
Warren, ‘Lefevre, George John Shaw-‘ ODNB; F.M.G. Willson, A Strong Supporting Cast: The Shaw 
Lefevres 1789-1936, (London: Athlone Press, 1993), pp. 312-313. 
100 Willson, The Shaw Lefevres, pp. 254-256. 
101 Willson, The Shaw Lefevres, p. 178. 
102 Beeler, British Naval Policy pp. 142-143, 261-262; Beeler, ‘In the Shadow of Briggs’, pp. 4-5. 
103 Willson, The Shaw Lefevres, p. 312. 
104 Shaw Lefevre, ‘Naval Policy of France’, p. 626.  
355 
 
the most developed Liberal thinkers on naval administration and strategy. That he agreed with 
Gladstone on what he called the ‘iniquities of Spencer’s proposals’ is therefore hardly 
insignificant.105 As he later explained to Gladstone, he regarded the plans ‘as calculated to lead 
the country into the vortex of militarism, which is the curse of Europe’.106 He wanted to resign 
in protest alongside Gladstone, but refrained only because Gladstone did not make his views on 
the matter public.107 Nevertheless Shaw Lefevre remained publicly unrepentant, declaring in a 
speech at the end of 1894 that taxes must rise because the Liberals ‘had to raise a large sum of 
money to increase the navy in deference to the view of alarmists, mainly belonging to the 
property classes’, an observation which could hardly have sat well with his fellow ministers.108  
Alone among his colleagues, Shaw Lefevre was utterly distraught about the implications the 
Spencer Programme had for his own reputation and that of Liberalism more generally, ‘saying 
that he cannot face his constituents at Bradford on our great Naval Expenditure after speeches 
he has made to them’.109 That such sentiments were not more common in the correspondence 
and diaries of the Cabinet during 1893-1894 is reflective of the extent to which liberal 
internationalist and anti-armament sentiment was now a minority concern at the top of the 
Liberal Party. Only Gladstone, Harcourt and Shaw Lefevre appear to have seriously 
contemplated the consequences of the proposed estimates. Although they may have denied it, 
with the Spencer Programme the bulk of the Liberal Party finally accepted that the demands of 
the Admiralty must come before any ideological or financial objections.110 Despite the fact that 
it recognised the role of the Naval Defence Act in initiating the European naval arms race, the 
Daily News begrudgingly supported the Spencer Programme, praising the government for 
‘doing its duty’ and warning other nations off attempting to challenge Britain’s ‘supremacy of 
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the sea’, a phrase which Gladstone himself abhorred.111 The same desperate hope that Britain 
could halt the naval arms race through more shipbuilding was evident in the language used by 
the Rosebery government to justify its programme. ‘We may hope’, asserted Kay-Shuttleworth 
on presenting the plans to parliament, ‘that it will be once for all understood that nothing which 
any other State can do will prevent our maintaining the security of our commerce, the defence 
of our possessions throughout the world, and the command of the seas.’112 The most telling 
indication of the direction liberalism was now heading was Cobden’s transformation into a 
navalist icon. At the same time as Gladstone was delivering ‘Cobdenite sayings’ to his Cabinet, 
he was being publicly berated for ignoring his idol’s famous ‘hundred millions’ speech [Figure 
28].113 In retirement, Gladstone’s views remained entirely unchanged, having lost faith in his 
former colleagues’ ability to resist Admiralty demands:114  
What is now most uppermost in his mind is what he calls the spirit of Jingoism, under 
the name of Imperialism, which is now so prevalent. He could not, he said, denounce it 
in loud enough tones; but neither could he lay it all at the door of one side. It was Lord 
Spencer with his naval programme who had begun it. Since then things had gone from 
bad to worse. All sense of decency was gone. It was enough to make Peel and Cobden 
turn in their graves.115 
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Figure 28: ‘“Rule, Britannia!” (?)’. 




A Prehistoric Doctrine? 
 
While everywhere the legions form, 
While bristle camps, while arsenals swarm, 
Think you alone to stem the storm 
With “Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform”? 
 






Figure 29: The ‘prehistoric statesman’ and the ‘up-to-date jingo’. 
Dressed in a bearskin tunic, Lawson faces the First Lord of the Admiralty George 
Goschen, who is encased in full plate armour with the prow of a warship protruding 
from his chest. Punch, 14 Mar. 1896, p. 131. 
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On 6 March 1896 Sir Wilfrid Lawson rose in the House of Commons and moved a nominal 
reduction to that year’s naval estimates, at that date the largest ever submitted to parliament in 
peacetime.1 He did so, he told the House, to condemn the ‘stupendous’ naval programme of the 
government and to raise a voice in support of ‘the good old cause’.2 At this remark many in the 
House began to laugh; they had heard a variation of Lawson’s speech at almost every debate on 
the Army and Navy estimates for as long as most there could remember. ‘Yes’, he replied 
despairingly, ‘the whole thing had become a joke now.’ Not only in the Commons: he believed 
that MPs represented the views of their constituents when they laughed at peace, retrenchment 
and reform. Nevertheless, he persisted. The proposed spending, he insisted, represented a 
desperate attempt to make the country impregnable, inspired by an irrational paranoia about the 
intentions of Britain’s neighbours. The only result would be the financial and moral ruination of 
the country: ‘What was the good of a man’, he asked, ‘if he had to walk about in heavy armour 
all his life?’ The previous day Sir Charles Dilke had directly attacked Lawson’s invocation of 
Sir Robert Peel as a ‘prehistoric doctrine’.3 ‘Well,’ replied Lawson, ‘he would far rather have 
the doctrine of a prehistoric statesman than the ravings of an up-to-date jingo’ [Figure 29].4 On 
9 March his amendment was defeated by 45 votes to 262. 
By the late 1890s ‘retrenchment’ was but a memory. In 1889 the annual naval estimates 
breached £15,000,000; by 1899 they had reached £26,000,000, and still the navalists argued that 
not enough was being spent.5 Lawson’s characterisation of jingoism as ‘up-to-date’ in contrast 
with the old-fashioned and dying creed of Peel-Cobdenism therefore captured the political 
mood well.6 As outlined in Part I, defence pessimists had determinedly cultivated an image of 
themselves as riding the ‘spirit of the age’. They had methodically deconstructed the ‘civilised’ 
view of relations between states, recasting conceptions of international relations in terms of 
competition and struggle and normalising the idea of Britain as a nation under challenge, weak 
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and in danger of a sudden foreign assault. By exploiting the authority of their professional 
expertise, armed forces officers presented themselves as men of the future, of ‘science’, whose 
views must be taken seriously and deferred to by ‘amateur’ civilians. This message they spread 
through sophisticated media techniques which exploited the limited nature of nineteenth century 
public opinion to present themselves as articulating the majority view of the nation. This proved 
especially effective in the aftermath of the 1884 Reform Act, which placed ‘th  people’ at the 
forefront of political debate as never before. In contrast, internationalists like Lawson were 
unable or unwilling to adopt countermeasures which equalled those of their opponents. While 
retired admirals wrote to the papers and held meetings on the latest developments in naval 
theory, Lawson’s language remained that of Cobdenite moralism, his diatribes confined almost 
exclusively to the House of Commons. Consequently, it proved easy for defence pessimists to 
paint their opponents as naïve Cobdenites, while simultaneously appropriating Cobden’s 
memory for their own ends. In this respect the description of Lawson as ‘prehistoric’ seems 
apposite. He was the personification of all the problems liberal internationalism laboured under 
and seemed unable to escape. 
While the peace movement struggled during the 1890s, their opponents lost no time in securing 
their victory.7 With the foundation of the Navy League in 1895 and the National Service League 
in 1902, defence pessimism became formerly institutionalised.8 Taking their inspiration from 
the agitations of the 1880s, these ‘strictly non-political’ organisations brought together 
professional expertise within organised propaganda machines. The personal link between these 
Leagues and the agitation of 1888 was particularly marked: Beresford became associated with 
both organisations, Phipps-Hornby was inaugural President of the Navy League and Wolseley, 
increasingly obsessed with the fear of invasion, joined the National Service League.9 Even 
though these organisations struggled to expand their membership beyond traditional Tory 
middle-class constituencies, they proved more than a match for the divided and disorganised 
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anti-armament movement, which never escaped its reliance on outdated Cobdenite mantra, 
making little headway even after the Liberal victory of 1906.10 Indeed, an important 
development of the period before 1914 was the extent to which defence pessimism became a 
cross-bench concern. A substantial number of Liberal MPs were involved in Navy League 
activities, for example.11 As the Channel Tunnel case study demonstrates, liberal intellectuals 
were becoming increasingly uneasy with Gladstonian foreign policy.12 The Liberal party itself 
was deeply split between the extremes of ‘Palmerstonian’ ‘Liberal Imperialists’ and Cobdenism, 
a problem that only began to be checked when Campbell-Bannerman assumed the leadership in 
1899.13  
The rise of the ‘Liberal Imps’, as Campbell-Bannerman derisively called them, reflected the 
culmination of the ‘imperial’ turn in British politics which had started back in the 1870s under 
Disraeli.14 This created much fertile ground for defence pessimists, for the greater the focus on 
imperial issues, the easier it became to emphasise how overstretched were the Empire’s forces. 
Ironically, an imperial crisis in 1898 over control of the Nile at Foshoda, in the Sudan, actually 
emphasised how little Britain had to fear from its continental neighbours. The respective fleets 
were mobilised, but instead of showing its weaknesses, the Royal Navy was immediately 
recognised to be more than a match for its French rival.15 Nevertheless, this display did little to 
challenge the myth of weakness. Two years later, pessimists used the excuse of the South 
African War to whip up a major French invasion scare which dominated headlines for weeks in 
the summer of 1900, on the premise that European nations were preparing for a ‘bolt from the 
blue’ invasion while the British Army was away in the veldt.16   
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In fact, it was not until Norman Angell published his Great Illusion in 1909 that 
internationalists finally obtained arguments which could equal the force and intellectual power 
of the pessimistic world-view. Reading his book, it is clear that the ‘illusion’ Angell attacked 
was essentially the image of ‘uncivilised’ warfare for economic gain that J.F. Maurice, 
Wolseley, Beresford and their supporters had constructed during the 1880s, and which Angell 
believed had become ‘universally accepted axioms of international politics’ by the twentieth 
century.17 Yet Angell’s book arrived too late to halt the anti-internationalist advance. In this it 
was only continuing the tradition of liberal internationalist failure to react ffectively to attacks. 
In both the Channel Tunnel and Naval Defence Act, this thesis has shown how supporters of the 
one and opponents of the other started with many advantages, not least a public which was 
largely on their side. Yet while the anti-Tunnellers and navalists strenuously pushed their views 
in every available forum, their opponents limited themselves to parliamentary speeches, 
seemingly unaware that the battle was already lost. Distracted by internal party concerns – not 
least the Irish issue – and overawed by the pessimistic arguments, Liberals beat hasty retreats at 
almost every turn, leaving only the most persistent and in many respects least suitable, such as 
Wilfrid Lawson, to speak for them. No man was more culpable in aiding this retreat than 
Gladstone himself, who personified the problem of delayed reaction. Too late, he recognised the 
great threat which ‘militarism’ now posed to his ideals. By the time he came to devote his vast 
energies to the problem, his allies in the Cabinet had already succumbed. Within the political 
circles in which he moved, defence pessimism had been installed as the ‘spirit of the age’. 
Conclusion 
Between 1880 and 1894, British politics underwent a revolution in the way it approached 
matters affecting national defence. In 1880, civilian ministers set the policy objectives and 
financial limits with little concern for the likelihood of a sudden and unprovoked attack on the 
United Kingdom. Britain, it was assumed, would have ample time to prepare for conflict, while 
its navy was more than a match for any likely aggressor. Crucially, parliamentary control over 
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the defence policy and the budget was paramount; armed forces officers were involved only 
insofar as their advice was requested. Most front-rank British politicians, including Gladstone 
and Salisbury, adhered to this consensus. 
Over the following fourteen years, however, a network of armed forces officers, ably assisted by 
a large circle of Conservative parliamentarians and members of the press, successfully 
overturned this status-quo. Exploiting their positions as ‘non-partisan’ defence experts, naval 
officers perpetually criticised the Royal Navy, while their army colleagues methodically 
constructed a scenario of future war ‘from the point of view of our finding the French army on 
our breakfast tables with The Times tomorrow morning.’18 Armed with a profoundly pessimistic 
understanding of international relations, they relentlessly attacked their opponents as fanatical 
economists or naïve cosmopolitans. At the same time, they steadily worked to chip away at the 
independence of parliamentary oversight, demanding that any major decisions that affected the 
defence of the realm must first be sanctioned by the relevant professionals. This was a key 
development, overthrowing decades of established practise; from this point onwards, defence 
policy was directed primarily by the war plans of the soldiers and sailors, not the diplomatic and 
financial priorities of the Foreign Office or Treasury. Importantly, the defence pessimists had 
succeeded in converting the Conservative party wholesale towards their point of view, using it 
to cement their victory. To this the Liberal party had little answer. With many high-ranking 
Liberals themselves convinced by the arguments of Wolseley and Beresford, the party became 
dangerously divided and unable to mount a serious counter-attack. With their failure to contest 
the Conservative decisions of 1889, the Liberals acquiesced in the transformation of defence 
policy which ultimately forced Gladstone out of office in 1894, after finding himself 
outmanoeuvred by his naval ‘advisors’. Far from doing ‘the work of peace and the work of 
goodwill among men’ that he had promised in 1880, by the 1890s Britain had rejected one high-
profile attempt to draw closer to Europe, and instead precipitated a costly and futile naval arms 
race. 
                                                          




This thesis has detailed how this transformation came about. Drawing heavily from the 
contemporary writings of armed forces officers and their supporters, Chapter One shows how 
mid-century anxieties were revived and modified to construct a powerful myth of British 
vulnerability, ‘defence pessimism’, which comprehensively rejected the certainties upon which 
British security was founded. By deconstructing the reality of the French threat, the Chapter 
argues that there was little real threat from this quarter, a conclusion which seriously 
undermines assumptions about Britain’s geopolitical position held by both contemporaries and 
historians. Developing this theme in the context of literature on the rise of professionalism, 
Chapter Two explains how the armed forces officers exploited societal trends to position 
themselves as disinterested professional patriots, at odds with the selfish and ignorant political 
classes. This created a powerful rhetoric of expert authority which was used to spread defence 
pessimism, capturing the Conservative Party and outmanoeuvring the Liberals. Chapter Three 
demonstrates how these forces played out within the public sphere. Working with recent studis 
which emphasise the nuances of nineteenth century ‘public opinion’, the Chapter shows how, by 
using the largely apathetic position of the people towards defence to their advantage, pessimists 
deployed their strong links with the London media to create public opinion in their own image, 
overwhelming the disparate and disorganised Liberal attempts to resist them. The result was to 
stoke a fear of panic, especially within the government, which became a sort of self-fulfilling 
prophesy, each new ‘scare’ serving to convince politicians of the truth of the pessimistic case. 
Acting together, these three themes – pessimism, professionalism and public opinion – created a 
political environment which progressively constricted policymakers’ room for manoeuvre. By 
the 1890s, the sort of approach to defence common in 1880 had become politically untenable, at 
least from the perspective of those sitting around the Cabinet table. 
The case studies in Parts II and III put this analysis into effect. For the Channel Tunnel, the 
hopeful Cobdenism of its supporters was swept aside by Wolseley’s uncompromising warnings 
about a ‘bolt from the blue’ invasion. Eight years later, the Naval Defence Act was passed by a 
Conservative government leaning heavily on anxiety and paranoia about foreign ‘jealousies’ to 
366 
 
justify what was a largely unnecessary programme of naval expansion. Closely dissecting press 
and ‘public’ opinion, both studies reveal how these forces were manipulated by the pessimists to 
give a false impression of the country’s mood which persists to this day – a wider implication of 
this thesis’ conclusions is that the British public were far from the enthusiastic imperialists or 
navalists they are often made to appear. Similarly, through analysis of the relevant Commons 
debates and divisions, the two studies have reversed our understanding of the position of the 
Tunnel and the Act within parliament. This is especially the case for the Liberal Party, which is 
shown to have opposed the Naval Defence Act and to have been much more in favour of the 
Channel Tunnel than hitherto assumed, illustrating, among other things, the extent to which 
Liberal MPs failed to act in a coordinated manner during these years. Finally, by closely reading 
the available documents, both studies show the situation within the leadership of the 
Conservative and Liberal Parties, and explain the difficulties which Gladstone and Salisbury 
had in reacting to developments. It seems safe to conclude that, in 1880, neither of these men 
wished to see the Channel Tunnel prevented or the naval estimates substantially increased. By 
the end of the decade, however, they had both been forced to come to terms with this new 
reality. After limited resistance, Salisbury accepted and embraced the growth of defence 
pessimism and the newfound power of the armed forces. Gladstone, meanwhile, saw his career 
destroyed in a futile attempt to prevent it. 
By placing the myth of British weakness at the heart of its approach, this thesis has developed a 
much-neglected aspect of contemporary British politics. It has brought a fresh-perspective to the 
history of civil-military relations, demonstrating the surprising extent to which armed forces 
officers influenced culture and politics well beyond their formal roles. At the same time, i  has 
seriously questioned the extent to which the British people bought in to the pessimism, building 
on an expanding historiographical trend problematising the idea of ‘public opinion’. It has also 
incorporated the Channel Tunnel and Naval Defence Act, for too long isolated within their own 
historiographical traditions, back into the narrative of the 1880s. Far from mere footnotes, hes  
two controversies were key battles in the struggle over the direction of Britain’s foreign and 
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defence policies. In both cases it has demonstrated that unanimity was far from the rule and that 
the move towards a ‘realist’ conception of international affairs was by no means a smooth or 
uncontested process.  
Reflecting on the historiography of the Great War, Margaret McMillian warns that ‘there is a 
danger in so concentrating on the factors pushing Europe towards war that we may neglect those 
pulling the other way, towards peace.’19 War in 1914, she argues, was not inevitable: in the 
same way, one implication to be drawn from this thesis is that the retreat of liberal 
internationalism during the 1880s was not preordained. There was a very real prospect of the 
Channel Tunnel being constructed, at least until late 1881. Likewise, even up to mid-1888 there 
was little obvious reason why Britain should kick-start a naval arms race in Europe. Had the 
former come to pass or the latter been prevented, the prospects for Anglo-French co-operation 
and European relations more generally might have been transformed, altering the course of 
twentieth century history.20 While it is easy to dismiss such counterfactuals, an appreciation of 
them helps to understand the scale of the internationalist failure and anti-internationalist succe s 
during these years. That the hopes of ‘peace, retrenchment and reform’ were so dashed between 
1880 and 1894 can justly be regarded as a tragedy, not merely for contemporary liberal 
internationalists, but for all Europe.  
                                                          
19 Margaret MacMillan, The War that Ended Peace (London: Profile Books, 2013), p. xxvii. 
20 See especially the conclusion to Parry, ‘Crawling towards God’, p. 35; Matthew, Gladstone: 1875-
1898, pp. 318-319. Wilson reflects on the diplomatic, cultural and strategic consequences of a Channel 





Appendix 1: Local Debating Societies on the Channel Tunnel, 1882-1893  
[British Newspaper Archive: search conducted October – November 2017] 
Society Motion Result Source 
Chatteris Debating 
Society (Ely) 
The Channel Tunnel: Will it be 
for the benefit or otherwise of 
the nation? 
A large majority 




Press, 28 Jan. 
1882, p. 7. 
Hendon Debating 
Society 
That the advantages to be 
derived from the proposed 
Channel Tunnel do not warrant 
the execution of that scheme, 
having in view the increased 
facilities for invasion which 
would be afforded thereby 
Carried by the 








(Isle of Wight) 
A resolution expressing the 
belief that the Channel Tunnel 
would be successful, and the 





May 1882, p. 4. 
Whitefield 
Debating Society 
That the construction of the 
proposed Channel Tunnel would 
conduce to the best interests of 
the English nation 
Carried by nine 
votes to seven 
Gloucester 
Citizen, 24 Oct. 
1882, p. 4. 
Oakham Institute 
Debating Society 
The Channel Tunnel would be 
of benefit to this country 




Journal, 4 Nov. 
1882, p. 2 
Penzance Debating 
Society 
That the Channel Tunnel is not 
desirable 
Affirmed by a 
majority of seven 
The Cornish 
Telegraph 30 




That the Channel Tunnel be 
allowed to proceed 




Chronicle, 8 Dec. 





The Channel tunnel scheme; 
would it be beneficial to national 
Interests? 
Carried in the 
negative by a 
large majority 
Huddersfield 
Chronicle 16 Dec. 
1882, p. 8. 
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Society Motion Result Source 
Wellingborough 
Debating Society 
The proposed Channel Tunnel 
Nine in favour of 
Tunnel, ten 
against (a number 
of non-voters) 
Northampton 
Mercury, 23 Dec. 
1882, p. 6. 




Is the Construction of the 
Channel Tunnel Advisable? 
Seven speakers, 
two in favour 
Hastings and St 
Leonards 
Observer, 23 Dec. 




That, in the opinion of this 
House, the proposed 
construction of a submarine 
Channel Tunnel connecting us 
with the Continent, would be 
dangerous to the national safety 
and commercial interests of the 
Empire. Amendment: that…a 
Tunnel…will confer a great 
blessing on the Commerce and 
will tend to foster the friendship 
between the two nations 
Amendment lost 




13 Jan. 1883, p. 5. 
 
Westgate (Baptist) 





Would the Channel Tunnel 




Leeds Times, 20 
Jan. 1883, p.8 
Berkhamsted 
Debating Society 
That neither from a commercial 
or national point of view would 
the proposed Channel Tunnel be 
of benefit to England 
Two for, five 
against 
Hertford Mercury 
and Reformer, 17 




That in the opinion of this 
House, a tunnel connecting 
England with the Continent 
would be fraught with danger to 
this country 
‘The “ayes” had 
it’ 
Shoreditch 
Observer, 17 Feb. 
1883, p. 3. 
Washford Debating 
Society 
That this society regards with 
approval the proposed Channel 
Tunnel, and believes it would be 
conducive to the social and 
commercial well-being of the 
country 
‘lost by a majority 
of one only’ 
West Somerset 
Free Press, 27 
Oct. 1883, p. 5; 10 
Nov., p. 5. 
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A Channel Tunnel between 
England and France is both 
expedient and desirable. 
Twenty for, 
seventeen against 
Western Times, 27 




That the advantages of a 
submarine tunnel between 
England and France are more 
than counterbalanced by the 
disadvantages 
The ayes have it 
Kent & Sussex 
Courier, 14 Dec. 
1883, p. 6. 
Swindon Debating 
Society 
Would the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel prove a benefit 




Feb. 1884, p. 3 
Aylesbury 
Debating Society 
The Proposed Channel Tunnel 
Motion in favour 
carried eleven 
votes to two 
Bucks Herald 12 
April 1884, p. 5 
Tonbridge 
Debating Society 








Nov. 1887, p. 5. 
Sevenoaks Social 
and Debating Club 
Debate on the Channel Tunnel 
Five for, 12 
against 
Kent & Sussex 
Courier, 18 Nov. 
1887, p. 8. 
Bath Debating 
Society 
That the proposed Channel 
Tunnel would be both unsafe 
and unnecessary 
Carried by a 
majority of two 
Bath Chronicle, 




A motion in favour of the 
Channel Tunnel 
Lost by two votes 
Sussex 
Agricultural 
Express, 5 Dec. 
1891, p. 2. 
Folkestone 
Debating Society 
Would the Channel Tunnel be a 




Herald, 12 Dec. 
1891, p. 12. 
St. Albans 
Debating Society 
The desirability of constructing 
the Channel Tunnel 
Eleven to two in 
favour of Tunnel 
Herts Advertiser, 
14 Jan. 1893, p. 5. 
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Commentary on Commons Divisions, Appendices 2-4.
The following data is taken from the official parliamentary division lists of the House of 
Commons, held in the library of the Institute of Historical Research.1 These list the names of 
every MP who voted in the division and how they voted, either Aye (A) or No (N). The names 
in the tables below are reproduced as they appear in the division lists, except in the case of ‘Mc 
and ‘Mac’ prefixes, which are shortened with an apostrophe in the original. In cases where more 
than one MP had the same last name, the lists provide their constituency in abbreviated form, 
which is also retained in the tables below.  
The original division lists do not include party affiliations. These have been added from a 
variety of sources, principally the relevant Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament.2 The 
classification of Irish Nationalist members in the 1880-1885 parliament is less straightforward, 
however, as there was little coherence in the group during this time. Consequently, only 
members listed as ‘Parnellites’ by Alan O’Day in his study of the party during this period have 
been categorised under the umbrella of the Irish Parliamentary Party; all other ‘nominal’ Home 
Rulers, with the exception of the Conservative A.H. Bellingham, have been classified as 
Liberals.3  
Party abbreviations: 
C – Conservative 
IPP – Irish Parliamentary Party 
L  – Liberal 
LU  – Liberal Unionist 
 
                                                          
1 Institute of Historical Research, BB.4016/Div. 
2 Michael Stenton (ed.), Who’s Who of British Members of Parliament, vol. I, 1832-1885 (Hassocks, 
Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976); Michael Stenton and Stephen Lees (eds.), Who’  Who of British Members 
of Parliament, vol. II, 1886-1918 (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978). See Lubenow, 
Parliamentary Politics, App. 1, for a discussion of classifying party affiliations, including the 
classification of a number of the more independent MPs.  




Radical: Liberal listed as a Radical MP in Thomas Heyck’s Dimensions of British Radicalism. 
Those marked with an asterisk ‘denotes those referred to as Radicals in reliable contemporary 
sources’, while those marked with a question mark ‘possibly were Radical, but the evidence is 
ambiguous’.4 
Post-1886 divisions only: 
Radical Unionist: Liberal Unionist listed as a Radical in Heyck.5 
IAL : Listed as a Vice President of the International Arbitration League in 1891.6 
Limp : Liberal listed as a Liberal Imperialist in H.C.G. Matthew’s The Liberal Imperialists.7  
Channel Tunnel divisions only: 
Knowles: Signed the Nineteenth Century ‘protest’ against the Channel Tunnel. 
SCRC: Director or shareholder of the Submarine Continental Railway Company, 1881 or 
1886.8 
CTC: Shareholder of the Channel Tunnel Company, 1881.9 
  
                                                          
4 Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism, apps. B, C. 
5 Heyck, Dimensions of British Radicalism, app. E. 
6 The Arbitrator, July 1891, pp. 76-77. 
7 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, app. 1. 
8 TNA, RAIL 779/9; RAIL 779/10. 
9 TNA, RAIL 779/45. 
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Appendix 2: Divisions on Channel Tunnel Bills, 1884 and 1885 
 
Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Ackers, Benjamin St. John C   N 
Acland, C.T. Dyke (Cornw. 
E.) 
L  N  
Acland, Sir T. Dyke (Devon. 
N.) 
L  N  
Agnew, William L Radical A  
Ainsworth, David L Radical A  
Allen, Henry Geo. 
(Pembroke) 
L  N  
Allen, W.S. (Newc. Under 
Lyme) 
L Radical N  
Allman, Richard Lane L  N  
Allsopp, Charles C  N  
Amherst, Wm. Amherst 
Tyssen 
C  N  
Anderson, George L Radical* A  
Archdale, William 
Humphreys 
C  A  
Armitstead, George L Radical N N 
Asher, Alexander L  N N 
Ashley, Hon. Evelyn M. L   N 
Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis C  N N 
Bailey, Sir Joseph Russell C   N 
Baldwin, Enoch L  N N 
Balfour, Arthur Jas. (Hertf. 
Bo.) 
C Knowles  N 
Balfour, J. Spencer 
(Tamworth) 
L  N N 
Balfour, Rt. Hn. J. Blair 
(Clackm.) 
L  N N 
Balfour, Sir Geo 
(Kincardinesh.) 
L  A A 





Barne, Fred. St. John 
Newdegate 
C  N N 
Barnes, Alfred L  N N 
Barran, John L Radical* N N 
Barry, John IPP   A 
Barttelot, Sir Walter B. C  N N 
Bass, Sir Arthur (Staffordsh. 
E.) 
L SCRC N  
Bateson, Sir Thomas C Knowles  N 
Baxter, Rt. Hon. William 
Edward 
L Radical* A A 
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Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Beach, W.W. Bramst. (Hants. 
N) 
C  N N 
Bellingham, Alan Henry C  N N 
Bentinck, Cavendish C SCRC A, Teller A 
Beresford, G. De la Poer C  N N 
Biddulph, Michael L  N N 
Biggar, Joseph Gillis IPP  A A 
Birkbeck, Edward C  N N 
Blackburne, Col. John Ireland C  N N 
Blake, John Aloysius IPP  A  
Bolton, Joseph Cheney L Radical  N 
Boord, Thomas William C   N 
Borlase, William Copeland L Radical A A 
Brand, Hon. Henry Robert L   N 
Brassey, Henry A. 
(Sandwich) 
L   N 
Brassey, Sir Thomas 
(Hastings) 
L CTC N  
Brett, Reginald Balliol L   A 
Briggs, William Edward L Radical* N  
Bright, Jacob L Radical*  A 
Brinton, John L  N  
Broadhurst, Henry L Radical* N N 
Broadley, William H. 
Harrison 
C  N N 
Brodrick, Hon. St. John C  N N 
Brooke, Lord C   N 
Brooks, Maurice (Dublin) IPP  A  
Brooks, W. Cunliffe (Chesh. 
E.) 
C  N  
Brown, Alexander Hargreaves L Radical* N N 
Bruce, Hon. Thos. (Portsm'th) C   N 
Bruce, Rt. Hn. Lord Chas. 
(Marl.) 
L   N 
Bruce, Sir H. Hervey 
(Coleraine) 
C  N  
Bryce, James L Radical* A A 
Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn L Radical* N N 
Bulwer, James Redfoord C  N  
Burghley, Lord C   N 






Buszard, Marston Clarke L Knowles N N 
Buxton, Francis Wm. 
(Andover) 
L   A 
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Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Buxton, Sir Robt. J. (Norf. 
S.E.) 
C  N N 
Buxton, Sydney C. 
(Peterboro) 
L Radical* N N 
Caine, William Sproston L Radical*  N 
Callan, Philip IPP   A 
Cambell, Richard F.F. (Ayr) L  N N 
Cameron, Charles (Glasgow) L Radical A A 
Cameron, Donald (Inverness) C   N 
Campbell, James A. (Glas. 
Univ.) 
C  N N 
Campbell, Sir Geo. 
(Kirkcaldy) 
L Radical*  A 
Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. 
Hn. H. 
L Radical*  N 
Carbutt, Edward H. L  A A 
Carden, Sir Robert Walter C   N 
Carington, Hon. Rupert L   N 
Cartwright, William C. L   N 
Cavendish, Lord Edward L  N N 
Cecil, Lord Eustace H. B. G. C Knowles N N 
Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph L Radical* N N 
Chambers, Sir Thomas L   A 
Chaplin, Henry C   N 
Cheetham, John Frederick L Radical  N 
Childers, Rt. Hon. Hugh C. E. L  N N 
Christie, William Langham C   A 
Churchill, Lord Randolph C CTC  N 
Clark, Stewart (Paisley) L  N N 
Clifford, Charles Cavendish L Radical? N N 
Clive, Col. Hon. G. Windsor C  N N 
Close, Maxwell Charles C  N  
Coddington, William C  A A 
Cohen, Arthur (Southwark) L SCRC  N 
Cole, Viscount C   N 
Colebrooke, Sir Thomas 
Edward 
L  N N 
Collings, Jesse L Radical* A  
Collins, Eugene IPP   A 
Collins, Thomas 
(Knaresboro') 
C Died Nov.1884 N  
Colman, Jeremiah James L   N 
Compton, Francis C   N 
Corbet, Wm. Joseph 
(Wicklow) 
IPP  A A 
Corry, James Porter C   N 
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Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Cotes, Charles Cecil L  N  
Courtauld, George L  A N 
Courtney, Leonard Henry L Radical*  A 
Cowen, Joseph L Radical*  A 
Cowper, Hon. Henry F. L  N N 
Creyke, Ralph L  N N 
Crichton, Viscount C  N  
Cropper, James L   N 
Cross, John Kynaston 
(Bolton) 
L Radical* N N 
Cross, Rt. Hn. Sir Rd. A. 
(Lanc.) 
C Knowles N N 
Cubitt, Rt. Hon. George C  N  
Cunliffe, Sir Robert Alfred L   N 
Currie, Sir Donald L  N  
Curzon, Major Hon. Montagu C  N N 
Dalrymple, Charles C  N  
Davenport, H.T. (Staffords. 
N.) 
C  N N 
Davenport, W.B. (Warwicks. 
N.) 
C Knowles N  
Davey, Horace L Knowles N  
Davies, David (Cardigan) L Radical*  N 
Davies, Richard (Anglesey) L Radical  N 
Davies, William 
(Pembrokesh.) 
L Radical? A A 
Dawnay, Col. Hon. L.P. 
(Thirsk) 
C  N  
Dawnay, Hn. G.C. (Yorksh. 
N. R.) 
C  N  
Dawson, Charles IPP  A A 
De Ferrieres, Baron L   N 
De Wormes, Baron Henry C   N 
Deasy, John IPP  A  
Dickson, Thomas A. (Tyrone) L   A 
Digby J.K.D. Wingfield 
(Som.) 
C   N 
Digby, Col. Hon. E. C  N  
Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles L Radical* N N 





Dixon-Hartland, Fred. Dixon C  N N 
Dodds, Joseph L CTC N N 
Douglas, A. Akers- C   N 
Duckham, Thomas L   N 
Duff, Robert William L  N N, Teller 
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Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir William 
Hart 
C   N 
Ebrington, Viscount L  N  
Ecroyd, William Farrer C   N 
Edwards, Henry (Weymouth) L  A A 
Egerton, Adm. Hn. F. (Derby, 
E.) 
L  N  
Egerton, Hn. Alg. Fulke 
(Wigan) 
C  N  
Egerton, Hon. Tatton 
(Cheshire) 
C   N 
Elcho, Lord C  N  
Elliot, G.W. (Northallerton) C   N 
Elliot, Hn. Art. R.D. 
(Roxburgsh) 
L Radical? N N 
Errington, George IPP  N  
Estcourt, George Sotheron C   N 
Evans, Thomas William L  N  
Ewart, William C  N N 
Ewing, Archibald Orr C  N N 
Fairbairn, Sir Andrew L  N N 
Farquharson, Dr. Robert L Radical A A 
Feilden, Lieut-General C  N N 
Ferguson, R.C. Munro- (Ross) L   N 
Ferguson, Robert (Carlisle) L Radical N N 
Ffolkes, Sir Wm. Hovell 
Browne 
L  N N 
Finch, George H. C  N  
Finch-Hatton, Hn. Murray 
E.G. 
C   N 
Findlater, William L  N  
Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmond L  N N 
Fitzwilliam, Hon. C.W. 
(Malton) 
L  N  
Fletcher, Sir Henry C  N  
Flower, Cyril L Knowles N N 
Floyer, John C   N 
Foljambe, Cecil G. S. (Notts, 
N.) 
L  N  
Foljambe, Fran. J.S. (Retford, 
E.) 
L  N N 
Forster, Rt.Hn. W.E. 
(Bradford) 
L   N 
Forster, Sir Charles (Walsall) L Radical  N 
Fort, Richard L  N N 
Foster, Wm. Hen (Bridgnorth) C   N 
Fowler, William (Cambridge) L Radical N N 
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Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Fremantle, Hon. Thomas F. C   N 
Freshfield, Charles Kaye C  N N 
Fry, Lewis (Bristol) L Radical  N 
Fry, Theodore (Darlington) L Radical N N 
Galway, Viscount C  N  
Garnier, John Carpenter C  N  
Gathorne-Hardy, Hon. John S. C   N 
Gibson, Rt. Hon. Edward C  N N 
Giffard, Sir Hardinge Stanley C  N  
Giles, Alfred C  N N 
Gladstone, Herbert J. (Leeds) L  N  
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E. L  N N 
Glyn, Hon. Sydney Carr L  N N 
Goldney, Sir Gabriel C  A A 
Gordon, Lord D. (Hunts.) L   N 
Gordon, Sir Alex. (Aberdeen, 
E.) 
L  A  
Gorst, John Eldon C  N N 
Gourley, Edward Temperley L Radical* A A 
Gower, Hon. E.F. Leveson L  A  
Grant, Andrew (Leith) L Radical N N 
Grant, Daniel (Marylebone) L  A A 
Grant. Sir G. Macpherson 
(Elgin) 
L  N N 
Greene, Edward C  N N 
Gregory, George B. C  N N 
Grey, Albert H.G. 
(Northum.S) 
L  A  
Grosvenor, Lord Richard L CTC N, Teller  
Gunter, Colonel Robert C   N 
Gurdon, Robert, Thornhagh L   N 
Halsey, Thomas Frederick C   N 
Hamilton, Ion Trant (Dublin 
Co.) 
C  N N 
Hamilton, J. Glen. C. (Lanark 
S.) 
L   N 
Hamilton, Lord Cl. John 
(L'pool) 
C   N 
Hamilton, Rt. Hn. Lord G. 
(Midx) 
C  N N 
Harcourt, Edw. Wm. (Oxf. 
Co.) 
C   N 
Harcourt, Rt. Hn. Sir W. 
(Derby) 
L  N N 
Hardcastle, Joseph Alfred L Knowles N N 
Harrington, Timothy IPP   A 
Harris, Wiliam James C  N A 
379 
 
Name Party Notes 14 May 1884 12 May 1885 
Hartington, Marquis of L  N N 
Harvey, Sir Robert Bateson C   N 
Hastings, George Woodyatt L  N  
Hay, Rt. Hn. Admiral Sir J. C. 
D. 
C Knowles N N 
Hayter, Sir Arthur Divett L  N N 
Healy, Timothy Michael IPP  A A 
Henderson, Frank L Radical  A 
Heneage, Edward L   N 
Henry, Mitchell IPP   A 
Hicks, Edward C  N N 
Hildyard, T. Blackb. Thoroton C   N 
Hill, Alex. Staveley (Staff. 
W.) 
C   N 
Hill, Lord Arthur Wm. 
(Down) 
C   N 
Hill, Thos. Rowley 
(Worcester) 
L Radical A A 
Holden, Isaac L Radical  A 
Holland, Samuel 
(Merionethsh.) 
L Radical? N  
Holland, Sir H.T. (Midhurst) C Knowles N N 
Hollond, John Robt. 
(Brighton) 
L Radical  N 
Holms, John L Radical*  N 
Hope, Rt. Hon. Alex. 
Beresford 
C Knowles N N 
Hopwood, Charles Henry L Radical* A A 
Houldsworth, William Henry C   N 
Howard, E. Stafford (Cumb, 
E.) 
L  N  
Howard, Geo. Jas. (Cumb E.) L Knowles N N 
Howard, James 
(Bedfordshire) 
L Radical? A  
Hubbard, Rt. Hon. John C   N 
Jackson, Wm. Lawies C   N 
James, Charles (Merthyr 
Tyvil) 
L Radical N N 
James, Hn. Walter H. 
(Gatesh'd) 
L Radical  A 
Jenkins, David James 
(Penryn) 
L  A A 
Jenkins, Sir John J. (Carmar) L Radical N A 
Johnson, Edward (Exeter) L  A A 
Kennard, Coleridge J. (N. 
Sarum) 
C   N 
Kennard, Colonel 
(Lymington) 
C   N 
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Kennaway, Sir John Henry C Knowles  N 
Kenny, Matthew Joseph IPP  A A 
Kensington, Lord L  N, Teller N, Teller 
King Harman, Edward Robert C  N  
Kingscote, Colonel L  N  
Kinnear, John L  A  
Knight, Frederick Winn C   N 
Knightley, Sir Rainald C  N N 
Labouchere, Henry L Radical* N N 
Lacon, Sir Edmund H.K. C   N 
Lalor, Richard IPP   A 
Lawrance, J. Compton (Linc. 
S.) 
C   N 
Lawrence, Sir J. Clarke 
(Lamb.) 
L   N 
Lawrence, Sir Trevor (Sur. 
M.) 
C  N  
Lawrence, William (London) L  N N 
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid L Radical* A  
Lea, Thomas (Donegal) L  N N 
Leahy, James IPP  A A 
Leamy, Edmund IPP  A  
Leatham, Edw. Aldam 
(Hudd.) 
L Radical* N N 
Lee, Henry (Southampton) L Radical  A 
Lefevre Rt. Hn. Geo. John 
Shaw 
L Radical N N 
Leighton, Sir Baldwyn 
(Salop, S.) 
C   N 
Lever, John Orrell IPP  N A 
Levett, Theophilus John C  N N 
Lewis, Charles Edward C   N 
Lewisham, Viscount C   N 
Lindsay, Sir Robert Loyd C   N 
Lloyd, Morgan (Beaumaris) L Radical* N N 
Lloyd, Sampson S (War. Co.) C   N 
Loder, Robert C   N 
Long, Walter Hume C Knowles  N 
Lopes, Sir Massey C  N N 
Lowther, Hn. W. 
(Westmorel'd) 
C  N N 
Lowther, James W. (Rutland) C  N N 
Lowther, Rt. Hon. J. (Lincsh. 
N.) 
C   N 
Lubbock, Sir John L Knowles  N 
Lusk, Sir Andrew L  A A 
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Lynch, Nicholas IPP  A A 
Lyons, Robert Dyer L  A  
Macartney, J.W. Ellison C   N 
Macfarlane, Donald Horne IPP   N 
MacIver, David C  A A 
Mackie, Robert Bownas L Radical N  
Mackintosh, Charles Fraser L Radical? A A 
Macliver, Peter Stewart L Radical  N 
Makins, Colonel C  N N 
Mappin, Frederick Thorpe L  N N 
March, Earl of C   N 
Marjoribanks, Edward L   N 
Marriott, William Thackeray L  N  
Marum, Edw. Mulhallen IPP   A 
Mason, Hugh L Radical*  N 
Master, Thos. William 
Chester 
C   N 
Maxwell, Sir H.E. 
(Wigtownsh) 
C   N 
Mayne, Thomas IPP  A A 
McArthur, Alexander (Leic.) L Radical A A 
McCarthy, Justin IPP  N  
McCoan, James Carlile IPP  N N 
McGarel-Hogg, Sir James C  N N 
McIntyre, Aeneas John L   N 
McKenna, Sir Joseph Neal IPP  A A 
McLagan, Peter L  A  
McLaren, Charles B. B. L Radical* A  
McMahon, Edward IPP  A A 
Meagher, William IPP   A 
Meldon, Charles Henry IPP  A  
Mellor, John William L   A 
Miles, Sir Philip J.W. (Som. 
E.) 
C  N N 
Mills, Sir Charles Henry C  N N 
Milner, Sir Frederick C   A 
Molloy, Bernard C. IPP  A  
Monk, Charles James L  A A 
Moore, Arthur IPP  N  
Moreton, Lord L  N  
Morgan, Hon. Fred. (Monm. 
Co.) 
C  N N 
Morgan, Rt. Hn. G.O. 
(Denbigh.) 
L Radical*  N 
Morley, Arnold (Nottingham) L Radical* A  
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Morley, John (Newcastle) L Radical*  A 
Moss, Richard C  N N 
Mowbray, Rt. Hon. Sir. John 
E. 
C  N N 
Mulholland, John C  N  
Muntz, Philip A. 
(WarwickCo.) 
C   N 
Muntz, Philip Henry L Radical N  
Newdegate, Charles 
Newdigate 
C  N  
Nicholson, W. Newzam 
(Newark) 
C  N N 
Nicholson, Wm. (Petersfield) L  N N 
Noel, Ernest L   N 
Nolan, Colonel IPP  A  
Northcote, Henry S. (Exeter) C   N 
Northcote, Rt. Hn. Sir S. 
(Devon) 
C   N 
O'Beirne, Colonel IPP   N 
O'Brien, Sir Patrick (King's 
Co.) 
IPP  N N 
O'Brien, William (Mallow) IPP  A A 
O'Conner, John (Tipperary) IPP   A 
O'Connor, A. (Queen's Co.) IPP  A A 
O'Connor, T.P. (Galway) IPP   A 
O'Donoghue, The IPP  N  
Onslow, Denzil C   A 
O'Shea, William Henry IPP   N 
O'Sullivan, William Henry IPP  A A 
Otway, Sir Arthur L Knowles N N 
Paget, Rich. Horner (Som. 
M.) 
C   N 
Paget, Thos. Tertius (Leic. S.) L   N 
Palmer, Charles Mark (Dur. 
Co.) 
L  A A 
Parker, Charles Stuart L  N  
Patrick, Robert Wm. Cochran. C  N N 
Pease, Arthur (Whitby) L   N 
Pease, Sir Joseph W. (Dur. S.) L  A  
Peddie, John Dick L Radical* A A 
Pell, Albert C   N 
Pemberton, Edward Leigh C   N 
Percy, Earl (Northumberl'd 
N.) 
C  N N 
Percy, Lord Algernon (Wes'r) C  N N 
Philips, R. Needham L  A A 
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Phipps, Chas. N.P. 
(Westbury) 
C   N 
Picton, James Allanson L Radical*  A 
Playfair, Rt. Hon. Sir Lyon L   A 
Portman, Hon. W. Henry B L  N N 
Potter, Thomas Bayley L Radical* A A 
Powell, W. Rice H. L Radical* N N 
Power, John O'Connor 
(Mayo) 
IPP  A A 
Power, P.J. (Waterford Co.) IPP   A 
Power, Richard (Waterford) IPP  A A 
Pugh, Lewis Pugh L  N  
Puleston, John Henry C  A A 
Raikes, Rt. Hon. Henry Cecil C   N 
Ramsden, Sir John L   N 
Rankin, James C   N 
Rathbone, William L Radical?  N 
Read, Clare Sewell C  N  
Redmond, John E (New Ross) IPP   A 
Redmond, W.H.K. (Wexford) IPP  A A 
Reed, Sir Edw. James 
(Cardiff) 
L  A  
Reid, Robt. Threshie 
(Hereford) 
L   N 
Rendel, Stuart L Radical* N  
Repton, George William C  N N 
Richard, Henry L Radical* N N 
Richardson, Thos. 
(Hartlepool) 
L   N 
Ridley, Sir Matthew W. C  N N 
Ritchie, Charles Thomson C  N  
Roberts, John L Radical*  N 
Robertson, Henry L   A 
Roe, Thomas L Radical A A 
Rogers, J.E. Thorold 
(Southw'k) 
L Radical*  A 
Rolls, John Allan C  N N 
Ross, Alex. Henry 
(Maidstone) 
C  N N 
Round, James C  N N 
Roundell, Charles Savile L  N N 
Russell, Geo. W.E. 
(Aylesbury) 
L Radical* N N 
Russell, Lord Arthur 
(Tavistock) 
L  N N 
Russell, Thomas (Glasgow) L   A 
Ruston, Joseph L Radical*  N 
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Rylands, Peter L Radical* N N 
Salt, Thomas C  N N 
Samuelson, Henry (Frome) L Radical A  
Samuelson, Sir Bernhard 
(Banb.) 
L   A 
Sclater-Booth, Rt. Hon. 
George 
C  N  
Scott, Montagu D. (Sussex, 
E.) 
C  N  
Seely, Charles (Lincoln) L Radical?  N 
Seely, Charles (Nottingham) L   N 
Sellar, Alexander Craig L Radical  N 
Selwin-Ibbetson, Sir Henry J. C  N N 
Severne, John Edmund C  N N 
Sexton, Thomas IPP  A A 
Shaw, Thomas (Halifax) L Radical* A A 
Sheil, Edward IPP  A  
Slagg, John L Radical  A, Teller 
Small, John Francis IPP  A A 
Smith, Abel (Herts) C  N N 
Smith, Eustace (Tynmouth) L   N 
Smith, Samuel (Liverpool) L  N  
Smithwick, John Francis IPP   A 
Smyth, Patrick Jas. 
(Tipperary) 
IPP  N  
Spencer, Hon. Charles Robert L  N  
St. Aubyn, Sir John (Corn. 
W.) 
L  N N 
St. Aubyn, Walter M. 
(Helston) 
C  N  
Stanhope, Hon. Edward C Knowles  N 
Stanley, Edw. James (Som. 
W.) 
C  N  
Stanley, Hn. E. Lyulph 
(Oldham) 
L Radical* A  
Stanley, Rt. Hon. Col. 
(Lanc.N) 
C   N 
Stansfeld, Rt. Hon. James L Radical*  A 
Stanton, Walter John L  N N 
Steble, Lieut.-Col. Richard 
Fell 
L   A 
Stevenson, James Cochran L Radical N N 
Storer, George C   N 
Stuart, Hen. Villiers 
(Waterford) 
L   N 
Stuart, James (Hackney) L Radical*  N 
Sullivan, T.D. IPP  A A 
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Summers, William L Radical A A 
Sutherland, Thomas L   N 
Sykes, Christopher C  N  
Talbot, John Gilbert (Oxf. 
Univ.) 
C  N N 
Tavistock, Marquis of L   N 
Taylor, Peter Alfred L Radical* N  
Thomasson, John Pennington L Radical  N 
Thompson, Thos. C. (Durh. 
City) 
L Radical* A A 
Thornhill, Arthur J. (Camb. 
Co.) 
C   N 
Thornhill, Thomas (Suffolk, 
W.) 
C  N N 
Tillett, Jacob Henry L Radical A  
Tollemache, H.J. C   N 
Tollemache, Hn. Wilbraham C  N N 
Tottenham, Arthur Loftus C  N N 
Tremayne, John C   N 
Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. George 
Otto 
L Radical* N N 
Vivian, Arthur P. (Cornwall 
W.) 
L  N  
Vivian, Sir Hen. Hussey 
(Glam.) 
L  N  
Walker, Samuel L  N N 
Wallace, Sir Richard C CTC  N 
Walrond, Cal. William Hood C  N N 
Walter, John L  N  
Walter, John L   N 
Warton, Charles Nicholas C  N N 
Watkin, Edward L SCRC A, Teller A, Teller 
Watney, James C   N 
Waugh, Edward L   A 
Webster, Dr. John L Radical N N 
West, Henry W. L  N N 
Whitbread, Samuel L   N 
Whitley, Edward C   N 
Whitworth, Benjamin IPP  A A 
Wiggin, Henry L  N N 
Williams, S.C. Evans 
(Radnor) 
L Radical* N  
Williamson, Stephen L Radical A A 
Willis, William L Radical A A 
Wills, William Henry L   N 
Willyams, E.W. Brydges 
(Truro) 
L Radical N  
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Wilmot, Sir Henry (Derbysh. 
S.) 
C  N N 
Wilmot, Sir J. Eardley 
(Warw. S.) 
C  N N 
Wilson, Chas. Hy. (Kings. on 
H.) 
L Radical A  
Wilson, Isaac 
(Middlesborough) 
L Radical? N A 
Wilson, Sir Matthew (Yk. 
W.R.) 
L  N N 
Wodehouse, Edmond Robert L  N N 
Woodall, William L Radical A A 
Wortley, Charles Beilby 
Stuart- 
C   N 
Wroughton, Philip C   N 
Wyndham, Hon. Percy C  N  
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L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Abraham, William 
(Limerick) 
IPP    A 
Acland, A.H. Dyke (Yorks.) L Radical   N 
Addison, John C   N  
Agg-Gardner, James T. C IAL N N  
Ainslie, William George C  A  A 









Allison, Robert Andrew L Radical A A  
Allsopp, Hon. Geo. 
(Worcester) 
C   N N 
Allsopp, Hon. Percy 
(Taunton) 
C   A  
Ambrose, William C   N N 
Amherst, Wm. Amhurst 
Tyssen 
C   N N 
Anderson, Charles Henry L  A A  
Anstruther, Col. Lloyd 
(Suffolk) 
C  N N N 
Anstruther, H.T. (St. 
Andrews) 
LU  N N N 
Asher, Alexander L   A  
Ashmead-Bartlett, Ellis C  N N N 
Asquith, Herbert Henry L Limp; Radical*   A 
Atherley-Jones, L. L   N N 
Austin, John L   A A 
Baden-Powell, Sir Geo. 
Smyth 
C   N N 
Baily, Sir Joesph R. C  N N N 
Baird, John George 
Alexander 
C  N  N 
Balfour, Gerald William 
(Leeds) 
C    N 
Balfour, Rt. Hon. A.J. 
(Manch'r) 
C Knowles N   
Balfour, Sir Geo 
(Kincardinesh.) 
L  A A  
Ballantine, W. Henry Walter L Radical*  N N 
Banes, Major George 
Edward 
C  A N  




  N 
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Baring, Thos. Chas. 
(London) 
C   N  
Barnes, Alfred LU   N N 
Barran, John L IAL; Radical*  N N 
Barry, A.H. Smith (Hunts.) C  N N N 
Barry, Francis Tress 
(Windsor) 
C    N 
Bartley, George C. T. C   N N 
Barttelot, Sir Walter B. C  N N N 
Bates, Sir Edward C   N  
Baumann, Arthur Antony C  N N N 
Bazley-White, J. C   N N 
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir M. H. 
(Bristol) 
C   N N 
Beach, W.W. Bramston 
(Hants.) 
C  N N N 
Beadel, William James C  N N N 
Beaumont, H.F. (Yorks. 
W.R.) 
LU IAL  N  
Beaumont, W.B. 
(Northumb.) 
L    A 
Beckett, Ernest W. (Yorks 
N.R.) 
C   N N 
Beckett, William (Notts.) C    N 
Bective, Earl of C   N  
Bentinck, Lord H.C. 
(Norfolk) 
C   N  
Bentinck, Rt.Hn. G.C. 
(White'n) 
C  A A A 
Bentinck, Wm. G.C. 
(Penryn) 
C  A N A 
Beresford, Lord C.W. De la 
Poer 
C  N N  
Bethell, Commander C  N N N 
Bickford-Smith, William LU    N 
Biddulph, Michael LU   N N 
Biggar, Joseph Gillis IPP  A A  
Bigwood, James C  N N N 
Birkbeck, Sir Edward C   N N 
Blane, Alexander IPP  A  A 
Blundell, Col. Hen. Blundell 
H. 
C  N N N 
Bolitho, Thomas Bedford LU   N N 
Bolton, Jos. Cheney 
(Stirlingsh.) 
L Radical  N N 
Bolton, T.D. (Derbyshire) L Radical   A 
Bolton, Thomas H. 
(St.Pancras) 
L    N 
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Bond, George Hawkesworth C  N  N 
Bonsor, Henry Cosmo Orme C  N N  
Boord, Thomas William C   N N 
Borthwick, Sir Algernon C  N N  
Boulnois, Edmund C    N 
Bowles, Capt. Henry 
Ferryman 
C    N 
Bradlaugh, Charles L Radical* A A A 
Bridgeman, Col. Hon. Fran. 
C. 
C  N N N 
Bright, Jacob (Manchester) L IAL; Radical*  A  
Bristowe, Thomas Lynn C   N N 
Broadhurst, Henry L Radical* N   
Brodrick, Hon. St. John C  N N N 
Brookfield, A. Montagu C  N N  
Brooks, Sir William Cunliffe C   N  




 N N 
Bruce, Gainsford (Finsbury) C    N 
Bruce, Lord Henry 
(Wiltshire) 
C  N N N 
Brunner, John Tomlinson L IAL; Radical  A A 
Bryce, James L   A A 
Buchanan, Thomas Ryburn L Radical  A  
Burdett-Coutts, W. C    N 





N N N 
Buxton, Sydney Charles L IAL; Radical* N N  
Byrne, Garrett Michael IPP   A  
Caine, William Sproston LU Radical Unionist  A A 
Caldwell, J. LU  A  A 
Cameron, Charles 
(Glasgow) 
L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Campbell, Henry 
(Fermanagh) 
IPP  A  A 
Campbell, James A (Glas. 
Univ.) 
C  N N N 
Campbell, Sir Arch. 
(Renfrewsh.) 
C   N  
Campbell, Sir Geo. 
(Kirkcaldy) 
L IAL; Radical A A A 
Campbell-Bannerman, Rt. 
Hn. H 
L Radical*  A A 
Carew, James Laurence IPP   A A 
Carmarthen, Marquess of C  N N  
Cavan, Earl of L   A A 
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LU Radical Unionist  N N 
Chamberlian, Rt. Hon. J. 
(Birm.) 
LU Radical Unionist   N 
Chance, Patrick Alexander IPP  A   
Channing, Francis Allston L IAL; Radical* N A A 
Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry C  N N N 
Charrington, Spencer C  N N N 
Childers, Rt. Hon. Hugh 
C.E. 
L   A A 
Churchill, Rt.Hn. Lord 
Randolph 
C CTC  N  
Clancy, John Joseph IPP   A  
Clark, Dr. G.B. (Caithness-
sh.) 
L IAL; Radical*  A  
Clarke, Sir Edward 
(Plymouth) 
C   N N 
Cobb, Henry Peyton L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Cochrane-Baillie, Hon. C. C  N   
Coddington, William C   A  
Coghill, Douglas Henry LU  N N N 
Coleridge, Hon. Bernard L IAL; Radical*   A 
Collings Jesse LU Radical Unionist A   
Colman, Jeremiah James L   A A 
Colomb, Sir John Chas. 
Ready 
C  N N  
Commins, Andrew IPP   A  
Compton, Francis (New 
Forest) 
C  N N N 
Condon, Thomas Joseph IPP   A A 
Connolly, Laurence IPP  A   
Conway, Michael IPP  A A A 
Conybeare, Chas. A. 
Vansittart 
L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Cooke, C. W. Radcliffe C  N N N 
Corbet, Wm. Joseph 
(Wicklow) 
IPP  A   
Corbett, Archibald C. 
(Glasgow) 
LU Radical Unionist  N  
Cornwallis, F.S. Wykeham C    N 
Corry, Sir James Porter C  N N  
Cossham, Handel L Radical* A   
Cotton, Col. Edw. Tho. D. C  N N  
Courtney, Leonard Henry LU Radical Unionist A A A 
Cox, Joseph Richard IPP  A A A 
Cozens-Hardy, Herbert 
Hardy 
L   N N 
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Cranborne, Viscount C  N N N 
Craven, Joseph L IAL; Radical  A A 
Crawford, Wm. (Durham, 
Mid.) 
L Radical*  A  
Cremer, William Randal L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Crilly, Daniel IPP   A A 
Cross, Herb. Shepard 
(Bolton) 
C  N N N 
Cross, Hon. Wm. H. 
(Liverpool) 
C    N 
Crossley, Edward (Yorks. 
W.R. 
L   A  
Crossley, Sir Savile B. 
(Suffolk) 
LU   N  
Crossman, General Sir 
William 
LU Radical Unionist N   
Cubitt, Rt. Hon. George C   N N 
Curzon, Viscount (Bucks.) C   N N 
Dalrymple, Sir Charles C  N N N 
Darling, Charles John 
(Deptford) 
C    N 
Davenport, Harry T. 
(Staffsh.) 
C   N  
Davenport, W. Bromley 
(Chesh.) 
C Knowles N   
De Cobain, Edw. Samuel 
Wesley 
C   N  
De Lisle, Edwin C  N  N 
De Worms, Rt. Hn. Baron 
Henry 
C  N N N 
Deasy, John IPP  A A  
Dickson, Thomas A. 
(Dublin) 
L   A  
Dillwyn, Lewis Llewelyn L Radical*; Knowles  N N 
Dimsdale, Baron Robert C  N N N 
Dixon, George (Birmingh.) LU Radical Unionist  A  
Dixon-Hartland, Fred. Dixon C  N N N 
Donkin, Richard Sims C   N  
Dorington, Sir John Edward C  N N N 
Duff, Robert William L  N   
Dugdale, John Stratford  C    N 
Duncan, Col. Francis C  N N  
Duncombe, Arthur C   N  
Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir William 
Hart 
C  N N N 
Ebrington, Viscount LU  N   
Edwards-Moss, Tom C. C   N N 
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Egerton, Hon. Alf. J.F. 
(Lanc.) 
C  N N  
Egerton, Hon. Tatton 
(Cheshire) 
C   N N 
Elcho, Lord C   N N 
Elliot, Geo. Wm. (Yorks. 
N.R.) 
C   N N 
Elliot, Hn. Art. R.D. 
(Roxburghs) 
LU  N N  
Elliot, Hn. Hugh F.H. 
(Ayrsh.) 
LU   N N 
Ellis, James (Leicestersh.) L IAL N A A 
Ellis, John Edward (Notts.) L IAL; Radical*   N 
Ellis, Thos. Edw. 
(Merionthsh.) 
L Radical*  A  
Elton, Charles Isaac C   N N 
Esmonde, Sir Thomas IPP  A A  
Esslemont, Peter L IAL; Radical* A A  
Evans, Francis Henry L Radical   A 
Evans, Samuel T. 
(Glamorgan) 
L    A 
Evelyn, William John C  N   
Evershed, Sydney L IAL  N N 
Ewart, Sir William C  N N  
Ewing, Sir Archibald Orr C   N N 
Eyre, Colonel Henry C   N N 
Farquharson, Dr. R. 
(Aberd'sh) 
L  A  A 
Farquharson, H.R. 
(Dorsetsh.) 
C   N N 
Feilden, Lieut.-Gen. 
(Lanc.N.) 
C   N N 
Fellowes,  Ailwyn Edward C    N 
Fenwick, Charles L IAL; Radical A A A 
Ferguson, R.C. Munro 
(Leith) 
L Limp N N N 
Fergusson, Rt. Hn. Sir J. 
(Manc'r) 
C  N N N 
Field, Admiral C   N  
Fielden, Thomas (Lanc. 
S.E.) 
C   N  
Finch, George H. C  N N  
Finlay, Robert LU  N N  
Finucane, John IPP  A A A 
Firth, Joseph Firth 
Bottomley 
L Radical*  A  
Fisher, William Hayes C  N N N 
Fitz Wygram, Sir Frederick C   N N 
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Fitzgerald, J. Gubbins 
(Longf'd) 
IPP    A 
FitzGerald, R. Uniacke 
Penrose 
C  N N N 
Fitzwilliam, Hn W.H.W. 
(Donc.) 
LU   N  
Fitzwilliam, Hn W.J.W. 
(Peterb.) 
LU   N  
Fletcher, Sir Henry C  N N N 
Flower, Cyril L Radical; Knowles  A A 
Flynn, James Christopher IPP  A A A 
Foley, Patrick James IPP IAL A A  
Foljambe, Cecil G.S. L   N N 
Folkestone, Viscount C   N  
Forster, Sir Charles 
(Walsall) 
L   A A 
Forwood, Arthur Bower C  N N N 
Fowler, Sir Robert N. 
(London) 
C  N  N 
Fox, Dr. Joseph Francis IPP  A A  
Fraser, Gen. Charles 
Crauford 
C  N N N 
Fry, Theodore (Darlington) L Radical   N 
Fulton, James Forrest C   N  
Gardner, Richardson- 
(Windsor) 
C   N  
Gaskell, Chas. Geo. Milnes- L   N N 
Gathorne-Hardy, Hn. J.S. 
(Kent) 
C  N N  
Gedge, Sydney C   N N 
Gent-Davis, Robert C  N N  
Gibson, John George C  N   
Giles, Alfred C   N N 
Gilhooly, James IPP  A A  
Gill, Thomas P. IPP  A A A 
Gilliat, John Saunders C  N N N 
Gladstone, Herbert J. 
(Leeds) 
L    A 
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W.E. L   A A 
Godson, Augustus Frederick C    N 




 N  
Goldsworthy, Major-General C  N N N 
Gorst, Sir John Eldon C  N N N 
Goschen, Rt. Hon. Geo. 
Joachim 
LU  N N N 
Gourley, Edward Temperley L IAL; Radical*  A A 
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L Radical  A A 
Gray, Charles Wing (Essex) C   N N 
Green, Sir Edward 
(Wakefield) 
C   N  
Greenall, Sir Gilbert C   A  
Greene, Edward (Suffolk) C   N N 
Grey, Sir Edward 
(Northum.) 
L IAL; Limp; Radical  N  
Grimston, Viscount C  N  N 
Grotrian, Frederick Brent C   N N 
Grove, Sir Thomas Fraser L IAL  N  
Gully, William Court L IAL; Radical   N 
Gunter, Colonel C   N N 
Gurdon, Robert Thornhagh LU  N N N 
Hall, Alexander Wm. 
(Oxford) 
C   N N 
Hall, Charles 
(Cambridgeshire) 
C  A N N 
Halsey, Thomas Frederick C  N N N 
Hambro, Col. Charles J.T. C  A  A 
Hamilton, Col. Chas. E. 
(South'k) 
C   A A 
Hamilton, Lord Cl.J. 
(Liv'pool) 
C  N N  
Hamilton, Lord Ernest 
(Tyrone) 
C  A   
Hamilton, Rt. Hn. Lord G. 
(Midx.) 
C   N N 
Hamley, Gen. Sir Edw. 
Bruce 
C  N N N 
Hanbury, Robert William C  N N  
Hanbury-Tracy, Hon. F.S.A. L IAL   A 
Hankey, Frederick Alers C   N N 
Hardcastle, Edward 
(Salford) 
C   N  
Hardcastle, Frank (Lanc. 
S.E.) 
C  N N  
Harland, Sir Edward Alers C    N 
Harrington, E. (Kerry) IPP  A A A 
Harrington, Timothy 
(Dublin) 
IPP  A A  
Harris, Mathew IPP  A A  
Harrison, Harry IPP    A 
Hartington, Marquis of LU  N  N 
Hastings, George Woodyatt LU   N  
Hayden, Luke Patrick IPP  A A A 
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Hayne, Charles Seale- L IAL N N N 
Healy, Maurice (Cork) IPP  A A A 
Heath, Arthur Raymond C   N N 
Heathcote, Captain 
Edwards- 
C   N  
Heneage, Rt. Hon. Edward LU  N N N 
Herbert, Hon. Sidney C  N N N 
Hermon-Hodge, Robt. 
Trotter 
C   N  
Hervey, Lord Francis C  N N  
Hill, Col. Edwd. Stock 
(Bristol) 
C  N N  
Hill, Lord Athur Wm. 
(Down) 
C  N N N 
Hingley, Benjamin LU Radical Unionist  N N 
Hoare, Edw. Brodie 
(Hampstead) 
C   N N 
Hoare, Samuel (Norwich) C  N N N 
Hobhouse, Henry LU   N N 
Holden, Isaac L IAL; Radical  A A 
Holland, Rt. Hn. Sir 
Thurstan 
C  N   
Holloway, George C   N  
Hooper, John IPP  A A  
Hornby, William Henry C   N  
Houldsworth, Sir Wm. 
Henry 
C   N A 
Howard, Joseph C   N N 
Howell, George L Radical*  N A 
Howorth, Henry Hoyle C  A   
Hozier, James Henry Cecil C  N  N 
Hubbard, Hon. Egerton C   N  
Hughes, Colonel Edwin C  A  A 
Hulse, Edward Henry C   N  
Hunt, Frederick Seager C  N N  
Hunter, Sir Guyer (Hackney) C   N N 
Hunter, Wm. Alex. 
(Aberdeen) 
L IAL; Radical*   A 
Illingworth, Alfred L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Isaacson, Frederick Wooton C  N N N 
Jackson, William Lawies C  N N N 
Jacoby, James Alfred L IAL; Radical*  N N 
James, Hn. Walter H. 
(Gatesh'd) 
L Radical  A  
James, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry 
(Bury) 
LU   N  
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Jardine, Sir Robert LU   N  
Jarvis, Alexander Weston C    N 
Jeffreys, Arthur Frederick C   N N 
Jennings, Louis John C   N N 
Johnston, William C   N  
Joicey, James L IAL; Radical*  A  
Jordan, Jeremiah IPP IAL A   
Kay-Shuttleworth, Rt H. Sir 
U. 
L   A A 
Kelly, John R. C  N N N 
Kennaway, Sir John Henry C Knowles N N N 
Kennedy, Edward Joseph IPP  A   
Kenny, C.S.  (Yorks. W.R.) L   N  
Kenny, Joseph Edw. (Cork, 
S.) 
IPP   A  





A  N 
Kenyon, Hon. George 
Thomas 
C  A  A 
Kenyon-Slaney, Col. 
William 
C  N   
Kilbride, Denis IPP   A A 
King, Henry Seymour (Hull) C   N  
King-Harman, Col. E.R. 
(Kent) 
C  N   
Kinloch, Sir John George 
Smyth 
L Radical*   A 
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Herb. 
T. (Kent) 
C   N N 
Knightley, Sir Rainald C   N N 
Knowles, Lees C  N N N 
Labouchere, Henry L Radical*; CTC   A 
Lafone, Alfred C  N N N 
Lambert, Cowley C   N  
Lane, William John IPP   A  
Lawrence, Sir Trevor 
(Surrey) 
C   N N 
Lawrence, W.F. (Liverpool) C    N 
Lawson, H.L.W. (St. 
Pancras) 
L IAL; Radical*   A 
Lawson, Sir Wilfrid 
(Cumb'land) 
L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Lea, Thomas (Londonderry) LU   N N 
Leahy, James (Kildare) IPP  A A A 
Leake, Robert L Radical  A A 
Leamy, Edmund IPP    A 
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Lechmere, Sir Edmund A.H. C   N  
Lees, Elliott C  N N N 
Lefevre, Rt. Hon. George 
Shaw 
L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Leighton, Stanley C   N N 
Leng, John L    A 
Lennox, Lord Walter C. 
Gordon 
C   N  
Lethbridge, Sir Roper C    N 
Lewis, Sir Chas. Edw. 
(Antrim) 
C   N  
Lewis, Thomas P. 
(Anglesey) 
L IAL  A A 
Lewisham, Viscount C  N N N 
Llewellyn, Evan Henry C   N  
Lloyd-George, David L    A 
Lockwood, Frank L IAL  N  
Loder, Gerald Walter 
Erskine 
C    N 
Long, Walter Hume C Knowles N N N 
Lowther, Hn. Wm. 
(Westm'land) 
C   N N 
Lubbock, Sir John LU Knowles  N  
Lyell, Leonard L IAL N   
Lymington, Viscount LU   N N 
Macartney, W.G. Ellison C   N  
MacDonald, Dr. Roderick 
(Ross) 
L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Macdonald, Rt. Hn. J, 
(Edinb.U.) 
C  N N  
Macdonald, W.A. IPP  A A  
Macinnes, Miles L Radical   N 
Mackintosh, Charles Fraser LU   N A 
Maclean, F.W. (Oxfordsh.) C   N A 
Maclean, J.M. (Oldham) C   N  
Maclure, John William 
C  A A 
A, 
Teller 
MacNeill, John Gordon 
Swift 
IPP   A A 
Madden, Dodgson Hamilton C  N N N 
Mahony, Pierce IPP  A A  
Maitland, William Fuller L    A 
Makins, Colonel C   N N 
Malcolm, Col. John 
Wingfield 
C    N 
Mallock, Richard C  N N N 
Maple, John Blundell C   N N 
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Mappin, Sir Frederick 
Thorpe 
L  N N  
Marriott, Rt. Hn. W. 
Thackeray 
C  N N N 
Marum, Edward Mulhallen IPP  A A A 
Mason, Stephen L  A   
Mather, William L IAL; Radical   A 
Matthews, Rt. Hon. Henry C  N N N 
Mattinson, Miles Walker C   N  
Maxwell, Sir Herbert E. C  N N N 
Mayne, Thomas (Tipperary) IPP  A A  
McArthur, Alexander 
(Leicester) 
L IAL  A A 
McArthur, William 
(Cornwall) 
L   N N 
McDonald, Peter (Sligo) IPP  A A  
McEwan, William L IAL; Radical N N N 
McKenna, Sir Joseph Neal IPP   A  
McLagan, Peter L IAL  A A 
McLaren, Walter S.B. L IAL; Radical*  A  
Menzies, R. Stewart L   A  
Mildmay, Francis Bingham LU IAL  N  
Milvain, Thomas C   N  
Molloy, Bernard Charles IPP   A  
Montagu, Samuel L IAL; Radical* A A  
More, Robert Jasper  LU IAL  N  
Morgan, H. Fred. 
(Monm'thsh.) 
C   N  
Morgan, J. Lloyd 
(Carmarthen) 
L    A 
Morgan, Octavius V. 
(Battersea) 
L IAL; Radical A A A 
Morgan, Rt. Hn. G.O. 
(Denbighs 
L IAL; Radical*   A 
Morgan, W. Pritchard 
(Merthyr) 
L    A 
Morley, Arnold 
(Nottingham) 
L Radical* A A A 
Morley, Rt. Hon. J. 
(Newcastle) 
L Radical* A A A 
Morrison, Walter LU  N  N 
Morrogh, John IPP    A 
Morton, Alpheus Cleophas L    A 
Moss, Richard C   N N 
Mount, William George C  N  N 
Mowbray, R.G.C. (Lanc. 
S.E.) 
C  N N N 
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Mowbray, Rt. Hn. Sir J. 
(Oxfd. U.) 
C   N  
Mulholland, Henry Lyle C   N N 
Muncaster, Lord C   N  
Mundella, Rt. Hn. Anthony 
John 
L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Muntz, Philip A. C   N  
Murphy, William Martin IPP   A  
Neville, Ralph L IAL; Radical  N  
Newark, Viscount C   N N 
Noble, Wilson C   N N 
Nolan, Colonel (Galway, N.) IPP  A A  
Nolan, Joseph (Louth) IPP  A A A 
Norris, Edward Samuel C   N N 
Northcote, Hon. Sir H. 
Stafford 
C  N  N 
Norton, Robert C  N N N 
O'Brien, James F.X. (Mayo) IPP  A A A 
O'Brien, P.J. (Tipperary) IPP  A A A 
O'Brien, Patrick (Monaghan) IPP  A   
O'Brien, William (Cork, 
N.E.) 
IPP   A A 
O'Connor, Arthur (Donegal) IPP   A  
O'Connor, T.P. (Liverpool) IPP  A A A 
O'Doherty, James Edward IPP  A A  
O'Gorman Mahon, The IPP   A  
O'Hanlon, Thomas IPP  A   
O'Hea, Patrick IPP  A A  
O'Keeffe, Francis A. IPP   A A 
O'Kelly, James IPP  A A A 
O'Neill, Hon. Robert 
Torrens 
C  N  N 
Paget, Sir Richard Horner C   N  
Palmer, Sir Charles Mark L IAL  A  
Parker, Hon. Francis 
(Oxf'dsh.) 
C  N N N 
Parnell, Charles Stewart IPP   A A 
Paulton, James Mellor L IAL; Limp; Radical   N 
Pearce, Sir William C   N  
Pease, Alfred E. (York) L    N 
Pease, Henry Fell (Yorks. 
N.R.) 
L IAL  A  
Pelly, Sir Lewis C  N  N 
Penton, Capt. Frederick 
Thomas 
C   N N 
Philipps, John Wynford L    A 
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Pickard, Benjamin L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Pickersgill, Edward Hare L IAL; Radical*   A 
Picton, James Allanson L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Pinkerton, John IPP  A   
Pitt-Lewis, George LU    A 
Playfair, Rt. Hon. Sir Lyon L IAL  A A 
Plowden, Sir William 
Chichele 
L IAL; Radical  N  
Plunket, Rt. Hon. David R. C  N N N 
Plunkett, Hon.J.W. 
(Gloucesh.) 
C  N   
Pomfret, William Pomfret C   N  
Portman, Hon. Edwin B. L   N  
Potter, Thomas Bayley L  A A A 
Powell, Francis Sharp 
(Wigan) 
C  N N N 
Powell, W.Rice H. 
(Carmar'sh) 
L   A  
Power, Richd. (Waterford 
City) 
IPP   A A 
Price, Captain (Devenport) C   N N 
Price, Thomas P. 
(Monm'thsh.) 
L IAL; Radical* A   
Priestley, Briggs L IAL; Radical  A A 
Pugh, David L   A  





Pyne, Jasper Douglas IPP  A   
Quinn, Thomas IPP  A A  
Raikes, Rt. Hon. Henry 
Cecil 
C  N N N 
Randell, David L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Rankin, James C  N N N 
Redmond, John E. 
(Wexford) 
IPP  A A  
Redmond, W.H.K. 
(Ferman'gh) 
IPP   A  
Reed, Henry Byron 
(Bradford) 
C   N N 
Reed, Sir Edw. James 
(Cardiff) 
L  A A A 
Reid, Robt. Threshire 
(Dumfries) 
L Radical N   
Reynolds, William James IPP   A  
Richard, Henry L   N  
Richardson, Thomas LU   N N 
Ridley, Sir Matthew White C   N N 
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Ritchie, Rt. Hon. Chas. 
Thomson 
C   N N 
Roberts, John (Flint Burghs) L   A A 
Roberts, John Bryn (Eifon) L IAL; Radical*   A 
Robertson, Edmund 
(Dundee) 
L IAL  N N 
Robertson, Rt. Hon J.P.B. 
(Bute) 
C  N N N 
Robertson, Sir Tindal 
(Brighton) 
C  N N  
Robinson, Brooke (Dudley) C   N N 
Roe, Thomas L IAL; Radical A A A 
Rollit, Sir Albert Kaye C   A  
Roscoe, Sir H. Enfield L  A A  
Ross, Alexander Henry C  N N  
Rothschild, Baron F. James 
de 
LU   N N 
Round, James C   N N 
Rowlands, James (Finsbury) L IAL; Radical*  A A 
Rowlands, W. Bowen 
(Card'sh.) 
L IAL  A A 
Rowntree, Joshua L IAL; Radical* A  A 
Russell, Sir Chas. (Hackney, 
S.) 
L   A A 
Russell, Sir George 
(Berksh.) 
C  A   
Russell, T.W. (Tyrone) LU  A N  
Salt, Thomas C    N 
Samuelson, G. Blundell 
(Gloucs.) 
L  A A A 
Samuelson, Sir B. (Oxford, 
N.) 
L IAL  A A 
Sandys, Lieut-Col. Thos. 
Myles 
C  N   
Saunderson, Col. Edw. 
James 
C   N N 
Schwann, Charles E. L IAL; Radical* A A  
Sellar, Alexander Craig LU  N N  
Seton-Karr, Henry C   N N 
Sexton, Thomas IPP   A A 
Shaw, Thomas (Halifax) L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Shaw-Stewart, M.H. 
(Renfrew) 
C   N N 
Sheehan, Jeremiah Daniel IPP  A A A 
Sheehy, David IPP   A A 
Sidebotham, J.W. (Cheshire) C  N N N 
Sidebottom, William 
(Derbysh.) 
C  N N N 
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Simon, Sir John L  A   
Sinclair, Wm. Pirrie 
(Falkirk) 
LU IAL N N N 
Slagg, John 




Smith, Abel (Herts) C   N N 
Smith, Rt. Hn. Wm. H. 
(Strand) 
C  N N  
Smith, Samuel (Flint) L IAL; Radical  N N 
Somervell, James C    N 
Spencer, Ernest 
(W.Bromwich) 
C  N N  
Spencer, Hn. C.R. 
(Northampt'n) 
L    A 
Stack, John IPP  A A  
Stanhope, Philip L IAL; Radical*   A 
Stanhope, Rt. Hn. E. 
(Lincolnsh.) 
C Knowles  N N 
Stanley, Edward James C   N N 
Stansfeld, Rt. Hon. James L Radical* A A  
Stephens, Henry Charles C  A  A 
Stevenson, Francis S. 
(Suffolk) 
L IAL; Radical   A 
Stevenson, Jas. C. (S. 
Shields) 
L IAL  N  
Stewart, Mark 
(Kirkcudb'tsh) 
C   N  
Stokes, George Gabriel C   N  
Storey, Samuel L IAL; Radical*  A  
Stuart, James (Shoreditch) L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Sullivan, Donal 
(Westmeath) 
IPP  A A A 
Summers, William 







L IAL; Radical* A A A 
Sutherland, Thomas 
(Greenock) 
LU   N  
Swetenham, Edmund C  A N  
Swinburne, Sir John L IAL; Radical A  A 
Sykes, Christopher C   N N 
Talbot, John Gilbert (Oxf. 
Univ.) 
C   N N 
Tanner, Charles Kearns IPP   A A 
Taylor, Francis LU   N  
Temple, Sir Richard C  N N N 
Theobald, James C  N N N 
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Thomas, Alfred (Glamorgan, 
E.) 
L IAL; Radical  A A 
Thomas, David Alfred 
(Merthyr.) 
L IAL; Radical*  N N 
Thorburn, Walter LU   N N 
Tollemache, Henry James C   N  
Tomlinson, Wm. Edw. 
Murray 
C  N N N 
Townsend, Frederick C   N N 
Tuite, James IPP  A A A 
Tyler, Sir Henry Whatley C   A  
Verney, Capt. Edmund H. L    A 
Vernon, Hon. Greville 
Richard 
LU  N N  
Villiers, Rt. Hon. C. Pelham LU   N  
Vincent, Chas. Edw. 
Howard 
C   N  
Vivian, Sir Henry Hussey L IAL  N N 
Wallace, Robert L Radical A A A 








Walsh, Hn. Arthur Henry 
John 
C   N  
Waring, Col. Thomas C  N  N 
Warmington, Cornelius M. L Radical  N  





Watson, James C   N  
Watt, Hugh L    A 
Wayman, Thomas L IAL; Radical  A  
Webb, Alfred IPP    A 
Webster, R.G. (St. Pancras) C   N N 
Webster, Sir R.E. (Isle of 
Wight) 
C   N N 
West, W. Cornwallis LU    N 
Weston, Sir Joseph Dodge L    A 
Weymouth, Viscount C  N N N 
Wharton, John Lloyd C  N N  
White, J. Bazley C  N   
Whitley, Edward C  N N N 
Whitmore, Charles Algernon C   N N 
Wiggin, Henry LU   N  
Will, John Shiress L   N N 
Williams, Arthur 
(Glamorgan) 
L IAL; Radical   A 





A   
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Williamson, J. (Lanc. N.) L IAL  A A 
Williamson, Steph. 
(Kilm'nock) 
L IAL; Radical  A A 
Wilson, Charles Henry 
(Hull) 
L Radical  A  
Wilson, Henry J. (York, 
W.R.) 
L IAL; Radical* A  A 
Wilson, Isaac 
(Middlesborough) 
L   A A 
Wilson, Sir Samuel 
(Portsm'th) 
C IAL N N N 
Winn, Hon. Rowland C   N  
Winterbotham, Arthur Brend L  N  N 
Wodehouse, Edmond Robert LU  N N  
Wood, Nicholas C   N  
Woodall, William L  A A A 
Woodhead, Joseph L IAL; Radical A A A 
Wortley, Charles Beilby 
Stuart 
C  N N N 
Wright, Caleb (Lanc.) L IAL; Radical A  A 
Wright, H. Smith 
(Nottingham) 
C  N N N 
Wroughton, Philip C   N N 
Wyndham, George C    N 
Yerburgh, Robert Armstrong C  N N  
Young, Charles Edward 
Baring 






Appendix 4: Divisions on the Naval Defence Bill, April-May 1889 
 
1 April (1): William Randal Cremer’s Amendment 
1 April (2): George Hamilton’s Resolution, First Reading 
4 April (1): High Childers’ Amendment 
4 April (2): George Hamilton’s Resolution, Second Reading 
7 May: Naval Defence Bill, Second Reading 
20 May: Naval Defence Bill, Third Reading 

















  N N   
Abraham, William 
(Limerick) 
IPP  N N N N N  
Acland, A.H. Dyke 
(Yorks.) 
L Radical   N N N  
Addison, John C  A A A A A  
Agg-Gardner, 
James T. 
C IAL   A A   
Ainslie, William 
George 
C  A A    A 


















L Radical   N N N  
Allsopp, Hon. Geo. 
(Worcester) 
C     A A A 
Ambrose, William C  A A   A  
Amherst, Wm. 
Amhurst Tyssen 
C  A A A A A  
Anstruther, Col. 
Lloyd (Suffolk) 
C  A A A A A A 
Anstruther, H.T. 
(St. Andrews) 
LU  A A A A A A 
Asher, Alexander L  A A   N  
Ashmead-Bartlett, 
Ellis 






  N  N  
Austin, John L  N N N N N N 
Baden-Powell, Sir 
Geo. Smyth 
C  A A     
Baily, Sir Joesph R. C  A A  A   
Baird, John George 
Alexander 
C  A A A  A A 
Balfour, Gerald 
William (Leeds) 
C  A A  A A  





N N  N N  
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Balfour, Rt. Hn. J. 
Blair (Clackm.) 
L Radical A A N  N  
Balfour, Rt. Hon. 
A.J. (Manch'r) 
C    A  A A 
Ballantine, W. 
Henry Walter 
L Radical*     N N 
Banes, Major 
George Edward 
C    A   A 
Barbour, William 
Boyle 






    A  
Baring, Visount 
(Bedfordsh.) 
LU  A A A    





   N N  
Barry, A.H. Smith 
(Hunts.) 
C  A A  A A A 
Bartley, George C. 
T. 
C  A A A A A A 
Barttelot, Sir 
Walter B. 
C  A A  A A A 
Bass, Hamar LU      A  
Bates, Sir Edward C  A A A A A  
Baumann, Arthur 
Antony 
C     A A  
Bazley-White, J. C  A A A A   
Beach, Rt. Hn. Sir 
M. H. (Bristol) 
C  A A A A A A 
Beach, W.W. 
Bramston (Hants.) 
C  A A    A 
Beadel, William 
James 
C  A A  A  A 
Beaufoy, Mark 
Hanbury 
L IAL N N  N   
Beaumont, H.F. 
(Yorks. W.R.) 
LU IAL A A     
Beckett, Ernest W. 
(Yorks N.R.) 
C  A A    A 
Beckett, William 
(Notts.) 
C  A A     
Bentinck, Lord 
H.C. (Norfolk) 
C  A A A A  A 
Bentinck, Rt.Hn. 
G.C. (White'n) 
C  A     A 
Bentinck, Wm. 
G.C. (Penryn) 
C  A A   A A 
Beresford, Lord 
C.W. De la Poer 
C  A A   A A 
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C  A A A A A A 
Bickford-Smith, 
William 
LU  A A    A 
Biddulph, Michael LU     A A A 
Biggar, Joseph 
Gillis 
IPP  N N N N N N 
Bigwood, James C  A  A A A A 
Birkbeck, Sir 
Edward 
C  A A  A A  
Blane, Alexander IPP  N N N N  N 
Blundell, Col. Hen. 
Blundell H. 
C  A A A A A A 
Bolitho, Thomas 
Bedford 




L Radical    N N N 
Bolton, T.D. 
(Derbyshire) 
L Radical N N N N N N 
Bond, George 
Hawkesworth 
C  A A A A A A 
Bonsor, Henry 
Cosmo Orme 
C  A A  A A  
Borthwick, Sir 
Algernon 
C  A A    A 
Bowles, Capt. 
Henry Ferryman 
C    A A A A 
Bradlaugh, Charles L Radical* N N  N N N 
Bridgeman, Col. 
Hon. Fran. C. 






   N N  
Bright, W.L. (Stoke 
upon Trent) 
L Radical*    N N  
Bristowe, Thomas 
Lynn 
C  A A A A A  
Broadhurst, Henry L Radical*   N  N N 
Brodrick, Hon. St. 
John 
C  A A A A A A 
Brooke, Lord C  A A     
Brookfield, A. 
Montagu 
C    A A A  
Brooks, Sir 
William Cunliffe 
C     A A A 





A A   A A 
Bruce, Gainsford 
(Finsbury) 
C  A A  A A A 
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Bruce, Lord Henry 
(Wiltshire) 






N N N N N N 
Buchanan, Thomas 
Ryburn 
L Radical    N  N 
Burdett-Coutts, W. C      A  











A A N    
Byrne, Garrett 
Michael 






A A   A A 












N N  N N N 
Campbell, Henry 
(Fermanagh) 
IPP     N N  
Campbell, James A 
(Glas. Univ.) 
C  A A  A A  
Campbell, Sir 
Arch. (Renfrewsh.) 
C    A A  A 









L Radical* A A N    
Carmarthen, 
Marquess of 
C  A A A A A A 
Causton, Richard 
Knight 
L Radical* N N    N 
Cavan, Earl of L      A  
Cavandish, Lord 
Edward 






A A  A A A 
Chamberlian, Rt. 










N N N N N N 
Chaplin, Rt. Hon. 
Henry 
C      A  
Charrington, 
Spencer 
C  A A A A  A 
Childers, Rt. Hon. 
Hugh C.E. 
L  A A N    
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C  A A     
Clancy, John 
Joseph 
IPP  N  N N  N 





N N   N N 
Clarke, Sir Edward 
(Plymouth) 






N N N N N N 
Cochrane-Baillie, 
Hon. C. 
C  A A A  A  
Coddington, 
William 
C  A A   A A 
Coghill, Douglas 
Henry 











   A A  
Colomb, Sir John 
Chas. Ready 
C  A A A A  A 
Compton, Earl 
(Barnsley) 
L IAL   N N   
Compton, Francis 
(New Forest) 
C  A A   A  






N N  N N N 
Cooke, C. W. 
Radcliffe 
C  A A   A  
Corbet, Wm. 
Joseph (Wicklow) 






A A   A A 
Cornwallis, F.S. 
Wykeham 
C  A A A  A  
Corry, Sir James 
Porter 
C  A A A A A  
Cossham, Handel L Radical* N N N N N N 
Cotton, Col. Edw. 
Tho. D. 
C  A A   A A 
Cozens-Hardy, 
Herbert Hardy 
L  A A  N N  
Craig, James L Radical   N  N  
Cranborne, 
Viscount 











  N    
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Crilly, Daniel IPP  N N N N N N 
Cross, Herb. 
Shepard (Bolton) 
C  A A A  A A 
Cross, Hon. Wm. 
H. (Liverpool) 
C  A A A A A  
Crossley, Sir Savile 
B. (Suffolk) 






   A A A 
Currie, Sir Donald LU  A A A   A 
Curzon, Hn. Geo. 
N. (Lanc.S.W.) 
C    A  A  
Curzon, Viscount 
(Bucks.) 
C  A A     
Dalrymple, Sir 
Charles 
C  A A A A A A 
Darling, Charles 
John (Deptford) 
C  A A   A A 
Darling, M.T. 
Stormonth (Edin.) 
C  A A A A A  
Davenport, Harry 
T. (Staffsh.) 
C    A A A A 
Davenport, W. 
Bromley (Chesh.) 
C  A A  A A  
Davey, Sir Horace L  A A   N  
Dawnay, Col. Hon. 
L. P. 
C      A  
De Cobain, Edw. 
Samuel Wesley 
C  A A A A A  
De Lisle, Edwin C  A A A A A A 
De Worms, Rt. Hn. 
Baron Henry 
C  A A A A A A 
Dickson, Thomas 
A. (Dublin) 
L    N N   
Dillwyn, Lewis 
Llewelyn 
L Radical* N N  N N  
Dimsdale, Baron 
Robert 






A A  A A A 
Dixon-Hartland, 
Fred. Dixon 
C  A A A A   
Donkin, Richard 
Sims 
C      A  
Dorington, Sir John 
Edward 
C    A A A  
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L  A A N    
Dugdale, John 
Stratford  
C  A A A A  A 
Duncombe, Arthur C  A A  A A A 
Dunsany, Lord C       A 
Dyke, Rt. Hon. Sir 
William Hart 
C  A A A A A A 
Edwards-Moss, 
Tom C. 
C  A A  A   
Egerton, Hon. 
Tatton (Cheshire) 
C  A A     
Elcho, Lord C  A A   A  
Elliot, Geo. Wm. 
(Yorks. N.R.) 
C      A  
Elliot, Hn. Art. 
R.D. (Roxburghs) 
LU  A A  A A A 
Elliot, Sir George 
(Monmouth) 
C    A  A  
Ellis, James 
(Leicestersh.) 
L IAL    N   





N N N N N N 
Ellis, Sir J. 
Whittaker (Surrey) 
C     A   
Ellis, Thos. Edw. 
(Merionthsh.) 
L Radical* N N N N N  
Elton, Charles 
Isaac 





N N N N N N 
Evans, Francis 
Henry 
L Radical   N N N N 
Evershed, Sydney L IAL   N    
Ewart, Sir William C      A  
Ewing, Sir 
Archibald Orr 
C  A A   A A 
Farquharson, Dr. R. 
(Aberd'sh) 
L    N   N 
Farquharson, H.R. 
(Dorsetsh.) 
C      A A 
Feilden, Lieut.-
Gen. (Lanc.N.) 
C  A A  A A A 
Fellowes,  Ailwyn 
Edward 





  N N N N 
Ferguson, R.C. 
Munro (Leith) 
L Limp A A N    
Fergusson, Rt. Hn. 
Sir J. (Manc'r) 
C  A A A A A A 
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Field, Admiral C  A A A A A A 
Fielden, Thomas 
(Lanc. S.E.) 
C  A A   A A 
Finch, George H. C     A A A 
Finlay, Robert LU  A A   A A 
Firth, Joseph Firth 
Bottomley 
L Radical* N N N N  N 
Fisher, William 
Hayes 
C  A A   A  
Fitz Wygram, Sir 
Frederick 
C  A A  A A  
Fitzgerald, J. 
Gubbins (Longf'd) 
IPP     N  N 
FitzGerald, R. 
Uniacke Penrose 
C  A A A A A A 
Fitzwilliam, Hn 
W.H.W. (Donc.) 
LU  A A A A A  
Fitzwilliam, Hn 
W.J.W. (Peterb.) 
LU  A A   A  
Fletcher, Sir Henry C     A A  
Flower, Cyril L Radical   N  N  
Flynn, James 
Christopher 
IPP    N N N  
Foley, Patrick 
James 
IPP IAL N N N N  N 
Foljambe, Cecil 
G.S. 
L     N N N 
Forwood, Arthur 
Bower 
C  A A A A A A 





N N   N N 
Fowler, Rt.Hn. 
H.H. (Wolver.) 
L Limp A A N  N  
Fowler, Sir Robert 
N. (London) 
C  A A  A A A 
Fox, Dr. Joseph 
Francis 
IPP    N    
Fraser, Gen. 
Charles Crauford 
C      A  




N N     
Fry, Theodore 
(Darlington) 
L Radical    N   
Fuller, George 
Pargiter 
L Radical N N  N  N 
Fulton, James 
Forrest 





   N   
Gardner, Herbert 
(Essex) 
L IAL A A     
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Gaskell, Chas. Geo. 
Milnes- 
L     N A  
Gathorne-Hardy, 
Hn. A. (Sussex) 
C  A A  A A A 
Gathorne-Hardy, 
Hn. J.S. (Kent) 
C     A  A 
Gedge, Sydney C  A A A A A  
Giles, Alfred C  A A  A A  
Gilhooly, James IPP  N  N N   
Gill, Thomas P. IPP    N N  N 
Gilliat, John 
Saunders 
C  A A A A A A 
Gladstone, Herbert 
J. (Leeds) 
L      N  
Gladstone, Rt. Hon. 
W.E. 
L      N  
Godson, Augustus 
Frederick 






A A A A A A 
Goldsworthy, 
Major-General 
C  A A A A A A 
Gorst, Sir John 
Eldon 
C  A A A A A A 
Goschen, Rt. Hon. 
Geo. Joachim 






    N  
Graham, Robert 
Cuninghame 
L Radical N N N N N  
Gray, Charles 
Wing (Essex) 
C  A A A A A A 
Green, Sir Edward 
(Wakefield) 
C  A A  A A  
Greene, Edward 
(Suffolk) 
C    A A A  





A A  N N  
Grimston, Viscount C  A A A A  A 
Grotrian, Frederick 
Brent 
C    A A A  
Grove, Sir Thomas 
Fraser 






N N  N  N 
Gunter, Colonel C      A A 
Gurdon, Robert 
Thornhagh 
LU  A A  A A  
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  N   N 
Hall, Alexander 
Wm. (Oxford) 
C  A A     
Hall, Charles 
(Cambridgeshire) 
C  A A  A A  
Halsey, Thomas 
Frederick 
C    A A A A 
Hambro, Col. 
Charles J.T. 
C     A A  
Hamilton, Col. 
Chas. E. (South'k) 
C    A A A A 
Hamilton, Lord 
Ernest (Tyrone) 
C      A  
Hamilton, Rt. Hn. 
Lord G. (Midx.) 
C  A A A A A A 
Hamley, Gen. Sir 
Edw. Bruce 
C  A A  A A A 
Hanbury, Robert 
William 
C  A A A   A 
Hanbury-Tracy, 
Hon. F.S.A. 
L IAL   N    
Hankey, Frederick 
Alers 
C  A A   A A 
Harcourt, Rt. Hon. 
Sir William 
L    N  N  
Hardcastle, Edward 
(Salford) 
C    A A A  
Hardcastle, Frank 
(Lanc. S.E.) 
C  A A A A A  
Harrington, 
Timothy (Dublin) 
IPP    N  N N 
Harris, Mathew IPP    N  N  
Hartington, 
Marquis of 
LU  A A A A A  
Hastings, George 
Woodyatt 






A A   A A 
Hayden, Luke 
Patrick 
IPP  N N N N N N 
Hayne, Charles 
Seale- 
L IAL N N N N N  
Healy, Maurice 
(Cork) 
IPP      N  
Healy, Timothy M. 
(Longford) 
IPP       N 
Heath, Arthur 
Raymond 
C  A A  A  A 
Heathcote, Captain 
Edwards- 
C  A A A A A A 
415 
 














C  A A A A A  
Heneage, Rt. Hon. 
Edward 








A A A A 
Hermon-Hodge, 
Robt. Trotter 
C  A A A    
Hervey, Lord 
Francis 
C    A A A  
Hill, Col. Edwd. 
Stock (Bristol) 
C     A A A 
Hill, Lord Athur 
Wm. (Down) 
C  A A   A A 
Hoare, Edw. Brodie 
(Hampstead) 
C  A A A  A A 
Hoare, Samuel 
(Norwich) 
C  A A A A A A 





N  N N   
Holloway, George C    A A A  
Hornby, William 
Henry 
C  A A  A A  
Houldsworth, Sir 
Wm. Henry 
C  A A  A A  
Howard, Joseph C    A A A A 
Howell, George 





C      A  
Hoyle, Isaac L IAL N N N N N  
Hozier, James 
Henry Cecil 
C  A A  A A A 
Hubbard, Hon. 
Egerton 
C  A A A  A A 
Hughes, Colonel 
Edwin 
C    A  A  
Hulse, Edward 
Henry 
C      A  
Hunt, Frederick 
Seager 
C  A A A A A  
Hunter, Sir Guyer 
(Hackney) 
C  A A  A A  










N N N N N N 
Isaacs, Lewis 
Henry 
C  A A  A A  
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C    A   A 
Jackson, William 
Lawies 










James, Hn. Walter 
H. (Gatesh'd) 
L Radical    N N N 
James, Rt. Hon. Sir 
Henry (Bury) 
LU  A A A A A  
Jardine, Sir Robert LU  A A  A  A 
Jarvis, Alexander 
Weston 
C  A A   A  
Jeffreys, Arthur 
Frederick 
C  A A A A A  
Jennings, Louis 
John 
C  A A   A  





    N N 
Jordan, Jeremiah IPP IAL      N 
Kay-Shuttleworth, 
Rt H. Sir U. 
L     N N N 
Kelly, John R. C  A A A A A A 
Kennaway, Sir 
John Henry 
C  A A  A A  
Kenny, Matthew J. 
(Tyrone) 






    A  
Kenyon, Hon. 
George Thomas 
C    A A  A 
Kenyon-Slaney, 
Col. William 
C  A A   A  
Kerans, Frederick 
Harold 
C  A A A A A A 
Kimber, Henry C     A A  
King, Henry 
Seymour (Hull) 
C    A A A  
Kinloch, Sir John 
George Smyth 









    N  
Knatchbull-
Hugessen, Herb. T. 
(Kent) 
C    A  A A 
Knightley, Sir 
Rainald 
C  A A  A A  
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Knowles, Lees C  A A A A A A 
Labouchere, Henry L Radical* N    N  
Lafone, Alfred C  A A  A A A 
Lalor, Richard IPP    N  N  
Lambert, Cowley C      A  
Laurie, Col. Robert 
Peter 
C  A A  A  A 
Lawrence, J. 
Compton (Lincsh.) 
C  A A A A A A 
Lawrence, Sir 
Trevor (Surrey) 
C  A A   A  
Lawrence, W.F. 
(Liverpool) 













N N N N N N 
Lea, Thomas 
(Londonderry) 
LU  A A A A A  
Leahy, James 
(Kildare) 
IPP    N  N N 
Leake, Robert L Radical   N N N  
Lechmere, Sir 
Edmund A.H. 
C  A A  A A  
Lees, Elliott C  A A A A   





    N N 
Legh, Thos. 
Wodehouse (Lanc.) 
C      A  
Lennox, Lord 
Walter C. Gordon 
C  A A  A A  
Lethbridge, Sir 
Roper 
C      A A 
Lewis, Thomas P. 
(Anglesey) 
L IAL N N N N N  
Lewisham, 
Viscount 
C  A A A A A A 
Llewellyn, Evan 
Henry 
C     A A  
Lockwood, Frank L IAL    N N N 
Long, Walter 
Hume 
C  A A A A A A 
Lowther, Jas. W. 
(Cumberland) 
C     A A A 
Lowther, Rt. Hon. 
James (Kent) 
C    A A A  
Lyell, Leonard L IAL    N N  
Lymington, 
Viscount 
LU    A  A  
418 
 




















N  N  N N 
Macdonald, W.A. IPP  N N  N N N 
Macinnes, Miles L Radical    N N  
Mackintosh, 
Charles Fraser 
LU    A  A  
Maclean, F.W. 
(Oxfordsh.) 
C  A    A  
Maclean, J.M. 
(Oldham) 
C  A A   A A 
Maclure, John 
William 
C  A A A A A  
MacNeill, John 
Gordon Swift 
IPP    N N   
Madden, Dodgson 
Hamilton 
C  A A A A A A 
Maitland, William 
Fuller 
L    N    
Makins, Colonel C  A A   A  
Malcolm, Col. John 
Wingfield 
C  A A  A A A 
Mallock, Richard C  A A A A  A 
Maple, John 
Blundell 
C  A A   A  
Mappin, Sir 
Frederick Thorpe 
L    N    
Marjoribanks, Rt. 
Hon. Henry 
L  A A 
N, 
Teller 
N   
Maskelyne, M. H. 
Story- 





   N N N 
Matthews, Rt. Hon. 
Henry 
C  A A A A A A 
Mattinson, Miles 
Walker 
C  A A  A A  
Maxwell, Sir 
Herbert E. 
C  A A A A A A 
Mayne, Adm. R.C. 
(Pembroke) 
LU  A A A A A  
Mayne, Thomas 
(Tipperary) 




L IAL     N  
McCarthy, J. 
Huntly (Newry) 
IPP    N    
McCarthy, Justin 
(Londonderry) 
IPP    N N   
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N N   N N 
McKenna, Sir 
Joseph Neal 
IPP    N    






    N N 
Mildmay, Francis 
Bingham 
LU IAL A A  A A  
Milvain, Thomas C  A A A A A  
Molloy, Bernard 
Charles 





  N N N  
More, Robert 
Jasper  
LU IAL A A A A A A 
Morgan, H. Fred. 
(Monm'thsh.) 






N     N 





   N   
Morley, Arnold 
(Nottingham) 
L Radical*   
N, 
Teller 
N N N 
Morley, Rt. Hon. J. 
(Newcastle) 
L Radical* A A N  N  
Morrison, Walter LU  A A    A 
Moss, Richard C      A  
Mount, William 
George 
C  A A  A A A 
Mowbray, R.G.C. 
(Lanc. S.E.) 
C  A A  A A A 
Mowbray, Rt. Hn. 
Sir J. (Oxfd. U.) 
C      A A 
Mulholland, Henry 
Lyle 
C  A A A A  A 
Muncaster, Lord C     A   





  N  N  
Muntz, Philip A. C       A 
Murdoch, Charles 
Townshend 
C  A A A A A A 
Murphy, William 
Martin 





  N  N  
Newark, Viscount C  A A  A   
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N N N    
Noble, Wilson C  A A  A A  
Nolan, Colonel 
(Galway, N.) 
IPP  A  N N  N 
Nolan, Joseph 
(Louth) 
IPP  N N N N N N 
Norris, Edward 
Samuel 
C     A   
Northcote, Hon. Sir 
H. Stafford 
C  A A A A A  
Norton, Robert C     A   
O'Brien, James 
F.X. (Mayo) 
IPP  N  N N   
O'Brien, P.J. 
(Tipperary) 
IPP  N N N N   
O'Connor, Arthur 
(Donegal) 
IPP    N   N 
O'Connor, John 
(Tipperary) 
IPP  N N N N   
O'Connor, T.P. 
(Liverpool) 
IPP  N N     
O'Hea, Patrick IPP    N N   
O'Keeffe, Francis 
A. 
IPP       N 





N N  N N  
O'Neill, Hon. 
Robert Torrens 
C  A A A A A  
Paget, Sir Richard 
Horner 
C      A  
Palmer, Sir Charles 
Mark 
L IAL A A   A  
Parker, Charles 
Stuart (Pe? 
L    N    
Parker, Hon. 
Francis (Oxf'dsh.) 






A      
Pease, Alfred E. 
(York) 
L    N  N  
Pease, Henry Fell 
(Yorks. N.R.) 
L IAL N N N N N  
Pease, Sir Joseph 
W. (Durham) 




Pelly, Sir Lewis C  A A  A A A 
Penton, Capt. 
Frederick Thomas 
C  A A  A A A 
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N N N  N N 
Pinkerton, John IPP       N 
Playfair, Rt. Hon. 
Sir Lyon 






A N N N A  
Plunket, Rt. Hon. 
David R. 
C  A A A A A A 
Pomfret, William 
Pomfret 
C  A A   A  
Powell, Francis 
Sharp (Wigan) 
C  A A   A A 
Power, P.J. 
(Waterford, E.) 
IPP  N N N N N  
Power, Richd. 
(Waterford City) 
IPP    N N N  
Price, Captain 
(Devenport) 
C  A A A A A A 
















     N 
Pugh, David L  N N N N   
Puleston, Sir John 
Henry 
C  A A A A A A 
Quilter, William 
Cuthbert 
LU IAL      A 
Quinn, Thomas IPP     N   
Raikes, Rt. Hon. 
Henry Cecil 





  N N N  
Rankin, James C    A A A  
Rasch, Major 
Frederic Carne 
C  A A   A A 
Redmond, W.H.K. 
(Ferman'gh) 
IPP       N 
Reed, Henry Byron 
(Bradford) 




L Radical   N   N 
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LU      A A 
Ridley, Sir 
Matthew White 
C       A 
Ritchie, Rt. Hon. 
Chas. Thomson 
C  A A A A A A 





    N  
Robertson, Edmund 
(Dundee) 
L IAL    N N  
Robertson, Rt. Hon 
J.P.B. (Bute) 
C  A A A A A A 
Robertson, Sir 
Tindal (Brighton) 
C  A A     
Robinson, Brooke 
(Dudley) 
C  A A   A  
Robinson, Thomas 
(Gloucester) 





    N  
Rollit, Sir Albert 
Kaye 
C  A A A A A  
Rothschild, Baron 
F. James de 
LU      A  






N N N N N N 
Rowlands, W. 
Bowen (Card'sh.) 





N N N N N  
Royden, Thomas 
Bland 
C      A  
Russell, Sir Chas. 
(Hackney, S.) 
L      N N 
Russell, Sir George 
(Berksh.) 
C       A 
Russell, T.W. 
(Tyrone) 
LU  A A A A A A 
Salt, Thomas C    A    
Samuelson, Sir B. 
(Oxford, N.) 
L IAL     N  
Sandys, Lieut-Col. 
Thos. Myles 






N N   N  
Sellar, Alexander 
Craig 
LU  A A A  A A 
Selwin-Ibbetson, 
Rt. Hn. Sir H. 
C     A A  
Seton-Karr, Henry C  A A  A A  
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    N N 
Shaw-Stewart, 
M.H. (Renfrew) 
C  A A   A A 
Sheil, Edward IPP    N    
Sidebotham, J.W. 
(Cheshire) 
C  A A A A  A 
Sidebottom, T. 
Harrop (Stalybr.) 
C  A A A A   
Sidebottom, 
William (Derbysh.) 
C  A A A A   
Sinclair, John (Ayr 
Burghs) 
L  N N  N N  
Sinclair, Wm. 
Pirrie (Falkirk) 
LU IAL A A A A A A 
Smith, Abel (Herts) C  A A  A A A 
Smith, Rt. Hn. 
Wm. H. (Strand) 






   N N  





    N, 
Teller 
 
Stanhope, Rt. Hn. 
E. (Lincolnsh.) 
C  A A A A A A 
Stanley, Edward 
James 
C    A A A A 
Stansfeld, Rt. Hon. 
James 
L Radical*   N N N N 
Stephens, Henry 
Charles 






  N   N 
Stevenson, Jas. C. 
(S. Shields) 






N N N N N N 
Stewart, Mark 
(Kirkcudb'tsh) 
C  A A  A A A 
Stokes, George 
Gabriel 











N N   N N 
Sullivan, Donal 
(Westmeath) 
IPP  N N N N N N 
Sullivan, T.D. 
(Dublin) 
IPP       N 
Summers, William L Radical N N N N N N 
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LU    A A  A 
Swetenham, 
Edmund 






N N  N  N 




C  A A A A A A 
Tanner, Charles 
Kearns 
IPP    N    
Tapling, Thomas 
Keay 
C  A A A A  A 
Taylor, Francis LU  A A A A A A 
Temple, Sir 
Richard 
C  A A A A A A 












N N  N N  
Thorburn, Walter LU  A A A A  A 
Tomlinson, Wm. 
Edw. Murray 
C  A A  A A A 
Townsend, 
Frederick 
C  A A A A   
Trevelyan, Rt. Hn. 
Sir Geo Otto 
L Radical*     N N 
Tuite, James IPP    N  N N 
Tyler, Sir Henry 
Whatley 
C    A A A A 
Vernon, Hon. 
Greville Richard 
LU  A A A A A A 
Vincent, Chas. 
Edw. Howard 
C  A A     
Vivian, Sir Henry 
Hussey 
L IAL   N    
Waddy, Samuel 
Danks 
L     N N  
Wallace, Robert L Radical N N N  N N 
Walrond, Col. Sir 
William 









Walsh, Hn. Arthur 
Henry John 





     N 
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C  A A  A  A 
Warmington, 
Cornelius M. 
L Radical N N N N N N 
Watkin, Sir Edward 
W. 
LU IAL     A  





N N  N N  
Webster, R.G. (St. 
Pancras) 
C  A A    A 
Webster, Sir R.E. 
(Isle of Wight) 
C  A A A A A A 
West, W. 
Cornwallis 
LU      A  
Weymouth, 
Viscount 
C  A A  A A  
Wharton, John 
Lloyd 
C       A 
Whitley, Edward C  A A  A A A 
Whitmore, Charles 
Algernon 
C  A A   A A 
Wiggin, Henry LU      A A 






N N  N N  
Williams, Joseph 




    A  
Williamson, J. 
(Lanc. N.) 






   N N  
Wilson, Charles 
Henry (Hull) 
L Radical     N N 





  N N N N 
Wilson, Isaac 
(Middlesborough) 






N   N N N 
Wilson, Sir Samuel 
(Portsm'th) 
C IAL   A  A  
Winn, Hon. 
Rowland 
C      A  
Winterbotham, 
Arthur Brend 
L  N N  N  N 
Wodehouse, 
Edmond Robert 
LU  A A A  A A 
Wolmer, Viscount LU  A A  A A  
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Wood, Nicholas C  A A  A A  





N N N N N N 
Wortley, Charles 
Beilby Stuart 






N N N N N N 
Wright, H. Smith 
(Nottingham) 
C      A  
Wroughton, Philip C      A  
Yerburgh, Robert 
Armstrong 
C  A A   A  
Young, Charles 
Edward Baring 
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